France To Expand Its Nuclear Deterrent With New Air Base
France has said it will establish another nuclear-capable air base — its fourth — which will be equipped with two squadrons of the latest version of the homegrown Dassault Rafale multirole fighter. The change in fortunes for the base, Luxeuil, in eastern France, once threatened with closure, comes as European NATO members, including France, look at bolstering their nuclear deterrence capabilities independent of the United States.
The announcements were made today by French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to Luxeuil Air Base — locally known as Base Aérienne 116. As a nuclear-capable base, Luxeuil is planned to host the new ASN4G hypersonic missile by 2035. The weapon will arm two squadrons of the most advanced F5-standard Rafales — a total of 40 aircraft. All in all, France will invest around 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) into the installation.
Pointing to the fact that the war in Ukraine 'has changed the situation,' Cédric Perrin, the senator for the region in which the air base is located, confirmed that the first Rafale squadron will touch down at Luxeuil in 2032, becoming operational the following year, while the second squadron will become operational in 2036.
It appears that these 40 advanced versions of the Rafale will be in addition to the 42 examples ordered earlier this year. As well as being compatible with the ASN4G missile, the F5-standard Rafales will also be able to work in conjunction with 'loyal wingman'-type drones.
Macron has just announced that the
Luxeuil airbase B116 will by 2035 host the ASN4G, the
nuclear deterrent's future airborne hypersonic missile, as well as two squadrons of the future F5-standard Rafale fighter jetHe announced this on his way to Germany, and on the day Trump talks to Putin
— Sophie Pedder (@sophiepedder.bsky.social) 2025-03-18T13:52:01.486Z
Whatever the case with the overall Rafale numbers, adding a new nuclear-capable air base for the French Air and Space Force is significant.
Currently, the French Air and Space Force has three air bases equipped with secure weapons storage for nuclear missiles: Saint-Dizier, Istres, and Avord. These bases host roughly 50 two-seat Rafale Bs, which are armed with ASMP-A supersonic missiles and are supported by a fleet of Airbus A330 MRTT Phénix aerial refueling tankers.
If the 40 nuclear-tasked Rafales at Luxeuil will be in addition to the existing ones, rather than a direct replacement, that would represent a major expansion of France's nuclear deterrence force. It would also imply that the total number of warheads fielded by the French Air and Space Force will be increased significantly. As of 2015, it was confirmed that France had 54 operational ASMP-A missiles.
Also significant is Macron's announcement of this nuclear expansion as he traveled to Germany to meet officials there, and on the same day that U.S. President Donald Trump had talks with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.
This kind of signaling serves as a demonstration of French independent nuclear deterrence toward Russia and, at the same time, is likely geared toward encouraging Germany to approve major new defense investments of its own. Meanwhile, in Berlin, the parliament is voting to remove constitutional limits on defense spending.
Ahead of Macron's trip to Luxeuil, it was stated that the primary aim was to underscore 'the key role of the air base' and its importance 'in collective defense and regional security.'
That latter point also refers to the growing momentum behind the idea of some kind of expanded nuclear deterrence among European NATO members, separate from the nuclear-sharing program that relies on the United States. This idea has emerged out of the deepening crisis in the transatlantic alliance under President Trump, emphasized by recent calls from German leader-in-waiting Friedrich Merz for talks with his British and French colleagues about European 'nuclear sharing or at least nuclear security.'
Last month, as TWZ reported at the time, it also emerged that France was apparently looking at the possibility of deploying air-launched nuclear weapons in Germany, another measure that could come to pass if it's determined that the United States may no longer guarantee European security under NATO. Macron's announcement today of a new nuclear-capable air base on French territory also points to a willingness to develop this kind of deterrence infrastructure, although establishing a base of this kind in Germany, whether on a permanent or temporary basis would be a lot more complicated. Furthermore, Luxeuil was a previous nuclear-capable base, before that mission was removed in 2011.
As for the F5-standard Rafale, this latest iteration is planned to keep the multirole combat aircraft in frontline service until around 2060. Initial studies for F5 were started last year, with full-scale development to begin in the 2026-27 timeframe.
Modifications to the Rafale's airframe are also being considered, including the adoption of conformal fuel tanks and of radar-cross-section reduction kits, to increase the stealthiness of the jet.
The Rafale F5 is expected to have a focus on collaborative combat, including crewed-uncrewed teaming with drones, as well as incorporating new-generation weapons like the ASN4G, the next-generation standoff nuclear weapon for the French Armed Forces.
Work on the ASN4G (Air-Sol Nucléaire de 4e Génération, or fourth-generation nuclear air-to-ground) missile began in 2016. The munition remains in the early stages of development, but it will be capable of hypersonic speeds — defined as speeds greater than Mach 5 — with a range in excess of 1,000 kilometers (621 miles).
The sucessor of the ASMPA-R is already in the works with the ASN4G. It will be hypersonic (Mach 6/7), and stealthier. In 2024, the program MIHYSYS was launched to began development of components for hypersonic flight. 20/22 pic.twitter.com/w59oZnLnwD
— VLS Enjoyer (@VLS_Appreciator) March 3, 2025
This compares with a speed of over Mach 3 for the current ASMP-A, which is powered by a liquid-fuel ramjet engine over a maximum range of around 500 kilometers (310 miles), depending on the flight profile. The ASMP-A is equipped with a thermonuclear warhead of around 300 kilotons.
For the French Air and Space Force, today's announcement of major investment in the (nuclear) future of the base is significant.
But the decision also has wider relevance, pointing to a growing feeling within Europe that its future nuclear deterrence guarantees will increasingly have to be developed using local resources and offer a much greater degree of independence from U.S. decision-making — while remaining within the framework of NATO.
In this regard, France already has a headstart.
The French deterrent includes both submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched nuclear missiles of its own design. More importantly, these weapons are technically independent of NATO nuclear planning, unlike the British nuclear deterrent, which is also closely intertwined with that of the United States.
How this would all play out when confronted by the realities of a nuclear conflict involving NATO is unclear, but it does at least provide Paris with more flexibility when it comes to discussions of how its nuclear umbrella might be extended to European NATO allies.
Now, with another nuclear-tasked air base on the cards, France is making a very clear statement of intent about its independent nuclear deterrence, which is set for a major expansion just at the time when other NATO partners in Europe are seeking more reassurance in this regard.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
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