The State That Can Discuss the Fate of Weapons

Al Binaa

17-02-2025

• Hardly had the Lebanese government decided to deny an Iranian plane landing rights at Martyr Rafik Hariri International Airport in Beirut – yielding to an Israeli threat – when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seized the moment to dictate a new agenda: dismantling Hezbollah and disarming it. The justifications offered by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam for the ban had already crumbled, especially after it became evident that other countries with stricter aviation safety standards and closer ties to the European Union continued to receive flights from the very same Iranian airlines that Lebanon had banned. This swift Lebanese concession to Israeli threats only emboldened Netanyahu, who had previously linked Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, following the 60-day deadline extension to February 18, to Hezbollah's retreat beyond the Litani River. Now, with Lebanon's willingness to comply, his appetite for demands had grown.
• Netanyahu's rhetoric, closely aligned with Washington's calculations, stems from the belief that the military failure to disarm the resistance in Lebanon and Gaza should not mark the end of the road. Instead, a strategy should be pursued to engineer an internal Lebanese, Palestinian, and Arab environment that encircles the resistance, introducing a hypothetical equation: either disarmament or the specter of war. The aim is to create a climate in Lebanon, Palestine, and the broader Arab world where resistance is seen as a liability, while the occupying entity is perceived as capable of reigniting war and securing victory. Before long, voices will rise to put the fate of Hezbollah's weapons on the table, especially since the campaign that claimed a ceasefire agreement included a disarmament clause suffered a major setback. That campaign was built on two flawed premises: the first assumed that Netanyahu would not uphold the ceasefire unless disarmament was implicitly part of the deal – a notion Netanyahu himself dismissed by framing the condition as Hezbollah's withdrawal beyond the Litani. The second premise argued that Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, who brokered the ceasefire agreement, should publicly clarify the terms. When Berri did speak, he confirmed that the deal applied only to the area south of the Litani, while discussions regarding the north of the Litani belonged to a broader national dialogue on a comprehensive defense strategy.
• In reality, the question of Hezbollah's weapons lingers in many minds, with some actively urging the government to open the file. However, no one dares to advocate for forced disarmament, knowing full well that the response would be clear: a hundred wars with Israel before a single civil war. Since the issue will remain a subject of debate, it is necessary to define the conditions under which the government could even begin discussing it. Simply invoking the state's right to monopolise arms is insufficient because that right is contingent upon the duty to prevent aggression and liberate occupied land. If the state abdicates this responsibility, then a higher right supersedes its claim to exclusive armament – the right of the people to resist occupation and defend against aggression. The question then arises: how can the state protect and liberate?
• A stark lesson emerges from neighboring Syria, where, for two months, a fresh and recurring reality has been unfolding before the Lebanese: capitulating to Israeli demands, ignoring its violations, avoiding confrontation, and relying on regional and international relations for protection is a losing bet. Despite all that Syria's new leadership has conceded to Israel, far beyond what Lebanon could even contemplate, it has reaped nothing but further subjugation. Syria has expelled Iran, severed its role in the Axis of Resistance, and pushed Hezbollah out, cutting its supply lines. Yet, instead of rewarding these concessions with leniency, Israeli leaders boast that they orchestrated the fall of the previous Syrian government and now demand their dues: recognition of Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights and acquiescence to the occupation's so-called 'security needs' in Syrian territory. Even heavyweight regional players like Turkey and Qatar lobbied Washington to shield Syria's new leadership from embarrassment, only to be ignored. Lebanon, with far weaker allies, has even less reason to expect international intervention on its behalf. The lesson is clear: bowing to Israeli demands or trusting in international diplomacy to stave off aggression and occupation is futile.
• There is only one path: possessing strength. The state is capable of achieving this and setting an example of a nation that defends its people from aggression and reclaims its land. If resistance and its weapons are needed for liberation, that need is temporary. However, the need for resistance in defense diminishes once the state builds a military force capable of protecting the country. The starting point is acquiring an air defense system, just as nations like Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan, all closer to the U.S. than Lebanon, have done by procuring Russian systems to secure their airspace. This is the essence of a true national defense strategy – one that deserves the title 'national' because its sole purpose is to safeguard the homeland.