
Prisoner's dilemma in the Israel-Iran escalation - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The US' role in Israel's war against Iran can be understood in terms of game theory.
In the wake of US President Donald Trump's announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, several pressing questions have emerged regarding the nature of the agreement and on whether the ceasefire can hold between two enemies after years of a 'hidden' conflict that escalated into an air war that included 12 days of mutual strikes.
There is also the question of the US role, particularly following the US strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites. The situation is growing more complex by the day, as it becomes evident that all the actors involved are facing profound political and military dilemmas.
Achieving a zero-sum outcome or a decisive resolution seems highly unlikely, given the intertwined interests, competing priorities, and looming risks of the powers concerned.
These dynamics recall one of the most iconic concepts in game theory, the prisoner's dilemma. This illustrates how two rational actors, in the absence of mutual trust, may make decisions that lead to suboptimal outcomes for both.
Applying this framework to the US-Iran situation, we see a similar mistrust. Washington doubts that Tehran will de-escalate or halt its provocations, while Iran suspects the US will never withdraw its support for Israel.
Both therefore lean towards escalation or threats thereof, even though temporary cooperation such as a ceasefire could avert more severe consequences. This fundamental paradox hinders the emergence of a balanced political resolution.
Within this framework, it is essential to dissect the underlying rationale behind Trump's decision to enter the conflict between Israel and Iran. This move appears to be driven by a complex fusion of political ambition, strategic calculation, and domestic constraints.
Trump, ever conscious of his historical legacy, likely seeks to be remembered as a transformative leader who took a history-shaping decision like former US president Harry Truman's decision to end World War II in the Asia-Pacific by using the atomic bomb against Japan.
Trump's own record is filled with symbolic yet controversial moves, such as the relocation of the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem in 2018, which he often indicates as a defining moment of political courage and defiance of global pressure. While the embassy move generated political capital with key constituencies and incurred no immediate military cost, it also promoted long-term regional instability with potential economic and security repercussions.
Along with tracing the US role throughout the conflict, Trump's decision to offer a two-week window to Iran may stem from multiple intersecting calculations. The most prominent of them is the potential for strategic deception. The deadline could be a calculated bluff aimed at catching Iran off guard with a swift military strike. Trump's reputation for unpredictability may be part of the strategy to maximise the psychological impact of the strike and minimise Iranian preparedness.
Yet, following the initial strikes on Iranian targets, it is now clear that the US under Trump's direction has entered a war with Iran, a conflict that even he admits could escalate further. Three major unknowns now dominate the landscape.
First, how will Iran respond? While Tehran may seek a strong counterattack to restore deterrence, its capacity to do so may be constrained. Second, have the US and Israeli strikes crippled Iran's nuclear ambitions or inadvertently accelerated them? There is now a genuine risk that Iran may conclude it needs nuclear weapons more than ever.
Third, is this the end of the conflict or just the beginning? Even if its enrichment facilities are destroyed, Iran's nuclear expertise cannot be bombed out of existence, indicating that the underlying conflict is far from resolved.
Given these complexities, the US strikes on Iran can be seen as a calculated escalation that is expected but measured. The choice of a limited strike strategy targeting major nuclear facilities such as Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow falls within the constitutional powers of the US president to launch short-term operations.
This avoids triggering a formal declaration of war, which is the exclusive domain of the US Congress. Trump thus prefer a 'middle way' a significant, yet limited action designed to send a message without dragging the US into a broader regional war, at least not for now.
TURNING POINT: In this regard, the US strikes on Iran represent a fundamental turning point in its political doctrines in terms of weakening the Iranian nuclear programme, as they demonstrated the US willingness to change course regarding its decades-long policy of not striking Iran.
As a result of the US desire to withdraw from the Middle East, Tehran gained many victories and enabled it to believe that it would be able to expand wherever it wanted.
Strategically, the strikes mark a shift in US policy driven by two key considerations, Firstly, there is an attempt to balance internal divisions within the 'America First' (MAGA) Movement in the US, which urges caution and is wary of being drawn back into the Middle East just as the US had been reducing its military footprint.
A forceful Iranian response could push the US towards deeper military entanglements. It could also entail enormous operational risks and financial burdens.
Moreover, Trump's explicit disagreement with CIA Director Tulsi Gabbard on Iran's nuclear programme, even though she was appointed by Trump himself, reflects deeper fractures within the national security establishment in the US.
Critics from this camp argue that escalating on behalf of Israel compromises US interests, while others advocate for a decisive military strike on Iran and strongly support backing for Israel, viewing military escalation as necessary for regional deterrence.
However, this second path contradicts broader US national security doctrines that increasingly prioritise China as the primary threat. Any large-scale military commitment in the Middle East would divert resources from the Indo-Pacific theatre, thereby undermining America's strategic pivot towards countering Chinese influence.
Secondly, the strikes served as a test of Iran's willingness to return to the negotiations on its nuclear programme under pressure. Should Iran accept American conditions and return to the talks from a weakened position, Washington would achieve a strategic win, though one that may not align with Israeli objectives.
Conversely, if Iran retaliates by attacking US interests further or its allies, it could justify a full-scale US war effort, potentially triggering Congressional authorisation.
It could spark a full-scale war with a superpower, risking catastrophic consequences for Iran ranging from military collapse to a prolonged period of chaos like post-invasion Iraq or Afghanistan.
On the other hand, restraint and the acceptance of a ceasefire without retaliation would amount to strategic defeat, a shattered nuclear programme, an exhausted military, and a dramatic loss of regional influence, weakening Iran's bargaining power to lift sanctions.
IRAN'S RESPONSE: As expected, there has been a limited Iranian response when it launched several missiles at the US Al-Udeid base in Qatar without leading to any injuries or loss of life.
Iran needed such a response to the US strikes in an attempt to demonstrate responsiveness to the Iranian streets and hardliners within the political system who are demanding a more forceful response.
Despite indications that this Iranian response was not only limited, but was also fully coordinated with the US and Qatar, what happened threatens to provoke further US strikes and a greater escalation, which may push Iran to carry out more of its previous threats against targets in the region.
This means that Iran will likely not be able to insist that this 'pre-planned and pre-announced strike' will not lead to Trump responding by another larger strike on Iran or giving the green light for a fatal strike on Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, let alone further large-scale attacks by Israel, which would also prolong the conflict.
In terms of its maximum pressure strategy, this would involve closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 per cent of the world's oil supply passes. This scenario would cause significant disruption to global energy markets, potentially leading to a sharp rise in oil prices, with the price of a barrel of oil expected to reach $130.
This would have widespread global economic repercussions, particularly for oil-importing countries and emerging market economies.
It would have a direct impact on the US, but Iran's closing of the Strait of Hormuz remains an unlikely option, given the negative consequences it would have for Tehran itself.
Such a measure would not yield any significant strategic benefit and could even prompt harsh retaliatory responses and expose it to international pressure, particularly from China, the largest importer of Iranian oil, as well as ships using alternative routes via the UAE and Oman, reducing the effectiveness of the threat.
More importantly, most of the daily consumer goods Iran relies on also pass through the strait, meaning that Iran would be the first to suffer from its closure.
Complete control of the strait also seems unlikely, given that most of its waters fall under Omani sovereignty, and its width, which ranges between 35 and 60 nautical miles, will make it difficult for Iran to establish complete control over it or permanently disrupt it
The limited US strikes against Iran appear to be a calculated effort to balance political pressures against the risk of broader war. Trump sought to act decisively without igniting a full-scale conflict, while sending a strong message about preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Yet, the situation has now entered an unpredictable phase, where all options are on the table.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 June, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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