Reynolds' fresh target in Higgins lawsuit
Linda Reynolds has turned her attention to former Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus in her bid to sue the Commonwealth over its compensation payment to Brittany Higgins, as the nation's anti-corruption agency revealed there was 'no corruption issue' in the payment.
The retiring former Liberal minister in May launched action in the Federal Court against the Commonwealth, with the crux of the claim over the $2.4m compensation payment to Brittany Higgins in 2022.
Senator Reynolds argued the payment was 'publicly affirming' of Ms Higgins allegations against her that she didn't support her former staffer when she alleged she was raped by Bruce Lehrmann. Brittany Higgins was paid a $2.4m compensation payment. NewsWire / Jeremy Piper Credit: News Corp Australia
The Federal Court has found Mr Lehrmann raped Ms Higgins on the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. A criminal trial was aborted due juror misconduct and a charge against him was dropped.
Mr Lehrmann has always denied the allegation and is appealing the Federal Court's finding.
An amended version of Ms Reynolds statement of claim was filed on Wednesday, just a day before the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) said there was 'no corruption issue' in the $2.4m payment.
The NACC on Thursday announced there was 'no evidence that the settlement process, including the legal advice provided, who was present at the mediation, or the amount was subject to any improper influence by any Commonwealth public official'.
Senator Reynolds' amended statement of claim was made public late on Thursday afternoon. Linda Reynolds has amended her statement of claim. NewsWire / Martin Ollman Credit: News Corp Australia
Among the changes is a reference to a speech by Mr Dreyfus the then Attorney-General made to parliament on March 15, 2021. Mr Dreyfus is not a party to the claim.
Mr Dreyfus recounted to the House of Representatives a speech by Ms Higgins just outside Parliament House, where she told a large crowd she was raped inside the building by a colleague, and how her story was 'a painful reminder to women that it can happen in Parliament House and can truly happen anywhere'.
'If a woman cannot feel safe from rape in Parliament House, a veritable fortress ringed with security cameras, with entrances protected by armed guards and with Federal Police officers on duty inside, where can women feel safe?' Mr Dreyfus told the House of Representatives, according to a transcript excerpt in the claim.
'How strong is the rule of law if it isn't able to protect a young woman working in the ministerial wing of Parliament House?'
The amended statement of claim argued Senator Reynolds had suffered loss and damage as a result of Mr Dreyfus' conduct, including denying her the opportunity to rebut Ms Higgins' allegation 'in the appropriate forum'. Former attorney-general Mark Dreyfus. NewsWire / Martin Ollman Credit: News Corp Australia
It also argues Mr Dreyfus 'enabled and encouraged the falsity of Ms Higgins' claim to be maintained by Ms Higgins'.
HWL Ebsworth, which acted on the Commonwealth's behalf, is also being sued by Senator Reynolds for negligence.
Lawyers on behalf of Senator Reynolds argued HWLE breached its fiduciary duty to her by excluding her from the mediation conference where the $2.4m settlement was reached, and failing to conduct independent investigations to establish if there was 'at least a meaningful prospect of liability' by Ms Higgins.
However, similar alleged breaches initially put forth against the Commonwealth were withdrawn in the amended document, with it now largely focusing on allegations of Mr Dreyfus' misfeasance of public office and alleged breaches of HWLE.
Mr Dreyfus has been contacted for comment.
He earlier welcomed NACC's statement.
'The NACC has conclusively found there was no improper interference by any Commonwealth official at any stage,' Mr Dreyfus said.
'I regret the baseless allegation of corruption has been so widely publicised ahead of this finding and hope future matters can be resolved in a more timely manner.
'I also regret any further distress caused to Ms Higgins as a result of this matter.'
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There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. 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There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend.
