The restaurant that Hong Kong dining scene stars have in common
I'm sitting with Jean Marc Petrus on the upper floor of Zuma Hong Kong when, midway through our conversation, a war cry emanates from the cavernous dining room below. 'That's the rah-rah,' Zuma's operations director for Asia says, with a slight smile and ears perked.
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It marks the end of the pre-service briefing, when the teams talk each other up, 'like you do before a football match', he says, and it's not unheard of for Zuma teams around the world to compete on their gathering calls, slapping on tables and such. 'That brings the team effort, that we are a family from now until the end.'
Contemporary Japanese restaurant Zuma in London, UK, designed by architect Super Potato.
In
Hong Kong's competitive food and beverage scene , where the average restaurant endures for just one to three years, Zuma's resilience since its 2007 opening in The Landmark, one of the city's priciest malls, is noteworthy. Equally impressive is the loyalty of its staff, many of whom have remained since day one – an anomaly in an industry notorious for high turnover rates.
In that time, Zuma has been the training ground for some of the most recognisable faces in Hong Kong's food industry, including
Yardbird co-founder Matt Abergel, who was Zuma's executive chef for two years; Pirata Group co-founder Christian Talpo, formerly Zuma's general manager; Arkadiusz Rybak, who went from bar development manager to
Rosewood Hong Kong's director of bars; and Gagan Gurung, who spent seven years climbing the ladder from waiter to assistant bar manager.
Tell Camellia co-founder Gagan Gurung worked at Zuma Hong Kong for seven years before opening his own bar. Photo: Gagan Gurung
'The secret to Zuma is consistency', says Gurung, who later founded Zzura and Barcode and was recognised by Asia's 50 Best Bars for another of his establishments, Tell Camellia. He recounts the launch of Zuma's brunch menu under Talpo's oversight, where each offering was researched and reworked extensively over one-and-a-half years before its launch.
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Established by chef Rainer Becker in London in 2002, Zuma pioneered a new model of upmarket dining that glamorised the Japanese izakaya for an upwardly mobile, globe-trotting Western audience – a review in The Guardian at the time described it as 'high-octane, high-energy, high-worth' for a 'Sex and the City clientele'. Becker, who spent six years in Tokyo, was inspired by the izakaya's informal, food-centric approach to socialising, as well as inakaya restaurants, which serve robatayaki skewers of meat, seafood and vegetables, all grilled over an open fire.
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China, for its part, must recognize that sustaining goodwill in Southeast Asia cannot rely solely on infrastructure investment or diplomatic fanfare. It must pay heed to the social consequences of its trade behaviors. Dumping excess production into Indonesia and other ASEAN markets may offer short-term economic relief for Chinese exporters, but it risks breeding long-term resentment, social instability and strategic blowback in a region vital to China's Belt and Road Initiative ambitions. The growing trade imbalance between Indonesia and China is not yet a fracture—but it is undeniably a fissure, one that reveals the fragile interconnections between economic policy, social harmony and geopolitical alignment. Whether this fissure is widened or closed depends on the wisdom and coordination of both Indonesia's domestic leadership and ASEAN's collective diplomacy. To ignore it would be to misread not only the fragility of Indonesia's pluralistic society but also the limits of ASEAN's absorptive capacity. By addressing this issue with fairness, clarity and resolve, Indonesia can lead the region in forging a more balanced relationship with China—one that respects economic sovereignty, sustains regional stability and ultimately preserves the dignity of Southeast Asia's diverse peoples. Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia and senior visiting fellow at the University of Cambridge. Luthfy Hamzah is senior research fellow of ASEAN Studies at Strategic Pan Indo Pacific Arena.
