1971 to Operation Sindoor, a paradigm shift in warfare

Hindustan Times

18-05-2025

The news of Indian Air Force (IAF) missiles striking Pakistan Air Force (PAF) base Nur Khan with pinpoint accuracy during Operation Sindoor took me back to the morning of December 4, 1971. Serving with an IAF squadron, I had led a section of two fighter-bombers to strike the same target then known as PAF Base Chaklala. Located just a few miles northeast of the Pak army headquarters in Rawalpindi, it was a heavily defended base, but my wingman and I returned home safely, after attacking some transport aircraft on the ground.
Separated by 54 years, Operation Sindoor, launched by India on May 7, 2025, in response to a terror attack in Pahalgam, and the 1971 India-Pakistan War are completely distinct events with vastly dissimilar contexts, objectives, and scales. However, a brief comparison of operations may be informative for the lay reader to grasp how radically the nature of warfare has changed over the half century separating these two conflicts.
Most of the participating aircraft in 1971 were sub-sonic, second-generation fighters and bombers. The pilot's primary sensor was his eyeball, and since GPS had not yet arrived, navigation was by compass and clock. Armed with bombs, rockets and cannon (all of them 'dumb' or un-guided), the attacking aircraft had to approach the target, enter a dive and release/fire weapons from a range of 800-1500 yards, before making a high-speed exit. During approach and departure, the attackers would be exposed to intense fire from anti-aircraft guns of various calibres, and occasionally, from surface-to-air missiles (SAM), inflicting heavy attrition.
Operation Sindoor, on the other hand, saw the deployment of fourth and fifth generation supersonic aircraft equipped with advanced sensors and smart, guided weapons. The long-range bombs and missiles had stand-off ranges of 50 to 250 miles, and ground targets could, therefore, be attacked from within own territory, without risking exposure of pilot and aircraft to adversary ground fire or SAMs.
Another major threat to attacking aircraft in 1971 was the enemy CAP or combat air patrol mounted over vulnerable points/areas. When threatened by a CAP, the attacker could either flee or join combat after jettisoning weapons and auxiliary fuel tanks. During close (within visual-range) combat, both pilots manoeuvred with full engine-power under high gravity-loading, trying to close-in to less than 200 yards, before opening cannon fire for the kill. The few aircraft equipped with close-combat air-to-air missiles could engage targets at ranges of two to five miles.
The aircraft deployed in Operation Sindoor were not only equipped with powerful, electronically scanned radars that could detect small targets at vast distances but could also engage them with air-to-air missiles of beyond-visual-range (BVR) capability. Thus, pilots on both sides had the ability to detect and, if required, launch missiles on targets at ranges of 60-100 miles or more without ever sighting each other.
With both air forces operating high-flying airborne warning and control system (Awacs) aircraft, the complete air picture could be monitored and aircraft control exercised by the Awacs crew. The Awacs could also pass target information to a fighter via datalink without the latter having to transmit on its own radar. It is presumed that radio communication on both sides was electronically encrypted and could not be monitored by the adversary.
Unprecedented in earlier conflicts, both India and Pakistan employed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones which reduced the need for manned incursions, offering low-risk high-impact options for strikes and reconnaissance. UAVs, designated loitering munition also known as suicide or kamikaze drones, are weapons that can hover/loiter silently for hours in the vicinity of a target before striking either autonomously or on command.
The drone threat had fortuitously triggered a whole ecosystem of Indian public and private sector companies developing innovative anti-drone technologies. Thus, there were adequate indigenous soft and hard-kill measures in place to neutralise drone swarms launched by Pakistan to attack our critical infrastructure.
Unlike in the 1971 war, Operation Sindoor involved no ground troop movements across borders. The Indian Army focused on defensive postures and retaliatory fire from Indian territory. This shift reflected a strategic choice as ground invasions run the risk of an expanded conventional conflict and uncontrolled escalation, especially, in a nuclear environment. In this context, an inference could, cautiously, be drawn that Operation Sindoor has further expanded the space for conventional operations below the nuclear threshold.
In 1971, the Indian Navy (IN) had played a key role in the outcome of operations, in both theatres of war, waging missile warfare in the west and mounting a carrier-borne air offensive in the east. In Operation Sindoor, the IN played a silent but, nevertheless, crucial role. An aircraft carrier task force was deployed in the north Arabian Sea, ready to undertake aircraft or missile strikes if ordered. In the lexicon of maritime operations, a robust naval presence has by itself numerous strategic implications. Given Pakistan's small coastline, with just 3-4 usable ports, considerable economic and psychological pressure could be built up by an IN taskforce exercising control over its maritime lifelines, carrying trade, energy and food.
While providing a brief insight into the changed nature of warfare, Operation Sindoor also raises some questions about the future. Will technology-driven, non-contact warfare, which minimizes escalation become the preferred option, replacing boots on the ground? Will autonomous weapons with lethality and range become more important than platforms like manned combat aircraft? While the success of Operation Sindoor does highlight a paradigm shift in warfare, can we assume that territorial transgressions are obsolete and that political imperatives will never again demand traditional war?
Arun Prakash, a former chief of naval staff, was awarded the Vir Chakra for gallantry in air action over West Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir in the 1971 war. The views expressed are personal