Both Israel and the US should ponder air power's limits in Iran
As the war between Israel and Iran escalates, Israel is increasing its calls on the United States to become involved in the conflict.
Former Israeli officials are appearing on US news outlets, exhorting the American public to support Israel's actions.
President Donald Trump has signaled a willingness for the US to become involved in the conflict. He's gone so far, in fact, to suggest in social media posts that he could kill Iran's supreme leader if he wanted to.
The American military could certainly make an impact in any air campaign against Iran. The problem from a military standpoint, however, is that the US, based on its forces' deployment, will almost certainly seek to keep its involvement limited to its air force to avoid another Iraq-like quagmire.
While doing so could almost certainly disrupt Iran's nuclear program, it will likely fall short of Israel's goal of regime change.
In fact, it could reinforce the Iranian government and draw the U.S. into a costly ground war.
The initial stated reason for Israel's bombing campaign — Iran's nuclear capabilities — appears specious at best.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has argued several times in the past, without evidence, that Iran is close to achieving a nuclear weapon. US intelligence, however, has assessed that Iran is three years away from deploying a nuclear weapon.
Regardless of the veracity of the claims, Israel initiated the offensive and now requires American support.
Israel's need for US assistance rests on two circumstances: While Israel succeeded in eliminating key figures from the Iranian military in its initial strikes, Iran's response appears to have exceeded Israel's expectations with their Arrow missile interceptors nearing depletion. Israel's air strikes can only achieve so much in disrupting Iran's nuclear ambitions. Most analysts note that Israel's bombings are only likely to delay the Iranian nuclear program by a few months. This is due to the fact that Israeli missiles are incapable of penetrating the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, which estimates place close to 300 feet underground.
The United States, however, possesses munitions that could damage, or even destroy, the Fordow facility. Most notably, the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (more commonly known as a bunker buster) has a penetration capability of 200 feet.
Multiple strikes by said munition would render Fordow inoperable, if not outright destroyed.
The efficacy of air power has been vastly overrated by the popular media and various air forces of the world. Air power is great at disrupting an opponent, but has significant limitations in influencing the outcome of a war.
Specifically, air power is likely to prove an inadequate tool for one of the supposed Israeli and American objectives in the war: regime change. For air power to be effective at bringing about regime change, it needs to demoralize the Iranian people to the point that they're willing to oppose their own government.
Early air enthusiasts believed that a population's demoralization would be an inevitable consequence of aerial bombardment. Italian general Giulio Douhet, a prominent air power theorist, argued that air power was so mighty that it could destroy cities and demoralize an opponent into surrendering.
Douhet was correct on the first point. He was wrong on the second.
Recent history provides evidence. While considerable ink has been spilled to demonstrate the efficacy of air power during the Second World War, close examination of the facts demonstrates that it had a minimal impact. In fact, Allied bombing of German cities in several instances created the opposite effect.
More recent bombing campaigns replicated this failure. The US bombing of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War did not significantly damage North Vietnamese morale or war effort. NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999, likewise, rallied support for the unpopular Slobodan Milosevic due to its perceived injustice — and continues to evoke strong emotions to this day.
Iran's political regime may be unpopular with many Iranians, but Israeli and potentially American bombing may shore up support for the Iranian government.
Nationalism is a potent force, particularly when people are under attack. Israel's bombing of Iran will rally segments of the population to the government that would otherwise oppose it.
The limitations of air power to fuel significant political change in Iran should give Trump pause about intervening in the conflict.
Some American support, such as providing weapons, is a given due to the close relationship between the US and Israel. But any realization of American and Israeli aspirations of a non-nuclear Iran and a new government will likely require ground forces.
Recent American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq show such a ground forces operation won't lead to the swift victory that Trump desires, but could potentially stretch on for decades.
James Horncastle is an assistant professor and the Edward and Emily McWhinney professor in international relations at Simon Fraser University.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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There is also a psychological layer to this moment. The memory of President Obama's unenforced 'red line' in Syria continues to haunt US credibility. When America declined to act after Assad's use of chemical weapons, adversaries took note. Iran, Russia and North Korea learned a critical lesson: US threats could prove hollow. That precedent now shapes this moment. Will the next move be guided by strength, by strategy, or by ego—or, as history often shows, a combustible mix of all three? Diplomacy remains relevant, but it is increasingly unclear whether it can contain Tehran's ambitions. The US is left debating whether treaties can hold Iran in check or if MOPs are the only remaining lever. One uncomfortable truth looms: the trajectory and intensity of this conflict—and perhaps the future of nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East—will depend largely on whether Washington chooses to act. Both allies and adversaries are watching and adjusting their calculations accordingly. 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The answer may be as consequential as any the US has made in the nuclear age. Kurt Davis Jr is a Millennium Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is also an advisor to private, public and state-owned companies and their boards as well as creditors across the globe on a range of transactions, including debt and equity financings, M&A and special situations (including financial restructurings). He can be reached at .
