Former Google engineer faces new US charges he stole AI secrets for Chinese companies
U.S. prosecutors on Tuesday unveiled an expanded 14-count indictment accusing former Google software engineer Linwei Ding of stealing artificial intelligence trade secrets to benefit two Chinese companies he was secretly working for.
Ding, 38, a Chinese national, was charged by a federal grand jury in San Francisco with seven counts each of economic espionage and theft of trade secrets.
Each economic espionage charge carries a maximum 15-year prison term and $5 million fine, while each trade secrets charge carries a maximum 10-year term and $250,000 fine.
The defendant, also known as Leon Ding, was indicted last March on four counts of theft of trade secrets. He is free on bond. His lawyers did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Ding's case was coordinated through an interagency Disruptive Technology Strike Force created in 2023 by the Biden administration.
The initiative was designed to help stop advanced technology from being acquired by countries such as China and Russia or potentially threatening national security.
Prosecutors said Ding stole information about the hardware infrastructure and software platform that lets Google's supercomputing data centers train large AI models.
Some of the allegedly stolen chip blueprints were meant to give Google an edge over cloud computing rivals Amazon and Microsoft, which design their own, and reduce Google's reliance on chips from Nvidia.
Prosecutors said Ding joined Google in May 2019 and began his thefts three years later when he was being courted to join an early-stage Chinese technology company.
Ding allegedly uploaded more than 1,000 confidential files by May 2023 and later circulated a PowerPoint presentation to employees of a China startup he founded, saying that country's policies encouraged development of a domestic AI industry.
Google was not charged and has said it cooperated with law enforcement.
According to court records describing a December 18 hearing, prosecutors and defense lawyers discussed a "potential resolution" to Ding's case, "but anticipate the matter proceeding to trial."
The case is U.S. v. Ding, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, No. 24-cr-00141.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Voice of America
15-03-2025
- Voice of America
Russian foreign minister exaggerates Russia-China relations, ignores nuances
On March 12, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke with American bloggers Mario Nawfal, Larry C. Johnson and Andrew Napolitano in Moscow. When asked whether the U.S. administration's efforts to normalize relations with Moscow are just to use Russia "cynically against the Chinese," Lavrov rejected such possibility. He described Russia-China relations as long-term, stronger and more confidential, based in deep trust and mutual understanding, and he emphasized widespread public support in both countries. That is misleading. The claim overlooks the underlying complexities and skepticism in the Russia-China relationship. Underlying tensions: Despite the appearance of a strong partnership, ongoing tensions underlie the relationship. This includes skepticism on both sides, especially about economic stability, military strength and the extent of mutual trust. Economic imbalance: China has become a dominant economic partner for Russia, but many Russians are concerned about China's increasing influence and the lack of substantial Chinese investment in Russia. Military relations: Unlike the strong military alignment seen in the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950, today's cooperation is not as deeply integrated, particularly in military terms. China has not provided direct military aid to Russia in the Ukraine conflict, which would have been expected in a deeply allied relationship. Public sentiment: There is skepticism about the partnership in both Russia and China. Russian citizens are not entirely supportive of Chinese products or investments, and many Chinese question the long-term economic and military viability of Russia. Historical context Sino-Soviet Alliance (1950s): This period marked a high point of cooperation, with the Soviet Union providing substantial economic, technological and military support to China. Yet, the alliance ended with the Sino-Soviet split by the late 1950s. This contradicts Lavrov's characterization that current relations are unprecedented in their depth. Strategic Partnership (1996-2014): The strategic partnership strengthened after the Cold War, especially under Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin. However, China still balanced its relations with the West, highlighting that the partnership was pragmatic, not based purely on mutual trust. Anti-Western Alignment (2014-2025): The relations have become closer since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Ukraine invasion. China has been providing crucial economic support. Beijing, however, avoids direct military aid to evade Western sanctions and maintains neutrality. This signals that the cooperation is based on shared opposition to the West, not genuine trust or an alliance akin to that of the 1950s. Current economic dependence Moscow is now heavily dependent on Beijing: China has become Russia's largest trading partner, and Russia plays a key role in supplying China with oil and gas. The economic relationship has its imbalances, however. China's total investments in Russia remain relatively low compared with its global investments. China still prioritizes its global economic ties, while Russia has become increasingly dependent on Beijing. Vedomosti, Russia's leading business daily, reported that China rarely invests directly in Russia, noting that while Russia seeks high-tech investments, China prioritizes mining, real estate, and banking. Since 2023, China has been Russia's largest trading partner, whereas Russia ranks only sixth among China's top trade partners. Skepticism in both countries Russians question Chinese investment and the long-term benefits, while many Chinese doubt Russia's economic resilience and military strength. In February 2025, FilterLabs released the results of research that used its Talisman data tool to analyze Chinese and Russian news and social media. Talisman's analysis reveals deep skepticism about Russia among Chinese social media users, many of whom question whether Russia's economy is truly as resilient as Moscow claims, whether its military strength matches its rhetoric, and what its long-term intentions are. These doubts suggest that despite official narratives of strong ties, public confidence in Russia within China is far from unanimous. The research also shows that online sentiments in Russia toward economic cooperation with China are more negative than official narratives suggest. International sanctions have pushed many Western products out of Russia, allowing Chinese goods to fill the gap in sectors such as automobiles and technology. While their market share grows due to affordability and geopolitical shifts, many Russians remain skeptical and dissatisfied with Chinese products, FilterLabs reported. In both countries, social media discussions are consistently less positive than mainstream press coverage, which itself was not uniformly supportive, revealing underlying skepticism about the partnership. "Their partnership is vulnerable," FilterLabs founder Jonathan Teubner told VOA. Conclusion While Lavrov's statement reflects an official narrative of a strong and enduring partnership, the truth is more nuanced. Relations are indeed closer than at any point since the 1950s, but they are shaped more by pragmatism, economic necessity and shared opposition to Western influence than by deep trust or historical affinity. In both countries, public opinion reveals skepticism, and the economic and military cooperation, while growing, is not without concerns.
Voice of America
13-03-2025
- Voice of America
VOA Asia Weekly: Across Pacific, New-Found Freedoms Face Legal, Economic Obstacles
Show more Show less The significant legal and economic obstacles standing in the way of press freedom for journalists in the Pacific Islands. Welcome to VOA Asia Weekly. I'm Chris Casquejo in Washington. That story is just ahead, but first, making headlines: Families of drug war victims in the Philippines attended a burial ceremony after the International Criminal Court arrested former Philippine leader Rodrigo Duterte in Manila on charges related to his deadly anti-drug crackdown that killed thousands. They say his arrest helps them heal. 'The justice that we want for those who have died is slowly moving forward.' Duterte says he was "responsible" and pledged to protect police and the military, as he arrived in the Netherlands to face the International Criminal Court case. He made the statement in a video posted on a close advisor's social media account Wednesday. Police arrested protesters outside the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on Monday during the 66th Tibetan National Uprising Day. Activists waved banners and Tibetan flags before being detained. The 1959 uprising led to the Dalai Lama's exile in India. China says it will take all necessary measures to protect its rights and interests after U.S. President Donald Trump's 25 percent tariffs on all metal and aluminum imports into the U.S. took effect. Trump emphasized that the tariffs must be reciprocal. North Korea fired multiple ballistic missiles into the Yellow Sea after South Korea began joint military drills with the U.S., the first major combined training of U.S. President Donald Trump's second term. A South Korean military official said this marks North Korea's fifth missile launch of the year. Across Pacific Island nations, journalists are pushing back on draconian laws and defamation cases and weighing the cost of Chinese economic help against true editorial freedom. VOA's Jessica Stone has the story. Celebration in December 2022. After more than a decade under a restrictive media law, a vote for change in the Pacific island of Fiji. Newly elected Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka: "I'd like to thank the people of Fiji and congratulate them.' The Rabuka government repealed a law that allowed the fining and jailing of journalists for up to two years for publishing stories considered against the national interest. 'The prime minister and the ministers, more or less, do not have any issues with answering questions.' Regional journalists rated Fiji's press freedoms in the top five of 14 nations surveyed for the first-ever Pacific Islands Media Freedom Index. 'This is just the first step for a better media for our Pacific people.' The island nation of Palau took the top spot in the index. Leilani Reklai is vice president of the Pacific Islands News Association and publisher of the Island Times. 'The journalists are protected specifically under the Constitution. And we also have laws that are in place to support the media.' But those protections are being tested. Reklai is named in a defamation lawsuit brought by a company owned by the father of Palau's president for what the company says are 'false and unsubstantiated allegations" about tax payments. Reklai believes the lawsuit is sending a message beyond the Island Times. 'It serves to have the journalists think twice before they print anything or [before] they express what they feel is the story that's going on.' Defamation lawsuits are also prevalent in the Pacific island of Tonga. Melino Maka, a commentator at the Tonga Independent, knows of many journalists entangled in them. Maka says these lawsuits exploit another vulnerability of the media here: a lack of funding. He says outlets sometimes resort to asking the Tongan or even the Chinese government for financial help, risking their editorial independence. 'Chinese pressure is always there behind the scenes.' Singh says the challenge now is ending the media's tendency to self-censor after almost 20 years of little to no accountability reporting in Fiji. Jessica Stone, VOA News. Visit for the most up-to-date stories. I'm Chris Casquejo. And finally, a modern take on traditional Korean pottery. The Denver Art Museum partnered with the National Museum of Korea to showcase the iconic 17th-century Korean moon jar. Some artists present traditional ceramics with a 21st-century twist, drawing inspiration from the jars' mysterious forms and imperfections. Thanks for watching VOA Asia Weekly.
Voice of America
13-03-2025
- Voice of America
Can the US pry Russia away from China?
Western politicians have repeatedly called on China to limit or cease tacit support for Russia's bloody war against Ukraine. In response, China's leadership insists it is committed to peace and respect for the territorial integrity of other nations. But unlike most United Nations member states, China has never condemned Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and their military-diplomatic partnership — from joint bomber flights near the U.S. state of Alaska to votes in the U.N. Security Council — has only helped the Kremlin overcome its international isolation. While President Donald Trump has said he has good personal relations with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, there is a consensus among experts in Washington that the China-Russia partnership poses a threat to U.S. interests, and that while Trump's predecessor, Joe Biden, tried to establish a strategic dialogue with China, the Trump team appears to be prioritizing normalized ties with Russia while punishing China over trade. As the White House talks about the possibility of restoring economic cooperation with Russia, some of its officials are hinting at lifting or reducing the sanctions Washington has imposed on Moscow in recent years. Charles Hecker, an expert on Western-Russian economic ties and risks, and author of the book Zero Sum: The Arc of International Business in Russia, says some Western companies will quickly return to Russia if sanctions are lifted, particularly those involved in energy, metals and minerals. 'There's only so much oil in Norway, and there's only so much oil in Canada; the rest of it is in some countries that have a very high-risk environment,' Hecker told VOA's Russian Service. 'And so, these kinds of companies are accustomed to business in these sorts of places, and they have the internal structures to help protect them. You know, there are energy companies doing business in Iraq right now. And I don't want to compare Russia and Iraq, but they are high-risk environments.' Still, Hecker cautions, their return to doing business in Russia wouldn't signal an overall U.S.-Russian rapprochement — let alone a fracturing of Sino-Russian relations. 'I think it will be very difficult for the West to pull Russia away from China,' he said. 'Allowing Western companies back into Russia doesn't necessarily change President Putin's hostility towards the West. President Putin remains antagonistic towards a Western-dominated political and economic system, and he has said over and over again that he wants to create an alternative political and economic environment – an alternative to the West. 'Part of that alternative includes China,' he added. 'You have never heard President Putin say anything ideologically against China. And the two are now important energy partners.' Limited popular domestic appeal U.S.-based FilterLabs analyzes public sentiment in regions where polling is problematic. According to a recently published assessment of popular attitudes expressed on Russian and Chinese social media networks, Sino-Russian relations are 'full of underlying tensions, mistrust, and diverging interests.' One of the report's authors, Vasily Gatov, told VOA its research found that 'the Chinese and Russian populations are far from happy with this alliance of their authorities.' "China does not perceive Russia as a reliable, safe and equal partner,' he said. 'Russia annexed the Amur Region from China; Russia adopted a completely colonial policy towards China during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Therefore, in my opinion, it is entirely possible to consider historical frictions as a vulnerability.' A media analyst at the University of Southern California's Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Gatov also noted that, despite the Kremlin's expectations, China's economic presence inside Russia today remains 'several times smaller' than that of either Europe or the U.S. before Russia invaded Ukraine. Thus, while Russian and China have overlapping interests, they are not 'marching in lockstep.' "They are very different, they have very different geopolitical focuses, very different political philosophies,' he said. Other experts, however, question the Filterlabs findings, warning that random Russian and Chinese opinions online are of limited value, especially as those casting the insights aren't likely to influence policy. "People who have the time and desire to comment on things on social media do not have much influence on how state policy is conducted,' Alexander Gabuev, director of the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told VOA. 'And these people certainly do not have much influence on whether China transfers components for Russia's weapons or takes certain military technologies from it, since the people who comment on this simply do not have real knowledge of what is actually happening.' Gabuev added that 'the Chinese leadership has reasons to think that they have something to take from Russia in terms of military technology,' suggesting that China is extremely interested in gaining Russian experience in countering Western weapons during Russia's war in Ukraine. Does Trump see China as a threat? One critical question about whether Washington's improved ties with Russia will loosen the Sino-Russian pact, say some analysts, is how Trump perceives China. Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy advisor on the U.S. and China at the International Crisis Group, describes Trump as an anomaly for U.S. policy. 'Widespread bipartisan agreement in Congress and from one administration to the next [is] that China is American's foremost strategic competitor,' he said. But 'President Trump, in many ways, is the most prominent dissenter from this alleged China consensus.' 'He doesn't view President Xi [Jinping] in adversarial terms,' Wyne said. 'He actually calls President Xi a 'dear friend' of his. And he believes that his personal rapport with President Xi will be the decisive dynamic in setting — or resetting — the U.S.-China relationship over the next four years.'
