Two German MEPs to defy EU with Moscow visit
A group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), including two Germans, are planning to travel to Moscow for a two-day visit to take part in Victory Day celebrations and send a message of peace, the German news agency dpa reported on Wednesday.
The delegation will reportedly also include MEPs from the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Slovakia. The visit will feature 'talks with [Russian] parliamentarians as well as politicians and cultural figures,' according to German MEPs Michael von der Schulenburg and Ruth Firmenich.
The two MEPs, who represent the left-wing Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), told dpa they wanted to express support for the unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine announced by Moscow.
'We also want to send a signal that we are committed to ensuring that the guns in Ukraine remain permanently silent,' they said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a unilateral Victory Day truce, which took effect at midnight on May 7–8 and is expected to last until midnight on May 10–11. Ukraine's Vladimir Zelensky dismissed the initiative as 'manipulation,' as Kiev intensified drone attacks on Russian cities, including Moscow.
Separately, two other BSW politicians – former German MPs Klaus Ernst and Sevim Dagdelen – told Der Spiegel on Wednesday that they would attend a reception at the Russian Embassy in Berlin marking the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. The politicians said they wanted to demonstrate opposition to the 'falsification of history' and the demonization of Russia.
'Russia is not my enemy, and I don't feel threatened by or at war with Russia,' Dagdelen stated, describing the occasion as an opportunity for 'dialogue' and a 'new beginning in German-Russian relations.' Ernst told the paper they were also alarmed by 'the clearly visible signs of war preparations in Germany.'
Their stance contrasts with that of official Berlin and Brussels. The German Foreign Ministry had earlier advised organizers against inviting Russian and Belarusian representatives to WWII commemorations. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas warned in April that the bloc opposes any officials from member or candidate states attending Victory Day celebrations in Moscow.
Meanwhile, Berlin authorities have banned the display of Russian and Soviet flags and symbols during commemorations on May 8 and 9, according to local media.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Russia Today
an hour ago
- Russia Today
German intelligence chief claims Russia could attack NATO
Russia could attack NATO countries after the Ukraine conflict is over, Bruno Kahl, the head of the German foreign intelligence agency (BND), has claimed while defending the drive to boost defense spending. 'We are confident, and have the intelligence data that Ukraine is merely one step on [Russia's] path toward the West,' Kahl stated when asked why the Germans should agree to take on 'additional debt' to fund the rearmament program and potentially reintroduce conscription abolished in 2011. 'There are people in Moscow who no longer believe that NATO's Article 5 would be upheld — and they would like to put it to the test,' the spy chief said. He argued that Russia is skeptical about the US resolve to defend its allies and send American troops 'across the Atlantic to die for Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius.' Russia could 'send little green men to Estonia' under the guise of protecting the Baltic state's Russian-speaking minority, Kahl claimed. Western media used the term 'little green men' to describe commandos sent to protect the residents of Crimea ahead of the 2014 referendum, in which the largely ethnic Russian region rejected the US-backed coup in Kiev and voted to secede from Ukraine and become a part of Russia. Kahl suggested that Russia's ultimate goal is to 'catapult NATO back to where it was in the late 1990s,' and push the US out of Europe. Moscow views the US-led alliance's expansion eastward as a threat, and has cited it as one of the root causes of the Ukraine conflict. President Vladimir Putin, however, said that Russia has no intention of attacking NATO states unless it is attacked first. Moscow also warned that Western military aid to Kiev de facto makes NATO 'a direct participant' in the conflict. Germany has ramped up its hostile rhetoric against Russia under new chancellor Friedrich Merz who said last month Ukraine could receive long-range Taurus cruise missiles. He also pledged to assist Ukraine in the production of its own long-range weapons. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has responded by accusing Germany of undermining the peace process.
Russia Today
2 hours ago
- Russia Today
WHISPERING GIANT: Russia's quiet power leaves the West in the dust
One of the central paradoxes of Russia's foreign policy is this: while its primary goal has always been to secure full autonomy in its decision-making, success has often hinged on the international environment in which it pursues that aim. Even today, as Russia enjoys a degree of internal stability unmatched in the past 25 years, global shifts are helping shape the country's ability to resist what can only be described as the increasingly destructive efforts of the collective West. Chief among these global changes is the unmistakable decline of Western Europe's centrality in world affairs. Though the region still remains geographically and symbolically important – given its proximity to Russia and its alignment with the United States – it has lost the capacity to act as an independent player in global politics. Simply put, Western Europe no longer matters as much. It is no longer the center of decision-making or initiative, but a stage on which others perform. The true centers of gravity today are countries like China and India. Their behavior no longer forms the 'background noise' of international affairs – it drives global developments. For Russia, this transformation is both a strategic opportunity and a conceptual challenge. On the one hand, it liberates Moscow from the old and often fruitless task of seeking allies within the West to safeguard its interests, particularly along its most dangerous frontiers. On the other hand, it compels Russia to reconsider the nature of its role in the world. What does global responsibility look like for a nation whose foreign policy has never been driven by messianic ideals or the desire to impose its values on others? Historically, Russia's strategic posture has not been animated by ideological expansionism. Unlike the Western European colonial empires, Russia never pursued dominance over distant territories to extract resources or spread its worldview. Even during the height of its imperial strength, such as in the 19th-century annexation of Central Asia, the Russian Empire did not develop a colonial policy comparable to that of Britain or France. The reason lies not in a lack of capacity, but in a fundamentally different orientation: Russia has always been more concerned with preserving its internal sovereignty and strategic autonomy than with exporting its model. Even the oft-cited concept of 'Moscow as the Third Rome' is misunderstood in the West. It was never a call to global proselytizing. Unlike the United States, which often ties its foreign policy to ideological missions, Russia's approach is deeply pragmatic and rooted in the idea of national self-preservation. The Soviet period, of course, was an exception. The revolutionary zeal of 1917 gave Moscow a temporary ideological edge, and during the Cold War, the USSR promoted its values as part of a broader geopolitical confrontation. But even then, ideological outreach was quickly subordinated to the central strategic aim: maintaining national stability in opposition to American-led containment. Another consistent feature of Russia's foreign policy has been the tactical use of divisions within the West. Whether confronting Sweden, Napoleonic France, or Nazi Germany, Russia always benefited from securing at least one Western partner. In the Crimean War of the 1850s and again during the Cold War, Russia suffered political setbacks in part because the Western front was unusually united. After the Cold War ended unfavorably for Moscow, Russian strategy relied on the hope that the EU would eventually drift from Washington's orbit and reclaim some degree of autonomy. That, clearly, has not happened. Internal crises, the erosion of elite leadership, and the rise of bureaucratic inertia have left Western Europe politically paralyzed. When the Ukraine crisis escalated into a military confrontation, the region's powers not only failed to act independently – they leaned even harder on the United States. This failure of EU emancipation has not strengthened Washington, however. On the contrary, Western Europe's strategic irrelevance only underscores the West's shrinking role in global affairs. That chapter of world history – where Europe stood at the helm – is now closed. Today, Russia faces a world where resistance to Western pressure no longer requires fractures within the Western alliance. What matters now is the emergence of a truly global system – one in which power is no longer concentrated in Euro-Atlantic hands. In this environment, Russia's ability to assert its interests has improved not because the West is weaker per se, but because the world is more balanced. The failure of the previous US administration to 'isolate' Russia is significant not only as a diplomatic defeat for Washington, but as evidence of this wider trend. The global South has not turned against Russia. On the contrary, many emerging powers are increasingly assertive in defining their own paths, free of Western tutelage. This structural shift works to Russia's advantage. And yet, this new reality also imposes obligations. In a world that is waiting for Russia's presence, Russia must now ask: what kind of global actor does it wish to be? This is not a question of abandoning its historical pragmatism or inward-facing strategic culture. Rather, it is about integrating that realism with the unavoidable demands of global responsibility. Unlike the missionary democracies of the West, Russia does not seek to reshape the world in its own image. But as one of the few nations capable of independent action on the global stage, it must now participate in shaping that world, not simply reacting to it. This is the conceptual challenge of the coming years. How can Russia remain true to its tradition of self-defined interest while also engaging with a multipolar world that increasingly demands initiative, leadership, and presence? The answer will not be found in grand ideological blueprints or universalist visions. It will lie, as it always has for Russia, in a careful balancing of national sovereignty with the strategic realities of a changing global article was first published by Valdai Discussion Club, translated and edited by the RT team.
Russia Today
2 hours ago
- Russia Today
EU wants to prolong Ukraine conflict
The European Commission's latest sanctions package, which targets the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), among other entities, is driven by the bloc's desire to prolong the Ukraine conflict, according to Kirill Dmitriev, the RDIF's CEO and a presidential investment envoy. The 18th sanctions package, unveiled by EC President Ursula von der Leyen on Tuesday, targets Russia's energy exports, infrastructure, and financial sector. It includes measures against the RDIF, its subsidiaries, and investment projects in an effort to stop it from funding initiatives to 'modernize the Russian economy.' By going after RDIF, Russia's sovereign wealth fund, the EC acknowledges it is 'an important channel' for strengthening Russia's industrial base, Dmitriev said in a statement. Von der Leyen's remarks were 'driven by the EU's desire to prolong the Ukraine conflict and its deep dissatisfaction with RDIF's efforts to restore Russia-US relations,' as well as the fund's role in Moscow's peace initiatives, he added. Dmitriev has played a prominent role in efforts to improve relations between Moscow and Washington, which reached its lowest point in decades under the administration of Joe Biden. The official took part in high-level meetings in Saudi Arabia and visited Washington in April for talks on potential joint investment projects in rare earths and energy. The EU's proposal also signals opposition to cooperation between Russian and European businesses, which the RDIF 'actively supports in Russia,' according to Dmitriev. In a post on X on Tuesday, Dmitriev noted that Russia has 'a number of joint investments with the leading EU companies' and said that the fund has 'helped significantly' many European firms that continue to operate in the country. The new sanctions package also proposes a ban on the use of Nord Stream gas infrastructure, a reduction in the oil price cap, and a halt to imports of all refined products derived from Russian crude. The draft will now be debated by EU member states and must be approved unanimously to take effect. Previous rounds have faced pushback from countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, which argue the sanctions hurt the EU more than Russia. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico wrote on Facebook on Tuesday that Bratislava won't back the package unless the EU offers 'a real solution to the crisis' that his country would face from a halt in Russian energy supplies. Russia has rejected the Western sanctions as illegitimate and counterproductive. President Vladimir Putin has said the removal of sanctions is among the conditions for a settlement of the Ukraine conflict.
