China in bid to challenge giant SpaceX by deploying maglev rocket launch pad by 2028
In a bid to disrupt the United States' long-held dominance in space exploration, China is quietly advancing a radical new rocket launch system – powered not by roaring engines but by electromagnetic force – that could propel satellites into orbit with unprecedented speed and efficiency.
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At the heart of the ambitious project is
Galactic Energy , a private aerospace company that plans to debut the world's first electromagnetic rocket launch pad by 2028, a project that could redraw the competitive lines of the global space industry.
Developed in partnership with state-backed research institutes in Sichuan province in southwestern China, the system uses superconducting magnets to silently accelerate rockets to supersonic speeds before ignition, a process often compared to launching a maglev train vertically.
11:05
Space race elevates Asia in new world order
Space race elevates Asia in new world order
The Ziyang government in Sichuan and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) is testing China's first electromagnetic launch verification platform with the ambitious goal of launching in three years, according to a report by Sichuan Radio and Television last week.
The platform would accelerate rockets to speeds above Mach 1 as rockets burn most fuel at the beginning of a flight, and offers a future in which launches could become as routine as high-speed rail departures.
The technology could double payload capacity and lower the launch cost, said Li Ping, president of the Ziyang Commercial Space Launch Technology Research Institute. Li said the launch track would not require the maintenance needed for traditional launch pads, enabling more frequent launches.
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If successful, it could offer China the critical edge it seeks to challenge American giants such as SpaceX.
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Asia Times
3 days ago
- Asia Times
Trump's tech sanctions to empower China, betray America
President Donald Trump is stepping up US efforts to cut off China's access to advanced technology, marking a continuation of restrictions first launched in his first term and continued under the Biden administration. The primary victims of these technology bans are American companies that were once China's preferred suppliers. The main beneficiaries are Chinese companies, some of which have been handed massive market opportunities stripped of their most formidable foreign competitors. This has most recently been illustrated by new restrictions on exports to China of US semiconductor design technology, Nvidia's H20 AI processor and jet engines for passenger aircraft. Last week, the Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce ordered electronic design automation (EDA) software providers serving the semiconductor industry to halt shipments to Chinese customers. On the news, the share prices of the world's top two EDA companies, Synopsys and Cadence Design, dropped by more than 13% and then recovered to finish down 6% and 8%, respectively, in the week to Friday, May 30. The third major EDA supplier, the US company formerly known as Mentor Graphics now owned by Germany's Siemens, is no longer publicly traded. According to market research organization TrendForce, Synopsys, Cadence Design, and Siemens have 31%, 30%, and 11% of the global EDA market, respectively. China accounted for 16% and 12% of Synopsys' and Cadence's EDA sales in 2024. Siemens does not provide a geographical breakdown of its EDA sales. As EETimes reports, EDA is seen as 'the true choke point' in China's semiconductor industry, particularly with regard to artificial intelligence (AI) processors and other advanced integrated circuits (ICs). In addition, according to Cadence, the BIS wrote that the sale of EDA software to Chinese companies constitutes 'an unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to a 'military end use' in China or for a Chinese 'military end user.'' In theory, exports of EDA tools to Chinese customers would be allowed under BIS license; in practice, licenses are extremely unlikely to be forthcoming. For this reason, Synopsys has reportedly shut down its EDA sales and service operations and told its local staff to stop taking new orders in China. EDA export restrictions were first considered during the previous Trump administration, but until now have reportedly been rejected because they were considered too aggressive. Now they are part of Trump's strategy to ramp up pressure on China in pursuit of a broad trade deal. Last year, Synopsis, Cadence Design and Siemens held approximately 80% of the Chinese EDA market, but that figure is already in decline. Synopsys' sales in China dropped 28% year-on-year in the first half of its fiscal 2025 (the six months to April), with the share of its total sales made there falling from a peak of 17% in Q3 of fiscal 2024 to 10% in Q2 of 2025. Cadence Design reported a 9% year-on-year increase in China sales in Q1 of its fiscal 2025 (ended March) but a 24% decline from Q4 of 2024, with the share of its total sales made in China dropping from 13% to 11%. And now, if Trump doesn't back down, it – and Synopsys's 10% – could fall to zero. Meanwhile, the sales of Chinese EDA companies are growing. There are more than ten EDA software and system developers in China, including Empyrean Technology, Primarius Technologies and Xpeedic. A combination of estimates from market research and industry associations, independent analysts and the companies themselves puts their market shares at 10%-12%, 5%-6% and 3%-4%, respectively. In March 2025, Empyrean announced plans to take control of Xpeedic. In Q1 of 2025, Empyrean and Primarius' sales were up 10% and 12% year-on-year, respectively. While the share prices of US EDA companies fell, those of their Chinese competitors rose. The share prices of Empyrean Technology and Primarius Technologies jumped 16% and 21%, respectively, last Wednesday and Thursday. Primarius, which has a significantly smaller market capitalization, continued to rise, finishing up 35% in the week through Tuesday, June 3. Chinese EDA companies receive support from central and local governments, academia and private sector customers, including tech giants Huawei and SMIC. China's National Center of Technology Innovation for EDA was established in Nanjing in June 2023, with contributions from Jiangsu Province, the Ministry of Education, Peking and Xidian universities, and an investment company from Shenzhen. Member companies include Empyrean, Primarius and Shenzhen Giga Design Automation. It could take some time, but China appears to be relatively well-positioned to take advantage of and overcome the latest US government sanctions. The Chinese EDA industry is already undergoing consolidation, and the forced withdrawal of US competitors provides a new incentive to push their technological limits and build economies of scale. Notably, Empyrean already works with Japan's Renesas while Empyrean, Primarius and Xpeedic are EDA partners of Samsung Foundry. In April, Nvidia revealed in an SEC filing that sales of its H20 AI processors to China would effectively be banned, and that it was therefore planning to write down $5.5 billion worth of inventory, purchase commitments and related reserves in Q1 of its fiscal 2026. (Shipments of equivalent processors from AMD were also restricted.) In the event, Nvidia's write-down was $4.5 billion but the ban also reduced sales by $2.5 billion and $8 billion more is expected to be lost in Q2. China accounted for about 10% of Nvidia's sales in Q1, down from 13% the previous fiscal year. Now, the figure seems likely to drop to low single digits. Nvidia's share of the Chinese market for AI processors, which has already dropped from 95% to 50% (40% by some estimates), is also expected to keep falling, likely to insignificance if US policy doesn't change. At the Computex 2025 event held in Taipei, Taiwan, from May 20 to 23, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang called export controls a 'failure.' Elaborating on the assessment, he said that, 'The US has based its policy on the assumption that China cannot make AI chips. That assumption was always questionable, and now it's clearly wrong.' A Nvidia spokesperson added, 'With the ban on H20, our competitors in China are now largely shielded from US competition and free to leverage that entire $50 billion market to build a robust AI ecosystem.' In an interview with the Stratechery tech newsletter published on May 19, Huang said, 'China's doing fantastic. 50% of the world's AI researchers are Chinese and you're not going to hold them back, you're not going to stop them from advancing AI. Let's face it, DeepSeek is deeply excellent work. To give them anything short of that is a lack of confidence, so deep that I just can't even tolerate it.' Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent and other Chinese buyers of AI processors are already using domestic alternatives to chips from Nvidia and AMD, starting with, but not limited to, Huawei's Ascend series. On May 28, The New York Times reported that the US government has restricted sales of jet engine technology to China, which will likely be a major headache for the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). COMAC's C919 passenger jets are currently equipped with LEAP turbofan engines manufactured by CFM International, a joint venture between GE Aviation of the US and Safran Aircraft Engines of France. However, the Aero Engine Corporation of China appears to be making progress toward developing a domestic alternative, known as the CJ-1000. In March, as reported by the South China Morning Post, Shi Jianzhong, honorary president of the Shanghai Society of Aeronautics and former deputy general manager of COMAC, told a Chinese aviation forum that 'The CJ-1000 engine is in trial runs and it fared better than my most optimistic expectations.' Verification flights of the C919 aircraft equipped with the CJ-1000 jet engine are expected to begin 'soon.' There is also the possibility of renewed collaboration with Russia, which has a history of building jet engines for commercial aircraft dating back to the Soviet Union era. But that appears to be on hold as Russia concentrates on developing key components for its own short- and medium-range passenger jets. Two years ago, Yury Slyusar, CEO of Russia's United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), warned COMAC that 'There may come a point when Western nations halt the supply of crucial components, assemblies, and products, potentially leading to a halt in aircraft production. Therefore, we urge them to reconsider the 'insides' of the aircraft as part of joint projects and reduce dependency on Western companies.' Ever since Trump first slapped sanctions on Huawei in 2018, the US government has incentivized Chinese innovation while undermining once-dominant American market shares, creating what it aims to prevent – the emergence of Chinese technology industries that are both self-sufficient and globally competitive. The attempt to suppress Huawei – which today is not only a world leader in telecom equipment but also has a growing presence in AI, IC design, autonomous driving and even enterprise software – has, by any measure, failed. And that will likely be the case for many Chinese companies targeted by the latest round of US sanctions. At the Reagan National Economic Forum held in California at the end of May, JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon said, 'I would engage with China. I just got back from China last week. They're not scared, folks. This notion they're going to come bow to America, I wouldn't count on that. When they have a problem, they put 100,000 engineers on it. They've been preparing for this for years.' Follow this writer on X: @ScottFo83517667
Asia Times
6 days ago
- Asia Times
Marco Rubio's and Miles Yu's war on Chinese students is misguided
In an age of escalating geopolitical rivalry, democracy's strongest foundations — press freedom, civic trust and public accountability — are being eroded by a perfect storm of surveillance, suspicion, and systemic misinformation. This is especially visible in US-China relations, where bipartisan hawkishness has led to sweeping proposals like Senator Marco Rubio's latest effort to revoke visas from Chinese students and researchers — treating them as national security risks by default. Joining the chorus is Miles Yu, a former Chinese international student who became a top China policy adviser in the first Trump administration. In his widely cited essay, 'Enabling the Dragon,' published in November 2024 the week after Donald Trump had won the election, Yu argues that US universities have become naive enablers of the Chinese Communist Party, serving as academic outposts vulnerable to intellectual theft and ideological infiltration. Yu urges that the United States should sharply restrict academic engagement with China, calling such cooperation a national security threat. His claim is sweeping: that China has 'outsourced' its academic system to exploit American openness, and that the US must respond by severing intellectual ties. Both Rubio and Yu are also ignoring the data: Chinese nationals make up the largest share of foreign students in STEM fields — computer science, engineering, math and the physical sciences. According to the National Science Foundation, more than 80% of Chinese PhD recipients in these fields stay and work in the US after graduation, contributing directly to American innovation, entrepreneurship, and research leadership. Many have founded startups, filed patents and worked in cutting-edge labs at US universities and tech companies. The idea that they are 'outsourcing' American prosperity to China is not only false — it's self-destructive. If these students are forced out, the US will not only lose a competitive advantage in global talent — it will damage its innovation ecosystem at its roots. Immigration-driven innovation has been one of the few consistent engines of American prosperity in a polarized and gridlocked political climate. Treating every foreign-born talent as a potential spy will only drive them into the arms of competitors. Moreover, this zero-sum framing misrepresents how education actually works. American universities are not ideological weaklings — they are spaces where critical thinking, civic inquiry and pluralistic values are cultivated. Chinese students are not arriving with monolithic loyalties — they are shaped by their experiences here, often becoming some of the most perceptive critics of authoritarianism and some of the strongest defenders of democratic ideals. Diaspora students and scholars, such as the founders of China Labor Watch and Human Rights in China, have often been at the forefront of documenting abuses, challenging both Chinese state narratives and the overreach of US suspicion. They are not security liabilities — they are civic actors. And yet, they are increasingly caught in the middle. Media outlets rush to publish stories about alleged espionage long before there's due process. Federal task forces pressure universities to cut off collaborations without context. On social media, platforms like X — once Twitter — amplify xenophobic paranoia while silencing legitimate voices. The result is a digital public sphere poisoned by fear and disinformation, where nuance disappears and policy becomes a blunt instrument of exclusion. In my research — China's Emerging Inter-network Society — I explore how diaspora communities and digital platforms are reshaping political consciousness. Platforms like WeChat and TikTok are indeed double-edged: they can be used for surveillance, but also for storytelling, mutual aid, and grassroots advocacy. What Yu fails to mention is this: He was once 'the dragon' he now seeks to shut out. To presume otherwise is to vastly underestimate the power of American education — something Yu himself should know firsthand. Yet there's a glaring irony: Yu himself is living proof that American education works — not just as a system of knowledge transmission, but as a transformative force of values, perspective and civic engagement. Yu came to the US in the 1980s as an international student from China. He benefited from the very system he now decries — one that welcomed global talent, nurtured individual potential and allowed a Chinese-born scholar to rise to the highest levels of US policymaking. If America had treated him then the way he now proposes treating others, Miles Yu might still be teaching Maoist doctrine in Anhui, not advising presidents in Washington. If Miles Yu truly believed Chinese students couldn't be trusted, one wonders why he chose to stay and serve in the US government rather than return to China after pursuing his PhD degree. Doesn't his own life prove the power of American education to transform, inspire, and integrate? If we now assume every Chinese student is a CCP foot soldier, does that include him too? Or is he the exception who proves the value — not the danger — of keeping the door open? He chose to stay in the United States not because he was coerced but because the openness and meritocracy of American institutions resonated with him. If we now claim that every Chinese student is a sleeper agent for Beijing, then Yu's own journey becomes an inconvenient contradiction. Isn't he the evidence that America's democratic model can win hearts and minds? That contradiction isn't just ironic. It's emblematic of a dangerous drift in US national security thinking in which suspicion has replaced strategy and identity has replaced evidence. If the US blocks Chinese students while maintaining that it wants to 'compete' with China, Beijing will likely frame the move as hypocritical — claiming it reveals American insecurity rather than confidence in its democratic model. The retaliatory measures may not just hurt bilateral relations but also signal to other countries the risks of aligning too closely with US policy on China. Yu's central claim is that Chinese students and scholars serve as covert extensions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), sent not to learn but to spy, steal, and subvert. This argument has gained traction in parts of Washington, where fears of intellectual property theft and technological competition are real and justified. But let's be clear: there is a vast difference between targeted counterintelligence and collective suspicion. To reduce an entire population of students — numbering over 270,000 annually — to latent threats is both empirically unfounded and strategically foolish. Chinese students are not a monolith. Many come precisely because they seek an alternative to the CCP's control. Some become critics of the regime. Others stay, contribute to US innovation, or build bridges that serve American interests abroad. Treating them as presumed agents of espionage doesn't protect US security — it undercuts America's greatest soft power asset: its openness. We are now witnessing the consequences of this worldview hardening into law. In May 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, citing security risks, announced that his department would move to revoke or block Chinese student visas in 'sensitive' research fields outright, citing national security risks. The proposal would give broad authority to federal agencies to deny or cancel visas without due process, based not on individual conduct, but on nationality and field of study. This is not strategic caution — it's blanket exclusion. And it mirrors the logic of Yu's essay: that anyone Chinese by origin or association is inherently suspect. Such policies are dangerously close to the racialized fearmongering of the Chinese Exclusion Act era, now dressed in tech-sector clothing. They undermine US universities, punish innocent scholars, and hand the CCP a propaganda victory. If carried out, this policy won't stop espionage — it will cripple American research labs, isolate Chinese dissidents, and accelerate talent flight to competitor nations like Canada, the UK, and Australia. The Trump administration's aggressive stance on Chinese espionage is haunted by the very intelligence failures it now seeks to prevent. As Sue Miller, the CIA's former chief mole hunter, has pointed out, the collapse of US spy networks in China more than a decade ago — a debacle that saw scores of informants arrested or executed — remains unresolved. That strategic humiliation not only decimated on-the-ground intelligence, it also created a culture of institutional paranoia in Washington. Now, instead of rebuilding trust and refining intelligence practices, the Trump-era approach has leaned heavily on suspicion and overreach — particularly targeting ethnic Chinese scientists, scholars, and students. But blunt tools don't fix complex failures. The overcorrection has led to high-profile wrongful prosecutions, deteriorating academic collaboration and growing mistrust within diaspora communities. The United States' inability to root out past internal breaches has fueled a form of policy scapegoating — one that risks trading precision for profiling. Without credible reform of intelligence capabilities and transparent accountability for past missteps, the crackdown will remain reactive, politically charged and ultimately self-defeating. Yu frames UA-China academic collaboration as 'outsourcing,' suggesting the US has ceded control of its intellectual infrastructure to a hostile power. But this misunderstands both how American academia works and why it thrives. Academic exchange is not a one-way transaction. It's a competitive ecosystem, where ideas are tested, refined and challenged through global participation. Chinese students and researchers don't dilute US education — they elevate it. They help fill STEM classrooms, contribute to breakthroughs in AI and biomedical research, and keep US universities globally dominant. Cutting them off would hurt America far more than it would hurt China. Yes, vigilance is necessary. Research security protocols should be strong. Federal funding should come with guardrails. But throwing out the entire system of engagement, as Yu and now Rubio suggest, would be self-sabotage. If enforced, Rubio's proposal to ban Chinese students will not only undercut America's higher education system — it could also trigger swift retaliation from Beijing. China may impose reciprocal visa restrictions on US students, scholars and education programs, halt joint research initiatives or tighten controls on American academic access to Chinese data and field sites. More strategically, it could restrict elite talent from going to the US, incentivize a reverse brain drain or escalate a global narrative campaign accusing the US of racial discrimination. Such moves wouldn't just harm bilateral ties — they would damage America's soft power, alienate diaspora communities and send a troubling signal to other nations about the risks of engaging with US institutions. Ironically, by closing the door on Chinese students, Rubio and his allies may be doing more to weaken America's global leadership than to defend The U.S.-China contest is not just about chips, jets, and rare earths. It's about the future of global norms — openness versus control, pluralism versus authoritarianism. In this battle, academic freedom is not a vulnerability. It's a weapon. It is what makes the US different from — and stronger than — the system the CCP promotes. If we start mimicking Beijing's paranoia, walling off knowledge, and excluding people based on their passport, we risk becoming what we claim to oppose. Yu himself is living proof of that freedom's power. He came to the US seeking truth, found it in an open society and used it to shape national strategy. That's a success story, not a turn around now and advocate for closing the gates behind him is not only short-sighted — it's a betrayal of the very ideals that made his own story possible. A call for strategic openness Miles Yu transferred himself from Chinese student to gatekeeper by pulling up the ladder behind him. What we need is not blanket restriction but smart engagement, clearer funding rules, targeted export controls and honest dialogue with university leaders – and, yes, a robust national security posture. But we must resist fear-driven policies that punish potential allies and weaken our intellectual base. The best way to 'outcompete' China is not to become more like it — but to double down on what made the US the envy of the world. If we follow Yu's and Rubio's advice, we may win a battle of suspicion — but lose the war for global leadership. If the US wants to outcompete authoritarian regimes, it must stop mimicking their logic. Surveillance, guilt by association and ideological profiling are not strategies for innovation — they are symptoms of decline. Democracy's strength lies in openness, in attracting talent, and in offering a system that can inspire — not coerce — loyalty. Rather than banning students, the US should reinvest in the institutions that make it a magnet for global minds: its universities, its press, and its civic infrastructure. Journalists must be more careful not to amplify racialized suspicion. Lawmakers must recognize that brainpower, not fear, drives prosperity. Scholars like Miles Yu must reckon with the contradiction between their personal journeys and the policies they now advocate. Democracy does not win by closing its doors. It wins by proving it is worth entering. Yujing Shentu, PhD, is an independent scholar and writer on digital politics, international political economy and US-China strategic competition.
RTHK
30-05-2025
- RTHK
Chip design firm Synopsys puts stop to Chinese sales
Chip design firm Synopsys puts stop to Chinese sales Synopsys says it is blocking sales and fulfillment in China and halting new orders until it receives further clarification. File photo: AFP American semiconductor design software firm Synopsys has told staff in China to halt services and sales in the country and stop taking new orders to comply with new US export restrictions, according to an internal letter. The United States has ordered a broad swathe of companies to stop shipping goods to China without a license and revoked licenses already granted to certain suppliers, people familiar with the matter have said. Products affected include design software and chemicals for semiconductors, they said. Synopsys on Thursday suspended its annual and quarterly forecasts after it received a letter from the Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce, informing it of new export restrictions related to China. The internal letter sent to staff in China on Friday said "based on our initial interpretation, these new restrictions broadly prohibit the sales of our products and services in China and are effective as of May 29." To ensure compliance, Synopsys said it was blocking sales and fulfillment in China and halting new orders until it receives further clarification. The measures affect all customers in China, including employees of global customers working at sites in China and Chinese military users wherever they are located, the letter added. The steps Synopsys is taking in light of the new restrictions have not been previously reported. Synopsys did not immediately reply to a request for comment. Alongside Cadence and Siemens EDA, Synopsys is among the top three companies that dominate electronic design automation (EDA) software that chipmakers can use to design semiconductors used in everything from smartphones to computers and cars. Restricting Chinese firms' access to EDA tools would be a big blow to the industry as Chinese chip design customers heavily rely on top-of-the-line US software. Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens' Mentor Graphics control more than 70 percent of China's EDA market, Xinhua reported in April. Chinese companies that have said they use Synopsys and Cadence software include design firm Brite Semiconductor, Zhuhai Jieli and semiconductor IP portfolio provider VeriSilicon. The letter sent to staff in China on Friday also said that Chinese customers' access to its customer support portal SolvNetPlus had been disabled. (Reuters)
