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Time of India
2 days ago
- Politics
- Time of India
Niger-Benin border standoff deepens as trade collapse bites
Representative AI image Nearly two years after Niger's military seized power and the border with Benin was shut, tensions over security, sovereignty and French influence have hardened into a stand-off throttling trade and paralysing ties between the west African neighbours. Benin, which denies hosting foreign forces accused of destabilising Niger, claims it has made repeated overtures to ease the blockade, but efforts have failed despite mounting economic pain on both sides of the border. "Those who are suffering are the people of both countries," Nigerien haulier Ibrahim Abou Koura, who is based in Benin's economic capital Cotonou, said. General Abdourahamane Tiani has repeatedly accused Benin of harbouring French military bases training jihadists to undermine Niger. In May, he insisted the border would "remain closed", saying the fight was not with Benin but with French troops he claims are operating from its soil. The friction since the coup has taken a heavy toll on cross-border trade and travel between the two countries. "Buses aren't as full. There's not the same number of people," said Abou Koura, in the deserted yard of his compound in Zongo, where he once stored goods bound for major Nigerien cities. Still, transport workers in Cotonou say some movement persists, with the Niger River -- a natural border -- remaining a busy crossing despite the official closure. "Goods pass and travellers cross the river to continue their journey by bus on the Niger side," said Alassane Amidou, a resident of Malanville, a city in northeastern Benin. But for trucks unable to cross by water, perilous detours through jihadist-infested zones in Burkina Faso have become the only option. "The Niger-Benin corridor is currently the safest, most profitable and shortest route for transporters and businesses," said Gamatie Mahamadou, secretary-general of a consortium of Nigerien truck driver unions, in Niamey. He called on Niger's military rulers to "immediately normalise relations with Benin", warning that "workers' safety" and "the national economy" are at stake. Cautious optimism Niger's vital oil exports to Benin's port of Seme-Kpodji resumed in late 2024 via a cross-border pipeline after months of disruption. Uranium shipments from northern Niger remain stalled, awaiting either a diplomatic thaw or an alternative route. Benin has denied Niger's claims it is turning a blind eye to any destabilisation attempts and continues to extend an olive branch to Niger. Former presidents Thomas Boni Yayi and Nicephore Soglo travelled to meet General Tiani a year ago in a failed bid to restore ties. Beninese Foreign Minister Olushegun Adjadi Bakari in early June said he hoped for "prospects for recovery" provided security conditions are met. "We are hopeful that this will be resolved quickly ... the blockage is not on Benin's side," he told local media. "We have to accept the fact that we are not on the same wavelength sometimes... The door remains open." A new Beninese ambassador may soon be appointed to Niamey, following the quiet February recall of Gildas Agonkan, who had publicly apologised to the Nigerien people "on behalf of all Beninese and the authorities of Benin". "The apology to the Nigerien people was seen in Cotonou as a diplomatic weakening of the country during this crisis," said Guillaume Moumouni, an international relations expert. "The next ambassador must be someone of great repute and who knows Niger well enough to inspire trust and respect." Benin, which maintains it hosts no foreign military bases, has seen a surge in jihadist attacks this year and laments poor cooperation with neighbouring Sahel states also affected. "Not being able to talk directly with its neighbours increases Benin's vulnerability," said Lassina Diarra, head of the Strategic Research Institute of the International Counter-Terrorism Academy in Ivory Coast. Benin is set to elect a new president in April 2026, which could be a chance to restart "serious negotiations", Moumouni said.
France 24
2 days ago
- Business
- France 24
Niger-Benin border standoff deepens as trade collapse bites
Benin, which denies hosting foreign forces accused of destabilising Niger, claims it has made repeated overtures to ease the blockade, but efforts have failed despite mounting economic pain on both sides of the border. "Those who are suffering are the people of both countries," Nigerien haulier Ibrahim Abou Koura, who is based in Benin's economic capital Cotonou, said. General Abdourahamane Tiani has repeatedly accused Benin of harbouring French military bases training jihadists to undermine Niger. In May, he insisted the border would "remain closed", saying the fight was not with Benin but with French troops he claims are operating from its soil. The friction since the coup has taken a heavy toll on cross-border trade and travel between the two countries. "Buses aren't as full. There's not the same number of people," said Abou Koura, in the deserted yard of his compound in Zongo, where he once stored goods bound for major Nigerien cities. Still, transport workers in Cotonou say some movement persists, with the Niger River -- a natural border -- remaining a busy crossing despite the official closure. "Goods pass and travellers cross the river to continue their journey by bus on the Niger side," said Alassane Amidou, a resident of Malanville, a city in northeastern Benin. But for trucks unable to cross by water, perilous detours through jihadist-infested zones in Burkina Faso have become the only option. "The Niger-Benin corridor is currently the safest, most profitable and shortest route for transporters and businesses," said Gamatie Mahamadou, secretary-general of a consortium of Nigerien truck driver unions, in Niamey. He called on Niger's military rulers to "immediately normalise relations with Benin", warning that "workers' safety" and "the national economy" are at stake. Cautious optimism Niger's vital oil exports to Benin's port of Seme-Kpodji resumed in late 2024 via a cross-border pipeline after months of disruption. Uranium shipments from northern Niger remain stalled, awaiting either a diplomatic thaw or an alternative route. Benin has denied Niger's claims it is turning a blind eye to any destabilisation attempts and continues to extend an olive branch to Niger. Former presidents Thomas Boni Yayi and Nicephore Soglo travelled to meet General Tiani a year ago in a failed bid to restore ties. Beninese Foreign Minister Olushegun Adjadi Bakari in early June said he hoped for "prospects for recovery" provided security conditions are met. "We are hopeful that this will be resolved quickly ... the blockage is not on Benin's side," he told local media. "We have to accept the fact that we are not on the same wavelength sometimes... The door remains open." A new Beninese ambassador may soon be appointed to Niamey, following the quiet February recall of Gildas Agonkan, who had publicly apologised to the Nigerien people "on behalf of all Beninese and the authorities of Benin". "The apology to the Nigerien people was seen in Cotonou as a diplomatic weakening of the country during this crisis," said Guillaume Moumouni, an international relations expert. "The next ambassador must be someone of great repute and who knows Niger well enough to inspire trust and respect." Benin, which maintains it hosts no foreign military bases, has seen a surge in jihadist attacks this year and laments poor cooperation with neighbouring Sahel states also affected. "Not being able to talk directly with its neighbours increases Benin's vulnerability," said Lassina Diarra, head of the Strategic Research Institute of the International Counter-Terrorism Academy in Ivory Coast. Benin is set to elect a new president in April 2026, which could be a chance to restart "serious negotiations", Moumouni said.
Morocco World
13-05-2025
- Business
- Morocco World
Morocco and the Alliance of Sahel States Countries: Towards a Common Area of Shared Prosperity?
Since their final withdrawal from ECOWAS on 29 January 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have intensified the construction of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), now structured as a sovereign confederation. This new entity aims to strengthen their political, economic, and security autonomy outside the traditional West African frameworks and traditional allies. On the security front, a 5,000-strong joint military force has been set up, benefiting from Russian and Turkish logistical and technical support, marking a major strategic realignment. On the symbolic and institutional level, the AES has launched a common biometric passport, abolished telephone roaming charges between its members, and adopted a common official anthem on 10th May 2025 to strengthen regional identity. In addition, an official AES emblem was unveiled. The AES is also pursuing ambitious economic integration projects, including the creation of a common currency. On February 15, 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), announced their intention to leave the CFA Franc Zone and create a common currency. General Abdourahamane Tiani, President of the Transition of Niger, said that this initiative aims to restore the monetary sovereignty of the concerned countries. As regards the trade aspect, the founding treaty establishes the principle of the free movement of persons and goods without specifying an economic integration mechanism or a clear vision. It is indicated that the details of this free movement will be regulated by additional protocols to be drawn up at a later stage. This could mean that the three countries will temporize and continue to manage economic integration and monetary issues within the framework of the WAEMU and the CFA monetary zone. On May 8th, 2025, HM King Mohammed VI received in Rabat the foreign ministers of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), as part of the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Sahelian countries. This meeting is an extension of the Atlantic Initiative launched by the Kingdom in 2023, aimed at facilitating the access of landlocked states in the Sahel to the Atlantic Ocean, perceived as a major geopolitical transformation paving the way for opening up, economic diversification and better integration into global markets. This audience illustrates, if need be, the central place of the Kingdom of Morocco in African geopolitical reconfigurations, as well as its commitment to a sovereign, united and integrated Africa. Economic relations between Morocco and the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) The AfCFTA, which entered into force in January 2021, is currently the main legal framework for trade between Morocco and the AES countries; Morocco, as a member of the AfCFTA, enjoys privileged access to member countries' markets, reducing customs barriers and non-tariff barriers. The zone also promotes the harmonization of trade rules, such as regulations on goods and services, investment, and the protection of intellectual property rights. Although the AfCFTA aims to facilitate intra-African trade, exclusion lists, highly restrictive or unfinalized rules of origin as well as Non-Tariff Barriers and infrastructure and logistics deficits can hinder the integration process. The economic relations between Morocco and the AES countries highlight a large untapped trade potential, which is still largely under-exploited. Currently, Moroccan exports to the four AES countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad) amount to about $300 million, while the overall trade potential is estimated at $2.23 billion, i.e. a realization rate of only 11.44%. This weak performance suggests significant room for growth. If we add trade with Mauritania and Senegal Moroccan exports reached $1.5 billion in 2022. High-potential markets include Senegal, Mali and Mauritania, while Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad remain emerging markets. Towards comprehensive and advanced cooperation between the Kingdom of Morocco and the AES countries Adopting a more ambitious approach could yield considerable benefits and maximize the potential of trade and investment; several levers can be leveraged, combining a progressive system of trade preferences reinforced by monetary cooperation, an economic corridor as well as investments in logistics infrastructure and the establishment of regional value chains. These initiatives would make it possible to expand the range of products traded, particularly in the Key sectors of agriculture and livestock, building materials, hides and leather, textiles, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals and rare earths. An expanded preferential area could thus generate an increase in trade of $2.1 billion to $6.27 billion, with contributions to GDP growth ranging from $0.315 billion to $0.836 billion. These figures underscore not only the untapped potential of cooperation between Morocco and the Sahel countries, but also the importance of further economic integration to foster growth, stability and well-being in the region. The project of Dakhla-N'Djamena corridor is another major strategic lever for the economic development and regional integration of the Sahel countries. It goes beyond a simple trade route by becoming an integrated economic development corridor, aimed at improving trade, attracting investment and stimulating economic activity. This project will evolve gradually, moving from a road corridor to a logistics and economic corridor, with rigorous management and effective coordination between the stakeholders. By connecting strategic endpoints such as cities, ports and industrial zones, it will facilitate regional trade and access to global markets, creating new economic opportunities for Sahelian countries. The Prospects of the Moroccan Dirham as a Regional Monetary Anchor for the AES Countries Between the option of leaving the Franc Zone and the option of creating a common currency, the AES states can explore a third way, which is more pragmatic and realistic, which would consist of considering an anchor to the Moroccan dirham. The dirham is a stable currency, pegged to a basket of currencies composed of 60% of the euro and 40% of the US dollar, thus offering relative stability. This stability could facilitate trade and investment between Morocco and the Sahel countries. In addition, Morocco has significant experience in monetary management unique in Africa, which could support the establishment of such an anchor. This option would offer a more realistic and pragmatic solution to the challenges posed by the creation of a hypothetical common currency. Of course, for a national currency to become a regional anchor currency, it must first be based on solid macroeconomic stability, which implies controlled inflation, stable growth, balanced public finances, and strong central bank credibility (Mundell, 1961; IMF, 2008; Eichengreen, 2011). The issuing country must also have significant economic and commercial weight in the region, with sustained trade, established financial influence, and a banking system sufficiently developed to ensure regional liquidity in national currency (Masson & Pattillo, 2005; AfDB, 2018; Sachs, 2005). The exchange rate regime of this currency must be predictable, supported by sufficient reserves, and compatible with the convertibility needs of other states (Eichengreen & Hausmann, 1999; IMF, 2008). Beyond the economic aspects, it is crucial that this currency is accepted politically and diplomatically by regional partners. The Dilemma of African Countries Between Monetary Orthodoxy and Concerns of Monetary Sovereignty In Africa, the idea of creating a single currency for the entire continent or at the regional level is not new and aims to accelerate economic integration, however, the realization of this ambition faces significant challenges; The economic structure of African countries is often unbalanced, characterized by a high dependence on commodity exports and weak intra-regional trade. The economic literature, in particular the one on optimal currency Areas (OCA), provides a rigorous analytical framework for assessing the feasibility of such a project. The work of Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro shows that monetary union or anchor regimes generally have a positive effect on trade, but only if certain pre requisites are met: Trade weight : Countries are more inclined to adopt the currency of a major trading partner. However, one of the historical obstacles to monetary integration in Africa is the weakness of intraregional trade. Macroeconomic convergence : Harmonization of economic policies, including fiscal policies, is essential to limit imbalances. Stability of the anchor currency : The issuing country must benefit from macroeconomic stability, developed financial markets and strong institutional credibility. Political will : The success of past monetary unions, such as the Scandinavian Monetary Union or the Latin Union, shows that monetary arrangements are, first and foremost, political projects. Unlike monetary unions in the North, South-South arrangements do not involve international reserve currencies, and economies face the 'original sin' (the situation in which a country's national currency is not used to borrow abroad) that limits their ability to borrow in their own currency from abroad (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2005; Fritz and Metzger, 2006). Traditional macroeconomic convergence criteria, often seen as prerequisites for integration, are not always met and have taken longer than expected to be achieved in regions such as ECOWAS, where political instability and high fiscal deficits are major obstacles. Despite these difficulties, the current approach suggests that monetary integration can be a process where convergence takes place ex post (after the start of integration) rather than being an ex-ante condition as suggested by the Optimal Currency Area theory. Classical theory is also criticized for its static nature and its lack of relevance to the dynamics observed in the countries of the South. (Barbara Fritz* and Laurissa Mühlich 2010). Indeed, this traditional theory of Optimal Currency Areas (OCAs), a pillar of the analysis of monetary unions, is now proving to be inadequate for understanding the new forms of regional monetary integration that have been developing since the 1990s, particularly within developing and emerging economies (South-South integration). One of the main shortcomings is its failure to take into account the specific monetary constraints of these countries, including the concept of 'original sin', which limits their ability to borrow in foreign currencies and makes it cheaper to abandon the exchange rate instrument. Moreover, these South-South arrangements differ fundamentally from the monetary unions of the North, as they do not involve any of the major international reserve currencies. Towards a new Dirham Currency Area In debates on monetary integration in Africa, the presence of a regional currency, such as the South African Rand in the Southern African Monetary Community (SAC), opens up a pragmatic perspective often neglected by the classical theory of optimal currency areas (OCAs). While the latter requires strong macroeconomic convergence among members – a criterion rarely met by developing countries – the example of the SAC shows that a structure centered on a more credible currency and less prone to 'original sin' (the inability of countries to borrow on international markets in their own currency), can offer tangible gains in everything, especially for LDC members. The latter then benefit from imported monetary stability, without themselves having the fundamentals required by the OCAs. This observation shakes up traditional economic dogmas that often exclude any form of monetary union between countries of the South because of structural divergences and lack of convergence. It stresses that successful integration depends not only on the symmetry of economies, but also on a country's ability to play the role of a regional anchor (Core Area). South Africa in the SAC, and perhaps tomorrow Morocco in the Sahel region, embody this alternative approach, where the monetary credibility of a single player can compensate for the lack of convergence within the group. The Moroccan dirham has several characteristics likely to charm Sahelian countries in search of monetary independence: it is stable, pegged to a euro-dollar basket, and managed by Bank Al-Maghrib, a central bank known for its prudence. Faced with a Franc Zone perceived by some as a colonial vestige, the prospect of a South-South regional anchorage, based on growing economic cooperation, could symbolize a new monetary and geopolitical era. An unprecedented monetary alliance could emerge between Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and several Sahel countries. The objective: to create an alternative to the CFA franc by backing Sahelian currencies to the Moroccan dirham, with substantial financial support from Abu Dhabi. This project would reflect a shared desire to rethink the monetary anchor in a space in search of economic sovereignty and political stability. The proposed arrangement would be inspired by flexible models such as the RAND zone in southern Africa, where several countries keep their national currencies while being linked to the South African Rand by a parity mechanism. Similarly, the Sahel countries would keep their currencies, but within a framework of regional anchoring to the dirham stabilized by a basket of currencies. This system would help mitigate external shocks while providing flexibility for national policies. Simple fiscal rules — a deficit and debt cap — would ensure the credibility of the system. This project would not be neutral from a geopolitical point of view. It would allow the Kingdom of Morocco and the UAE to strengthen their foothold in West Africa and the Sahel, for the Sahelian countries, it could be a way of emancipating themselves from traditional allies and ECOWAS perceived as too aligned with external interests. A political project above all The adoption of the dirham as an anchor will not be without obstacles. The main challenge is political: an anchor implies a partial renunciation of the monetary sovereignty of the partner countries. In an asymmetric fixed exchange rate system, only the issuing central bank retains monetary autonomy. Partners must therefore be convinced that the benefits (stability, reduced transaction costs, better regional integration) outweigh the costs (loss of monetary control, dependence). The African history of monetary arrangements – between the ambivalent legacy of the Franc Zone and the unsuccessful attempts at a common currency such as the ECO – shows that considerations of sovereignty, mutual trust and coordination of fiscal policies are decisive; Regional adherence to this currency therefore presupposes a shared political will, coordination of economic policies, and common institutions to provide a framework for the pegging. The advantages of a regional monetary zone between Morocco and the AES countries and possibly extended in a second phase to other countries are many and varied. First, deeper monetary integration can serve as an effective buffer against the systemic effects of financial globalization, it also offers considerable opportunities in terms of increased trade between member countries, synergies and economic cooperation, thus stimulating development; By grouping together, countries can negotiate more favorable trade terms bilaterally or multilaterally and be more competitive in attracting investment and international trade, especially in a world undergoing geopolitical restructuring. In the African context, a national currency can play the role of a regional anchor provided that it is based on strong macroeconomic credibility, political stability, and widespread use in regional trade. The issuing country must have a robust economy, an independent central bank, and a solid financial system to inspire the confidence of other states. However, this anchoring role exposes the national currency to Triffin's paradox: by providing regional liquidity, the country has to accept external deficits that weaken confidence in its own currency. To overcome this contradiction, several avenues are being considered, such as the establishment of regional reserve mechanisms, the adoption of a unit of account based on a basket of currencies, or multilateral surveillance of imbalances. These solutions would ensure the stability of the anchorage without sacrificing the internal balances of the issuing country. Making the dirham a regional anchor in West Africa and the Sahel is part of an economic and geopolitical logic, but it requires a strong political will and clear commitments. Morocco can lay the foundation by investing in regional integration, infrastructure and security in partnership with non-hegemonic actors and multilateral institutions. Tags: G5 Sahel regionMorocco and Sahel
