01-06-2025
Dhi Qar deadly drill drives Iraq to rethink military training
Shafaq News/ The recent deaths of two cadets during a training exercise in Dhi Qar have reignited longstanding concerns about Iraq's military education model, which critics argue remains locked in outdated Cold War–era doctrines.
Far from being an isolated lapse, the tragedy reflects deep structural and philosophical shortcomings that, if unaddressed, risk perpetuating preventable losses and undermining Iraq's future defense capability.
Legacy Systems vs. Modern Needs
Iraq's military training institutions continue to rely on rigid, antiquated protocols that prioritize physical endurance over tactical readiness and psychological resilience. Adnan Al-Kanani, a retired military instructor, explains that military education is divided into two main phases: a three-month 'basic training' at foundational schools, followed by branch-specific academies (e.g., infantry, engineering, logistics, armored units). Elite forces—such as special operations—undergo additional courses, including parachuting and advanced assault techniques.
'Training begins with theoretical instruction and gradual exposure to physical stress,' notes Alaa Al-Nashou, another retired instructor. 'The first 45 days are supposed to focus on adjusting the cadet mentally and physically to the military environment. Only afterward do they advance to intensive field training and combat simulations.'
Under these curricula—formally vetted by military education authorities—each session is prescribed by strict 'training cards.' Deviations can lead to disciplinary action or even military prosecution. In theory, this ensures uniformity; in practice, however, oversight is weak, coordination between institutions is poor, and some instructors resort to personal improvisation, perpetuating outdated beliefs about 'breaking in' new soldiers.
In neighboring Jordan and Egypt, military academies have shifted in recent years to emphasize tactical simulations and stress inoculation techniques over brute endurance—a model Iraq has yet to emulate, italicized by regional military analysts.
Fatal Drill in Dhi Qar
On May 21, 2025, seven cadets at the Fourth Military College in Dhi Qar were hospitalized—and two succumbed to dehydration and heatstroke—after enduring prolonged drills under direct sunlight without access to water, despite wearing civilian clothing during their first day of training. Mustafa Ajeel, Advisor to the Iraqi Parliament's Security and Defense Committee, condemned the incident as 'entirely preventable' and labeled it 'a case of gross mismanagement.'
'There was a complete disregard for even the most basic health and safety protocols,' Ajeel said.
According to survivors, the cadets were marched across open ground in extreme heat, with no pauses for hydration. By the time instructors recognized signs of distress—confusion, collapse, rapid heartbeat—it was too late.
Exposing Structural and Philosophical Flaws
Alaa Al-Nashou emphasizes that the Dhi Qar incident was not merely procedural but structural. By exposing fresh recruits to intensive field drills from day one, instructors violated the intended progression from classroom instruction to physical conditioning.
'Losses do happen during advanced training—but not like this, and not this early,' Nashou said. 'This was negligence, plain and simple.'
Despite official curricula mandating a gradual build-up—45 days of mental and physical acclimation before rigorous exercise—many training centers still adhere to the notion that brutality equals discipline. Nashou warns that 'modern warfare demands intelligence, agility, emotional resilience, and above all, leadership,' qualities that cannot be forged by running cadets to collapse.
On the other hand, Al-Kanani points out that, while formal structures exist, their enforcement is spotty. Inspectors rarely visit remote bases, and coordination between the Ministry of Defense and individual colleges is minimal.
'Instructors are expected to follow training cards, but there is no real accountability when they improvise,' Al-Kanani told Shafaq News. 'Outdated beliefs about 'breaking in' new soldiers are still prevalent.'
Mustafa Ajeel corroborates this, noting that inspectors often find discrepancies between written protocols and actual practices.
'We've discovered that some academies ignore basic precautions during summer months,' Ajeel said. 'This pattern predates the Dhi Qar tragedy but was only exposed when lives were lost.'
Inadequate medical support and nutrition services further compound the problem. Cadets frequently train on empty stomachs, and medical teams are ill-equipped to handle heatstroke or dehydration. Al-Kanani warns that, without systematic reform, 'Iraq's military education will remain an exercise in endurance rather than a science of readiness.'
Government Response and Accountability
In the days following the fatalities, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al- Sudani —also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces—ordered the immediate dismissal of the academy's president, deputy, and the battalion commander overseeing the drill. He convened an investigative board and granted the two fallen cadets promotions to second lieutenant posthumously.
In addition, the Ministry of Defense revised training schedules: afternoon summer drills were canceled, and training hours were restricted to 6:00–10:00 a.m. and 5:00–9:00 p.m. to avoid peak heat.
The Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee pledged to dispatch inspection teams nationwide. Mustafa Ajeel explained that these teams will 'review training conditions and adherence to modern protocols in military bases nationwide. These visits will help us determine where the system is breaking down.'
Calls for Comprehensive Reform
While the immediate policy changes address scheduling and chain-of-command accountability, experts insist that Iraq must undertake a deeper overhaul of its military education philosophy. Essential components include:
Modern Training Tools: Investment in flight simulators, urban-combat mock-villages, and virtual-reality modules to replicate battlefield scenarios without endangering cadets.
Psychological Preparedness: Embedding stress-management courses, resilience workshops, and mental-health screenings as core components of the initial 45-day phase.
Enhanced Nutritional and Medical Services: Providing balanced meals, hydration stations, and medical personnel trained specifically in heat-related illnesses at every training facility.
Instructor Accountability: Instituting an 'Instructor Accreditation Program' to ensure that all trainers meet global standards, with regular audits and disciplinary measures for deviations.
'Unless these long-overdue changes are implemented, the Dhi Qar tragedy risks being remembered not as a turning point—but as just another avoidable loss in a broken system,' Al-Nashou warned.
Al-Kanani added that 'modern warfare requires more than just physical stamina—it demands intelligence, agility, emotional resilience, and above all, leadership. Continuing to treat new cadets with outdated methods risks not only lives but Iraq's future defense capability.'
