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India.com
5 days ago
- Politics
- India.com
Blaze of Agni: Missiles to Crush China and Pakistan's War Dreams
Blaze of Agni: Missiles to Crush China and Pakistan's War Dreams India's journey to becoming a global power is not just about economic growth or diplomatic ties; it's about ensuring our nation's safety in a challenging neighbourhood. With tensions along the borders with Pakistan and China, India's missile programme, particularly the Agni series, stands as a powerful symbol of resolve. The Agni V, already a game-changer, and the upcoming Agni VI, promise to strengthen India's deterrence against both adversaries. These missiles, armed with nuclear warheads, secure our nation and shape a formidable future. Agni V: The Fire That Reaches Far The Agni V, a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), is India's pride with a range exceeding 7,000 km. It can deliver nuclear warheads to targets across Pakistan and deep into China, including cities like Beijing. Unlike earlier missiles like Agni I or II, tailored for Pakistan, Agni V's reach makes it a potent deterrent against China. Its canisterised design enables rapid launches from mobile platforms, leaving enemies little time to react. Agni V's Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, proven in the 2024 Mission Divyastra, allows one missile to carry multiple nuclear warheads, each striking a different target. For Pakistan's compact geography, a single Agni V could devastate multiple strategic sites, making aggression prohibitively costly. For China, MIRV complicates missile defence systems, as intercepting multiple warheads is a daunting challenge. India's no-first-use nuclear policy positions Agni V as a second-strike weapon, guaranteeing catastrophic retaliation. Agni V's precision and range outmatch Pakistan's shorter-range Shaheen III, which lacks comparable reach or nuclear payload capacity. Against China's advanced Dongfeng-41, Agni V levels the strategic field by threatening eastern cities, compelling caution in border disputes. Deployed from central India, Agni V's nuclear warheads ensure credible, far-reaching deterrence. Agni VI: The Future of India's Deterrence The Agni VI, under development, could elevate India's defence to unprecedented heights. With a range of 8,000–12,000 km and capacity for up to 10 nuclear MIRV warheads, it would be a global missile, capable of targeting China, Pakistan, and even parts of Europe or Africa. This strategic reach places India among an elite few nations. Agni VI's advanced features, including submarine-launch capability and Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRV), enhance its ability to evade China's growing missile defences. Its four-stage design and 3-tonne payload capacity allow it to deliver devastating nuclear strikes, reinforcing India's second-strike capability. Once deployed, Agni VI would transform regional security. For Pakistan, it would render nuclear brinkmanship suicidal, as one missile could obliterate multiple military and economic hubs. For China, Agni VI counters their ICBM numerical edge, ensuring India's nuclear retaliation would be overwhelming, even against distant cities. It would also proclaim India's shift from regional to global strategic power. Challenges and the Road Ahead Agni V and VI, with their nuclear arsenals, fortify India's deterrence but face challenges. Pakistan claims MIRV capability with its Ababeel missile, though its effectiveness is uncertain. China may accelerate its missile programme, risking an arms race. India must balance deterrence with diplomacy to manage tensions. Agni VI's development requires government approval and technical advancements, such as seeker technology for long-range accuracy. Yet, India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has consistently overcome such hurdles, as demonstrated by Agni V's success. A Fiery Message of Peace The nuclear-armed Agni V and potential Agni VI are more than weapons; they are India's commitment to its people's safety. They warn Pakistan and China that misadventures will incur unbearable costs. Upholding India's no-first-use policy, these missiles promote peace through unmatched strength. As Agni VI nears reality, it will solidify India's place in the elite ICBM club, delivering a clear message: India is prepared to defend itself against any threat. In a world where power respects power, Agni V and VI, with their nuclear warheads, are India's fiery shield, safeguarding our dreams of a secure and prosperous future. May our neighbours choose peace, for the fire of Agni burns only for those who threaten us.
India.com
16-05-2025
- Politics
- India.com
'Brahmastra' BrahMos demolished Pakistan during Op Sindoor, but India has a much more lethal weapon capable of..., name is...
Representational/File Agni 5 missile: India's 'Brahmastra', the BrahMos missile, caused widespread devastation across Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, annihilating terrorist hideouts and Pakistani military infrastructure, including key airbases, deep inside the enemy nation. While BrahMos is undoubtedly a formidable weapon of war, India has a much more deadlier weapon in its arsenal, the Agni 5 (Agni V) missile. Agni-5: India's most powerful missile Dubbed the 'Mahastra' of India's missile arsenal, the Agni-5 missile is a land-based nuclear MIRV-capable Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) boasting a range of over 7,000 kilometers, which means that the missile can even strike deep inside the Chinese mainland. Capable of reaching speeds of up to 29,400 km/hour, the Agni V missile is one of the fastest missiles in the world, and can strike virtually any target in Asia and beyond within a matter of minutes. Developed by India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Agni V is the longest-range ICBM in India's missile arsenal, with a payload capacity of around 50-56 tonnes, and the capability to carry a 1.5 tonne (1500 kg) nuclear or conventional warhead. Recently, the Agni-5 missile was equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology under Mission Divyastra, giving it the capability to strike multiple targets simultaneously by carrying multiple warheads. BrahMos brought missile Pakistan to its knees The BrahMos supersonic missiles were used extensively by Indian Armed Forces to strike Pakistani military sites during Operation Sindoor, and caused major devastation on Pakistani airbases, forcing the enemy to virtually beg for a ceasefire. According to reports, India fired as many as 15 BrahMos missiles on Pakistani airbases, each one reportedly hitting its intended target. The BrahMos is a medium-range cruise missile with a range between 450 to 600 kilometers, and can be launched from land, air, and sea. But Agni-5 is a completely different beast altogether, as its designed for intercontinental warfare, with speeds that make it highly difficult for any modern air defense system to intercept.
India.com
14-05-2025
- Politics
- India.com
India's 'Brahmastra' can destroy Turkey within 6 minutes! This deadly weapon is capable of..., name is...
The Agni-V ICBM has a range of over 7,000 kms. (File) India-Pakistan tensions: Turkey, along with China, were among the few nations that openly supported Pakistan during its recent conflict with India, supplying our hostile neighbour with advanced military drones that were used to launch attacks on Indian cities and military installations as India-Pakistan tensions reached a critical point post Operation Sindoor. Even after an India-Pakistan ceasefire came into force on Saturday, Pakistan violated the 'bilateral understanding' within a few hours of the announcement, reportedly using Turkish-made drones. On Wednesday, Turkey reiterated its stance, stating that it stand with Pakistan in its ongoing tensions with India. India-Turkey war But what if India is forced go toe-to-toe with Turkey in a conflict, a formidable military power of its own. Military experts believe India has devastating weapons, including the lethal Agni V Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which has a range of over 5,000 kms, and is capable of travelling at speeds of up to 29,400 km/h, making it one of the fastest missiles in the world. Comparing the armed forces of the two countries, the Indian Air Force is a highly-professional force with a fleet of 2,229 aircraft, including 513 fighter jets, while the Turkish air force lags behind with 1,083 aircraft, that includes, 201 fighter planes. Beyond armed forces, India has deadly supersonic missiles like the BrahMos and Agni series, which can bring any nation to knees within a a span of days, as was witnessed in the recent conflict with Pakistan. India's 'Brahmastra' could devastate Turkey Dubbed the 'Brahmastra' of India's missile arsenal, the Agni V missile is a land-based nuclear MIRV-capable ICBM boasting a range of over 7,000 kilometers. Given that the aerial distance between India and Turkey is around 4,565 km. The Agni V missile, which is capable of reaching speeds of up to 29,400 km/hour, can strike any part of Turkey, even its capital Ankara, within a matter of minutes. Developed by India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Agni V is the longest-range ICBM in New Delhi's arsenal, and is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead weighing up to a whopping 1000 kg BrahMos can be used against Turkey The BrahMos Supersonic missile recently demonstrated how devastating they can be as these deadly missiles razed key Pakistani airbases and military bases during Operation Sindoor, forcing the enemy to virtually beg for a ceasefire. The BrahMos is a medium-range cruise missile with a range between 450 to 600 kilometers, and can be launched from land, air, and sea. India could potentially use this missile against a far away nemesis like Turkey by launching it from an aircraft carrier or warship in the sovereign waters of another country which lies close to Ankara.
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First Post
10-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Explained: How many nuclear weapons do India and Pakistan have?
India maintains approximately 180 nuclear warheads, adhering to a 'No First Use' doctrine, highlighting deterrence and restraint. In contrast, Pakistan possesses around 170 warheads and follows a policy allowing first use under certain conditions, particularly to counterbalance India's superior conventional forces read more A surface-to-surface Agni V missile is launched from the Wheeler Island off the eastern Indian state of Odisha, April 19, 2012. File Image/Reuters Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called a meeting of the National Command Authority, the apex body overseeing the nation's nuclear arsenal on Saturday (May 10, 2025), following Islamabad's military operations against India targeting multiple bases. The standoff, now in its fourth consecutive day, intensified as Pakistan launched drone and missile attacks targeting 26 sites across India under the cover of darkness on May 9. In retaliation, India struck back, with Islamabad reporting attacks on three of its airbases: Nur Khan, Mureed and Shorkot. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Pakistan's use of its nuclear arsenal as a tool of deterrence has been a recurring theme, with Pakistani politicians invoking nuclear threats amid the ongoing conflict. Notably, Pakistan escalated the situation by launching at least one ballistic missile, which was intercepted over Sirsa in Haryana, India. Meanwhile, we do a comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities and doctrines: The India-Pakistan rivalry dates back to the partition of British India in 1947, leading to multiple wars and ongoing disputes. Both nations have since developed nuclear capabilities, with India conducting its first nuclear test in 1974 and Pakistan following in 1998. What is India's nuclear policy compared to Pakistan's India adheres to a 'No First Use' (NFU) policy, asserting that it would not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike but would respond with punitive retaliation if attacked. This doctrine puts an emphasis on credible minimum deterrence and aims to maintain a posture of restraint. India's nuclear command structure is under civilian control, with the Nuclear Command Authority overseeing strategic decisions. Pakistan, on the other hand, has not adopted an NFU policy. Its doctrine is based on 'Full Spectrum Deterrence,' which includes the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons to counter conventional military threats. This approach is designed to deter India's conventional military superiority and rapid mobilisation strategies, such as the 'Cold Start' doctrine. Pakistan's nuclear command is similarly under civilian oversight, with the National Command Authority responsible for strategic control. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD How many nuclear warheads do India and Pakistan have According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), India has upwards of 180 nuclear warheads as of 2025. India has developed a nuclear triad consisting of land-based ballistic missiles (for example - Agni series), air-delivered weapons and sea-based platforms, including nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles (SSBNs). Note: Arrows refer to general trends over a multi-year period, rather than individual year-to-year changes. Numbers may fluctuate year-over-year for several reasons, including actual changes in a countries' stockpiles and/or reassessments by the authors based on new data. Image/FAS Pakistan has upwards of 170 nuclear warheads as of 2025, according to FAS. Pakistan's delivery mechanisms include land-based ballistic missiles (for example - Shaheen and Ghauri series), air-delivered weapons and cruise missiles. While Pakistan is developing sea-based capabilities, its nuclear triad is not yet fully realised. How India became nuclear-capable India's nuclear journey began in earnest after China's first nuclear test in 1964, which heightened New Delhi's security concerns. India conducted its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974 at Pokhran in Rajasthan, code-named 'Smiling Buddha.' Though described as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion,' it signalled India's entry into the nuclear club. A surface-to-surface Agni V missile is displayed during the Republic Day parade in New Delhi, India, January 26, 2013. File Image/Reuters India's strategic posture remained ambiguous until 1998, when it conducted five underground nuclear tests as part of 'Operation Shakti.' These tests demonstrated a range of nuclear capabilities, including thermonuclear devices. In the aftermath, India formally declared itself a nuclear-armed state and adopted a policy of 'No First Use' and credible minimum deterrence, maintaining civilian control over its nuclear arsenal under the Nuclear Command Authority. How Pakistan became nuclear-capable Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons was driven primarily by its security rivalry with India, especially after India's first nuclear test in 1974. Under the leadership of then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan accelerated its nuclear programme, initiating clandestine efforts to acquire the technology and expertise necessary for weapons development. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Key figures like Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan played a pivotal role by bringing uranium enrichment technology to Pakistan. Despite global scrutiny and proliferation concerns, Pakistan maintained a covert nuclear programme for decades. Pakistani military trucks carry the long range nuclear-capable surface-to-surface 'Ghauri' ballistic missile during the National Day parade in Islamabad, Pakistan, March 23, 2005. File Image/Reuters On 28 May 1998, in response to India's Pokhran-II tests, Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests in the Chagai Hills, Balochistan, officially becoming the world's seventh nuclear power. These tests demonstrated a range of nuclear devices and underscored Pakistan's intent to maintain strategic parity with India through a doctrine of credible deterrence. Diplomatic efforts by India & Pakistan in the past Despite their adversarial relationship, India and Pakistan have engaged in various confidence-building measures to mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict: Non-Nuclear Aggression Agreement (1988): Both countries agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities and have since reportedly exchanged lists of such installations annually. Lahore Declaration (1999): This agreement aimed to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to promote mutual understanding of each other's security concerns. Also Watch: With inputs from agencies
India Today
07-05-2025
- Politics
- India Today
Pakistan's nuke tactics: Should India worry?
(NOTE: This article was originally published in the India Today issue dated June 20, 2016) The buddy-buddy relations between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Barack Obama were evident at the Oval Office on June 7-their seventh meeting in two years. But the ghost of Pakistan hovered in the room like a Betaal, as an Indian official put it, likening our north-western neighbour to the irksome character in the ancient fable. India had recently lobbied successfully to get the US Congress to put a temporary hold on the sale of eight nuclear-capable F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan by refusing to subsidise their cost. The more alarming concern for India, the US and the rest of the world, however, is Pakistan's development of a new generation of nuclear-tipped missiles that threaten to lower the nuclear threshold and make the sub-continent, as a US official put it, "the most dangerous place in the world to live in". Pakistan has reportedly inducted these 'tactical' nuclear weapons as part of its artillery arsenal to pulverise any advancing Indian army division in the event of a war. Prior to this, both India and Pakistan had developed a panoply of 'strategic' nuclear weapons designed to strike terror among civilian populations in metros, or to knock out major military targets some distance away from the border. India's Agni V, for instance, can strike targets over 5,000 km away and can be launched from as far south as Chennai to strike Islamabad or Beijing. Pakistan, too, has developed the Ghauri and Shaheen to strike anywhere in India, and has lately extended their range to the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, where India has an important tri-service base. But never before were nuclear weapons meant to be used as a tactical manoeuvre on the battlefield to thwart an advancing army corps. The Nasr, as the midget red-and white nuclear-tipped missile has been christened, is a slim pencil-shaped rocket with fins, which can traverse a distance of 60 km, or little more than the range of an artillery gun. In its current configuration, shown during Pakistan's Military Day parade last year, the Nasr was housed in a multibarrel launch vehicle that could fire four of them simultaneously. Unlike conventional munitions, whose lethality comes from their explosive force and shrapnel, a nuclear-tipped missile doesn't only kill or immobilise enemy troops with the force of the blast. The extreme heat it produces, followed by the radiation it emits, can lead to debilitating sickness or kill a large number of troops within minutes of a strike. Though they had been in the works for the past five years, the first official confirmation that Pakistan had deployed tactical nuclear weapons to thwart an Indian aggression was made by the country's foreign secretary, Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, at a press briefing before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's bilateral meeting with Obama last October. The timing of Chaudhry's announcement was significant and clearly meant to warn both the US and India. For months, there was speculation that Pakistan had requested the US to give it a civil nuclear deal similar to the one India signed in 2005. In return, the US was forcing Pakistan to roll back its nuclear weapons programme, including stopping the development of tactical nuclear weapons and agreeing to sign the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that would further limit its nuclear capability. When The Washington Post's David Ignatius leaked the details in what he termed 'a diplomatic blockbuster' just weeks before Sharif's visit to the US, Islamabad went into overdrive to deny the report. The Pakistan army, which controls the country's nuclear arsenal, was reportedly furious with the civilian establishment for trying to dilute its nuclear deterrence against India. Sharif was forced to say, en route to the US: "We will protect the national interests of Pakistan during my meetings with the US leadership." He added, for good measure, that "we should not forget who the prime minister was in 1998 when we became a nuclear power", reminding his country that the tests had happened during his watch. It was also a significant message to India. At that point, relations between the neighbours had touched a new nadir. A planned meeting of the national security advisors (NSAs) of both countries in Delhi had ended in a fiasco and had to be called off. There was growing suspicion and fear in Pakistan that Modi's 'blow hot, blow cold' policy was a cover for the new 'offensive defence' doctrine advocated by Ajit Doval, his hawkish NSA. Doval had always maintained that the only answer to Pakistan's repeated terror strikes was for India to develop the capability to strike at Pakistan's vital interests without escalating it to an all-out war. By flaunting Nasr, as an expert put it, Pakistan was "showing India its nuclear middle finger and telling Doval to dare". Experts now see the Pakistan army's belligerence, and its continued backing of terrorist groups targeting India, as an emboldening because of the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. There is no let-up on terror strikes against India, as demonstrated by the Pathankot attack in December and the recent strikes in Jammu & Kashmir. The Pakistan army appears smug in the belief that India will now think thrice before contemplating an 'offensive defence' attack. The threat that Pakistan is sending is that it will quickly escalate any retaliation to a nuclear dimension, spooking the world and getting major powers to hold India back. It is also being seen as the reason why, while Sharif makes conciliatory gestures towards Modi, the army appears against normalising relations. Pakistan justifies the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons as a response to India's Cold Start doctrine. Though India officially denies the existence of such a doctrine, it was first enunciated by the Indian army after the Kargil War in 1999 and the terror attack on Parliament in 2001. Policy experts had complained that it took months for the Indian army to ready its strike corps for a counter-attack on Pakistan. Since then, India is supposed to have developed a proactive strategy to mobilise major formations at short notice to launch a surprise strike. To counter such a strike, Lt Gen (retd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, advisor to Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA), which controls its nuclear weapons, asserted that Pakistan had to develop tactical nuclear weapons that could thwart a surprise thrust by Indian troops on its border. In March this year, Kidwai told a gathering at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad: "We are not apologetic about the development of tactical weapons. They are here to stay. Pakistan will not cap or curb its nuclear weapons programme or accept any restrictions." It was Kidwai who, as director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), the operational wing of Pakistan's NCA, in 2002, had listed four conditions that would elicit a Pakistani nuclear riposte. These were: if India conquers a large swathe of Pakistani territory; if it destroys a large part of its armed forces; if it strangulates the Pakistani economy; or if it causes political destabilisation. Pakistan also retained the option of striking first and its nuclear threshold is deliberately ambiguous so as to generate uncertainty in the minds of Indian leaders. In contrast, India has a No First Use (NFU) nuclear doctrine but reserves the right to massively retaliate if Indian forces, populace or territory suffer a nuclear, biological or chemical strike. Feroz Hassan Khan, author of Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistan Bomb, believes that Pakistan's new deterrence strategy is based on risk manipulation. "Tactical weapons create a high level of uncertainty that India could not proceed with a conventional war for fear of the unknown," he says. India's counter is to call Pakistan's 'nuclear bluff', and punish it for waging proxy war. If Pakistan resorts to using tactical nuclear weapons, a top official in India's NCA, told India Today, "We will retaliate so massively that Pakistan, as we know it, will cease to exist." The worry for US nuclear experts such as Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, is that "neither side believes that the other's stated nuclear use doctrine is credible and that, by itself, creates a dangerous uncertainty." Worse, Pakistan is now the fastestgrowing nuclear weapons power in the world and has overtaken India's arsenal in size. Krepon points out that Pakistan is playing the "catch-up game" and, in the last decade, has constructed four reactors that can produce 25 to 50 kilogram of weapons-grade plutonium-four times the amount India is producing. When added to its stockpile of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), which can also be used to make bombs, Pakistan can produce as many as 14 to 27 nuclear weapons every year, as compared with the two to five nukes that India can build. Pakistan is now said to have 120 nuclear bombs as compared with India's 110. In spite of this, India remains committed to its doctrine of 'credible minimum deterrence'. A former top NCA official says, "Tactical nukes are as dated as the Cold War between Soviet Union and the US. There is a meaningless distinction between 'tactical' and 'strategic' because the distances in the subcontinent are short as compared with Moscow and Washington DC. If Pakistan hits us with a tactical nuke, we are going to hit it hard with everything we have." Despite Pakistan's suspicions, India denies it has tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The official reveals that, after Nasr's development, the issue was reviewed three times by the NCA in meetings chaired by the prime minister, and each time the armed forces said there was no need to develop a counter or alter India's No First Use doctrine. As he points out, "We have never treated India's nuclear capability as part of our offensive arsenal. We developed it only for defence and to deter anyone planning a nuclear strike against us." Instead, the Indian army has now prepared itself to absorb a tactical nuclear strike by equipping its troops with suits that can withstand such attacks and evolving other strategies. While India has not altered its nuclear course, it has used every occasion to highlight the dangers of Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons, particularly to the US. Ashley Tellis, who has written several defining books on India's nuclear programme, believes that Pakistan is wrong in its belief that it has 'checkmated' India by developing tactical weapons. He points out that even the US has all but abandoned tactical nukes because they are not effective war-fighting instruments. Tellis points out that it would take "300 to 400 Hiroshima-sized weapons, not tactical weapons, to stop an armoured corps". He says that Pakistan just doesn't have the numbers to sustain such a nuclear battle. Other experts point to the inherent dangers of maintaining an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons because the chances of misuse and accidental use rise manifold. Jeffrey D. McCausland of the Stimson Center, pointed out in an in-depth study last year that Pakistan's military planners would find battlefield nuclear weapons a logistical nightmare, calling such an induction "dangerous and problematic". For one, it would require a pre-delegation of authority to field military commanders, which increases the risk of miscalculations and weapons falling into the wrong hands. Also, because of the proximity of the borders to large towns such as Lahore, there is a danger of radioactive clouds being blown back to Pakistan and affecting its own people. So what do India and the world do with Pakistan's renegade nuclear plans? There is a limit to the pressure India can put on the US and other major powers as New Delhi is first seeking clarity on its own global nuclear status. With its imminent acceptance as a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) coupled with its bid to be a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), India hopes to sit on the high table of nuclear decisionmaking. It could then use the forums to put pressure on Pakistan to restrain its nuclear ambitions. George Perkovich, another US expert who has written a seminal book on India's nuclear programme, believes that "for India to put boots on the ground and battle Pakistan would be a mistake. It needs to develop zero-cost methods to put pressure on Pakistan and further isolate it." Noted Pakistan expert Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution has advocated a US civil nuclear agreement for Pakistan in a bid to 'mainstream' its role. He views it as a prerequisite for Pakistan to achieve strategic stability and normalise relations with India. Krepon believes the US should make such an offer only if Pakistan undertakes nuclear-related initiatives such as committing to a recessed deterrence posture and cutting down on tactical nuclear missiles, apart from joining the FMCT negotiations and signing the CTBT. And, like India, it should agree to separate its civilian and nuclear facilities. India is appalled by such an offer to mainstream Pakistan and believes that Islamabad has to demonstrate far greater nuclear restraint and responsibility before any concessions are made. India constantly reminds other nations of how physicist A.Q. Khan sold Pakistan's nuclear secrets to a number of countries including North Korea and Iran and that its non-proliferation record remains suspect. Pakistani experts such as Feroz Hassan Khan, who once served in the nuclear establishment, advocate a more moderate and nuanced nuclear posture by Pakistan. As he points out in a recent paper, "Ultimately nuclear weapons only make strong states stronger; they do not make weak states impregnably secure. They can be diversions of the precious resources that weak states possess. Nuclear weapons are an ineradicable part of Pakistan and it does need a credible nuclear deterrent. Yet, for Pakistan to achieve real security, it must focus on some long-term societal, economic and social problems that nuclear weapons cannot address." Sensible words. If only the leaders and generals in Pakistan would listen. Subscribe to India Today Magazine
