Latest news with #AlbertKhorev
Business Recorder
30-05-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
Russian envoy meets UAF vice chancellor
FAISALABAD: Russian Ambassador Albert Khorev has said that the educational and research ties especially between Russian universities and University of Agriculture Faisalabad (UAF) will be further strengthened to learn from each other's experiences. He along with Education and Cultural Attaché Alina Kolesnikov visited UAF and called on UAF Vice Chancellor Prof Dr Zulfiqar Ali. He lauded the steps being taken on the part of UAF to address the agricultural challenges and ensure the food security. He said that his visit was aimed at further improving the bilateral ties. The areas of collaboration in academia and research including students exchange programs came under discussion. The meeting also discussed the possibilities of joint degree program, establishment of cultural center and short courses of Russian language. Prof Dr Zulfiqar Ali said that collaboration with international partners, including Russia, could open new avenues for joint research, faculty exchange and student mobility which ultimately will benefit both nations in the fields of research, advancement and education. He highlighted the immense potential and ongoing contributions of the university in the global academic and research landscape. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Russia Today
25-02-2025
- Business
- Russia Today
Russia has a new game plan for South Asia
Russia-Pakistan relations have been in the spotlight in recent months – from the visits of high-level delegations to the signing of various cooperation agreements, trade deals, and even joint counterterrorism exercises. All this means that Russians are becoming increasingly aware of another promising partner in South Asia. Earlier this month, Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Albert Khorev said in an interview with TASS that the Kremlin shares the country's concern over growing terrorist activity – something that has been a point of contention between Islamabad and New Delhi, Moscow's key partner in the region. Khorev stated that Russia fully supports Islamabad's determination to combat this threat and emphasized that Moscow acknowledges the rising security challenges facing the country and is committed to enhancing constructive cooperation with both Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. The ambassador highlighted the productive counterterrorism collaboration between Russia and Pakistan, noting the effectiveness of expert consultations at the deputy foreign minister level. These high-level dialogues have played a significant role in strengthening bilateral efforts against terrorism, the envoy emphasized. The countries are also fast-tracking important economic agreements. For instance, freight railway transportation between Russia and Pakistan is scheduled to commence in March 2025, according to a recent statement from the Russian Ministry of Transport. The announcement was made after the two countries signed an action plan for cooperation in the transportation sector at the 3rd Caspian Economic Forum, held in Tehran. This plan includes establishing a transport link with Pakistan, as the initial stage of the route will pass through Iranian territory. The route to Pakistan will serve as an extension of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which Russia is developing alongside Iran and India as an alternative to traditional trade routes like the Suez Canal. For foreign policy experts, the deepening ties between Russia and Pakistan come as no surprise. Interest in the evolving relationship between the two countries has grown steadily since 2014, gaining particular momentum after 2022. Despite this upward trajectory, Russia perceives Pakistan as a nation with a complicated political landscape, persistent socio-economic challenges, and enduring security concerns—issues unlikely to be resolved in the near term. While the potential for bilateral cooperation appears promising, the future of the relationship remains marked by a degree of uncertainty. The February 2024 Pakistani general parliamentary elections, were undoubtedly the country's most significant political event. Three parties competed in the elections: the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Although the first two parties were not formally allied, they represented the traditional political elite and were apparently favored by Pakistan's military establishment. In contrast, supporters of PTI and its leader, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, faced administrative restrictions and criminal prosecution. In January, Khan, who remains a popular political figure figure in the country, was sentenced to 14 years in prison for corruption (after already spending 18 months in jail). He maintained that the cases against him are part of a 'political witchunt' to keep him out of office. Khan's wife, Bushra Bibi, was also charged in the corruption case and given a 7-year term. She was arrested in the courtroom after the verdict was given. Although the opposition managed to secure a relative majority of seats in parliament in last year's election, this did not alter the final outcome – thanks to coalition negotiations, the allocation of parliamentary seats to women and religious minorities, and independent candidates who ultimately joined PML-N and PPP, the latter parties were able to form a coalition government and secure key positions in both the executive and legislative branches. Unsurprisingly, the opposition refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new government, citing discrimination during the election campaign, vote counting irregularities, and a general collusion between political and military elites. The confrontation between the government and Khan's supporters resulted in tragedy by the end of last year. In November, Khan urged his supporters to take to the streets, demanding a review of the election results, the release of detained allies, and the repeal of the 26th amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan, concerning the powers of the Supreme Court. The street protests that erupted then resulted in many casualties among both law enforcement officers and demonstrators. The situation was exacerbated when the protest leaders—Khan's wife Bibi and Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province Ali Amin Gandapur, abandoned their supporters and left Islamabad amidst the chaos. For the opposition, the outcome of this confrontation was rather disheartening – the protests failed to influence the government, while responsibility for the deaths of law enforcement officials and civilians largely fell on the protest leaders who, as many believe, displayed cowardice and were unworthy of their party leader. The setbacks faced by the opposition, however, do not signify the defeat of Imran Khan, who remains active from behind bars. This week, Khas announced that his PTI party will launch a nationwide protest movement with other opposition parties for 'the restoration of democracy' and Pakistan's constitution after the holy month of Ramadan. Khan's popularity remains strong as long as the government fails to address the country's considerable socio-economic challenges. Despite many persisting issues, 2024 proved to be a relatively favorable year for Pakistan's economy. A decline in budget deficits, public debt, and inflation rates has sparked optimism among observers, since the country avoided default and a major crisis – at least according to key macroeconomic indicators. This relative stability can largely be attributed to the implementation of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program and the assistance received from the organization. In July 2024, the IMF announced a new loan of $7 billion for Pakistan, contingent upon continued economic reforms. These reforms include enhancing the efficiency of the tax system and phasing out subsidies in the energy sector. This situation presents two main challenges. Firstly, the IMF remains Islamabad's only immediate solution for its economic troubles. This indicates that Pakistan's macroeconomic model essentially remains unchanged – it is heavily reliant on external capital, as there are no viable conditions for tapping into domestic financial resources. Secondly, the IMF's requirements come with their own problems. Broad budget cuts, increased tax burdens, and the liberalization of energy prices will primarily impact ordinary people, who are already facing considerable economic challenges. In this context, it can be assumed that the government will continue to navigate between the IMF's demands and the expectations of the people. This balancing act will involve implementing half-measures that allow for further borrowing from financial institutions without provoking a fierce backlash from potential voters. Such a strategy is unlikely to address the country's structural problems, and will exacerbate the overall socio-economic situation, leading to rising social tensions and threats to national security. In 2024, the Pakistani elite expressed significant concern over growing terrorist activity in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The Pakistani leadership attributes the worsening situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the Afghan authorities' reluctance to cooperate with Islamabad in countering Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Meanwhile, Balochistan faces additional turmoil as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) targets Chinese workers and engineers involved in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects. To address these threats, in June 2024 the government announced the launch of a 'multi-domain counter-terrorism campaign' called 'Resolve for Stability' (Azm-e-Istehkam). Since there is little public information about the campaign, it is difficult to assess specific changes, and we can only rely on certain comments from Pakistani elites. The military leadership emphasizes that this campaign is more than just another counter-terrorism operation; it aims to be a comprehensive initiative focused on the long-term resolution of the terrorism issue. It's likely that the military will seek to move away from large-scale combat operations that have led to civilian casualties in favor of targeted actions that minimize collateral damage. In this context, the revival of joint counter-terrorism exercises between the armed forces of Russia and Pakistan look quite promising. This collaboration serves the interests of both Moscow and Islamabad and does not infringe on the security concerns of other countries. Pakistani experts have pointed out that while there has been progress in the field of security cooperation between Russia and Pakistan, it has not extended to economic collaboration. With an increase in high-level contacts between the two countries last year and in the first months of this year, the imbalance is being addressed, as both sides are actively looking for ways to establish an economic foundation for their partnership. The agreements signed by the two countries in the 9th Session of the Russia-Pakistan Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation last year – spanning sectors like energy, industrial development, logistics, trade, and education – provide hope for establishing a solid foundation for bilateral relations. The central question is whether these governmental agreements will translate into tangible business contracts. Considering the structural challenges both economies face, substituting concrete commitments with mere declarations of goodwill would serve neither side's interests. If the planned initiatives fail to materialize, the discussions and statements from Russia-Pakistan meetings will amount to little more than empty rhetoric. However, should Moscow and Islamabad succeed in launching mutually beneficial projects, it could elevate their bilateral relationship to a new level.
Asia Times
12-02-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Russia better than China for making Afghan-Pakistan peace
Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Albert Khorev told TASS over the weekend that his country supports Pakistan and Afghanistan's respective counter-terrorism efforts. He then added that it encourages both of them to resolve their border tensions through bilateral or multilateral means. This suggests a desire to mediate between them. China has already tried to do so but has struggled to achieve anything, yet Russia has a better chance of success. Russia's grand geo-economic plan in this part of Eurasia is to pioneer parallel connectivity and energy corridors to India via Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To that end, Russia must cultivate equally excellent relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, help resolve their border tensions, and then do the same with Pakistan and India's. The first step has already been achieved upon strategically partnering with the Taliban last summer and then clinching a strategic resource pact with Pakistan in December. The second step will be much more difficult to fulfill but therein lies the purpose behind Ambassador Khorev's latest remarks regarding Russia's support for Pakistan and Afghanistan's respective counter-terrorism efforts. On the one hand, he acknowledged his host country's problems with Afghan-emanating terrorist threats, but on the other, he shied away from blaming the Taliban for them like Islamabad does and instead offered to provide them with vague 'necessary assistance'. The goal appears to be to empower each to in their own way, the first through political support for stopping all terrorist infiltration from Afghanistan and the second by possibly equipping them with small arms and potentially training their special forces to fight ISIS-K. Left unsaid is any reference to Pakistan's claims that the Taliban backs the TTP ('Pakistani Taliban') and other terrorist groups, however, though commenting on this either way would ruin Russia's careful balancing act. To be sure, China has already applied the same approach towards this issue, but it lacks the geo-economic vision that Russia does wherein the improvement of Afghan-Pakistani ties is integral to the success of its broader regional policy. Pakistan and Afghanistan don't need to trade across one another's territory in order to do business with China since the first employs the Belt & Road Initiative's China-Pakistan Economic Corridor flagship to that end while the second has rail access to it via Central Asia. Therefore, although China does indeed want its neighboring partners to work more closely together, this isn't required to advance its geo-economic interests. The situation is altogether different with Russia, whose grand geo-economic plan necessitates Afghanistan and Pakistan patching up their problems in order to pioneer parallel connectivity and energy corridors that could one day ideally reach India. Those two, therefore, naturally understand that Russia has much greater stakes in mediation than China does. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan would receive additional economic benefits from China upon resolving their tensions, but Pakistan could finally receive more direct overland connectivity with Russia and perhaps even energy from it with time too if that happens, both via Afghanistan. Likewise, Afghanistan could profit from its middleman role in these corridors, especially if they ever extend to India. No such benefits stand to be reaped from China if Beijing were to successfully mediate between them. Accordingly, it's incumbent on Russia to utilize creative means for moving this diplomatic process along to the best of its ability, which could include sharing detailed plans of its proposed connectivity and energy investments in both in Afghanistan and Pakistan should they agree to resolve their disputes. These could include specific projects, the estimated amount that'll be invested, lending terms if required, the possibility for joint ownership of some sort, and the local labor that might be employed. It might still not be enough for a breakthrough, but it would still be more than what China has offered to do if they make peace, which is nothing. Moreover, such a detailed proposal could later be returned to if the political and/or military situation changes and they decide to patch up their problems, in which case they'd have a mutual interest in reviving Russia's plans. It's too early to predict what'll happen either way, just that Russia is expected to push for peace, and its efforts will be more meaningful than China's. This article was first published on Andrew Korybko's Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber here.
