2 days ago
Is Lebanon Irreformable?
In a normal country, political life is structured around a constitution that outlines its system of governance. Recent developments, however, have shown that Lebanon has not yet reached this stage. Disappointment has prevailed once again after the inauguration of President Joseph Aoun raised citizens' expectations. The optimism heightened with Nawaf Salam's appointment as the head of the first government of Aoun's term, as his previous role as a judge at the International Court of Justice raised hopes for reform. It was only natural for the country to be swept up in optimism, especially given Aoun's inauguration speech and cabinet's ministerial statement, which echoed citizens' deep-seated aspirations for reform and transparency.
However, the contrast between the rhetoric and policy decisions being made is stark, particularly at the highest levels. Key political appointments in this country that had been deliberately looted and impoverished- and are now in a foundational phase- have left the public disillusioned. The ruling class has not taken a single step toward dismantling the sectarian-quota-based spoil-sharing system. As a result, the country's political trajectory has not changed, failing to break with the disastrous practices of the past. Under the Aoun–Salam duo, deviations from the paths set by the Constitution continue, with many of the decisions and appointments blatantly violating constitutional principles.
When Michel Aoun was president, constitutional loopholes were a constant theme of the public discourse. Disputes over each branch's authority revolved around the notion that the country's top offices are sectarian in nature, with the state and its constitutional institutions reduced to fiefdoms. It is worth noting, that the constitution, which reserves the oath of office for the president, does not stipulate the president represents the Maronite community, nor does it say that the speaker represents the Shiite community or the prime minister represents the Sunni community. The idea of a "troika" gained traction under the Syrian occupation. It was used to undermine the constitutional authority of the president as a neutral arbiter on the one hand; on the other, it allowed the hegemon to tighten its grip on the country's decisions and resources.
Several parties have defended the supposed need to maintain sectarian balance at the top. However, precedents show that their real objective is not to uphold the balance created by the constitution but to ensure that individual sectarian leaders maintain their privileges and tighten their grip on politics under the pretext of representing their respective communities. The outcome of this approach is obvious: it has been profoundly negative, preventing the establishment of a state built on institutions and the rule of law.
Today, there is no shortage of figures eager to promote this approach through manipulative rhetoric. With regard to the president, their argument is built on that 'strong mandate' that he enjoys given his broad international and regional backing, as well as his near-unanimous domestic support for him to fill the longstanding vacuum born of the political system's dysfunction. Some have argued that the president is entitled to implement his own interpretation of how to expand his role, irrespective of constitutional boundaries.
Let us pause here and look over the 1991 constitutional amendments introduced after the Taif Agreement. The executive authority that had been given to the president was transferred to the Council of Ministers as a collective body. However, the coup against the Taif Accord and the Republic prevented the implementation of the constitution and enabled the former Syrian regime to seize control of the executive branch. To paper over this breach, large shares of power were granted to leaders (under the pretext that they represented their sects) who owed their power to militias or wealth. Their power would broaden and narrow depending on the interests of foreign powers, pushing Lebanon into a transitional phase that came to be known as the 'confederation of sects.'
After 1991, Lebanon nominal adopted a classic parliamentary political system. In reality, however, actual power was seized by sectarian factions. The state was undermined and oversight was ignored as a result. The subjugation of the judiciary ultimately dragged the country into the abyss. Many hoped that the new president would break with this dismal era. The inaugural speech and ministerial statement drew a lot of attention, with some linking the moment to the Shihabist era of reform.
Those in power failed, however, to meet the expectations of the people. The president's calls for citizens to report cases of corruption and misconduct directly to the presidency has raised questions: Where about the government? Concerns heightened when the president unilaterally took on the task of resolving Hezbollah's weapons. Many Lebanese were also alarmed by the appointment of former minister Ali Hamieh (who represented Hezbollah in the previous government) as a presidential advisor for reconstruction. It was surprising to see Hamieh named to a 'presidential committee tasked with drafting a comprehensive plan for the reviving regions devastated by the war.' He had represented a party held responsible for the very catastrophe that befell Lebanon!
Lebanon is not inherently resistant to reform, change, or transparency. However, Lebanon needs strong reformist elites with strong popular support that can seize this historic opportunity to lift its people out of poverty and alleviate their fears. It needs elites who can break with the logic of sectarian quota-sharing and reject evasive tactics, to finally reach safe harbor.
