Latest news with #ArmyBlackHawk
Axios
14-05-2025
- General
- Axios
Hotline linking Pentagon, Reagan Airport inoperable since 2022, FAA says
A direct line between the Pentagon and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport ' s air traffic control tower has been inoperable since March 2022, a Federal Aviation Administration official testified Wednesday. The big picture: The FAA had briefly closed military helicopter routes flying near the airport after one collided with a civilian passenger jet in January, causing the deadliest airline accident in the U.S. in decades. The Defense Department manages the hotline, Franklin J. McIntosh, FAA deputy chief operating officer, said during the Senate hearing. The Pentagon did not immediately respond to Axios' request for comment. Driving the news: "We're insisting upon that line to be fixed before we resume any operations out of the Pentagon," he said. Without the hotline, air traffic controllers at the airport had to use a landline to communicate with the Pentagon helipad instead. State of play: The FAA "became aware" that the hotline was out this month, less than a week after the Army resumed D.C.-area flights for the first time since January's fatal mid-air collision. The Army resumed flying in the D.C. region April 25. Days later, air traffic control commanded two commercial aircrafts to abort landings at Reagan National because an Army Black Hawk was on an apparent Pentagon training mission. At the time, air traffic controllers were in charge of both local air traffic and helicopter flights, just as they were on the day of the crash, McIntosh said. The Army Aviation Brigade again suspended operations in the D.C. area. on May 5.
New York Times
12-05-2025
- General
- New York Times
Revealing the Many Factors Behind a Fatal Plane Crash
I was watching the news with my husband on the night of Jan. 29 when a horrifying incident was reported: A helicopter and a plane had collided near Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington. I immediately began messaging my sources in aviation. My New York Times colleague Mark Walker, who had been eating dinner at a restaurant, quickly paid his bill and began calling sources in the transportation world. The crash, which occurred roughly 300 feet above the chilly Potomac River at a high speed, was unlikely to have any survivors. In the hours that followed, additional details were revealed. The helicopter had been an Army Black Hawk, and the plane had been an American Airlines regional jet from Wichita, Kan. Wreckage landed in the Potomac. Reporting in the days after crystallized the frightening scope of the disaster — which killed 67 people, three on the helicopter and 64 on the plane — and offered flashes of insight into the events that preceded it. Frequent and largely unconstrained helicopter flights near the airport had made the already congested airspace even more so, we found. A single air traffic controller had been guiding both helicopters and airplanes at the time of the crash, a scenario that was 'not normal' for the hour and volume of traffic, according to a Federal Aviation Administration memo. The Black Hawk had been flying higher than permitted for helicopters in the area. Still, we had questions: How could this have happened in the United States, whose airspace is widely regarded as among the world's safest, and in its capital no less? And was there some fundamental cause of the accident, a mistake that set in motion the series of events that led to catastrophe? At a source's suggestion, Mark looked into a 2022 collision in San Diego in which two helicopters crashed into each other. While there were no casualties in that case, there was a similarity with the Washington crash: an aviation technique common in U.S. air travel known as 'see and avoid.' See and avoid flying is when pilots take responsibility for spotting and evading nearby air traffic without a controller's guidance. In both the San Diego collision and a 2019 crash in Ketchikan, Alaska, that killed six people, officials at the National Transportation Safety Board blamed see and avoid. A vast majority of the time, Mark and I discovered, see and avoid works as intended. But factors like human error, blind spots and environmental conditions, such as darkness, can be deadly. Just before the Jan. 29 crash, the helicopter pilots were operating under a type of see and avoid flying. They were wearing night-vision goggles, which were required for their training mission. Military pilots say the goggles can make urban lights practically blinding. The crew also had not received detailed guidance from the controller on the location or proximity of the nearby jet. We decided that see and avoid was at the crux of our findings, but we made clear that there was no one action or mistake behind the crash. We interviewed pilots, current and former government officials with knowledge of U.S. aviation regulations, leaders at the N.T.S.B. and controllers who had worked at the National Airport tower. We also spoke with Army officials about the helicopters they flew over the Potomac and why those missions, often cloaked in secrecy, were necessary. I traveled to Fort Novosel, Ala., with Kenny Holston, a Times photojournalist and Air Force veteran, to see the type of Black Hawk the crew had operated on Jan. 29. Army officials explained the avionics, or dashboard equipment, on the helicopter. Officials also let me fly a simulation of a Black Hawk flight. I was struck by the amount of visual stimulation a low-flying pilot would have to absorb, as well as how difficult it was to steer and watch the gauges. The N.T.S.B.'s preliminary report, based on initial examinations of the wreckage and cockpit voice recordings that have not yet been made public, was a great help in our understanding of the history and final moments of both flights. But as we began to write, we struggled with how to make a highly technical account accessible to all readers. Our editor, Jennifer Forsyth, suggested we read the novel 'Dear Edward' by Ann Napolitano for inspiration. Set in 2013, it is about the lone survivor of a plane crash in Colorado. The story of that survivor, Edward, and his physical and emotional recovery is interspersed with a dramatic account of the other passengers and the actions of the pilots. Our article became a chronology, interspersed with analysis and new reporting. We broke the text into sections by theme and timing: the intentions of each flight; what the controller did — and did not — say; the controller's attempt to manage busy traffic using an efficiency tactic called a squeeze play; apparent problems with some of the Black Hawk's equipment; and, finally, the failure of see and avoid to keep the aircraft apart. This felt like the right collection of moments that led to this tragedy. Since the story was published late last month, we have been heartened by the responses of many Times readers. Sheri Lilley, the stepmother of Sam Lilley, the first officer on the American Airlines flight, wrote in a comment, 'The N.T.S.B. has long warned that 'see and avoid' is dangerously outdated,' adding that 'the gap between what we know needs to be done and what is actually happening is costing lives.' As the investigation proceeds, we will keep readers informed.
Washington Post
02-05-2025
- General
- Washington Post
Airliners abort landings as Army helicopter makes ‘scenic' loop around Pentagon
Two airliners abandoned landing attempts at Washington's Reagan National Airport on Thursday afternoon when an Army Black Hawk took a 'scenic route' near the flight path and circled the Pentagon before landing at a military heliport, according to the Federal Aviation Administration. The National Transportation Safety Board said it would investigate the incident.
Yahoo
30-04-2025
- Health
- Yahoo
Army pilot claims he distributed LSD for religious reasons
An Army Black Hawk pilot who was indicted by a grand jury for allegedly distributing LSD argued in court he has the religious right to consume the psychedelic drug as a sacrament and sell it on the dark web. Federal prosecutors accused 1st Lt. Kyle Norton Riester of conspiring with others to distribute 10 grams or more of LSD, according to an indictment filed April 24 by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In their own lawsuit, Riester's attorneys acknowledged he distributed LSD online but countered that he did so in a sacramental form and only to other individuals who used it for religious reasons. Riester and his attorneys are attempting to fight his prosecution on religious freedom grounds. They sued — unsuccessfully — to receive an emergency injunction that aimed to block the government from indicting him. In the lawsuit, Riester's attorneys said he has a sincerely held belief that LSD is a sacrament, which allows him to commune with God and is 'necessary for his continued spiritual growth and development.' He 'also believes Bitcoin to be sacred,' the lawsuit said, because it allows him to distribute allegedly sacramental LSD to others who share his beliefs. The case turns a spotlight on the entheogenic movement, the adherents of which use psychoactive substances like hallucinogenic mushrooms, ayahuasca or other psychedelics as part of religious rituals or to achieve a meditative or spiritual state. The federal government classified LSD as a Schedule I drug, meaning the substance is not recognized as serving an accepted medical use and is labeled as having a high potential for abuse. The government has in recent years conducted studies on the potential therapeutic uses of other drugs, such as MDMA. LSD is barred in the military. Its use was once rare enough among troops that in 2006, the Pentagon's former top counternarcotics official cut testing for it from the Defense Department's standard drug-testing panel. In a memo announcing the change at the time, former defense official Richard Douglas said that over a three-year period, only four drug tests out of more than two million had tested positive for LSD. But over the past decade, a series of embarrassing incidents involving LSD prompted the Pentagon to pay more attention to service members' illicit use of the drug. 'We have a drug problem': LSD now part of random drug screening in 2nd Marine Division In 2016, security forces airmen at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming — whose jobs entailed guarding nuclear missiles — were busted for buying, distributing and using LSD and other drugs. Six airmen were ultimately court-martialed, and another eight were disciplined in other ways. Four years later, following the revelation of a drug problem among some Marines, the Defense Department authorized commanders to once again test troops for LSD. Riester alleged in his lawsuit that the federal government violated his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act by raiding his home last August, issuing him a reprimand, ordering him to cooperate with federal law enforcement and attempting to prosecute him for alleged conspiracy to distribute LSD. The suit was filed April 3 against multiple Defense Department and federal government officials. A district court judge in Alexandria, Virginia, rejected those arguments April 23, clearing the way for federal prosecutors to indict him. The Washington Post, which first reported the case, said prosecutors alleged in the April 23 hearing that Riester sent almost 1,800 shipments of LSD to purchasers online and collected almost $122,000 from the sales. The judge at hearing denied his request for an injunction to prevent his prosecution, The Washington Post reported, and said that even if his spiritual beliefs on the consumption of LSD were genuine, 'it's far from clear that sincere religious belief would extend to the indiscriminate selling of LSD on the dark web.' VA awards $1.5 million to study using psychedelics for PTSD treatment Army spokesman Christopher Surridge said Riester has been reassigned to administrative duties pending his discharge and does not have access to classified material. He said the Army could not provide further information due to Privacy Act constraints. Riester's attorneys said he never piloted helicopters while under the influence of LSD. They argued the government's actions are causing 'ongoing irreparable harm to [his] religious exercise, conscience and reputation' by forcing him to stop his religious practices and potentially ending his military career with a dishonorable discharge. Riester had asked the court to declare a permanent injunction on the government, preventing it from arresting, prosecuting or threatening him or his wife for acquiring and possessing LSD and distributing it to those who share his faith for ceremonial purposes. His wife is also a Black Hawk pilot but had no knowledge of Riester's LSD-related activities, his lawyers wrote in the lawsuit. Riester also wanted the court to order the government to allow him to use and dispense LSD to those who share his faith. After the judge denied those requests, Riester's attorney, George Lake, told Military Times that Riester plans to appeal the judge's decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The lawsuit said that Riester — who grew up in a non-religious household in Vermont — first took LSD in 2017 while attending Indiana University's Kelly School of Business under an Army ROTC scholarship. That sacramental experience 'was deeply religious and mystical in nature,' the lawsuit said, 'allowing him direct communion with his creator.' He continued to sacramentally consume LSD, the suit said. Those experiences, ranging from between eight to 12 hours, helped him reach 'religious and mystical states' and allowed him 'to consult divine forces and entities which guide and instruct him on how to live in accordance with his higher spiritual self and higher spiritual path.' Today, Lake said, Riester regularly attends a nondenominational Christian church. Lake described Riester's religion as a 'syncretic' blend of Christianity and entheogenic psychedelic use. 'Through his adult life, he started this spiritual journey … in college, going to ceremonies with mushrooms, ayahuasca, these things,' Lake said. 'And then, just kind of naturally evolved for him into LSD, [which] he found was his preferred and best method for communion with his conception of God.' But during COVID-19 lockdowns, the suit said, it became difficult for Riester and others who share his beliefs to gather in person to practice their religion. The pandemic also caused stress and isolation, it said, so Riester and his religious community moved online. Riester 'felt compelled, in accordance with the Divine guidance and instruction he had received while communing with LSD, to assist others in sacramental access to their shared Sacrament during this time,' his lawsuit reads. Riester's lawsuit said he 'dispensed sacramental LSD to co-religionists via the dark web' from September 2022 to May 2024. He also published articles on Substack from May 2021 to June 2022 detailing his beliefs on LSD and Bitcoin, the suit said. In May 2024, as COVID-19 restrictions eased and access to 'sacrament-grade LSD' expanded, Riester voluntarily stopped all his online distributions and deleted his dark web account, the lawsuit said. But three months later, agents from the FBI, Army Criminal Investigation Division, U.S. Postal Service and other organizations raided Riester's Springfield, Virginia, apartment, looking for LSD trafficking evidence, the lawsuit said. Riester's attorneys said this search did not turn up LSD, but agents seized his passport and electronics and ordered him to submit to a urinalysis with CID. Can LSD and magic mushrooms help win wars? This Marine officer says 'yes' Riester is also under indictment in the Southern District of Texas on at least one charge related to 'fraudulent Bitcoin transfers in which [Riester] had unwittingly taken part,' the suit said. Riester is now on bond in Texas, and his pre-trial release conditions prohibit him from using controlled substances such as LSD, 'which substantially burdens plaintiff's sincere religious exercise,' his lawsuit says. The suit also said that after the August 2024 raid on his apartment, he has been 'unable … to maintain his commitment to his religion and to the military as his military service contract did not allow him to consume any controlled substances while on active duty.' Riester's commanding officer ordered him to cooperate with the federal government shortly after the August 2024 raid on his apartment, Lake said. At that point, he was coerced by law enforcement into gathering information on dark web dealers' attempts to sell fake oxycodone pills made with fentanyl, Lake claimed. Riester's dark web account had credits showing it was used to sell LSD, Lake said, which law enforcement may have felt gave him credibility as he attempted to gather information on fentanyl dealers. Lake said Riester did not participate in sting operations on those dealers but pried for information on their manufacturing and distribution protocols and suppliers. 'This wasn't something natural with him,' Lake said of Riester's attempts to contact fentanyl dealers on the dark web on behalf of the government. 'Mr. Riester was actually part of dark web forums that were full of spiritual seekers using [psychedelic substances] for religious, spiritual purposes, and trying to do so safely. That's the community he was part of. All this other [stuff] was forced upon him.' Lake said Riester cooperated with law enforcement for several months in late 2024 but the operation yielded only 'perfunctory information.' If Riester is convicted of LSD distribution, he could be forced to forfeit property involved in the commission of the alleged crime, including cryptocurrency, a rifle, a shotgun, two pistols, magazines and ammunition, among other penalties, according to the indictment.
Time of India
28-04-2025
- General
- Time of India
What led to Black Hawk-Jet collision? Missteps, equipment problems and missed warnings that killed 74
On the evening of January 29, a catastrophic midair crash involving an Army Black Hawk helicopter and an American Airlines regional jet flying over Washington DC killed all 74 individuals on board both aircraft. This tragedy, one of the most fatal aviation crashes in the United States in almost a quarter-century, occurred as a consequence of a combination of errors and lapses at various levels of the aviation systems and procedures. These blunders, fueled by human error, inadequate communication, and defective safety protocols, eventually culminated in the devastating crash, as reported by NYT. Here's all that went wrong that day- by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like My one-month-old daughter is in so much pain, please help! Donate For Health Donate Now Undo Conducting visual separation The Army Black Hawk flight asked for visual separation, which made them responsible to detect and stay away from other aircraft. But that was mismanaged. The pilots did not see the approaching American Airlines aircraft (Flight 5342) nor react in time to prevent a collision. The helicopter kept going along its course without changing its altitude or direction, despite the fact that it was in the landing path of the commercial aircraft. Helicopter flying too high The Black Hawk flew higher than it was supposed to be, placing it in airspace shared by Flight 5342's descent path. This error put the helicopter in a potentially hazardous position in relation to the commercial aircraft, which was descending toward a lower-altitude runway. Radio communications failures Radio contact between the helicopter crew and the air traffic controller was inadequate. The controller's commands were regularly cut off (stepped on) by the crew, possibly resulting in omitted or misunderstood directions. The last exchange was merely seconds before the crash: the controller commanded the helicopter to "pass behind" Flight 5342, yet the message very likely did not reach the crew because of a second cut-off. Deactivation of ADS-B out technology The Black Hawk's ADS-B system was deactivated, according to Army procedure. This system reports real-time tracking information to air traffic controllers, which makes it hard for them to track the helicopter's position in real time. This absence of real-time tracking helped create confusion in the tower and postponed the identification of possible conflicts. Controller's failure to take urgent action Although the controller was aware of a conflict alert in the tower and witnessed the possible collision unfolding, the reaction was insufficient. At 8:47:39 pm, the controller instructed the Black Hawk crew to fly behind the jet, but the crew failed to respond or react in time. The controller failed to explicitly update the Black Hawk crew on the position of the jet, nor did he give additional direct instructions for avoiding the collision. The FAA requires controllers to alert pilots when targets are likely to converge, but this was not carried out with enough urgency here. Insufficient staffing at national airport The air traffic controller had to deal with several planes and also handle both military and civilian air traffic. This increased pressure and made it more difficult for him to concentrate solely on the possible confrontation between the helicopter and Flight 5342. Inaccurate tracking of helicopter's location Black Hawk's position was updated only between 5 and 12 seconds by its transponder, thereby causing huge time lags to track its positions. This interval made it difficult to end the developing conflict with speed. Both aircraft were then approximately 1 mile apart during the last contact, but the Black Hawk crew did not reply immediately, further adding to the risk. The "squeeze play" tactic of the controller As part of a plan to decongest a congested airspace, the controller had tried to position aircraft into smaller landing windows, adding to the complexity. This plan, which consisted of pushing planes towards smaller flight paths, might have led to the confusion and inability to appreciate the risk of collision. Environmental and visibility problems The crew on the helicopter had night-vision goggles to help them see through low-visibility conditions, but these probably could not resist the glare from the lights in Washington, DC. Such a natural issue provided a major impediment in viewing other flying aircraft around their vicinity. Last crucial communication At 8:47:39 pm (local time), the controller made a final call to the Black Hawk crew: "PAT two-five, do you have the CRJ in sight?" – the CRJ being Flight 5342. A conflict alert was reported in the tower simultaneously, indicating an approaching threat, but the crew of the Black Hawk did not react. The controller then asked them to "pass behind" the jet, although this instruction was not received as a result of a communication breakdown. The crew of the Black Hawk then answered positively, asking for visual separation, which was provided by the controller. However, this was the last communication. Within the seconds that ensued, the helicopter crew did not alter their course. At 8:48:19 p.m., the Black Hawk was just 15 seconds from colliding with the jet. In spite of recommendations to turn left to evade the collision, the helicopter kept going straight towards the approaching jet, which resulted in the crash. The controller's lost chance for direct action The controller, even though he heard the conflict alert and was cognizant of the danger, failed to provide clear, immediate orders to the helicopter crew to turn away from the jet. He failed to tell the Black Hawk crew the precise location of the jet and its path of flight, which would have been in compliance with FAA rules to avoid a collision. The helicopter crew's inaction In spite of the last directive to turn left to clear from the approaching jet, the crew of the Black Hawk failed to act in a timely manner. There were no indications of any medical conditions or impairment among the crew, according to investigators, but the inability to respond to air traffic control or change course resulted in the collision.
