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Turkiye's support for Pakistan signals a bigger neighbourhood problem for India
In the recent India-Pakistan military conflict, Turkiye stood steadfast in offering unambiguous support to Pakistan before and after the conflict. Sources close to the Turkish government claimed that Turkish cargo planes carried military supplies to Pakistan, although this was denied by Turkish officials. This is one of the loudest statements Turkiye has made in a long time, marking a clear departure from its previously stated Asia Anew Initiative, as Turkiye reprioritises security over trade in its South Asia policy. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spoken several times since then, reiterating his country's support for Pakistan. Turkiye has clearly made up its mind on how it looks at South Asia and who it sees fit to support in the region. This has not happened overnight. Nor is it temporary. Turkiye is operating within its conception of a 'securitised South Asia,' where its national security is linked to the region. Nearly all statements coming from Turkiye after the Indian military action have condemned the 'provocative steps' and claimed that strikes inside Pakistan raised 'the risk of an all-out war'. No other Muslim or Arab nation, except Azerbaijan, issued a direct condemnation of the Indian operation. Turkiye and Pakistan share predicament There is general agreement that in the post-Cold War era, both Turkiye and Pakistan have lost their relevance to the Western security architecture. Both have been searching for ways to stay relevant in the changing security landscape. Turkiye's NATO allies have been harsh in their criticism of its growing ties with Russia, particularly after it purchased the S-400 missile defence system. Its allies have denied Turkiye crucial defence technologies and supplies to the extent that in today's Middle East, non-NATO members Israel and the UAE have received the best of NATO defence technology, which Turkiye has been denied, including the F-35. Pakistan, too, is vulnerably dependent on the Chinese defence industry – its only option after the West abandoned it. Turkiye's Pakistan policy may not be India-centric, but they need each other because they have few allies. The bigger question, however, is whether Turkiye can or should have a Pakistan policy at the expense of its relations with India. Choosing Pakistan over India There is an unspoken consensus in Ankara and Riyadh that Pakistan is far too important to be written off. Islamabad has already become Turkiye's most important defence ally outside NATO. However, this has come at a heavy cost: an antagonised India. Almost every Muslim nation, not just Turkiye, faces the same dilemma. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have, however, successfully de-hypenated their relations with India and Pakistan. Turkiye tried to maintain a degree of ambiguity about its relations with Pakistan for a long time and sought close and confident ties with India. Turkiye's offer to India was equally important, as it involved strategic relations with New Delhi in exchange for the normalisation of ties with Pakistan, including a peaceful resolution of their disputes over Jammu and Kashmir. For that, the Turkish president used all possible tactics to bring New Delhi on board, which mostly resulted in public and diplomatic backlash. The period 2019-2022 could be counted as the lowest point in Turkiye-India relations when the two countries waged a massive media campaign against each other. This was in the wake of the revocation of the special status accorded to Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian federal structure. Since 2022, there have been signs of withdrawals on the Turkish side as India gave Turkiye a clear message that Turkiye's special ties with Pakistan and supporting its Kashmir politics are the biggest obstacles in India-Turkiye relations. In 2022, Turkiye and Pakistan supported Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Armenia, defeated and isolated, rushed to India for crucial defence supplies, including India's indigenous air defence system, Akash. Not just Armenia, India quickly reached out to Turkiye's regional rivals and detractors, Iran, Greece, Cyprus, UAE and Israel, seeking close defence and strategic relations. Many in Delhi explained this as a reaction to Turkiye's defence relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives. Turkiye's rising influence in its immediate neighbourhood may challenge India's interests. By aggressively marketing its defence sector in Asia, Turkiye has attracted new clients and potential allies whose perspectives on regional security may differ from those of Delhi. India's foreign policy has gradually shifted. India has started reimagining itself as a resurgent power, taking pride in self-reliance (Atmanirbhar Bharat). 'India First' becomes India alone In the ruling party's ideological discourse, India First has always been echoed as a slogan, which means India's interests are the supreme objectives of its new foreign policy. Realist pundits in New Delhi have often defined, even exaggerated, 'India First' as 'India Alone'. This contradicts a previously practised the ' Gujral Doctrine ' that offered support to the neighbouring countries without expectation of reciprocity. India's geopolitical imagination of itself is even more complex. It goes well beyond the boundaries of its existing nation-state. Today, India sees itself as a reduced geographical version of a larger civilisational India. These two imaginations of India – 'India First' and India as the magnanimous neigbour seeking no reciprocity – demand distinct and occasionally contradictory foreign policies. 'India First' represents that realism that originates from the perceived trauma of the dismemberment or shrinking of a civilisational India. On the other hand, Turkiye and China are aggressively advancing transnational foreign policies by instrumentalising their Turkic and Ottoman pasts and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. Under Narendra Modi, India has successfully built bilateral partnerships worldwide, leaving regional cooperation forums, including the South Asian Association forRegional Cooperation (SAARC), mostly unattended or underrepresented. India's growing disinterest in regional cooperation forums has allowed India's neighbours to look beyond India. This has provided an opportunity for China, Turkiye, and the United States to ignore India's regional leadership in South Asia. India must be worried that the securitisation of South Asia has helped China, Turkiye, and other powers find new defence partnerships in its neighbourhood. The change was coming gradually and silently, away from the glare of diplomatic crises. The end of ambiguity in Turkiye's South Asia policy and the burgeoning Turkiye-Pakistan defence relations is a new reality that India must deal with. What is apparent, however, is that India does not have a Turkiye policy beyond transactional interests and temporary anger, which is insufficient to counter a rising power like Turkiye. It might need its allies within the Arab and Islamic world, particularly Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia to discourage Turkiye from its South Asian ambitions. Yildirim Beyazit University. He is also the Director of Research at the International Dialogue and Diplomacy Foundation in New Delhi.
NDTV
26-05-2025
- Business
- NDTV
Why Turkey Has Chosen To Side With Pakistan Over India
In the recent India-Pakistan military conflict, Turkiye stood steadfast in offering unambiguous support to Pakistan before and after the conflict. Sources close to the Turkish government claimed that Turkish cargo planes carried military supplies to Pakistan, although this was denied by Turkish officials. This is one of the loudest statements Turkiye has made in a long time, marking a clear departure from its previously stated Asia Anew Initiative, as Turkiye reprioritises security over trade in its South Asia policy. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spoken several times since then, reiterating his country's support for Pakistan. Turkiye has clearly made up its mind on how it looks at South Asia and who it sees fit to support in the region. This has not happened overnight. Nor is it temporary. Turkiye is operating within its conception of a 'securitised South Asia,' where its national security is linked to the region. Nearly all statements coming from Turkiye after the Indian military action have condemned the 'provocative steps' and claimed that strikes inside Pakistan raised 'the risk of an all-out war'. No other Muslim or Arab nation, except Azerbaijan, issued a direct condemnation of the Indian operation. Turkiye and Pakistan share predicament There is general agreement that in the post-Cold War era, both Turkiye and Pakistan have lost their relevance to the Western security architecture. Both have been searching for ways to stay relevant in the changing security landscape. Turkiye's NATO allies have been harsh in their criticism of its growing ties with Russia, particularly after it purchased the S-400 missile defence system. Its allies have denied Turkiye crucial defence technologies and supplies to the extent that in today's Middle East, non-NATO members Israel and the UAE have received the best of NATO defence technology, which Turkiye has been denied, including the F-35. Pakistan, too, is vulnerably dependent on the Chinese defence industry — its only option after the West abandoned it. Turkiye's Pakistan policy may not be India-centric, but they need each other because they have few allies. The bigger question, however, is whether Turkiye can or should have a Pakistan policy at the expense of its relations with India. Choosing Pakistan over India There is an unspoken consensus in Ankara and Riyadh that Pakistan is far too important to be written off. Islamabad has already become Turkiye's most important defence ally outside NATO. However, this has come at a heavy cost: an antagonised India. Almost every Muslim nation, not just Turkiye, faces the same dilemma. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have, however, successfully de-hypenated their relations with India and Pakistan. Turkiye tried to maintain a degree of ambiguity about its relations with Pakistan for a long time and sought close and confident ties with India. Turkiye's offer to India was equally important, as it involved strategic relations with New Delhi in exchange for the normalisation of ties with Pakistan, including a peaceful resolution of their disputes over Jammu and Kashmir. For that, the Turkish president used all possible tactics to bring New Delhi on board, which mostly resulted in public and diplomatic backlash. The period 2019-2022 could be counted as the lowest point in Turkiye-India relations when the two countries waged a massive media campaign against each other. This was in the wake of the revocation of the special status accorded to Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian federal structure. Since 2022, there have been signs of withdrawals on the Turkish side as India gave Turkiye a clear message that Turkiye's special ties with Pakistan and supporting its Kashmir politics are the biggest obstacles in India-Turkiye relations. In 2022, Turkiye and Pakistan supported Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Armenia, defeated and isolated, rushed to India for crucial defence supplies, including India's indigenous air defence system, Akash. Not just Armenia, India quickly reached out to Turkiye's regional rivals and detractors, Iran, Greece, Cyprus, UAE and Israel, seeking close defence and strategic relations. Many in Delhi explained this as a reaction to Turkiye's defence relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives. Turkiye's rising influence in its immediate neighbourhood may challenge India's interests. By aggressively marketing its defence sector in Asia, Turkiye has attracted new clients and potential allies whose perspectives on regional security may differ from those of Delhi. India's foreign policy has gradually shifted. India has started reimagining itself as a resurgent power, taking pride in self-reliance (Atmanirbhar Bharat). India First becomes India Alone In the ruling party's ideological discourse, India First has always been echoed as a slogan, which means India's interests are the supreme objectives of its new foreign policy. Realist pundits in New Delhi have often defined, even exaggerated, 'India First' as 'India Alone'. This contradicts a previously practised the ' Gujral Doctrine ' that offered support to the neighbouring countries without expectation of reciprocity. India's geopolitical imagination of itself is even more complex. It goes well beyond the boundaries of its existing nation-state. Today, India sees itself as a reduced geographical version of a larger civilisational India. These two imaginations of India – 'India First' and India as the magnanimous neigbour seeking no reciprocity – demand distinct and occasionally contradictory foreign policies. 'India First' represents that realism that originates from the perceived trauma of the dismemberment or shrinking of a civilisational India. On the other hand, Turkiye and China are aggressively advancing transnational foreign policies by instrumentalising their Turkic and Ottoman pasts and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. Under Narendra Modi, India has successfully built bilateral partnerships worldwide, leaving regional cooperation forums, including the South Asian Association forRegional Cooperation (SAARC), mostly unattended or underrepresented. India's growing disinterest in regional cooperation forums has allowed India's neighbours to look beyond India. This has provided an opportunity forChina, Turkiye, and the United States to ignore India's regional leadership in South Asia. India must be worried that the securitisation of South Asia has helped China, Turkiye, and other powers find new defence partnerships in its neighbourhood. The change was coming gradually and silently, away from the glare of diplomatic crises. The end of ambiguity in Turkiye's South Asia policy and the burgeoning Turkiye-Pakistan defence relations is a new reality that India must deal with. What is apparent, however, is that India does not have a Turkiye policy beyond transactional interests and temporary anger, which is insufficient to counter a rising power like Turkiye. It might need its allies within the Arab and Islamic world, particularly Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia to discourage Turkiye from its South Asian ambitions. Omair Anas is an Indian academic and International Affairs analyst based at the Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University. He is also the Director of Research at the International Dialogue and Diplomacy Foundation in New Delhi.
Arab News
14-02-2025
- Business
- Arab News
Erdogan on tour as Turkiye pivots to Asia
Turkiye's engagement with Southeast Asia is often seen as part of a broader strategic pivot that has been evolving in line with its broader foreign policy. Last week President Recep Tayyip Erdogan conducted a tour of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, which was significant in many respects and deserves a closer look. In 2019, Turkiye introduced the Asia Anew Initiative with three main goals: to bolster Turkiye's defense cooperation by building stronger defense ties with Asian countries; to address the growing demand for defense procurement by increasing Turkiye's access to Asian markets; and to foster closer economic relations with individual countries and regional organizations of which they are members. The initiative covers various projects from 2024 to 2026. Malaysia and Indonesia play important roles, as both are members of influential organizations such as the ASEAN, BRICS, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Developing-8. Erdogan's first stop on his tour was Malaysia, which he last visited in 2019. Malaysia is especially important in the context of Asia Anew for several reasons. Malaysia is the 2025 chair of ASEAN, in whose summits Turkiye has participated since 2013. Turkiye is currently a sectoral dialogue partner of the organization, with aspirations to gain full dialogue partner status. Malaysia's support, as one of ASEAN's founding members, is crucial for Turkiye to achieve this goal. Malaysia is also a member of the D-8, an international organization founded in 1997 in Istanbul, along with Turkiye, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Egypt, and Nigeria. It is also an active member of the OIC, and along with Turkiye has been instrumental in diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of the key issues discussed during Erdoğan's visit to Malaysia was the reconstruction of Gaza: Malaysia pledged to support the creation of a fund for this purpose and co-chair the East Asia Reconstruction Plan for Gaza and Palestine. Erdogan emphasized the importance of platforms like the OIC and D-8 to address global humanitarian issues, including Gaza. Malaysia also was the first ASEAN member country to sign a free trade agreement with Turkiye, in 2014. There is a burgeoning relationship between Turkiye and Southeast Asian states in the area of defense. Malaysia's Ministry of Defense has identified Turkiye as a key player in the development of its defense capabilities. In particular, Malaysia has shown interest in Turkish maritime defense products. Turkish defense giant STM signed an agreement with Malaysia in 2024for the purchase of three corvette warships. The strong momentum of Turkish-Malaysian relations was evident in the 11 agreements signed during Erdogan's visit. The president's second stop was Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority nation and Southeast Asia's largest economy. The two countries have significantly strengthened their ties in recent years. In 2022, they signed five agreements on defense, technology, forestry, and environmental cooperation. In 2023, they agreed to carry out joint military exercises and enhance their defense industry cooperation. During Erdogan's visit, an agreement was signed between Indonesian defense company Republikorp and Turkiye's Baykar to establish a drone production facility in Indonesia. President Prabowo Subianto spoke highly of this growing cooperation, noting successful joint ventures with Turkish defense firms such as Roketsan, Aselsan, Havelsan, and Baykar. This visit also marked the first meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council of two states, which was established in 2022. The final leg of Erdogan's tour took him to Pakistan, which he visited five years ago. Turkiye has a special bond with Pakistan, a middle-sized defense partner where Turkiye has long played a crucial role in strengthening military capabilities. During this visit, Pakistan signed a deal to acquire electronic warfare aircraft — another outcome of the already growing defense cooperation, particularly in areas such as technology transfer, joint production agreements, and arms sales. Turkish defense companies such as Aselsan and Roketsan have worked with Pakistani partners to develop advanced weaponry, enhancing Pakistan's indigenous defense production and reducing its reliance on Western suppliers. This growing military collaboration has deepened Turkiye-Pakistan relations and solidified Turkiye's position as an important partner. The global shift of power from the West to the East, the 'pivot to Asia' trend, changing dynamics in the Middle East, and Turkiye's pragmatic foreign policy have shaped Ankara's own turn toward Asia. Turkiye is now working to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, a region that has warmly welcomed this involvement. But it is important to consider how Turkiye can further align its strategic objectives with the evolving dynamics of this region and increasing competition among several actors. The personal diplomacy at leadership level with each nation, defense capabilities, and economic potential are Turkiye's key assets that can support its pivot to Asia. But its Southeast Asia policy needs sustained focus and efforts, moving beyond economic and defense collaboration, and building more on people-to-people relations. • Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye's relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz
