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Asia Times
19 hours ago
- Politics
- Asia Times
Interview: AfD's Frohnmaier rejects Merz's Ukraine strategy
In an era of intensifying geopolitical rifts, the foreign policy positions of Europe's political parties are gaining renewed global attention. In Germany, the nationalist right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has emerged as a significant player challenging the consensus positions of the country's traditional parties. In this exclusive interview, Markus Frohnmaier—foreign policy spokesperson for the AfD—shares his perspectives on the German government's stance towards the Ukraine conflict, the attempts of the established parties to and the urgent economic challenges facing German industry. The timing of this conversation is especially relevant. Amid persistent calls for increased military support for Ukraine, Germany's mainstream parties remain committed to an all-out confrontational stance towards Russia. Yet Germany's economy is simultaneously grappling with the costs of energy transformation and strategic realignments that are reshaping industrial competitiveness. The AfD, critical of both the military engagement and Berlin's energy policy, is gaining traction in the polls and now commands double-digit national support. Uwe von Parpart, publisher of Asia Times, and correspondent Diego Faßnacht spoke with Markus Frohnmaier. Parpart: A few days ago, Chancellor Friedrich Merz spoke out and said that the restrictions on the range of weapons now in Ukraine's possession have been lifted. This would be necessary to enable the Ukrainians to defend themselves against the Russian attack. As far as I know, all range limits on British, French and American weapon systems were lifted no later than 17 November last year when the US first eliminated range restrictions on ATACMS missiles, which have a maximum range of 300 kilometers. So, that's quite some time ago. Why do you think Merz made a big deal about this again right now? Frohnmaier: Long before he became chancellor, Mr Merz was an ardent advocate of giving the 500-km range Taurus missiles to Ukraine. But recently, he has avoided the subject. He has to be considerate of his coalition partner, the Social Democrats (SPD), who oppose Taurus delivery, and is trying to use smoke and mirrors such as the lifting of range restrictions to distract from that. You will have watched his May 28 press conference. In it, he did not say anything about supplying Taurus, but that he wants Germany to help Ukraine to develop new weapons with long-range capabilities. With such talk, he is trying to distract from the fact that the CDU/CSU promised the delivery of Taurus for many months during the recent parliamentary election campaign. From our perspective, from the perspective of the AfD, these are completely the wrong approaches to the Ukraine situation. We now need diplomatic efforts. We must ensure that the Ukrainians and the Russians sit down at the same table and continue negotiations. We fail to see that Mr Merz is pursuing any strategy here that goes beyond what has been attempted in recent years: throwing crumbs to a state that would actually no longer exist without foreign support – it has to be said that harshly – and keeping it on a drip. This is not our idea of a solution. Instead, we need to support the steps that US President Trump has taken to persuade the two parties to talk in Turkey. And I believe that discussions about range restrictions or providing an alibi-like surrogate for Taurus are completely the wrong signal at the moment. Parpart: What do you think? How seriously should we take Russia's threat that if Taurus is fired at Russia, this will be interpreted as German combatant status in the war? Frohnmaier: In my opinion, Russia has long regarded Germany as an active participant in this war. But I find the debate difficult. It is pointless to discuss whether the deployment of Taurus would mean German involvement or not. I believe that in real terms, Germany has been involved in this war for a long time. It has also clearly taken sides, which I find regrettable. I believe we would have had the chance to act as a kind of broker, an honest broker, in this conflict. Germany has built good relationships with the Ukrainian and Russian sides over the last few decades. This potential was squandered. But now, Mr Trump has definitely succeeded in forcing the two parties to the negotiating table. And I believe that a decisive component was this: that Donald Trump has made it clear that Ukrainian and US interests are different. This is something that we have not seen in European politics for many months, actually for years. European government representatives no longer make or formulate a distinction between their own national interests and the interests of Ukraine. It was only this new way of thinking on the part of Trump that ultimately forced the Ukrainians and Russians to enter into dialogue with each other. We will have to wait and see how this develops. However, I cannot see that the German government under Friedrich Merz is currently making any positive contribution to making peace in Ukraine as quickly as possible. Faßnacht: Friedrich Merz would now reply that the last few weeks have shown that more diplomacy has achieved nothing. What he did say is that the current government would do everything in its power to ensure that the Nord Stream pipelines are not put back into operation. This raises the question of what the real German interest is in these negotiations. Frohnmaier: Well, to Mr Merz's question, what's the use of diplomacy, I would pose a counter-question: We have seen in the last two years that the supply of weapons of the most diverse categories has not brought us one meter closer to peace. On the contrary, the situation may even have deteriorated. You will no doubt remember the first negotiations that were held relatively soon after the start of the war in Istanbul. Since then, there have been no more negotiations for a long time. But Trump's negotiations have already led to the largest prisoner exchange since the start of the war. Everyone involved would probably like to see more. But peace also sometimes takes time, which must also be recognized by the Russian side at this point. There is a fear that if a 30-day ceasefire is agreed, but at the same time arms deliveries and the strengthening of the Ukrainian armed forces continue, this could work to Russia's disadvantage. I believe that an attempt should be made to find a solution on this point, for example by freezing the front line and stopping the supply of weapons. This will probably not happen for the time being, but it is certainly an aspect that will be raised time and again. So far, I have not heard any convincing argument to dispel these concerns. The second point you mentioned is Nord Stream. I think you have addressed a very important point that has been given far too little attention in the press and in the media coverage following the press conference. In the debates in the German Bundestag over the last few days – there was a debate on Nord Stream – the CDU/CSU has made every effort to avoid a clear statement on how it intends to proceed with Nord Stream. That's why I was surprised that Friedrich Merz declared yesterday that he would do everything in his power to ensure that Nord Stream is not put back into operation. From a German perspective, I think that is completely negligent and wrong. Why? It is in our national interest to ensure a broad energy supply range for Germany. Friedrich Merz's CDU/CSU has shut down the nuclear power plants in Germany. The CDU/CSU decided to phase out coal-fired power. In other words, thanks to the CDU/CSU, Germany has said goodbye to all conventional energy sources and has virtually been forced to rely entirely on expensive American liquefied natural gas and alternative, i.e. renewable, energies. This is not sustainable for a major industrial nation like Germany. It has always been essential for Germany to be able to procure cheap energy. That made us strong for many years, but we have lost that. If you like, Germany had three pillars. One of them was always the cheap energy that could be obtained from Russia. However, the previous government made us too dependent on Russia because it took away our energy sovereignty and ability to compensate for the energy supply from Russia. You don't simply shut down well-functioning and amortizing nuclear power plants. Nor do you simply blow up Europe's most modern coal-fired power plant. But all of this took place in Germany. The second pillar was and still is, of course, the embedding in the Atlantic alliance. The third pillar was access to the Chinese market. Now one pillar, namely affordable energy, has been lost. If Friedrich Merz really wants to find a solution to this war, he must also give the Russian side motivation to do so, as hard as that sounds. You can't keep imposing new sanctions and supplying new weapons and at the same time expect Russia to end the war. When the war is over, will we continue to deny Russia access to our markets and not trade with it? I don't think that is a motivation for a peace agreement. That's why I can't understand the chancellor's strategy. Faßnacht: When you talk about a solution, how do you see the future of a possible European security architecture? Does it need to be fundamentally rethought? What are the AfD's thoughts on this? Frohnmaier: I believe that, first and foremost, we need to strengthen our own armed forces … in our own national interest. The Bundeswehr is in a desolate state. It has been cut to the bone over several years. At the moment, we are not even in a position to ensure minimal national defense. This has nothing to do with our brave soldiers, but we have to be honest. There are studies that have come to the conclusion that Germany would not even be able to wage war for a week in the event of an attack on the Federal Republic due to a lack of ammunition and equipment. That shows, as a first step, we must strengthen our own armed forces. As a second step, we must then discuss what a European security architecture could look like. Part of the hard unpopular truth is this: The Americans have co-financed our security for many decades. It is therefore only logical that the American side is now saying: 'You have to contribute more if you want to continue to enjoy our protection.' We are currently experiencing something similar with the customs debate. The German media are acting outraged. But here, too, the truth is that the European Union initially imposed tariffs on American goods. In this debate, I think we also need to start being honest. Parpart: Yes, it is very important to be honest about Germany's own military capabilities. I served in the Bundeswehr, in the Navy, for many years. First on active duty, then as a reserve officer. I looked at what it looks like today and what it looked like back then. There is no comparison at all: there are not even 100,000 deployable soldiers in Germany now. That's just the way it is. In England there are maybe 25,000 and in France I don't know, but let's say 50,000. What's the point? To pontificate in this grandiose way that we will have to do it ourselves if the Americans no longer want to. Europe won't be able to do that in the next five years. That's it. That is a very clear, realistic assessment, which was made by a leading German institute, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, and was confirmed a fortnight ago by the Institute of International Studies in London. Perhaps a debate on this should also be organized in the Bundestag. How does the AfD see this? How do you want to proceed in the Bundestag in order to set something in motion? Frohnmaier: We are working on it. We have introduced several legislative initiatives. We have also raised several questions in the Bundestag regarding the delivery and construction of long-range missiles for Ukraine. But we are facing major hurdles. The established parties have erected what they call a 'Brandmauer' (fire wall) preventing their members from collaborating with us. We are the second largest party in parliament, but find it nearly impossible to push through any of our policies. Parpart: At the February Munich Security Conference, US Vice President J.D. Vance didn't speak about security. Instead, he spoke about the truncated understanding of democracy in Germany, the fear of established politicians of the will of the voters and of free speech. Could you please comment on that and tell us how democracy is being practiced in the new Bundestag? Frohnmaier: I have just come from a panel discussion in which Dr. Weidel [the AfD co-chair] also took part. It was a hot topic there. If I may, I would like to go a little further: Germany is the only developed Western country in which a domestic intelligence service has started to monitor and categorize political parties. This involves checking whether a party meets democratic requirements or not. In the process, those democratic standards are determined by the governing parties. This means that in Germany, a domestic intelligence service does not work on the defense against Islamism or the threat of terrorism, for example, but observes rival political parties to the ruling parties. In Germany, such observation currently only applies to the AfD. Various categories were invented for this purpose. First, there was the so-called test case phase, examining whether the AfD is a democratic party or not. There was no such thing in case law before. From the test case, which was invented especially for the AfD because it had become too strong, we then moved on to the observation case. A third category was then introduced: We are now to be categorized as extremist. In Germany, you are extremist if you say that freedom of expression is under threat, if you say you want to live in a world in which you earn your money with your labor, if you say you don't want mass migration that jeopardizes internal security and, for example, if you say you don't think that all decisions about our nation state should be made in Brussels. If you make these points today, you run the risk of being categorized as extremist. The AfD will continue to be dealt with in an unparliamentary manner. Here's what just happened: There are committees in the German Bundestag, similar to the congressional committees in the US. There are over 20 committees, and each party is entitled to chair several committees in proportion to its number of seats in parliament. The AfD, as the strongest opposition party, is entitled to several committee chairs. However, contrary to decades of parliamentary tradition, we have not been granted a single committee, [not] one. There has never been anything like it in Germany. [We're] ahead of the ruling CDU/CSU bloc in weekly opinion polls. However, the party is treated like an outcast. The votes of over 20% of German voters are cast aside. This is absolutely absurd and it needs to be pursued and discussed more widely internationally in the future. Faßnacht: The AfD is the only party in Germany that consistently has taken a very strict approach to the migration issue. Nevertheless, demographic change will certainly be an issue in the coming decades, as the number of people working in Germany is declining. Is there a position on migration that goes beyond simple rejection of the current migration policy? Frohnmaier: Yes, thank you for the opportunity to address that because in the German media such a differentiation often is not made. The AfD makes a very clear distinction between needs-based immigration and illegal immigration, or regular and irregular migration. We are not fundamentally against migration. Anyone who is a legal resident in Germany and has the appropriate qualifications to be integrated into the labor market, is very welcome in Germany. This has been the case in the past and will remain so in the future. Following the Canadian example, we are in favor of needs-based immigration that is geared towards the requirements of the German economy. On the other hand, we say quite clearly that we no longer want people who are not legal residents of Germany, who commit criminal offences here and who despise and disrespect our culture. In the last 10 to 15 years, we have seen masses of such illegal immigrants coming to Germany. If you look at the crime statistics, the results are truly frightening. The 15% of non-German residents are responsible for almost 45% of all crimes. That's why we, as the AfD, say: 'anyone who is in Germany legally, who works here and contributes to the community, is welcome, especially if they want to learn our language and respect our culture.' However, we do not want people in Germany who commit crimes or stay here illegally. This is completely normal in every healthy and normal country in the world. But in Germany, we have experienced a very different situation in the last 10 to 15 years. We want to return to normality. We can see that far too many highly qualified people are now emigrating. We have a brain drain problem and need to counteract this. The taxes people pay are far too high, in numerous places domestic security can no longer be guaranteed. And we need to promote an active family policy in order to make Germany attractive again. Unfortunately, today it is often the case that the question of whether you can start a family is also a question of your wallet, because children are considered too expensive. That's a shame, because I believe that children should experience a welcoming culture and that it shouldn't be a question of how much money you have. Faßnacht: What specific ideas does the AfD have to change this? Particularly in view of the incentives that make Germany so attractive for low- or unskilled migrants? Frohnmaier: Firstly, when it comes to illegal migration, we need a no-way policy. We must make it clear that people who cannot stay in Germany legally will be turned back directly at Germany's external borders. Refoulement must take place without compromise. We also must consistently deport and return those who are in Germany illegally. If we do not do this, we will not come to grips with the problems here. These are essential building blocks. If I may: before I became the foreign policy spokesperson for the AfD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, I was the spokesperson for development policy for a long time and would also like to say a few things about that. A study by the United Nations, which is certainly not suspected of playing AfD politics, has shown that Germany has become a magnet for immigration with its so-called incentive structure. This is about remittances. We have a situation where many people, particularly from Africa, come to us to feed their families back home through remittances. In some countries, remittances now make up a not inconsiderable proportion of national wealth. This must be stopped. This system of incentivizing remittances must be reduced and only benefits in kind should be granted. Scaling Fences has shown that people migrate to Germany in an organized manner in order for them to provide support in the form of remittances to home countries. We know that this amounts to almost 20 billion euros a year, which is not consumed in the German domestic market, but is predominantly transferred back to developing countries. German social benefits must not be misappropriated and used for development co-operation. We already have a situation where Germany is the leader in Official Development Assistance per capita and number two in absolute terms. Only the Americans pay more for development services. However, there is no strategy behind this, nor any consideration of what is in the German interest. It includes completely absurd projects. For example, we pay for LED lamps in Moroccan mosques. We pay for so-called e-rickshaw driving licences for transsexual people in India. Or we pay 30 million euros for climate-neutral cookware in Kenya. I could go on and on with this list. We have to set priorities here in our national interest. And what sums up the inefficiency of it all is that 70 cents of every euro we spend on development cooperation ends up in project administration and only 30% actually reaches the projects. Parpart: Ten years ago, China mainly exported to the United States and Europe. Now, however, things are very different. The main customer countries for Chinese products are in the Global South. Are there any thoughts on this in Germany? It looks like German exporters are still very much focused on the US, other European countries and China. Does the AfD have a concept of increased trade and investment in the Global South? Frohnmaier: I wrote a book about it called 'Die Verwohltätigung' ['charitibilization']. It describes German development cooperation. You're not even allowed to use the word 'aid' anymore, out of political correctness, because the official Germany has recently come to the conclusion that there are no longer any donor and recipient countries. I'm not being politically correct when I say that this is now done on an equal footing. I always have to smile and think: Imagine you go to your bank and say: 'When the next repayment is due, we'll decide on an equal footing, I'll have my say. That simply wouldn't work. The decoupling of conditions from development services has led to development cooperation becoming even more inefficient. We need a German strategy that goes beyond playing benefactor and altruism. The Global South is very important for us. We are talking about new markets here. The African market is largely untapped, at least from a European perspective. The Chinese are far ahead of us there when it comes to raw materials, partnerships and infrastructure projects. There is hardly any of this from a German perspective. That is why I am in favor of development cooperation having at least three focal points. One focus should be on raw materials and economic partnerships, another on preventing migration. These are sensible priorities that we should set in development cooperation. The Chinese are doing well in these areas. In 2017, at the very beginning of my time in the German Bundestag, I said that learning from China means learning to win – in the context of development cooperation. That caused great indignation, but it is simply true. Of course, they organize development cooperation differently. The Chinese are very business-like in some areas, which is perhaps not always compatible with the German mindset. However, I would also like to argue that we should once again allow our own interests to play a much greater role in development cooperation and develop strategies from that perspective. Parpart: I just came back from Shanghai. Germany's BASF, the world's largest chemical company, has established a major research center there and is building a $10 billion Verbund site (an integrated chemical complex linking production, energy flows and infrastructure) in Guangdong province. One engineer told me: 'We need cheap Russian natural gas to make our chemicals, but we can't do that in Germany anymore.' That's the backdrop of your argument, isn't it? Frohnmaier: It is not in Germany's interest to rule out the possibility of Russian gas being sourced again after the end of the war. It is not in Germany's interest to say 'nuclear power is no longer for us' out of some hippie and do-gooder ideals, while nuclear power plants are still being built all over the world. It is not in Germany's interest to phase out coal power and so on. How Germany positions itself in terms of energy policy is a critical issue. The prosperity of our country, the standard of living and the future of our citizens and families stand and fall with it. Trump would probably organize the framework conditions for American companies in such a way that they can produce in the USA. And in my opinion, that is a major difference to our federal government. These people have made the location so unattractive through their policies that it is hardly possible for companies to produce here, so they go abroad. That is regrettable. I am very worried. The southwest of Germany where I'm from is one of the centers of the automotive industry, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, Bosch. If these companies, on whose creative economic power every second job in my region depends, are forced to leave, then we will experience a change like the one that once took place in the Ruhr region and turned it into a rust belt as described in US Vice President Vance's book about his home state of Ohio. Affordable energy is an absolute necessity. Parpart: Yes, definitely. A final question: Will you become Minister President of Baden-Württemberg one day, Mr Frohnmaier? Frohnmaier: I am working on it … for our citizens. Parpart: When is the election? Next year, right? Frohnmaier: Exactly, in March 2026. Parpart: And what is the current situation? If there were elections next Sunday, you would still lag behind the CDU, wouldn't you? Frohnmaier: We are the second strongest force in Baden-Württemberg, but the CDU actually still leads by around 5-6%. We are now starting the election campaign and I expect to win.
Asia Times
4 days ago
- Politics
- Asia Times
The real meaning of Japan's 'men without chests'
' The task of the modern educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts. The right defense against false sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments. By starving the sensibility of our pupils, we only make them easier prey to the propagandist when he comes. ' -C.S. Lewis, 'The Abolition of Man' A recent article published in Asia Times , written by the author Han Feizi (which I presume is a pseudonym), used a phrase that caught my attention. The author spoke of 'men without chests,' a phrase used by Francis Fukuyama in 'The End of History and the Last Man.' The article was the second of a multi-part series titled an 'Asia without America' and presents a (compelling) case that the American military, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the political and cultural occupation of Japan have been corrupting post-war Japan since the founding of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955. The author hopes for the possibility of a 'Tang renaissance' in Japan in which a truer and more authentic Japan would emerge if only America's influence was withdrawn. Han Feizi writes, 'Japan has everything to gain from America's military departure and rebuilding a nation of men with chests.' If this essay can be understood in any way as a disagreement, it is a subtle one, since I do not seek to contradict Han Feizi's basic thesis of America's corrupting influence on the soul of Japanese culture. It is the usage of the phrase 'men without chests' where I take particular issue. When Fukuyama speaks of 'men without chests', he is referring to the middle component of Plato's tripartite soul, which is composed of the head ( logos , reason) chest ( thymos , spiritedness) and bowels ( eros , appetite). However, from reading Fukuyama alone, it would be easy to make the assumption that thymos means almost exclusively 'ambition' and 'desire for recognition.' Fukuyama writes, 'Plato's thymos is… nothing other than the psychological seat of Hegel's desire for recognition' and that ' thymos typically, but not inevitably, drives men to seek recognition.' The original meaning of thymos in the Phaedrus does indeed include the desire for recognition, but certainly not exclusively so. Fukuyama, perhaps in the interest of supporting his argument, heavily overemphasizes this aspect. When Socrates was sentenced to death for 'corrupting the youth of Athens,' he exhibited no signs of discontent or remorse at the prospect of dying in infamy and disrepute. If Socrates is to be regarded as a role model for Plato's ideal man, then what he meant by thymos cannot be how Fukuyama interprets it. Han Feizi, while disagreeing with Fukuyama in other areas, seems to accept Fukuyama's interpretation of thymos at face value. As a result, the philosophical foundations of Han Feizi's otherwise incisive analysis may suffer from a kind of linguistic photocopying that strays quite far from the original meaning. Just as a 1-degree difference in direction can determine whether an airplane lands in Rome or Tunisia, the slightest nuance in our definitions can lead us to radically different conclusions. How we define ' thymos ' and 'men without chests' directly affects how we are to understand the cultural situation in Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are currently experiencing, in Han Feizi's words, the 'nihilism and cultural anomie of end-state capitalism and liberal democracy.' Since this essay is largely in response to 'Part II: Japan's Tang renaissance', I also focus here primarily on Japan. Fukuyama took the phrase 'men without chests' from C.S. Lewis's 1943 essay 'The Abolition of Man. ' It is important to understand that when Lewis advocated for 'men with chests' he was never thinking about the relative breadth of one's pectoral muscles. The term 'men' here referred to general humanity and was not as gender-specific as it would be interpreted today. Insofar as Lewis did specifically refer to men, his vision for masculinity was arguably much more holistic. For Lewis, 'men without chests' were men (and women) who lacked integrated sentiment about reality—what Iain McGilchrist would call a balance between the left and right brain hemispheres, and others may call 'emotional intelligence.' 'The Abolition of Man'is about the abolition of humanity, not strictly the abolition of masculinity. Lewis provides the example of Coleridge, who once observed two tourists admiring a waterfall: one said it was 'pretty' and the other thought it was 'sublime.' For Coleridge, the tourist who called the waterfall sublime had a more proper response. Lewis does not use this example to be a snob about sophisticated literary vocabulary. He segues from this example to argue that the real purpose of education is to cultivate 'proper sentiments' that are appropriate to the contemplated object—a project that Lewis considered inseparable from the cultivation of virtue itself and a necessary component of civilization. Men (humanity) ought to be moved by a landscape, a narrative, or a line of poetry in a certain way; to remain unmoved would be the equivalent to a dead nerve, even a moral defect. While physicality is not totally irrelevant here, Lewis's clarion call for broad-chested men was not primarily so that they can bench-press 200 pounds but so that they could accommodate a large heart : that is, to feel and explore all of reality more deeply. It is not so that they can pursue 'Fukuyamian' thymos (like samurais committing hara-kiri) but true Platonic thymos, where the heart serves as the liaison between the head and the bowels. 'Men with chests,' therefore, should not recall the likes of Donald Trump, but rather someone more like Saint Augustine: 'our souls are like a house–too small for You [God] to enter, but we pray that You enlarge it.' Interestingly, when Lewis writes about what these 'just sentiments' should entail, he does not appeal to Platonic thymos or even his own Christian theology but the Tao (道) of Chinese philosophy. Although Lewis himself was not a scholar of Sinology or the Sinosphere, my own specialization can testify that his invocation of the Tao is quite appropriate. Chinese thought is deeply rooted in what might be called 'affect-centered ethics.' While foundational texts such as Lao Zi's 'Dao De Jing ' and Confucius's 'Analects ' differ in terms of method, they are nonetheless both in basic agreement that the way to the Tao begins with learning to feel 'appropriately.' I need only cite the very first passage from the 'Analects ' as evidence: 'The Master said: To study and at due times to practice what one has studied, is this not a pleasure ? When friends come from distant places, is this not a joy? To remain unsoured when his talents are unrecognized, is this not fitting for a gentleman [ junzi ]?' [emphasis added.] The Confucian method of education advocates rigorous memorization, something that is still widely practiced in China today, as well as many other Confucian-influenced Asian countries. But mere memorization itself was never the end goal. The end goal could be summed up in that single rhetorical question: 'Is this not a pleasure?' It was not pleasure per se that was the goal, but rather proper pleasure cultivated to align with the Tao. If you have only learned to recite a line of poetry from Li Bai or Du Fu but not learned to delight in it, Confucius would probably say his project had failed. If, on the other hand, you remain bitter because your talents go unrecognized, it is also a sign that your sentiments have not yet been properly cultivated. You have not become a real 'superior person' ( junzi ). This is true thymos in the original Platonic sense: the education of the heart. Not only does Confucius's delight in learning have nothing to do with the drive for recognition, but Confucius even explicitly states that the sign of a true junzi is precisely the absence of this desire . His vision for the completed junzi was the individual whose natural desires were completely within the bounds of ritual, and therefore needed no suppression or restraint: The Master said: When I was 15, I set my heart on learning. At 30, I took my stand. At 40, I was without confusion. At 50, I knew the command of Heaven. At 60, I heard it with a compliant ear. At 70, I follow the desires of my heart and do not overstep the bounds. Lewis, as it turns out, is quite in agreement with Confucius here: 'Those who know the Tao can hold that to call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not.' One can see from this that the whole discussion of men, with or without their chests, has been missing the point. I blame Fukuyama for this misunderstanding, not Han Feizi. Fukuyama co-opted the term 'men without chests' to mean 'men without thymos ' and by thymos he meant 'the primeval drive for recognition and glory which is present in ancient civilization but is now eclipsed by modern liberal democracy.' Fukuyama does not see 'men without chests' as necessarily problematic—since thymos (under his definition) is the primary cause for history's bloody wars. Han Feizi (if I understand him correctly) does since it has turned the land of 'samurai warriors and hardened salarymen' into 'a theme park filled with kawaii anime, Pokemon, Super Mario and schoolgirl manga.' It is not entirely true that postwar Japan can be reduced to these extremes. No culture is that simple. Neither the wistful regret of Haruki Murakami nor the fiery samurai passions of Yukio Mishimia should be seen as examples of what it means to have a chest or to not have one. For this reason, it is not clear what Han Feizi means for Japan to be liberated from its 'bonsai pot' and become 'men with chests' again. If the rape of Nanjing was an expression of Japan's thymos , we might prefer Fukuyama's world to it—the world happily denuded of thymos via liberal democracy. But was this hideous act really a true expression of samurai culture, or a betrayal of Japan's own Bushidō (武士道) code of conduct? If the latter, we may be much closer to locating the real heart of culture from which we could craft a vision for Japan's 'Tang renaissance.' The final kanji character ' dō ' (道) is in fact a direct loanword from the Chinese Tao. If there is anyone who carries the seeds of Japan's 'Tang renaissance,' I suggest Hayao Miyazaki as a candidate, the legendary creator of classic films such as 'Spirited Away ', 'My Neighbor Totoro ' and 'Princes Mononoke .' There is a distinct Confucian flavor in all of these films, one that prioritizes relationships, mutual respect and the balance of reason, intuition and emotion. The heroes and heroines of Miyazaki are not hyper-masculine glory seekers or listless, dispirited recluses. They are real men, and real women, with 'chests,' with thymos and eros balanced and directed by Logos, or the Tao. This was Lewis's interpretation of Confucius and Plato. Without these kinds of full-chested men so defined, we should not expect Japan or anyone else to experience any kind of real cultural renaissance in our lifetimes. Raymond Dokupil holds a Master's degree in Asian Studies from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
India.com
23-05-2025
- Politics
- India.com
Pakistan and China set to face the heat in coming days, will they continue to remain friends? Check India's connection
China has always had the back of Pakistan and time and again, it has proved to be a great friend of India's arch rival. This was also confirmed during the recent Operation Sindoor of the Indian Armed Forces in which, China shared satellite and technical intelligence information against India with Pakistan. Islamabad also used Chinese weapons against India in response to this operation. But now the tension of these two countries is going to increase. The situation will become so bad that both will have to struggle to save their own lives. In such a situation, they will not even get a chance to think about helping each other. Indian Air Force is increasing its presence in near space In fact, the Indian Air Force has begun to look beyond traditional airspace in light of regional conditions. This strategic region is near space, which extends from 20 to 100 kilometers above the Earth's surface. This region, often called the 'unseen middle,' lies above the reach of conventional aircraft and below the orbits of satellites. This area provides a unique opportunity for long-range surveillance, communications, and defense applications of enemy territory. With advances in high-altitude platforms, re-entry vehicles, and hypersonic technology, the Indian Air Force is beginning to establish its presence in this emerging region. What are the benefits of being in near space? According to the Asia Times report, near space offers several strategic advantages. It allows for continuous monitoring of disputed or remote areas, supports reliable communication links in difficult terrain and enables early detection of missile threats. Unlike satellites, near-space platforms can be operated, recovered and redeployed quickly and cost-effectively. At the same time, satellites follow the predicted orbits of any missiles and also face threats from anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. India will keep a close watch on these areas Moreover, the growing military applications of near space also serve India's broader security priorities. It can prove to be quite effective, especially with regard to monitoring Chinese activities along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), security of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and countering the growing missile capabilities of neighbouring countries. One of the most immediate applications of near space for the IAF is in the area of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Platforms such as high-altitude pseudo satellites (HAPS) and stratospheric balloons can conduct surveillance from altitudes of 20 to 30 kilometres for long durations. Solar-powered and equipped with advanced sensors, these systems can provide high-resolution images and signal intelligence over a wide area. This persistent aerial presence is ideal for border surveillance, especially in remote areas such as Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh and the Siachen Glacier. Conventional drones and manned aircraft are limited by fuel and endurance, while satellites can only fly over a given area at fixed intervals. HAPS and similar near-space vehicles can fill this critical surveillance gap.
Yahoo
19-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Reagan admin official who helped America defeat communism dead at age 83
Michael A. Ledeen, a major American historian and intellectual, died after suffering a series of small strokes on Sunday at his daughter's house in Texas. He was 83 years old. Ledeen was a vigorous participant in contributing to the demise of the communist Soviet Union and its Iron Curtain allies in Eastern Europe. Ledeen served as a special advisor on terrorism to President Ronald Reagan's secretary of state, Alexander Haig, and later worked as a consultant for the National Security Council. Writing for the Asia Times, author and journalist David P. Goldman argued that Ledeen's "personal contribution to America's victory in the Cold War is far greater than the public record shows." Goldman noted that the Reagan administration, in 1983, sent Ledeen, a scholar of Italian history and fascism, to meet Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi to convince the Italian leader to allow the U.S. to deploy Pershing missiles to counter rising Soviet jingoism. Goldman added, "The incident reflects the high trust that Ledeen commanded in the Reagan administration and the strategic role that he played." Trump Says Us Has Given Iran Proposal For Nuclear Deal After Italy accepted the Pershings, the then-Social Democratic German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who was reluctant for his nation to be first to house Pershing missiles, agreed to Reagan's demand. Leeden was a fan of former anti-communist American philosopher Sidney Hook, who declared during the Cold War that "Freedom is a fighting word." Read On The Fox News App Ledeen would take his hard-charging world view against a new set of U.S. enemies after the ground zero of communism was defeated: radical Islamism in Iran, North Korea's totalitarian regime, and Arab and Latin American despots bent on the eradication of the U.S. In 2003, while working as the resident scholar in the Freedom Chair at the American Enterprise Institute, Ledeen wrote about former President George W. Bush's Axis of Evil (Iran, North Korea and Iraq), "Most commentators ridiculed the very idea of the Axis of Evil, just as they laughed at Reagan's description of the Soviet Union as an Evil Empire. The deep thinkers laughed at Reagan, and then somberly warned that such language was not only misguided but provocative, as if the Kremlin would be more aggressive as a result of the president's speech." Ledeen stressed the importance of American leadership breeding inspiration among dissidents trapped in totalitarian systems: "The greatest of the Soviet freedom fighters, from [Vladimir] Bukovsky to [Natan] Sharansky, have since written about the surge of hope they felt when they saw that the American president understood why they were fighting." He would bring his same intellectual freedom toolkit to his principal worry in this century: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ledeen garnered enormous respect and praise from Iranian dissidents seeking to dissolve the theocratic regime in Tehran, the world's worst state-sponsor of terrorism, according to the U.S. State Department. His wife, Barbara, told Fox News Digital about her late husband, "My only regret is that he didn't outlive the regime." Iran's Long Trail Of Deception Fuels Skepticism Over New Nuclear Deal As Talks Continue Leeden did not advocate military intervention in Iran. He was in the business of replicating Reagan's anti-Soviet playbook for Iran's clerical regime. He told Fox News Brit Hume in 2005 that "the Western world, and in particular the United States" needs to support political prisoners in Iran and demonstrations against the regime. He told Hume, "We should be giving money to the various ... Farsi-language broadcasters, some here, some in England, some in Sweden and so forth, some in Germany, to go on the air and share with the Iranian people the now-demonstrated techniques for a successful, nonviolent revolution." He coined the phrase "Faster, please!" for his widely read blog at PJ Media to denote the great urgency to dismantle America's enemies and stop Islamist-animated terrorism. Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, paid tribute to Ledeen in a post on X. He wrote in part, "Michael's understanding of the American people and the Jewish people formed the basis of his abiding faith in the future of America and Israel and in our enduring alliance and friendship." Ledeen was born in Los Angeles in 1941 and authored numerous books on national security, including "Perilous Statecraft: An Insider's Account of the Iran-Contra Affair." He earned a Ph.D. in history and philosophy from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His academic advisor at Wisconsin was the prominent historian George Mosse, who fled Nazi Germany because of antisemitism. Ledeen cultivated a new generation of academics, journalists, think tank scholars and authors at his Chevy Chase home. His residence became a kind of informal salon for intellectuals and foreign policy types who had freshly arrived in Washington, D.C. He was also a top-level bridge player and won a national championship, the Truscott/U.S.P.C. Senior Teams. He is survived by his wife, a daughter, Simone, who served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the first Trump administration, and his two sons, former Marine Corps officers Gabriel and article source: Reagan admin official who helped America defeat communism dead at age 83
Asia Times
16-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Trump's trade beef more with Global South than China
As Donald Trump gears up for his big trade battle with Xi Jinping's China, is the US president fighting the wrong economic war? A perusal of Federal Reserve data shows, rather convincingly, that the US now imports roughly four times as much from Global South nations, ex-China, than from Asia's biggest economy. In March, for example, the US imported about US$29.3 billion worth of goods from China and $114 billion from the Global South. This is no aberration, as the accompanying chart shows. US-bound shipments from Latin America, Africa, Turkey, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and elsewhere are, taken together, increasingly bigfooting those directly from the mainland. Caveats abound, of course. The magnitude of indirect trade passing through third countries and re-exported to another is literally off the charts. The nature of modern-day supply chains is that economies like Mexico or Vietnam use Chinese components in their wares, which are then put on tankers to American shores. Graphic: Asia Times Even so, the extreme bilateralization of trade as a foundational concept in the Trumpian mindset unravels, circa 2025, when you look at the biggest sources of US trade flows. It's a reminder that Trump's economic strategy is ripped from the pages of the mid-1980s. The rationale behind Trump's tariff policies dates back to a time when the five most industrialized nations held vast sway over economic dynamics. His obsession with a weaker dollar is inspired by a deal struck 40 years ago in New York's Plaza Hotel, an iconic property Trump owned for a while. His tax priorities have critics linking them to the 'trickle-down economics' era. The problem with a US leader having his head stuck in 1985, aside from the obvious, is that 'Made in China 2025' is upending the global economy now. And at a moment when China is investing in where it thinks the world will be in 2035. This goes, too, for a Global South that's increasingly forging its own path – one that barely factors in where the US might fit in a decade from now. 'The world economy is splitting into competing groups instead of a single connected system of globalization of the 1990s,' says Gilles Moëc, chief economist at AXA Investment. So, despite what Trump appears to believe, nothing he does with tariffs is going to shrink cross-border trade. What Trump World missed is that 'instead of bringing production back to the countries where products are used, global companies have been reorganizing their supply chains around groups of countries or 'clubs with similar values or security concerns.' Moëc adds that 'this rejig is a diluted version of globalization but can still keep the wheels moving. As long as clubs include both low-wage nations and high-spending economies, the adverse effects of fragmentation – such as inflation and lower efficiency – could be mitigated.' Now that Trump seems to have segued from pushing tariffs to pushing Boeing planes and American semiconductors, the hope is that his assault on China Inc is losing momentum. But the reordering of global trade dynamics, evidenced by Fed data, suggests the Trump administration is firing tariffs at the wrong economic foe. That is becoming even truer as traditional US allies like the European Union pivot to where the real future growth is. 'China is likely to double down on ties with the Global South and Europe, the latter now its most crucial market given its purchasing power and relatively restrained trade stance,' says Lauren Gloudeman, analyst at Eurasia Group. Of course, China's ability to reroute exports from the US to Europe will probably be quickly curtailed by forthcoming EU measures to prevent dumping by other countries,' Gloudeman notes. Still, this is trade that Trump is leaving on the table with policies that look backwards, not to the decade ahead. Trump doesn't have a monopoly on Panglossian views of the future. The Chinese side can also go too far with half-glass-full takes on the magnanimity of Beijing's policy mix. Or the Chinese economy's perceived invulnerability. Take Yang Guangbin, international relations expert at Renmin University, who argues that 'unlike the order brought to the world by the rise of the West, the new form of human civilization created by Chinese modernization will be shared development rather than beggar-thy-neighbor, common security rather than security dilemmas and civilization mutual learning rather than civilization conflicts.' In Yang's view, China's policy priorities 'set an example for Global South countries to independently and autonomously move towards modernization and will inevitably be emulated by some countries.' Perhaps, but even BRICS nations — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — compete far more amongst each other than they cooperate. Yet, at the same time, the more Global South to Global South trade there is, the less there might be old-school trade with big roles for US companies. As Fabian Zuleeg, chief economist at the European Policy Center, notes, multipolarity is often linked to countries aligning flexibly with other powers, rather than being forced into camps, or worse, becoming unwilling parties in a cold war or open conflict between superpowers. 'On one level,' Zuleeg says, 'multipolarity is a description of the emerging global landscape. It also reflects the justified dissatisfaction with the global economic and governance system that was designed, and has been dominated by, the West, led by the US. This system is neither fair, nor is it underpinned any longer by the support of the US, let alone of the Global South.' However, he stresses, 'multipolarity is not an ordering principle, especially if it lacks a clear plan for reformed and inclusive international organizations able to define jointly acceptable rules, allowing for the peaceful mitigation of conflict.' Yet Aparna Bharadwaj, managing partner at the Boston Consulting Group, adds that the US takes the Global South for granted at its own peril. She points out that global attention lately has fixated on the challenges and tensions fracturing the Western-led world order, such as 'America First' policies, the fraying of decades-old alliances, dramatic US tariff increases on all its global trade partners, and Europe's struggle to remain competitive. 'Less-noticed,' Bharadwaj says, 'has been a development with perhaps even greater long-term implications for the global economy—the rise of a 'third front' on the world stage spanning more than 130 nations outside the orbits of the West and China and that accounts for more than three-fifths of global population. Nations in the Global South … are emerging from the shadows to craft their own paths in a multipolar world.' And that world is now, collectively, becoming a bigger trading force for the US than the one over which Trump obsesses. This linear focus, of course, also dates back to the 1980s. Back then, it was Japan that Trump accused of exploiting US workers. Now it's China in the role of economic bogeyman. One could look at the destination of the first overseas trip of Trump's second presidency — the Middle East — as a sign of situational awareness. But Trump family business seems to be the main objective of this Gulf tour, not spreading America's economic wings. The good news for the global economy is that Trump is retreating on tariffs, at least for now. 'The transition from tariff rates, retaliation and ultimately to trade deals is an important sequence for the recovery in US equity markets,' says Adam Turnquist, chief technical strategist at LPL Financial. And the recovery in global markets, too. But Trump can't be happy about the dominant narrative that he blinked on his ballyhooed trade war. Nor is he likely to sit quietly as Xi's government fails to offer loads of trade concessions in the days and weeks ahead. The odds are still high that 'Tariff Man' returns, wreaking fresh havoc in stock, bond and currency markets around the globe. Trump's tariff policies are driving de-dollarization. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Jewel Samad The dollar is of particular concern as the US national debt races toward $37 trillion and Team Trump angles for more tax cuts. Markets worry, too, about Trump's assault on the Federal Reserve's independence. And his musings over time about engineering a weaker dollar. As Trump continues to do his worst to trading partners and foes alike, the dollar's future as the top reserve currency is becoming more and more wobbly. The market is 're-assessing the structural attractiveness of the dollar as the world's global reserve currency and is undergoing a process of rapid de-dollarization,' says Deutsche Bank economist George Saravelos. 'Nowhere is this more evident than the continued and combined collapse in the currency and US bond market' in recent weeks. What's not collapsing, though, is US trade, thanks largely to the Global South, ex-China set. If Trump wants to boost US exports, he might want to start looking to the world that exists beyond China. Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
