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The Guardian
26-04-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Giorgia Meloni faces awkward weekend at funeral of pope whose values she opposed
It is an awkward weekend for Giorgia Meloni. The Italian leader will host a gathering of world leaders to say goodbye to a much-revered pope whose public views – from the treatment of people fleeing war to the climate crisis – were diametrically opposed to hers. While Pope Francis was a staunch advocate for asylum seekers, and blessed the vessels that saved refugees at sea, Meloni once said Italy should 'repatriate migrants back to their countries and then sink the boats that rescued them'. Close allies of Meloni are attending, including the US president, Donald Trump, who Francis sharply criticised for his anti-immigration stance, saying: 'Anyone who only wants to build walls and not bridges is not a Christian.' Also flying in is Argentina's president, Javier Milei, who at various times called the pontiff an imbecile and a representative of the 'evil one'. In a joint session of parliament on Wednesday, Meloni cited how the pope 'gave back a voice to those who did not have one'. The words of Italy's prime minister were sharply criticised by opposition parties in parliament. The leader of the centre-left opposition Democratic party, Elly Schlein, said: 'Francis does not deserve the hypocrisy of those who deport migrants, take money from the poor, deny the climate emergency and deny care to those who cannot afford it.' The former Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi of Italia Viva was equally scathing. 'It is very funny that each of us seeks to grab a little piece of his legacy,' he said. Addressing the government's members, he added: 'Your detention camps for migrants were a disgrace to Pope Francis.' On big issues, Meloni and the pope could not have been further apart. The climate emergency was for Francis a moral and spiritual crisis demanding a radical and systemic response, whereas for Meloni the ecological transition is subordinate to economic competitiveness and national interest. In economics, the pope denounced the 'culture of waste', criticising a system that values people according to their productivity and calling for an economy in the service of human dignity. Meloni, meanwhile, has abolished subsidies for the poor and cut healthcare. 'There was a huge gap between the two,' said Francesco Galietti, the founder of Policy Sonar, a political consultancy in Rome. 'Meloni bet on Atlanticism, on a close rapport with Trump, while Bergoglio [Pope Francis] was by no means pro-American nor a friend of Trump. There was also a divergence in geopolitical vision: Francis pursued a policy of rapprochement with China, whereas under Meloni Italy withdrew from Beijing's ambitious belt and road initiative.' But on a personal level, they appeared to be friendly, even friends. 'Despite this,' Galietti added, 'the friendship between Meloni and the pope was allegedly genuine. They spoke in Spanish and met often. This should come as no surprise: after all, the pope, who grew up under Argentina's Videla dictatorship, was forced to coexist with generals in uniform far to the right of Meloni.' Meloni has long publicised her personal rapport with Francis, frequently citing details of their conversations in public speeches. Many political observers and media outlets described the prime minister's strategy as an 'operazione simpatia', an attempt to win over her electorate by highlighting her friendship with one of the most beloved pontiffs. With the death of Francis, Meloni has lost someone politically, and possibly personally, important to her. 'Francis accepted Meloni's history, her self-portrayal as an underdog,' said Prof Alberto Melloni, a church historian at the University of Modena-Reggio Emilia and the Unesco chair on religious pluralism and peace. 'Once Bergoglio told me he liked the PM because she was 'a woman of the people'.' The professor said the crucial question for Meloni was whether the next leader of the Catholic church would also play a useful role. 'If the pope does not sympathise with them, he won't let them off so lightly.'
The Guardian
12-03-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
From the archive: The end of Atlanticism: has Trump killed the ideology that won the cold war?
We are raiding the Guardian Long Read archives to bring you some classic pieces from years past, with new introductions from the authors. This week, from 2018: The foreign policy establishment has been lamenting its death for half a century. But Atlanticism has long been a convenient myth By Madeleine Schwartz. Read by Kelly Burke
Euronews
07-03-2025
- Politics
- Euronews
Atlanticism's last stand: Meloni's bid to keep EU engaged with US
As some EU leaders consider the consequences of an apparent US disengagement from Europe's security, Italy's premier remains one of the strongest advocates for keeping the continent under American protection. ADVERTISEMENT Italy's Giorgia Meloni arrived in Brussels for the extraordinary EU summit on Thursday, sticking by a mantra she had pitched at last Sunday's informal summit in London: European defence is not viable without full NATO involvement. This position differs from French President Emmanuel Macron, who is helming the efforts of those interpreting recent US political shifts under President Donald Trump as a signal for Europe to enhance its strategic autonomy. While Macron has gone so far as to propose extending France's nuclear protection to the entire continent as an added security guarantee for EU allies, Meloni reaffirmed her commitment to traditional Atlanticism—a doctrine advocating a close alliance between the US and Europe on political, economic, and defence matters since World War II. As Europe grapples with shifting geopolitical realities, Meloni is seeking to mediate between EU leaders, many of whom seem now open to supporting Macron's vision of maintaining NATO ties while also strengthening European defence capabilities in the event the US pulls the plug on the transatlantic alliance. Keeping the Western camp united The push for European self-reliance is gaining traction beyond France. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas recently intensified the debate following tensions between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, tweeting: 'It became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It's up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.' For Italy, bridging these ideological gaps is crucial to maintaining NATO unity. 'What is evident in this situation is the need to maintain unity—not only within the European Union but more generally within the Western camp," as one diplomatic source said ahead of the EU summit. Italy's Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, in Brussels for a meeting of his centre-right European People's party, reinforced this perspective: 'Guaranteeing Ukraine's security and that of Europe without a strong transatlantic relationship and without NATO is absolutely impossible.' French President Emmanuel Macron and Italy's PM Giorgia Meloni have different views on the impact of Trump's administration on Europe. AP Photo Meloni's close ties to Trump Beyond her commitment to transatlantic unity, Meloni remains one of Europe's few potential 'Trump whisperers' since she is a close ally - Trump has hailed her as 'a fantastic woman' and 'a great leader' - and Meloni has leveraged this and wants to maintain the connection. In January, she travelled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida to coordinate efforts for the release of Italian journalist Cecilia Sala, who was imprisoned in Iran. This diplomatic success boosted her domestic standing. In a recent speech, Meloni sought to quell concerns about Trump's commitment to Europe: 'Our adversaries hope Trump will move away, but that won't happen. I know him: he is strong and effective. I bet we will prove them wrong.' A 'legally questionable' NATO compromise In this sense and in a bid to seek a middle ground between Trump's opposition to Ukraine's NATO membership and the need to offer Kyiv security assurances, Meloni pitched an unusual solution. She suggested extending to Ukraine NATO's Article 5 - its collective defence clause - without the territory being granted actual membership of the alliance. This would place Ukraine under NATO's protective umbrella while avoiding a formal commitment. Political historian Lorenzo Castellani of Rome's Luiss Guido Carli University said the plan would be 'legally questionable and difficult to implement on a political level". 'It basically means that if Putin breaks the truce after the conflict is frozen, NATO steps in. Meloni is aware that this sort of deterrence plan would never be accepted by Russia,' said the expert. Moreover, deploying Italian troops in Ukraine remains politically untenable. 'Italian public opinion is much more opposed to increasing military spending and sending weapons to Ukraine compared to France, Germany, or the UK,' Castellani noted. ADVERTISEMENT Domestic political challenges Meloni also has obstacles within her own government. Her coalition partners, Forza Italia and Lega or the League, are divided on military support for Ukraine and European defence strategy. From left to right: Matteo Salvini, Giorgia Meloni, and Antonio Tajani. AP Photo Forza Italia, led by Foreign Minister Tajani, is fully aligned with Meloni's cautious approach. The party backs military aid to Kyiv and endorses the European Commission's ReArm Europe plan, which aims to boost EU defence capabilities. By contrast, the League remains sceptical of EU defence initiatives and has placed its faith in Trump's potential negotiations with Russia. Finance Minister and League heavyweight Francesco Giorgetti have even criticised the EU's defence strategy as 'hasty and illogical'. So Meloni is navigating a careful path to maintain a tilt towards the US, both to play to her political strengths but also as a means of preserving her domestic power base. But if her profile currently appears low amid the crisis summitry, as events develop, she may well be pitched into a more front-of-house role.
Euronews
07-03-2025
- Politics
- Euronews
Atlanticist last stand: Meloni's bid to keep EU engaged with US
As some EU leaders consider the consequences of an apparent US disengagement from Europe's security, Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni remains one of the strongest advocates for keeping the continent under American protection. ADVERTISEMENT Italy's Giorgia Meloni arrived in Brussels for the extraordinary EU summit yesterday sticking by a mantra she had pitched at last Sunday's informal summit in London: European defence is not viable without full NATO involvement. This position differs from French President Emmanuel Macron, who is helming the efforts of those interpreting recent US political shifts under President Donald Trump as a signal for Europe to enhance its strategic autonomy. While Macron has gone so far as to propose extending France's nuclear protection to the entire continent as an added security guarantee for EU allies, Meloni reaffirmed her commitment to traditional Atlanticism—a doctrine advocating a close alliance between the US and Europe on political, economic, and defence matters since World War II. As Europe grapples with shifting geopolitical realities, Meloni is seeking to mediate between EU leaders, many of whom seem now open to supporting Macron's vision of maintaining NATO ties while also strengthening European defence capabilities in the event the US pulls the plug on the transatlantic alliance. Keeping the Western camp united The push for European self-reliance is gaining traction beyond France. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas recently intensified the debate following tensions between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, tweeting: 'It became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It's up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.' For Italy, bridging these ideological gaps is crucial to maintaining NATO unity. 'What is evident in this situation is the need to maintain unity—not only within the European Union but more generally within the Western camp," as one diplomatic source said ahead of the EU summit. Italy's Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, in Brussels for a meeting of his centre-right European People's party, reinforced this perspective: 'Guaranteeing Ukraine's security and that of Europe without a strong transatlantic relationship and without NATO is absolutely impossible.' French President Emmanuel Macron and Italy's PM Giorgia Meloni have different views on the impact of Trump's administration on Europe. AP Photo Meloni's close ties to Trump Beyond her commitment to transatlantic unity, Meloni remains one of Europe's few potential 'Trump whisperers' since she is a close ally - Trump has hailed her as 'a fantastic woman' and 'a great leader' - and Meloni has leveraged this and wants to maintain the connection. In January, she travelled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida to coordinate efforts for the release of Italian journalist Cecilia Sala, who was imprisoned in Iran. This diplomatic success boosted her domestic standing. In a recent speech, Meloni sought to quell concerns about Trump's commitment to Europe: 'Our adversaries hope Trump will move away, but that won't happen. I know him: he is strong and effective. I bet we will prove them wrong.' A 'legally questionable' NATO compromise In this sense and in a bid to seek a middle ground between Trump's opposition to Ukraine's NATO membership and the need to offer Kyiv security assurances, Meloni pitched an unusual solution. She suggested extending to Ukraine NATO's Article 5 - its collective defence clause - without the territory being granted actual membership of the alliance. This would place Ukraine under NATO's protective umbrella while avoiding a formal commitment. Political historian Lorenzo Castellani of Rome's Luiss Guido Carli University said the plan would be 'legally questionable and difficult to implement on a political level". 'It basically means that if Putin breaks the truce after the conflict is frozen, NATO steps in. Meloni is aware that this sort of deterrence plan would never be accepted by Russia,' said the expert. Moreover, deploying Italian troops in Ukraine remains politically untenable. 'Italian public opinion is much more opposed to increasing military spending and sending weapons to Ukraine compared to France, Germany, or the UK,' Castellani noted. ADVERTISEMENT Domestic Political Challenges Meloni also has obstacles within her own government. Her coalition partners, Forza Italia and the League, are divided on military support for Ukraine and European defence strategy. From left to right: Matteo Salvini, Giorgia Meloni, and Antonio Tajani. AP Photo Forza Italia, led by Foreign Minister Tajani, is fully aligned with Meloni's cautious approach. The party backs military aid to Kyiv and endorses the European Commission's ReArm Europe plan, which aims to boost EU defence capabilities. By contrast, the League remains sceptical of EU defence initiatives and has placed its faith in Trump's potential negotiations with Russia. Finance Minister and League heavyweight Francesco Giorgetti have even criticised the EU's defence strategy as 'hasty and illogical'. So Meloni is navigating a careful path to maintain a tilt towards the US, both to play to her political strengths but also as a means of preserving her domestic power base. But if her profile currently appears low amid the crisis summitry, as events develop she may well be pitched into a more front of house role.
The Independent
24-02-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
Why Friedrich Merz is the right man to unite Europe against Trump
Claiming his victory in the German election, Friedrich Merz, leader of the centre-right CDU, said that his absolute priority was 'to strengthen Europe so that we are independent from the United States '. Hitherto known as a fervent Atlanticist and friend of the United States, the man set to be the next German chancellor also cast doubt on the future of Nato without American support. He was only a little less categorical at a press conference the next day, where he expressed the hope for good transatlantic relations, but also reiterating the 'need very rapidly to [...] be able to organise our own defence '. These are, of course, early days. Merz has yet to form a coalition – although the arithmetic makes a so-called 'grand coalition' with the centre-left SPD the most probable option, given that any association with the second-placed far-right AfD is ruled out. And the terms could take a while for the leaders to hammer out, given differences on such basics as tax policy and migration. On defence and security policy, on the other hand, it was the centre- right, with its wholehearted commitment to close transatlantic relations, to Nato and to the US security umbrella, that could have been thought the outlier. Pretty much all other parties harboured varying reservations, while paying lip-service to Atlanticism, with the exception of the anti-Nato AfD. In only a couple of sentences on election night, Merz shattered all those distinctions and turned CDU – and all German – security policy on its head. It is possible that this should be seen more as staking out a position that could be adjusted as and when, rather than – as yet – a complete reorientation of German policy, given that Merz at his press conference noted that Washington might not have said the 'last word'. But the overall shift in the US, which now sets China, and not Europe, as the priority, is surely for real. And that in turn dictates that a rapprochement with Russia is more important than continuing support for Ukraine. Having been blindsided by the abrupt US policy turn two weeks ago, European leaders seem to be gradually converging on a view that accepts that talks to end the Ukraine war are probably imminent, even as they compete with each other to offer military, economic and, especially, rhetorical support to Ukraine. This much was on display at an event called the Support Ukraine summit in Kyiv, marking the third anniversary of the Russian invasion. It was notable, however, that while the leaders of Canada and another dozen countries attended in person, the UK and the secretary-general of Nato, among others, made their contributions remotely. Notable, too, was that the French foreign minister, who was among the last to speak, was also one of few to assert directly that a 'turning point' had been reached, with the sharp policy U-turn from Washington. This could well be because such a turn was less unwelcome to France than to many other European countries. President Emmanuel Macron has long favoured the concept of 'strategic autonomy' for Europe, which would entail greater defence self-reliance for Europe, and at least a partial de-coupling from the United States. Macron was thwarted in advancing his ideas by two developments: the war in Ukraine that underlined for many the necessity of US involvement in European security; and by his own political weakness, following last summer's parliamentary elections, which left the far-right National Rally party of Marine Le Pen as the main opposition and paralysed much decision-making. The idea of 'strategic autonomy' could now make a comeback, with German support – a possibility some are terming the return of Gaullism. This could also have the secondary effect of strengthening the position of the governments in both countries, where far-right opposition is in the ascendant. Both National Rally and the AfD are reconciled to their countries' continued membership of the EU – a position underlined, perhaps, by watching Brexit from the sidelines – but are far more sceptical of Nato. This is not to say that what could be a fragile centre-right, centre-left coalition in Germany would be more likely to survive or that France would become any more governable. But it could draw the sting of far-right opposition in Parliament, and perhaps even open the way for the revival of the French-German dynamo, giving a fresh impetus to the EU. Such a development could place the Central and East European countries, which have been among the most wedded to Nato, as well as the UK in quite a tricky position – or rather, in an even more tricky position than they currently are, given that they are also the countries most vocal in their hostility to Russia and support for Ukraine. But the fact that membership of the EU and Nato now overlaps more than before, now that Sweden and Finland have abandoned their neutrality, and neutral Austria has a government led by the far-right, the result could be greater cohesion in the EU, and a resurrection of European defence and security policy that has languished in recent years. Given Macron's current political weakness – and the constitutional bar on his standing for re-election if he survives in office until 2027 – coupled with the UK's departure from the EU, the role of de facto European leader could well fall to Merz, in the same way as it did to Angela Merkel – ironically, Merz's deadly rival when they were in CDU politics together. This, however, would depend on Merz being able to run a stable ship, something that could be more likely if, as he has indicated, the defeated centre-left leader Olaf Scholz stays clear of the new coalition, and his successor was the popular Boris Pistorius, who could also retain his position as defence minister. There are reasons – serious and less serious – why Merz could just carry this off, and why he could also take over the role coveted by the UK as the 'bridge' to Washington. Merz says he has no illusions about Donald Trump. But they also have more in common than might be thought. Merz is a wealthy former businessman and corporate lawyer who worked for the US mega-investment company, BlackRock, and is familiar with New York and the US business world. Less seriously, Merz stands at 6ft 6in – which gives him a three-inch height advantage over Trump, who is used to being the 'big guy' in the room. The body language between the two could be interesting. What all this adds up to is a faint hope that the transatlantic rift that now seems to be written in the stars could be avoided. If it isn't, Europe in the shape of the EU could be in a better position than it might have expected, both to resist whatever trade pressure the US may decide to exert, but also – perhaps sooner rather than later – to look after its own defence. This does not mean that there could not be considerable strains on the EU, but more particularly on Nato, if Europe and the US start to go their separate ways, or that there would not be losers. For a start, the question of a European nuclear deterrent could rear its head. And the UK could find itself with its existing dilemmas sharpened: supplanted by Germany as the recognised bridge across the Atlantic, and finally forced to confront the choice as between Europe and the US that it has for so long done its utmost to avoid.
