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Daily Maverick
6 days ago
- General
- Daily Maverick
Somalia's stance on peace missions — interference or local ownership?
Threats to the independence of peace support missions call for clarity on their relationship with host countries. The Federal Government of Somalia has repeatedly used the 'persona non grata' principle to expel senior representatives of African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) missions, citing 'misconduct' and 'interference in internal affairs'. Somalia is also playing a more pronounced but contested role in planning, deploying and repatriating AU peace support operations (PSOs) in the country. These moves undermine missions' independence and hamper their ability to carry out mandated tasks. They also question host nations' increasing role in shaping mission strategy and operations. As the UN and AU explore the future of PSOs, the implications for existing and future peace missions must be considered. The UN and AU have long supported Somalia through peace missions to help deal with the country's protracted civil war. For almost 20 years the AU has deployed three consecutive PSOs – the latest being the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (Aussom) – with a mandate to help defeat violent extremist groups, including al-Shabaab, protect civilians and rebuild the country's governance capacity. The UN has provided special political missions to support state-building, rule of law, justice and human rights. It also authorised the AU PSOs and provided them with logistical assistance. Despite their many challenges and the persistent al-Shabaab threat, these missions have helped stabilise the country. Somalia has consolidated its government structures at federal and state levels, and an increasing number of regions have been liberated from al-Shabaab. Thousands of peacekeepers have died for the cause of peace. The 3,500 AU mission personnel killed in Somalia between 2007 and 2023 nears the total deaths of all UN peacekeeping missions in 75 years worldwide. Mission leaders walk a fine political line as they operate in Somalia. According to recent media reports, diplomatic concerns among Somali federal authorities resulted in Aussom acting head Sivuyile Bam being declared 'persona non grata'. Bam is also a deputy special representative to AU Commission chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Neither side has issued an official statement, but Somalia reportedly accused Bam of sympathising with al-Shabaab, and the government hinted at 'misconduct' when announcing Bam's replacement. This announcement appears false since the AU Commission has yet to appoint a head and deputy head of Aussom. Anonymous AU sources told ISS Today that the AU Commission withdrew Bam from the mission before Somalia expelled him. They said the reason was his briefing to the UN Security Council in April, which highlighted Aussom's funding and capabilities challenges, and the rise in al-Shabaab attacks. Somalia has used these tactics before, when senior leaders of AU and UN missions were forced to leave the country for similar reasons. In 2022, former AU Commission chairperson special representative and head of the first two AU PSOs, ambassador Francisco Madeira, was ejected. Somalia accused Madeira of 'engaging in acts that are incompatible with his status as representative of the AU Commission'. Former AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat rejected the accusation, expressing his 'trust and confidence' in Madeira. In 2019, Somalia expelled the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy and Mission Head Nicholas Haysom, accusing him of 'interfering with the country's internal affairs.' However, other sources said he was expelled because he was defending human rights in the country. In recent years Somalia's government has increasingly contested the planning, deployment and repatriation of AU PSOs. For example, Burundi – one of the largest contributors to AU PSOs since 2008 – has said it will withdraw its forces from Somalia following disagreement with the government on the number of troops to be deployed. These decisions were not Somalia's to make. Burundi's troop contribution was planned under the AU framework, and any decisions on expert and troop numbers deployed should have been made by the AU Commission. Local and national ownership is generally recognised as key to a mission's effectiveness. In 2001, the UN endorsed the concept as a way to empower local actors and communities in the peacebuilding process. In principle though, this was not intended to compromise the strategic and operational independence of missions. Tensions between host nations and peace missions are not new and are not restricted to Somalia. When Sudan, Mali, and Kosovo expelled UN mission leaders, the UN condemned their actions because the 'doctrine of 'persona non grata' is not applicable to UN personnel'. While the legality of 'persona non grata' in the context of UN and AU peace missions is still debatable, the implications for peace missions of using this tactic are evident. At the very least, the threat of expulsion undermines the morale of mission personnel and their ability to act independently according to their mandates. Operational independence is vital to a mission's legitimacy in the eyes of host nation communities and the world. For Aussom, having an 'acting' head of mission since mid-April will limit its effectiveness. The Somali government's direct dealings with Burundi on troop contributions to Aussom not only compromise mission independence but undermine troop-contributing countries' confidence in the AU Commission's decision-making. This highlights the dilemma of state sovereignty and how to manage the principle of local ownership in peace operations. But once a country signs an agreement consenting to international support, it cedes some sovereignty in line with the mandate of UN and AU peace missions. Local ownership is important, but so too is ensuring missions' strategic and operational independence. The latest developments in Somalia call for a rethink of how these relationships are structured and managed. The UN and AU should jointly define the role of host nations to ensure the independence of existing and future peace missions as part of a larger conversation about the relationship between host countries and peace missions. DM
Daily Maverick
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Global uncertainty calls for an overhaul of African Union peace support operations
US and likely European funding cuts call for peacekeeping that is focused, fast and modest in its ambition. The US intends to significantly reduce its contributions to the United Nations (UN), including a complete withdrawal of funding for peacekeeping operations, according to a recent Washington Post report. The decision must still be formalised by the State Department and approved by Congress, but it's an ominous sign of what may lie ahead for both UN and African Union-led peace support operations (PSOs). This includes the new AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (Aussom), which already faces major funding uncertainties. While the European Union (EU) is still committed to multilateralism, its growing focus on the war in Ukraine may lead to a decline in assistance for PSOs in Africa and elsewhere. The changing multilateral context and resource constraints require innovative thinking from the AU and its member states. Not only are PSOs beyond the financial capabilities of African countries and regional organisations, but traditional partners are growing reluctant to fund an instrument that struggles to demonstrate its efficiency. In recent years, laudable efforts have been made to meet the AU Peace Fund's endowment target of $400-million, but using the income for PSOs such as Aussom would deplete it. Despite some Western partners committing to support the Peace Fund once it starts financing AU-led operations, the sheer number of conflict hotspots across Africa casts doubt on the sustainability of that option. Reimagining PSOs – particularly their conflict management role – starts with acknowledging that they are just a means to an end, namely the peaceful resolution of violent conflicts, as articulated in the AU's normative frameworks. Peace missions are not meant to last for decades. As often reiterated since the 2015 UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations report, peacekeeping should be informed by a political strategy grounded in a measured understanding of what these operations can realistically achieve. To improve future funding prospects, peacekeeping should focus on visible impact and realistic results. AU-led missions can, for example, help to stabilise conflict environments and create the conditions for political dialogue. They can also support the implementation of political agreements. One of the most important lessons of multidimensional peace operations is that the instrument is not fit for long-term endeavours such as state building or fostering societal cohesion. These are inherently endogenous processes. Clarity of purpose and modest ambition must become the guiding principles of a redefined peace support model. This new model should blend various existing approaches, guided by the spirit of the Powell Doctrine. In a 1984 speech on the use of military power, then US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger set out criteria that would inform what is today known as the Powell Doctrine, named after late Chief of Joint Staff General Colin Powell. These criteria included a clearly defined vital interest, a firm intention to win, proportionality between objectives and military means, support from the public and Congress, and the use of force as a last resort. In the context of African PSOs, the new model could rest on four key principles: clear and limited mandates, time-bound deployment, selective criteria for troop-contributing countries, and multidisciplinary deployments. First, it is vital to have political and military clarity on the mission's objectives. The scope of the mandate should be limited to a maximum of three core objectives, primarily within the political and security domains. Second, each mission should be subject to a clearly defined and non-renewable timeframe. This is essential to avoid the risks of institutional inertia that often arise in protracted deployments. Third, the AU should consider adopting a middle-ground position between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's framework nations concept and the current AU lead-nation approach. It is important that capable African countries be given more responsibilities in leading missions, supported by no more than two additional contributing countries. This streamlined approach would help address some of the persistent command and control challenges that often undermine the effectiveness of AU-led missions, including Aussom. Also, states sharing a border with crisis-affected countries should be excluded from participating in the operation to avoid conflicts of interest and safeguard the mission's credibility and neutrality. The fourth principle is to avoid an overly militarised approach to peace operations. Many security challenges – such as protecting civilians – require police-led rather than military responses. Future missions should be genuinely multidisciplinary, demand-driven and tailored to the needs of each situation. A reimagined PSO model should be based on the rationale of acting swiftly, forcefully if necessary, and withdrawing as soon as conditions permit – leaving the space for a sustainable political process. Strengthening the political dimension of these operations is vital. Prolonged peacekeeping missions often result from the failure of internal and external stakeholders to develop political solutions that would render peacekeeping unnecessary. The AU's main value lies in its political and diplomatic legitimacy. That means it should enhance the capacity of its political units and diplomatic instruments both within and beyond PSOs. While the AU Peace and Security Council's primary function should be to prevent conflicts from breaking out, it could help manage conflicts by developing accountability instruments such as a sanctions regime. Along with robust procedures for adopting and enforcing sanctions, this could pressure conflict parties towards dialogue and compliance with agreed frameworks. However, member states' resistance to sanctions remains strong despite the looming risk of another postponement of the 'Silencing the Guns by 2030' goal, which would significantly damage the AU's credibility. Substantial normative shifts are needed across the crisis management cycle of the AU and UN. Rather than just a facelift, this requires a complete rethink that reflects the ongoing transformation of the international order. A thorough overhaul of the African PSO concept is vital to reinvigorating the AU's Peace and Security Architecture and resolving the continent's enduring instability. DM Paul-Simon Handy, regional director East Africa and representative to the African Union, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Addis Ababa, and Félicité Djilo, Independent Analyst, ISS.
