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The Life of MI6's Forgotten Master Spy
Tim Willasey-Wilsey's The Spy and The Devi l is an incredible story of a British 'master spy' who gained direct access to Adolf Hitler in 1931 through Alfred Rosenberg, a Baltic-German theorist, who headed the Nazi party's foreign office (NSDAP) from 1933-1945.
It recreates the post-World War I Europe, dominated by intrigues, treachery and predatory redrawing of borders through land grabbing. The story has shades of John Le Carre's enthralling drama, chronological clarity through assiduous research and a message on how governments should utilise intelligence services.
Willasey-Wilsey, CMG, a former British diplomat, is currently Visiting Professor of War Studies at King's College, London and Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). He spent three years researching for this book.
The author admits that some books had already acknowledged the spy's contributions, like professor Keith Jeffery's authorised MI6 history, The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949. Yet, not everything was revealed about how this 'important and courageous secret agent' operated at a time when the British government was divided over a coherent policy towards Nazi Germany.
Also, in 1934, the agency 'saw Germany as a potential ally in the more important battle against Bolshevik Russia'. It was this spy who helped 'MI6's evolution from being a service providing low-level tactical information to the strategic organisation' for the British government.
That was in 1938, when MI-6 chief Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair consulted the spy when Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, requested the agency to draft a strategic paper 'What should we do?' to deal with Hitler.
The spy was Baron Wilhelm Sylvester von der Ropp, or Bill de Ropp, code number 12821, a Baltic-German from Lithuania, who 'lived in the heart of Berlin under the noses of the three main German security services – the Gestapo, the Abwehr and the SD'. Yet, as Jeffery said, at least 70% of the political intelligence on Hitler's Germany was provided by him.
Ropp studied in Birmingham University, became a British citizen in 1914. He joined the British army's Air Intelligence team (propaganda & interrogations) under press baron Lord Northcliffe due to his linguistic flair. Ropp came in touch with MI6 as part of his work with Northcliffe and moved to 'Occupied Germany' in 1919, where he worked in the weekly reporting section.
After that job ended, MI-6 employed him for covering the Baltic States under cover as a Daily Mail journalist, courtesy Lord Northcliffe. Meanwhile, he got married to Marie Winifred Woodman, known as Jimmy, who helped him in his 'real' work. MI-6 reappointed him to Berlin where he started writing for Outlook magazine edited by John Balderston, an American.
At the end of November 1926, Ropp published an article on 'Airships' in Outlook. 'Little did he realise that he would be discussing these very issues with Adolf Hitler himself only four years later."
Very soon, he became their Berlin correspondent. The author said that his first piece on 'Germany inside the League' following Berlin's entry to the League of Nations in Geneva demonstrated his ability as a 'political analyst as well as his excellent written English.'
In 1926, Ropp became a representative in Germany for the Bristol Aeroplane Company, which was used by MI-6's 'Air Section' led by F.W. Winterbotham, the 'Ultra' intelligence specialist. This facilitated achieving a three-fold object: 'selling Bristol engines for civil aircraft, watching out for the potential military use of civil aviation, and tracking the expansion of Russo-German relations since the Rapallo Treaty of 1922'. Ropp's reputation in Berlin as an expert on Anglo-German relations stabilised in this capacity.
However, MI-6 was still not convinced that Germany was their prime concern even in 1930. Here the master spy became a catalyst to convince his bosses in London. The author quotes Ropp's post-retirement article in Daily Mail in October 1957, out of a series of five, permitted by MI-6: 'I should make friends with Hitler while he was no more than the leader of a minority, if boisterous, party and stay with him as his friend if he rose to power'.
For this he adopted, as the author described in Chapter 11, a 'crab-like' approach to Hitler in five stages: First, he tapped Baron Walter von Medem, whom he had met in 1919 while recapturing Riga from the Bolshevik forces. Medem was a member of the Right Wing Stahlhelm (The Steel Helmet) of German war veterans.
Medem introduced him to Major Hans Berthold, also of Stahlhelm, who in turn introduced him to Arno Schickedanz, a fellow Balt from Riga, who was the Berlin correspondent of the Nazis' influential newspaper Völkischer Beobachter (VB).
Schickedanz suggested that Ropp should meet his boss, Alfred Rosenberg, who was the editor of VB. They got along well: 'In Bill de Ropp he found someone who was prepared to listen. He may never have realised that Bill only took an interest because he was being paid by MI6 to obtain intelligence'.
Also, for long, Rosenberg had believed that Great Britain was a natural ally of Nazi Germany. Bill de Ropp allowed him to believe in that and 'kept it alive in Rosenberg's consciousness for many years to come'.
The author describes how Ropp met Hitler in VB's office at Schellingstrasse, Munich in 1931: 'He [Hitler] was dressed in an old trench-coat and an ill-fitting 'reach me down suit'. Hitler did not waste time with any formalities but plunged into his first question: 'What do the English think about my movement?''
Ropp worked on that to continue conversations with Hitler and Rosenberg. Hitler told him in his second meeting: 'If you could keep me informed of what, in your opinion, the English really think, you will not only render me a service, but it would be to the advantage of your country.' Both Hitler and Rosenberg thought that Ropp was spying on England for them.
Ropp felt that Hitler was not very insightful. In his last meeting, he told Ropp, quoting Ribbentrop, that 'the British won't fight' as they would not get 'the backing of Australia, Canada or South Africa and their youth is too decadent and pacifist'.
The author did not know how often Hitler and Bill de Ropp met over the next eight years 'although there is evidence of at least a dozen meetings'.
Ropp and Jimmy finally left Berlin on August 29, 1939, just three days before the Nazi tanks entered Poland. From Rosenberg's diaries, the author felt that his correspondence with Ropp came to an end on 3 March 1940. At the end of the War, MI-6 terminated Ropp's services and paid a paltry final gratuity of £500.
The 'Master Spy' passed away at the age of 87 on October 3, 1973 at Kingswood Hall, a care home at Kington near Peterchurch. 'There was no funeral and there were no letters from the MI6 officers who had known him so well. There are strict rules preventing contact between retired officers and their agents'.
In the final chapter, the author assesses the importance of Ropp. 'Without him 'What Should We Do?' could not have been written and MI6 might have remained a source of low-level tactical information rather than the global geopolitical service that it is today'.
