16 hours ago
The ‘Axis of Upheaval' in the West Asia conflict
As the war between Israel and Iran has resulted in a ceasefire after being layered with America's bombing of Iran's nuclear sites, the narrative of the world being divided into power blocs like those during the Cold War era stands punctured. With Iran having suffered a political and military decapitation of leadership and capacity alike, its main partners, China and Russia, have maintained a distance. Before the conflict, Iran had been central to the narrative of the global order's perceived fracturing between palatable West-led alliances against a Moscow- and Beijing-knitted axis, dubbed as the 'Axis of Upheaval' by American scholars Richard Fontaine and Andrea Kendall-Taylor.
In Russia's war against Ukraine, Iranian drone technologies have played a critical role, while Moscow and Tehran, despite certain regional differences, once joined hands to stabilise the government of the now ousted Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, as sanctions have gnawed at Iran's economic depth over the years, China has gained much by continuing to buy cheap oil from the country. This has been helpful to Beijing in powering its stagnating growth while giving Tehran much needed cash inflows in a polity and society that is starved of steady financial streams.
No treaties
However, all this balancing has strategic limitations as well. The axes, at best, are a narrative construct. There are no treaties that bind these states into military blocs, where charters can be mobilised to push the others to join a war if a partner country is attacked. The underpinnings of these partnerships nonetheless go deeper, spilling over into a reconstruction of institutions, currencies, multilateralism and how the world operates today. They want de-dollarisation, alternatives to western payments gateways such as SWIFT, and a strengthening of organisations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as well as fundamental anti-West ecosystems. But there is no military treaty to anchor all these, which marks a critical gap in taking on western influence which is pinned using both treaties and understandings.
Russia and China, nonetheless, have made statements in favour of Iran as a way of support. Moscow has criticised those backing Israel's actions, including the ambiguity of positions taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency and attempts to manipulate international non-proliferation regimes. Russia's President Vladimir Putin in a telephone call offered mediation, which was sidelined by United States President Donald Trump. The noticeable part was this: it was not that Mr. Putin wanted to mediate, but political and diplomatic support may be the only thing Russia may be able to offer Iran at this stage.
Tehran has comprehensive strategic partnerships that it signed with Mr. Putin (2025) and China's President Xi Jinping (2021), which are almost exclusively economic in nature. While aligning with Iran as part of an axis in the long term makes sense if one considers the country's vast energy reserves (many of which remain untapped due to technology-led roadblocks aided by international sanctions), the fact is that neither Russia nor China have the intent or the bandwidth to come to Tehran's aid in a military sense even though the suitability of the current political system under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is critical to their own individual interests.
Where Russia stands
For Moscow, its war against Ukraine has tied down most of its political and military capabilities. The other opaque member of the axis, North Korea, is already providing soldiers to Russia to arrest its depleting military depth. This denies it any capabilities to tactically help Tehran. Previously, with its bases and assets in Syria, providing some air power assistance could have been possible, at least theoretically. However, with the fall of the Assad regime, which has now been replaced by former al-Qaeda leader Ahmed Al Sharaa — ironically, he is prioritising relations with the West pushed by Arab partners — Moscow has lost the only military footing it had in West Asia.
China too has come out in support of Iran. While its Foreign Minister Wang Yi in a call with his Israeli counterpart highlighted how Israeli strikes were violating international law, a readout after a call between Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin interestingly demanded that the U.S. (without referencing it directly) orchestrate a de-escalation. While both Russia and China are worried about the wider implications of this conflict, it benefits their strategic postures in many ways. With the U.S. now having joined Israel in attacking Iran, a decision Mr. Trump took while keeping even his closest advisers in the dark, it would bog the White House down once again in West Asia, potentially relocating critical military assets away from the Indo-Pacific and from Ukraine. This would free-up space in both Beijing and Moscow's immediate geographies of interest while also potentially sowing self-inflicted discord within the Trump administration. For now, a brittle U.S.-backed ceasefire is holding Tehran and Tel Aviv at bay.
The outlook
For Iran, the news on any of the axes front is not good. While Russia and China may prioritise their own positions, the proverbial 'Axis of Resistance' made up of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis among others is down for the count as Iran's first line of defence and offence in the region. Finally, the future of Iran, irrespective of what kind of political reality prevails, even in a moderate system, may be shaped by the point that only nuclear power can hereon guarantee sovereignty.
Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation
