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Boston Globe
26-05-2025
- Politics
- Boston Globe
Trump's vision: One world, three powers?
'We all want to make deals,' Trump said in a recent interview with Time magazine. 'But I am this giant store. It's a giant, beautiful store, and everybody wants to go shopping there.' Trump may have something even bigger in mind involving Russia and China, and it would be the ultimate deal. His actions and statements suggest he might be envisioning a world in which each of the three so-called great powers — the United States, China, and Russia — dominates its part of the globe, some foreign policy analysts say. It would be a throwback to a 19th-century style of imperial rule. Advertisement Trump has said he wants to take Greenland from Denmark, annex Canada, and reestablish US control of the Panama Canal. Those bids to extend US dominance in the Western Hemisphere are the clearest signs yet of his desire to create a sphere of influence in the nation's backyard. He has criticized allies and talked about withdrawing US troops from around the globe. That could benefit Russia and China, which seek to diminish the US security presence in Europe and Asia. Trump often praises President Vladimir Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping, China's leader, as strong and smart men who are his close friends. Advertisement To that end, Trump has been trying to formalize Russian control of some Ukrainian territory — and US access to Ukraine's minerals — as part of a potential peace deal that critics say would effectively carve up Ukraine, similar to what great powers did in the age of empires. Trump and Putin spoke about Ukraine in a two-hour phone call last week. 'The tone and spirit of the conversation were excellent,' Trump wrote on social media. Monica Duffy Toft, a professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, said that the leaders of the United States, Russia, and China are all striving for 'an imaginary past that was freer and more glorious.' 'Commanding and extending spheres of influence appears to restore a fading sense of grandeur,' she wrote in a new essay in Foreign Affairs magazine. The term 'spheres of influence' originated at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, in which European powers adopted a formal plan to carve up Africa. Some close observers of Trump, including officials from his first administration, caution against thinking his actions and statements are strategic. While Trump might have strong, long-held attitudes about a handful of issues, notably immigration and trade, he does not have a vision of a world order, they argue. Yet there are signs that Trump and perhaps some of his aides are thinking in the manner that emperors once did when they conceived of spheres of influence. 'The best evidence is Trump's desire to expand America's overt sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere,' said Stephen Wertheim, a historian of US foreign policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Advertisement But setting up a sphere of influence in the post-imperial age is not easy, even for a superpower. Last month, Canadians elected an anti-Trump prime minister, Mark Carney, whose Liberal Party appeared destined to lose the election until Trump talked aggressively about Canada. Leaders of Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, have rejected the idea of US control. Chinese officials are threatening to stop a Hong Kong company from selling its business running two ports in the Panama Canal to US investors. 'China will not give up its stakes in the Western Hemisphere so easily without a fight,' said Yun Sun, a China analyst at the Stimson Center in Washington. Even so, Trump and his aides persist in trying to exert greater US influence from the Arctic Circle to South America's Patagonia region. When Carney told Trump this month in the Oval Office that Canada was 'not for sale,' Trump replied: 'Never say never.' In March, Vice President JD Vance visited a US military base in Greenland to reiterate Trump's desire to take the territory. And it is no coincidence that Secretary of State Marco Rubio's two most substantial trips since taking office have been to Latin America and the Caribbean. In El Salvador, Rubio negotiated with Nayib Bukele, the strongman leader, to have the nation imprison immigrants deported by the US government, setting up what is effectively a US penal colony. Rubio also pressed Panama on its ports. On a late March visit to Suriname, Rubio was asked by a reporter whether administration officials had discussed setting up spheres of influence, which would entail negotiating limits on each superpower's footprint, including in Asia. Advertisement Rubio, who has more conventional foreign policy views than Trump, asserted that the United States would maintain its military alliances in Asia. Those alliances allow it to base troops across the region. 'We don't talk about spheres of influence,' he said. 'The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation. We have relationships with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines. We're going to continue those relationships.' Some analysts say Trump's approach to the war in Ukraine is consistent with the concept of spheres of influence. The United States is talking to another large power — Russia — about how to define the borders of a smaller country and is itself trying to control natural resources. Trump has proposed terms of a settlement that would mostly benefit Russia, including US recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and acknowledgment of Russian occupation of large swaths of eastern Ukraine. Last week, Trump even seemed to back off his demand that Russia agree to an immediate cease-fire with Ukraine. Earlier, he got Ukraine to sign an agreement to give US companies access to the country's minerals. Supporters of Trump's settlement proposal say it reflects the reality on the ground, as Ukraine struggles to oust the Russian occupiers. But Trump's praise of Putin and of Russia, and his persistent skepticism of America's role in NATO, has inflamed anxieties among European nations over a potentially waning US presence in their geographic sphere. The same is true of Taiwan and Asian security. Trump has voiced enough criticism of the island over the years, and showered enough accolades on Xi, that Taiwanese and US officials wonder whether he would waver on US arms support for Taiwan, which is mandated by a congressional act. Advertisement Trump says he wants to reach a deal with China. Whether that would go beyond tariffs to address issues such as Taiwan and the US military presence in Asia is an open question. 'Beijing would love to have a grand bargain with the US on spheres of influence,' said Sun, the China analyst, and 'its first and foremost focus will be on Taiwan.' This article originally appeared in
Morocco World
05-05-2025
- Politics
- Morocco World
Diplomacy, Context, and Misperception
Moroccans are fond of sayings and proverbs. They refer to sayings and proverbs to make an argument and justify a choice. Often, they add a scent of sacredness to make the reasoning credible. Sidi Abderrahmane el-Majdoub (1506-1568), Ahmed Ibn Ajiba al-Hassani (1747-1809), and Mansour al-Hallaj (858-922) are the most referred to when Sufism is taken into consideration. Some Moroccans, more familiar with the history of classical Middle Eastern literature, most often quote Abu Muhammed A. Ibn al-Muqaffa (724-759), whom they compare to Jean de La Fontaine (1621-1695). In their understanding, twisting from one to the other is made when no argument is made. They fly over the eras and therefore fall into extrapolations and speculations. They don't take into account the context, although it is a fundamental rule in any self-respecting analysis. They close their eyes or ignore, for example, the tragic fate that Ibn al-Muqaffa suffered. He was mutilated, organ by organ, while tied to a tree to die a slow death. Each severed organ was thrown into a boiling vessel under a huge fire. This was his punishment for having a big mouth and underestimating the context of its time and despising Sofiane Ibn Maaouiya Ibn Yazid, governor of Basrah. The governor hated Ibn al-Muqaffa for being disrespectful to the ruling elite and for using pamphlet as a public nuisance. This was also true for La Fontaine's admirers. They placed him on a pedestal to plead their cases and to mock him when their opponents put him in the spotlight to taunt them. They ignore La Fontaine's redemption towards the end of his life when he asked forgiveness for the harm he would have caused through the Fables (1668, 1678, and 1694). The context is very important, without which, everything that is said and written, ignoring it, is not worth a candle. Well, the context is taken into account in this paper and it has a direct link with the issue of the Moroccan Sahara. Morocco was on the verge of suffering the fate of Ibn Al Muqaffa and the laughing stock of La Fontaine. Indeed, long before the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the project of 'dividing' Morocco into separate entities was conceived, thought out and set in motion. Morocco is exposed and pushed towards a tree in the center (the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East) to be tied up in anticipation of the amputation of its essential organs. Morocco was then alone ( ( H. Hami: No Room for Dual-allegiance in Geopolitics, MWN; September 19, 2024). Let us proceed smoothly to emphasize the reading of the problematic of the context. This reading is associated with that of diplomacy, which is currently the subject of biased and unjustified attacks, particularly with regard to the issue of the Moroccan Sahara. When Masaad Boulos, special adviser to the US president for African and Middle Eastern affairs, made a far-fetched statement on the Al Arabiya channel on April 19, 2025, on the Sahara issue, Moroccan and Algerian commentators stepped up to the plate to make the reading they deemed relevant on the subject. On the Moroccan side, commentators, including respected academics, have gone to work quickly to make projections on Moroccan diplomacy. Most of them excel in making readings that are worth what they are worth in terms of hindsight and rigor. However, some analysts go even further. They therefore mix widely and mix eras. They show a flagrant ignorance of the context. They were quickly caught up in the element of surprise, the same one that plunged them into the rush to comment with no reservation as they are supposed to. Boulos amended his statement and confirmed, twenty-four hours later, that his words had been misinterpreted and that the United States clearly and unambiguously recognized Morocco's sovereignty over the Moroccan Sahara. Check mate for the detractors and the revengeful. In the wake of this, academics and experts in Maghreb affairs entered the fray and spoke of mistakes that Moroccan diplomacy had made since Morocco's independence in the management of the Moroccan Sahara issue. A statement as flat as it is ridiculous. Diplomacy is not a quiet river However, diplomacy is not rocket science. Foreign policy in general is not just the guiding principles that each country stands for. One could comment that everybody is aware of such an elementary fact. Indeed, diplomacy as a means to implement foreign policy has its secrets. It has, like all the professions in the world, its techniques, its rules, its dogmas, its men and women. What is it about? Suffice it to sit on a café terrace or stretch your legs when you're doing your ritual promenade park and somehow eavesdropping. You'd hear customers or walkers share all sorts of analyses and suppositions on domestic and international politics, all regions of the world combined. The Italian film 'We Loved Each Other So Much – C'eravamo tanto amati' by Ettore Scola, released in 1974, tells the story of three childhood friends played respectively by Nino Manfredi, a trade unionist, Stefano Satta Flores, an idealistic artist and Vittorio Gassman, a bourgeois. They meet to evoke their memories and, above all to assess their previous ideological choices. All three characters covet the friendship, beauty, and grace of Stefania Sandrelli, who represents for them the life they should have chosen. Beyond the aesthetic aspect, the film flies over a particularly troubled period in the history of Italy. It is ultimately characterized by an unnatural marriage between the Christian Democrat Party and the Lefts parties. Both were threatened by the far-left Marxist-Leninist militant group (the Red Brigades). Stefania represents Italy divided since the end of the Second World The three characters resume their normal lives. They are convinced that they cannot make concessions. Fifty years later, Italy finds itself in almost the same situation. We are faced with the same problem of context. Yet, politics and diplomacy consist of arrangements, agreements, alliances, and marriages that surprise neophytes and call into question the stereotypical readings of experts who are too full of their personalities and blinded by their aura à la carte. The context applies in the case of the establishment of the Arab-African Union (AAU) by Morocco and Libya in 1984. This happened as a retaliation to the alliance between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania, incepted as a result of their signing of the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord in 1983. The unnatural marriage between Morocco and Libya caused a lot of ink to flow. However, the approach of the late King Hassan II was justified by his concern to avoid being isolated as Algeria and Libya had wished a decade earlier. Morocco suffered the ire of the United States and some European countries, such as Spain and France, even though they were on good terms with Gaddafi. Fifty years later, informed observers are of the opinion that the Moroccan monarch played one of the most masterful moves of which he has been known to dislocate, from within, a quadripartite alliance in perspective that would sound the death knell of Morocco's Sahara cause. Diplomacy is driven by decision-making that combines realism, adaptation and flexibility. It depends on the balance of power and the opportunities offered. However, sometimes goodwill is exploited by adversaries. This is the case with the supposedly secret 1981 meeting between Foreign Minister M'hamed Boucetta (1977-1983), his Algerian counterpart, and a representative of the Polisario separatist movement. The meeting was secretly filmed by Algerian intelligence and leaked to exert pressure on Morocco and promote the narrative of direct negotiations and the referendum option, leading to the creation of an artificial entity in the Sahara territory. Diplomacy is also about dirty tricks, insipid staging, and volte-faces. On the question of the Sahara, foreign observers are spoiled for choice. For my part, I stick to what I would call knowingly connivance and ignorance connivance. Critics ignore the fact that Morocco, in the midst of negotiations on its independence, has insisted on the need to complete its territorial integrity. The declarations of independence in 1956 with France and Spain were made in this spirit. Morocco's intention was confirmed by the late King Mohammed V in the speech of Mhamid El-Ghizlane in February 1958. Critics also ignore the fact that Morocco was the first to bring the issue of its territorial integrity before the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, well before Algeria's independence and a few months after Mauritania's. The latter was to enter the scene in 1962 and 1963 to request that the Sahara be part only of Mauritania and Mauritania alone. It did so in collusion with Spain and, later, with Algeria. To my knowledge, few critics have made an objective parallel between the domestic situation and the foreign policy of the parties to the Sahara issue, Morocco, Mauritania, Spain and Algeria. In the chain of established parallelism, there is a link that stands out like a sword of Damocles and that targets, in the first place, Morocco. If, in the public transcript they convey, the commentators-analysts proclaim their support for Morocco's territorial integrity, they do not refrain, in a half-word, from criticizing the way whereby diplomacy has tackled the issue. However, in the hidden script, they unconsciously side with Morocco's opponents' allegations that the Sahara issue is a matter of the regime and not of the people. This narrative was adopted between 1970 and 1982; which relatively weakened Morocco until 1989. What about the sacred alliance between Spain, Algeria, and Mauritania from 1963 to 1975? And why not have a positive view of the behavior of Moroccan diplomacy which has made it possible to extract Mauritania from the influence of Madrid and Algiers? And why not consider that the Sahara issue was, in reality, a positive factor that put in place the conditions for democratic opening and the commitment to alternation of power? The answers would be as contradictory as they are far from integrating each question into its real context. Among the detractors of Moroccan diplomacy from 1960 to 2025, there are those whose mindset is full of ideological prejudices and who have been associated, at varying levels, with the Moroccan decision-making system. 'Hell is the others,' says Jean-Paul Sartre in Huis clos (1944-1947). Hell is also this dichotomous perception, bordering on schizophrenia, which classifies international conflicts according to the mood and interests of the time being. However, international conflicts are above all a stock in trade. For seventy years, the Palestinian issue has been used in this sense, supplanting all other conflicts relating to borders, social choice and ideological differences within the Arab periphery. In reality, the Arab governments and regimes have been using the Palestinian case as a pretext to neutralize each other and pretend to be right all along the line Existential Vacuum For the past five years, some misguided minds have been trying to draw a parallel between the Palestinian question and the Moroccan Sahara. Among Morocco's opponents, Algeria is the gold medal in this type of narrative. There is a desire on the part of Algerian decision-makers to have hegemonic ascendancy over the Maghreb and the Sahel-Saharan region. In Morocco, certain movements, fortunately very much in the minority, prefer transnational alliances and relegate national preferences in terms of geopolitical interpretation to second place. The first category, Algeria topping the list, belatedly realized that it had only been a guinea pig in the global geopolitical equation. It had to invent another narrative and stay in the race. For the second category, the choice between Ibn Rochd, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyyah, Marx, Trotsky, Franz Fanon or Spinoza placed the actors concerned in a position of hallucinatory self-neutralization. They have been shaken so much that they expressed their position in terms of an existential vacancy. That is to say, these movements, all trends included, are eyeing a vacant chair (an undeniable legitimation), but are skeptical about the procedure to follow to access and take over it. There is a kind of clash between the desired legitimacy and the existential brakes. There is a third category that mixes ingredients from the first and second categories. It is composed of those who have only a shallow knowledge of the political and diplomatic history of Morocco. They have no basic clue about their country's monarchical foundation that, despite certain periods of instability, has made it possible to save it. Sept dynasties : les Idrissides (789-978), les Almoravides (1060-1147), les Almohades (1145-1248), les Mérinides (1244-1465), les Wattassides (1472-1554), les Saadiens (1554-1659) et les Alaouites (1666-présent) n'auraient pas survécu s'il n'y avait pas eu une lecture judicieuse des circonstances particulières à chaque époque. Seven dynasties: the Idrisids (789-978), the Almoravids (1060-1147), the Almohads (1145-1248), the Merinids (1244-1465), the Wattassids (1472-1554), the Saadians (1554-1659) and the Alawites (1666-present) would not have survived if there had not been a judicious reading of the particular circumstances and the geopolitics of each era. The issue of the Moroccan Sahara, like those of all matters related to the authentic borders of the country, has been managed since 1956 with the same spirit of foresight and tact that takes into account the opportunities offered. Always the context to take into consideration if one doesn't want to fall into the easy way and the mixing of the wind. The context is also how events between 1981 and 1982 were handled. Morocco proposed the organization of a referendum on self-determination at the summit of the Organization of African Unity in Nairobi in 1981. Taken by surprise, Algeria nevertheless succeeded in getting the pseudo-Sadr admitted in 1982. The policy of creating a divided North-Africa was revived with the creation of the Algeria-Tunisia and Mauritania axis in 1983 and the Morocco and Libya axis in 1984. Morocco left the OAU in 1984 and only returned under its new name, the African Union, in 2017. Analysts in the Arab periphery are taking admiring and critical positions on Russian President Vladimir Putin's discourse on Russia's viability and resistance to the policies implemented by the West to weaken his country. They do not take a step back to understand the context in which Mikhail Gorbachev reluctantly accepted the erosion of the USSR. These analysts understand even less Putin's Munich speech at the 2007 European Security Conference. They remain silent in observing the way in which Russia intervened in Syria in 2012 and withdrew in 2025 by sacrificing the Assad regime. Well, it is clear that the regional conflict over the Sahara is on the way to its resolution, with all due respect to detractors inside and outside. The only appropriate framework is the autonomy plan Morocco proposed in 2007. The main party to the conflict is Algeria. It must sit down at the negotiating table and assert its demands. Algeria will have to do so by agreeing to put everything on the table, starting with a clear understanding of the provisions of the border agreement signed in 1972, acknowledging its responsibility in the 1963 Sand War, and repairing the harm caused to thousands of Moroccans expelled from Algeria in 1975. All this should be part of a clear vision designed to protect the Maghreb from hegemonic greed from the Middle East and the Middle East. That wouldn't be too much to ask. A final warning: time is running out. If some Algerian decision-makers – and the few foreign supporters they have left – playing it smarty, had in mind to imply that they would (theoretically) agree to negotiate on the basis of the autonomy proposal and to drown it (in fact) in endless demands, they would be mistaken. Because Morocco continues to build the country by consolidating local democracy. This requires the implementation of advanced regionalization, which has started on a speedy paces lately. The southern provinces are included in the process. Knowingly connivance and ignorant connivance Mistakes of Moroccan diplomacy, some like to shout it loud? What a conclusion drawn by the horses! The mistakes, on the contrary, are to believe: One, that Moroccan diplomats, especially those in charge of the Sahara issue, are broken arms and that the paradigms built far from the ground would reflect reality. Two, Moroccan diplomats enjoy their lives doing nothing to help their country. They would be dressed to the nines. It is almost like accusing them of lacking patriotism in comparison with the other servants of the Moroccan state. Third, that the Sahara issue would be a question of the regime and that transnational alliances would take precedence over national solidarity. Fourth, that the ongoing process for the resolution of the conflict is smoke and mirrors and that the United States and other international powers are playing with the naivety of Moroccan decision-makers. Fifth, not seizing the opportunities offered would be fatal for the unity and stability of Morocco. Six: When opportunities arise, you have to go for it. One must not make the mistakes certain Arab regimes made on the Palestinian question in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords in 1978. Nor pitying themselves on the democratic transitions setback during the years 1990-2000. Mistakes Moroccan diplomacy might have recorded? What a categorical and unjust judgment! The Moroccan diplomats in charge of the territorial integrity portfolio would have liked to see today's detractors sitting in their places at times when everyone was bequeathed against Morocco. One: in 1961, when Spain claimed that the Moroccan sultans had given up the sovereignty of their country by concluding treaties with foreign powers, including Spain (1767 and 1912) and France (1912) at the bilateral and multilateral levels (1906). Two: also in 1961, when Spain claimed that Morocco had not raised reservations on the question of the colonized territories on the occasion of the joint communiqué recognising its independence in 1956. Three: in 1963, when all the Arab and African countries took the side of Algeria on the occasion of the War of the Sands for which Morocco was not responsible. Four: 1966, when Algeria declared itself a party to the Sahara conflict and made common cause with Spain and Mauritania to torpedo the association between the Sahara issue and the handover of the city of Sidi Ifni. Five: in 1974, when Spain was on the verge of winning its bet to organize a formal referendum for the creation of a phantom entity. And later, to keep its control over the territory that it would indirectly bequeath to Algeria eager to have access to the Atlantic. This was in accordance with the arrangements sealed in 1966, the date Spain held a mini-referendum that few observers are aware of. Six: still in 1974, when Morocco almost saw its request to bring the Sahara issue before the International Court of Justice rejected by the United Nations General Assembly. If it had not been for the good reaction of the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs to the proposal of his Mauritanian counterpart on sharing the territory to gain time, Spain would have definitively buried Morocco's hopes. Seven: 1979, when Mauritania withdrew from Terris algharbiya (Oued Eddahab) by signing, under pressure from Algeria, an agreement with the Polisario. Morocco's military action had to be supported by a large-scale diplomatic campaign. Eight: 1980-1988, when Morocco tried by all means to bring Algeria back to a better disposition and to convince its mentors of its good faith. This period paved the way for the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989. Moroccan diplomats were dispatched to the four corners of the planet to explain Morocco's commitment and firmness with regard to its southern provinces. Naivety? Let's talk about it. It is this presumed naivety (let's say good faith) that allowed the late King Mohammed V to neutralize detractors inside and outside the country; those who were in cahoots with foreign countries for political, ideological and strategic purposes. A thoughtful management of the issue of territorial integrity with France and Spain at a time when the latter's objective was regime change. It is the same naivety-good faith that allowed the late King Hassan II to control the internal political chessboard and to negotiate stability with foreign powers without losing out. At the same time, he knew how to tame the fury of Houari Boumediene who was unaware that he had been used by France for projects that the former power had not been able to complete before the independence of the African countries. The same naivety-good faith helped the late King Hassan II to soak the other Maghreb leaders in their own elixir of bad faith: failure of the axis policy, creation of the UMA, non-interference in the Algerian civil war and acceleration of the intra-national democratic process to make detractors doubt inside and outside. It is the same approach that King Mohammed VI adopts: an outstretched hand and a firmness that is unfailing. Political and diplomatic openness materialized by bold concrete actions aimed at the intranational, Maghreb, Arab, and African political chessboards. This coherent approach was reflected in visits to Algeria, Tunisia, and some thirty sub-Saharan African and Middle Eastern countries Among the most salient visits are those that helped to bring some countries out of the isolation imposed by their neighbours, intra-national insecurity, and the economic and security embargo. This was the case in Tunisia in 2014, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks that paralyzed the country and dealt a heavy blow to the tourism sector, which is one of the most important sources of the Tunisian economy. This was also the case for Qatar in 2017, the day after the embargo was imposed on the country by three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council in addition to Egypt. Unless they are acting in bad faith, commentators have nothing to complain about. Cynicism has no place in politics, and even less so in diplomacy. Nass El Ghiwane, whose music fascinated the American director, Martin Scorsese, to the point that he used their song Ya Sah (My Buddy) in his movie 'The Last Temptation of Christ' released in 1988, have a favorite song whose first line says: اللي ڣَالْ لَعْصيدَة بَارْدَة يِديرْ يِدُّو فِيها. It can be poetically translated as 'Whoever claims that the broth is not hot, let him put his hand to it'. Another saying dear to Nass El Ghiwane calls for reason and determination instead of sacrificing to lamentations and denigrations without appropriate hindsight. The saying goes: والله ما قَفِّلْنَا لَفَوِّرْنَا which can be roughly translated as 'Unless you close the lid of the couscous maker, there is no couscous in the finesse of the gastronomic art.' And then the sayings and proverbs of Ibn al-Muqaffa and La Fontaine risk seeing the morality they imply applied to a certain sprinkler who is about to be watered. Moreover, like all rivers, the river of diplomacy is never quiet. At a time when the Sahara issue is nearing its epilogue, it should be recalled that the argument that Algeria had put forward in 1966, distinguishing between the Rguibat of the Sahel (Mauritania) and the Rguibat of the East (Tindouf), is likely to cost it dearly. Indeed, already in 1959, when Algeria was still a French department, a significant fraction within the French army proposed a plan for the establishment of ' a Sahrawi state ' in Tindouf, the main component of which would be the Rguibat of the East. A Moroccan saying fits in this respect. It says : اللِّي دَارْهَا بِيِدِّيهْ يِفُكْها بِسِنِّيه. 'Whoever causes a disaster must take responsibility for it.' History is not amnesiac. Archives may well be affected by humidity, but they cannot hide the truth indefinitely. Let's say conclude that some Algerian decision-makers who are running the business can run, but they can't hide. Moreover, time is running out among those who have their say to end the charade and do nothing. Tags: Africa diplomacyMoroccan Diplomacy
Al Jazeera
03-03-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
Why some in the Global South are not mourning the demise of USAID
United States President Donald Trump's blitzkrieg campaign against the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has demolished the organisation described as the 'world's largest donor' and left aid workers scrambling to salvage the international development aid and humanitarian response system. Many have lamented the grave consequences of the US president's unprecedented decision as well as moves by other countries, such as the United Kingdom, to cut aid. In a LinkedIn post commenting on the situation, Luca Crudeli, who said he has been 'immersed in development since 2003', spoke of 'the sense that the moral center of our work is quietly slipping away' and 'the uneasy realization that development's humanistic soul might be lost in a shuffle of contracts and strategic scorecards'. But describing 'development' as having a humanistic soul would be to many people in the Global South a contradiction in terms. That is not to say that many people who work in 'development' are not decent, moral human beings genuinely interested in improving the welfare of others around the world. Nor is it to deny that the aid industry delivers crucial assistance that millions rely on to survive. It is to say that the soul of 'development' has always been much less humanistic than its proponents assert. In fact, the entire enterprise of aid has been a tool for geopolitical control, a means of preserving, rather than eliminating, global inequality and the resource extraction that feeds it. In recent days, following the demise of USAID, there has been growing openness about this reality – consciously or unconsciously. For example, a statement issued by InterAction, which 'unites and amplifies the voices of America's leading humanitarian and development organizations', made that quite clear. These organisations, it said before a hasty rewrite, 'work tirelessly to save lives and advance US interests globally'. It added that the attack on USAID had suspended 'programs that support America's global leadership and creates dangerous vacuums that China and our adversaries will quickly fill'. That doesn't sound very humanistic, does it? Marina Kobzeva, who has spent nearly two decades as an aid worker commented on how colleagues from the Global North and the Global South reacted differently to the statement. She described the former bemoaning it as 'poor wording, … an honest mistake' while the latter expressed a sense of vindication: 'Finally, they are showing their true colours.' Western humanitarianism has not just lost its way. It has been intimately tied to Western colonialism from the start. For example, the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, which set the stage for Europe's conquest of Africa, was framed as a humanitarian event. And although the first humanitarian organisations were created to deal with the barbarous consequences of conflict in Europe as post-World War II reconstruction projects wound down, many started playing an active role in the Global South, where they actively propped up imperial domination. The aid industry, in effect, inherited colonialism's 'civilising mission'. Its do-gooder image papers over the extractive nature of the international system and attempts to ameliorate its worst excesses without actually challenging the system. If anything, the two are in a symbiotic relationship. The aid industry legitimises extractive global trade and governance systems, which in turn produce the outcomes that legitimise the existence of the aid agencies. As a result, today, despite the proliferation of aid and development agencies, the racialised global order has barely budged, and deep inequality continues to characterise the relations between nations. A 1997 study by the US Congressional Budget Office found that foreign aid played, at best, a marginal role in promoting economic development and improving human welfare and could even 'hinder development depending on the environment in which that aid is used and the conditions under which it is given'. It is thus not surprising that as the aid sector finds itself on the brink, some of those it claims to help would not be entirely saddened to see its back. Heba Aly, a former CEO of The New Humanitarian news agency, noted that at a recent meeting, 'some activists from the Global South proved less worried about aid cuts than the donors were in the hope this would force their own leaders to take responsibility & stop depending on aid'. This highlights how aid substitutes fundamental reform of both global and national systems of colonial extraction for charity. The hollowing-out of Western aid will undoubtedly be tragic and painful. Some of the world's most vulnerable people will suffer, and many will die. We must not lose sight of this in arguments about the righteousness or wickedness of aid in general. The fact is, we should address the world as it is, not as we wish it to be, and do all we can to ameliorate the impact. That said, this is also an opportunity to begin to build a world without aid. 'If this is the beginning of the end of aid,' Aly wrote, 'we should focus on structural transformation.' That is the reform of global trade and financial systems that have seen the poorest pay for the lifestyles of the rich. That does not mean it would be a Hobbesian world without solidarity. Rather, it would be one where charity is not allowed to be a cover for global injustice. And the end of aid should also see the end of 'development', a pernicious ideology that assumes the 'developed world', whose prosperity is built on the ruination of other societies and of the planet, is an example worth emulating. We need to work for an order that truly embodies a humanistic soul.
Al Jazeera
23-02-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
Ever wonder why Africa's borders appear so strange?
Africa has the most countries of any continent with a total of 54. Rather than following natural terrains or historical boundaries, many of its borders are strikingly straight in some areas and jagged in others, cutting through mountains, rivers and even communities. Most of these artificial borders trace back to the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, a meeting that concluded 140 years ago this week in which European powers carved up the continent among themselves with no African nations invited or represented. In this visual explainer, Al Jazeera delves into the stories behind some of the continent's most unusual borders. Egypt or Sudan – why does no one want Bir Tawil? Starting in northeastern Africa is a 2,000sq-km (795sq-mile) uninhabited, arid piece of land that neither Egypt nor Sudan wants to claim as their own. In 1899, Britain drew a straight-line border along the 22nd parallel, a line of latitude 22 degrees north of the equator, separating Egypt and Sudan, two territories under British control. However, in 1902, Britain reassigned the coastal and resource-rich Hala'ib Triangle to Sudan and Bir Tawil to Egypt for geopolitical and administrative reasons. Decades later, after both countries gained independence, Egypt insisted that the true border should follow the 1899 agreement while Sudan argued that it should follow the 1902 demarcation. Bir Tawil remains unclaimed by either country because claiming it would require forfeiting claims to the Hala'ib Triangle. Egypt has controlled the Hala'ib Triangle since 2000, but the dispute remains unresolved. Why is The Gambia so narrow? As you travel along Africa's western coast, you'll see a narrow strip of land wrapped around the Gambia River and almost entirely surrounded by Senegal. This is The Gambia, the smallest country in mainland Africa and home to about three million people. First explored by the Portuguese in the 15th century, The Gambia later became a major hub in the transatlantic slave trade. It remained a British colony from 1821 until gaining independence in 1965. Due to its proximity to then-French Senegal, its territorial boundaries were a point of contention between British and French authorities. In 1889, Britain and France formally established The Gambia's borders, agreeing that British control would extend about 16km (10 miles) on either side of the river, reaching its furthest navigable point at Yarbutenda. A popular legend suggests that British forces fired cannonballs from their ships to determine the country's width, ensuring control over vital trade routes. While no evidence supports this claim, historical records indicate that an Anglo-French commission in 1891 tried to refine the borders but faced resistance from local rulers whose lands were being arbitrarily divided. Ultimately, The Gambia's borders were shaped by colonial interests and British military power, leaving it as a long, narrow enclave within Senegal. Why is Cabinda part of Angola? Heading south along the continent's western coast, you'll come across a small section of Angola separated from the rest of the country. This is Cabinda, Angola's northern province, cut off from the rest of the country by a narrow strip of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Cabinda became part of Angola due to historical decisions made during Portuguese colonial rule. During the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, Cabinda was formally recognised as a Portuguese possession, separate from Angola, although both were under Portuguese rule. Over time, Portugal administratively merged Cabinda with Angola, but the region remained geographically and culturally distinct. When Portugal withdrew from its African colonies in 1975, the Alvor Agreement, signed with Angola's main liberation groups, excluded Cabindan representation. and Cabinda was merged with Angola, primarily for its valuable offshore oil reserves. This sparked resistance from the Cabindan independence movement, particularly the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda, which has continued to call for Cabinda's independence from Angola. Why does Namibia have a little panhandle? As you move into Southern Africa, you may notice a narrow panhandle jutting out from Namibia. This is the Caprivi Strip. Until the early 20th century, Germany controlled German South West Africa (now Namibia) and German East Africa (now Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi) while Britain controlled the surrounding territories, including modern-day Botswana and Zambia. Germany was looking for a direct trade route to link its territories and wanted access to the Zambezi River. The plan was to navigate the river to the Indian Ocean, providing a shortcut to Tanzania. In 1890, Germany and Britain signed a treaty in which Germany gave up claims to Zanzibar in exchange for Heligoland, an island in the North Sea, and control of the Caprivi Strip, which met the Zambezi River. However, Germany's transport plan failed. It is believed that no one told the Germans about Victoria Falls – one of the world's largest waterfalls with a 108-metre (354ft) drop, about 65km (40 miles) east of the strip, making it useless for transport. Why is Lesotho surrounded by South Africa? Nestled in the mountains of Southern Africa lies a small landlocked country entirely surrounded by South Africa called Lesotho. In the 19th century, the Basotho people, led by King Moshoeshoe I, established their stronghold in the highlands, using the mountains as a natural defence against invaders like the Zulu and Boer settlers (Dutch farmers). To resist Boer expansion, Moshoeshoe sought British protection in 1868, making Basutoland a British protectorate. Attempts to place it under Colonial Cape rule failed due to Basotho resistance, and in 1884, Britain declared it a crown colony. When the Union of South Africa formed in 1910, Basutoland remained under British rule, avoiding South Africa's apartheid policies, and later gained independence in 1966 as Lesotho. Why are three African countries named Guinea? Four countries around the world have 'Guinea' in their names, three of which are along the West African coast. They are: Guinea, formerly known as French Guinea, gained independence in 1958 and kept the name Guinea. Guinea-Bissau, formerly known as Portuguese Guinea, gained independence in 1974 and added 'Bissau' to its name to differentiate itself from neighbouring Guinea. Equatorial Guinea, formerly known as Spanish Guinea, gained independence in 1968 and added Equatorial to its name because it is near the equator. On the other side of the world lies Papua New Guinea, named by a Spanish explorer who named it after Guinea in West Africa, believing the locals resembled its inhabitants. The name Guinea is believed to have been derived from the Portuguese word Guine, which referred to the region along the West African coast. When European colonisers divided this region, each called their territory Guinea. Fun fact: The British guinea coin, first minted in 1663, was named after the region of Guinea in West Africa because the gold used to produce it came from there. Why are there two Congos? On opposite sides of the Congo River lie two countries named after it: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo. Colonial powers Belgium and France established separate colonies along the river, naming each after it. The name Congo comes from the Kingdom of Kongo, a powerful kingdom that once flourished along the river.
Russia Today
06-02-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
Ceasefire in DR Congo sparks hope for negotiations
The unilateral ceasefire declared by the M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) opens a window for renewed peace talks, Madaraka Nyerere, a member of the African Legacy Foundation, has told RT in an exclusive interview. An alliance of rebel groups in eastern DR Congo, including M23 fighters, has declared a ceasefire after weeks of clashes with the national army and peacekeepers. The truce aims to allow humanitarian access, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) announced Monday. Nyerere stressed that the ceasefire offers an opportunity for the warring factions to 'sit together and go back to the negotiating table' to seek a lasting resolution. Nyerere pointed out that broader participation in peace processes could be beneficial, citing the involvement of regional leaders such as Kenyan President William Ruto and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in joint summits. 'The more parties that you have participating in finding or looking for a peace process... the better it is,' he added. READ MORE: Evil masterminds: Here's how Europeans sealed Africa's fate Reflecting on the roots of the instability, Nyerere traced the origins back to the colonial era, emphasizing the role of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. He argued that 'the foundation of instability and ethnic tensions' in the DRC and other African countries was laid when European powers divided the continent without considering ethnic and religious differences. On the role of international bodies, Nyerere criticized the UN, stating that there has been 'a lot of talk but not enough action' to ensure progress in the peace process. He also pointed out that frameworks such as the Addis Ababa agreement have not been adequately supported by global powers. Discussing the economic situation, Nyerere warned that regional insecurity threatens projects like the Lobito Corridor, a key transport route connecting the DRC to global markets via Zambia and Angola. READ MORE: Rwanda committed to peace in DR Congo conflict – spokesperson DR Congo has been plagued by decades of violence, particularly in the eastern part of the country, as dozens of armed groups, including M23, fight local authorities. During the latest escalation, M23 militants seized control of more territory than ever before, prompting the UN to warn of the risk of a broader regional conflict.
