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Remembering British author Frederick Forsyth, the man who sold 75 million books
Remembering British author Frederick Forsyth, the man who sold 75 million books

First Post

time5 hours ago

  • Entertainment
  • First Post

Remembering British author Frederick Forsyth, the man who sold 75 million books

Frederick Forsyth passed away on Monday at age 86 after a brief illness. While Forsyth is most famous for writing 'The Day of the Jackal' — a page-turning novel about an assassin for hire — the British author and giant of the thriller genre was much more than that. Let's take a look at his life and times read more Frederick Forsyth's most famous work is The Day of the Jackal. Frederick Forsyth passed away on Monday at age 86 after a brief illness. Forsyth is most famous for writing 'The Day of the Jackal' — a page-turning novel about an assassin for hire. But the British author and literary giant in the thriller genre was much more than that. Not only did Forsyth write two dozen other books and in all sold an estimated 75 million copies, he also served as a pilot in the British Royal Air Force. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Forsyth also worked as a foreign correspondent for Reuters, witnessed the attempted assassination of French President Charles de Gaulle, and also served as an intelligence officer for MI6 — the UK's foreign intelligence service made famous by Ian Fleming in his James Bond series. In short, Forsyth lived many lives in his eight-and-a-half decades on the planet. Let's take a look at his life and times:

Ukraine's Operation Spider Web redefined the front lines of war
Ukraine's Operation Spider Web redefined the front lines of war

Asia Times

time4 days ago

  • Politics
  • Asia Times

Ukraine's Operation Spider Web redefined the front lines of war

A series of blasts at airbases deep inside Russia on June 1, 2025, came as a rude awakening to Moscow's military strategists. The Ukrainian strike at the heart Russia's strategic bombing capability could also upend the traditional rules of war: It provides smaller military a blueprint for countering a larger nation's ability to launch airstrikes from deep behind the front lines. Ukraine's Operation Spider Web involved 117 remote-controlled drones that were smuggled into Russia over an 18-month period and launched toward parked aircraft by operators miles away. The raid destroyed or degraded more than 40 Tu-95, Tu-160 and Tu-22 M3 strategic bombers, as well as an A-50 airborne-early-warning jet, according to officials in Kyiv. That would represent roughly one-third of Russia's long-range strike fleet and about US$7 billion in hardware. Even if satellite imagery ultimately pares back those numbers, the scale of the damage is hard to miss. The logic behind the strike is even harder to ignore. Traditional modern military campaigns revolve around depth. Warring nations try to build combat power in relatively safe 'rear areas' — logistics hubs that are often hundreds, if not thousands, of miles from the front line. These are the places where new military units form and long-range bombers, like those destroyed in Ukraine's June 1 operation, reside. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin has leaned heavily on its deep-rear bomber bases — some over 2,000 miles from the front in Ukraine. It has paired this tactic with launching waves of Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones to keep Ukrainian cities under nightly threat. The Russian theory of victory is brutally simple: coercive airpower. If missiles and one-way drones fall on Kyiv often enough, civilian morale in Ukraine will crack, even as the advance of Russian ground forces gets bogged down on the front line. For Kyiv's military planners, destroying launch platforms undercuts that theory far more cheaply than the only other alternative: intercepting every cruise missile in flight, which to date has achieved an 80% success rate but relies heavily on Western-donated equipment coming increasingly in short supply. Airfields have always been critical targets in modern warfare, the logic being that grounded bombers and fighters are more vulnerable and easier to hit. In the North African desert during World War II, the United Kingdom's Special Air Service used jeep raids and delayed-action explosives to knock out an estimated 367 enemy aircraft spread across North Africa — firepower the Luftwaffe never regenerated. That same year, German paratroopers seized the airstrips on Crete, denying the British Royal Air Force a forward base and tipping an entire island campaign. A generation later in Vietnam, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army assault teams armed with satchel charges and mortars repeatedly penetrated US perimeters at Phan Rang, Da Nang and Bien Hoa, burning fighters on the ramp and forcing the diversion of thousands of American soldiers to base security. The underlying playbook of hitting aircraft on the ground remains effective because it imposes cascading costs. Every runway cratered and every bomber torched obliges the military hit to pour money into ways to frustrate such attacks, be it hardened shelters or the dispersal of squadrons across multiple bases. Such air attacks also divert fighters from the front lines to serve as guards. US soldiers look at wreckage of an Air Force B-57 Canberra bomber after Viet Cong mortars destroyed 21 planes at Bien Hoa airbase in 1964. AP Photo via The Conversation In Operation Spider Web, Ukraine has sought to repeat that strategy while also leveraging surprise to achieve psychological shock and dislocation. But the Ukraine operation taps into a uniquely 21st-century aspect of warfare. The advent of unmanned drone warfare has increasingly seen military practitioners talk of 'air littorals' — military speak for the slice of atmosphere that sits above ground forces yet below the altitude where high-performance fighters and bombers traditionally roam. Drones thrive in this region, where they bypass most infantry weapons and fly too low for traditional radar-guided defenses to track reliably, despite being able to incapacitate targets like fuel trucks or strategic bombers. By smuggling small launch teams of drones within a few miles of each runway, Kyiv created pop-up launchpads deep into Russia and were able to catch the enemy off guard and unprepared. The economic benefits of Ukraine's approach are stark. Whereas a drone, a lithium-battery and a warhead cost well under $3,000, a Russian Tu-160 bomber costs in the region of $250 million. Ukraine's Operation Spider Web will have immediate and costly consequences for Russia, even if the strikes end up being less destructive than Kyiv currently claims. Surviving bombers will need to be relocated. Protecting bases from repeat attacks will mean erecting earthen revetments, installing radar-guided 30 mm cannons and electronic-warfare jammers to cover possible attack vectors. This all costs money. Even more importantly, the operation will divert trained soldiers and technicians who might otherwise rotate to the front line in support of the coming summer offensive. Russian MiG-31bm fighter jets, a Tu-160 strategic bomber and an Il-78 aerial refueling tanker fly over Moscow during a rehearsal for the WWII Victory Parade on May 4, 2022. Photo: Kirill Kudryavtsev / AFP via Getty Images The raid also punches a hole in Russia's nuclear weapons capabilities. Losing as many as a dozen Tu-95 and Tu-160 aircraft, which double as nuclear-capable bombers, would be strategically embarrassing and may prod the Kremlin to rethink the frequency of long-range air patrols. Beyond the physical and financial damage to Russia's fleet, Ukraine's operation also comes with a potent psychological effect. It signals that Ukraine, more than three years into a war aimed at grinding down morale, is able to launch sophisticated operations deep into Russian territory. Ukraine's security service operation unfolded in patient, granular steps: 18 months of smuggling disassembled drones and batteries across borders inside innocuous cargo, weeks of quietly reassembling kits, and meticulous scouting of camera angles to ensure that launch trucks would be indistinguishable from normal warehouse traffic on commercial satellite imagery. Operators drove those trucks to presurveyed firing points and then deployed the drones at treetop height. Because each of the drones was a one-way weapon, a dozen pilots could work in parallel either close to the launch site or remotely, steering live-video feeds toward parked bombers. Videos of the strike suggest multiple near-simultaneous impacts across wide swaths of runway — enough to swamp any ad hoc small-arms response from perimeter guards. For Ukraine, the episode demonstrates a repeatable method for striking deep, well-defended assets. The same playbook can, in principle, be adapted to missile storage depots and, more importantly, factories across Russia mass-producing Shahed attack drones. Kyiv has needed to find a way to counter the waves of drones and ballistic missile strikes that in recent months have produced more damage than Russian cruise missiles. The Center for Strategic and International Studies' Firepower Strike Tracker has shown that Shaheds are now the most frequent and most cost-effective air weapon in Russia's campaign. But the implications of Operation Spider Web go far beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict by undermining the old idea that rear areas are safe. Comparatively inexpensive drones, launched from inside Russia's own territory, wiped out aircraft that cost billions and underpin Moscow's long-range strike and nuclear signaling. That's a strategy than can be easily replicated by other attackers against other countries. Anyone who can smuggle, hide and pilot small drones can sabotage an adversary's ability to generate air attacks. Air forces that rely on large, fixed bases must either harden, disperse or accept that their runway is a new front line. Benjamin Jensen is professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting and scholar-in-residence, American University School of International Service This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Ukraine's Operation Spider Web destroyed more than aircraft – it tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe
Ukraine's Operation Spider Web destroyed more than aircraft – it tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe

Yahoo

time4 days ago

  • Politics
  • Yahoo

Ukraine's Operation Spider Web destroyed more than aircraft – it tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe

A series of blasts at airbases deep inside Russia on June 1, 2025, came as a rude awakening to Moscow's military strategists. The Ukrainian strike at the heart Russia's strategic bombing capability could also upend the traditional rules of war: It provides smaller military a blueprint for countering a larger nation's ability to launch airstrikes from deep behind the front lines. Ukraine's Operation Spider Web involved 117 remote-controlled drones that were smuggled into Russia over an 18-month period and launched toward parked aircraft by operators miles away. The raid destroyed or degraded more than 40 Tu-95, Tu-160 and Tu-22 M3 strategic bombers, as well as an A-50 airborne-early-warning jet, according to officials in Kyiv. That would represent roughly one-third of Russia's long-range strike fleet and about US$7 billion in hardware. Even if satellite imagery ultimately pares back those numbers, the scale of the damage is hard to miss. The logic behind the strike is even harder to ignore. Traditional modern military campaigns revolve around depth. Warring nations try to build combat power in relatively safe 'rear areas' — logistics hubs that are often hundreds if not thousands of miles from the front line. These are the places where new military units form and long-range bombers, like those destroyed in Ukraine's June 1 operation, reside. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin has leaned heavily on its deep-rear bomber bases — some over 2,000 miles from the front in Ukraine. It has paired this tactic with launching waves of Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones to keep Ukrainian cities under nightly threat. The Russian theory of victory is brutally simple: coercive airpower. If missiles and one-way drones fall on Kyiv often enough, civilian morale in Ukraine will crack, even as the advance of Russian ground forces get bogged down on the front line. For Kyiv's military planners, destroying launch platforms undercuts that theory far more cheaply than the only other alternative: intercepting every cruise missile in flight, which to date has achieved an 80% success rate but relies heavily on Western-donated equipment coming increasingly in short supply. Airfields have always been critical targets in modern warfare, the logic being that grounded bombers and fighters are more vulnerable and easier to hit. In the North African desert during World War II, the United Kingdom's Special Air Service used jeep raids and delayed-action explosives to knock out an estimated 367 enemy aircraft spread across North Africa — firepower the Luftwaffe never regenerated. That same year, German paratroopers seized the airstrips on Crete, denying the British Royal Air Force a forward base and tipping an entire island campaign. A generation later in Vietnam, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army assault teams armed with satchel charges and mortars repeatedly penetrated U.S. perimeters at Phan Rang, Da Nang and Bien Hoa, burning fighters on the ramp and forcing the diversion of thousands of American soldiers to base security. The underlying playbook of hitting aircraft on the ground remains effective because it imposes cascading costs. Every runway cratered and every bomber torched obliges the military hit to pour money into ways to frustrate such attacks, be it hardened shelters or the dispersal of squadrons across multiple bases. Such air attacks also divert fighters from the front lines to serve as guards. In Operation Spider Web, Ukraine has sought to repeat that strategy while also leveraging surprise to achieve psychological shock and dislocation. But the Ukraine operation taps into a uniquely 21st-century aspect of warfare. The advent of unmanned drone warfare has increasingly seen military practitioners talk of 'air littorals' — military speak for the slice of atmosphere that sits above ground forces yet below the altitude where high-performance fighters and bombers traditionally roam. Drones thrive in this region, where they bypass most infantry weapons and fly too low for traditional radar-guided defenses to track reliably, despite being able to incapacitate targets like fuel trucks or strategic bombers. By smuggling small launch teams of drones within a few miles of each runway, Kyiv created pop-up launchpads deep into Russia and were able to catch the enemy off guard and unprepared. The economic benefits of Ukraine's approach are stark. Whereas a drone, a lithium-battery and a warhead cost well under $3,000, a Russian Tu-160 bomber costs in the region of $250 million. Ukraine's Operation Spider Web will have immediate and costly consequences for Russia, even if the strikes end up being less destructive than Kyiv currently claims. Surviving bombers will need to be relocated. Protecting bases from repeat attacks will mean erecting earthen revetments, installing radar-guided 30 mm cannons and electronic-warfare jammers to cover possible attack vectors. This all costs money. Even more importantly, the operation will divert trained soldiers and technicians who might otherwise rotate to the front line in support of the coming summer offensive. The raid also punches a hole in Russia's nuclear weapons capabilities. Losing as many as a dozen Tu-95 and Tu-160 aircraft, which double as nuclear-capable bombers, would be strategically embarrassing and may prod the Kremlin to rethink the frequency of long-range air patrols. Beyond the physical and financial damage to Russia's fleet, Ukraine's operation also comes with a potent psychological effect. It signals that Ukraine, more than three years into a war aimed at grinding down morale, is able to launch sophisticated operations deep into Russian territory. Ukraine's security service operation unfolded in patient, granular steps: 18 months of smuggling disassembled drones and batteries across borders inside innocuous cargo, weeks of quietly reassembling kits, and meticulous scouting of camera angles to ensure that launch trucks would be indistinguishable from normal warehouse traffic on commercial satellite imagery. Operators drove those trucks to presurveyed firing points and then deployed the drones at treetop height. Because each of the drones was a one-way weapon, a dozen pilots could work in parallel either close to the launch site or remotely, steering live-video feeds toward parked bombers. Videos of the strike suggest multiple near-simultaneous impacts across wide swaths of runway — enough to swamp any ad hoc small-arms response from perimeter guards. For Ukraine, the episode demonstrates a repeatable method for striking deep, well-defended assets. The same playbook can, in principle, be adapted to missile storage depots and, more importantly, factories across Russia mass-producing Shahed attack drones. Kyiv has needed to find a way to counter the waves of drones and ballistic missile strikes that in recent months have produced more damage than Russian cruise missiles. The Center for Strategic and International Studies' Firepower Strike Tracker has shown that Shaheds are now the most frequent and most cost-effective air weapon in Russia's campaign. But the implications of Operation Spider Web go far beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict by undermining the old idea that rear areas are safe. Comparatively inexpensive drones, launched from inside Russia's own territory, wiped out aircraft that cost billions and underpin Moscow's long-range strike and nuclear signaling. That's a strategy than can be easily replicated by other attackers against other countries. Anyone who can smuggle, hide and pilot small drones can sabotage an adversary's ability to generate air attacks. Air forces that rely on large, fixed bases must either harden, disperse or accept that their runway is a new front line. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Benjamin Jensen, American University School of International Service Read more: Ukraine 'spiderweb' drone strike fails to register at peace talks as both sides dig in for the long haul Cult of the drone: At the two-year mark, UAVs have changed the face of war in Ukraine – but not outcomes Even if Putin and Zelenskyy do go face-to-face, don't expect wonders − their one meeting in 2019 ended in failure Benjamin Jensen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Sophie, Duchess of Edinburgh issues heartfelt plea against sexual violence: 'We must do better'
Sophie, Duchess of Edinburgh issues heartfelt plea against sexual violence: 'We must do better'

Daily Mail​

time5 days ago

  • Health
  • Daily Mail​

Sophie, Duchess of Edinburgh issues heartfelt plea against sexual violence: 'We must do better'

The Duchess of Edinburgh has spoken passionately of her campaign to highlight the plight of victims of sexual violence in conflict, saying: 'We must do better.' Sophie, 60, who has spoken out on the issue for years and met hundreds of survivors around the world, was visiting the UK's first exhibition dedicated to the subject on Wednesday. Featuring shocking stories ranging from the First World War until the present day, the royal expressed her frustration as she toured the displays at the way the issue is still swept under the carpet - and the cultural norms that give rise to the degradation of women even today. She looked amazed when told that the British Royal Air Force didn't ban 'nose art' - the drawing of scantily-clad women on the front of their fighter planes - until 2007. 'Surprising….' she said, clearly unimpressed and raising an eyebrow. Unsilenced: Sexual Violence in Conflict has opened at the Imperial War Museum in London and will run until November 2. It is a subject the duchess - who was making her visit to the exhibition ahead of International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict on June 19 - says is woefully 'under-discussed'. In recent years the King's sister-in-law, who is married to his brother, Prince Edward, has travelled to current and former war zones including Chad, the Congo, Kosovo, South Chad, Lebanon and Sierra Leone. She has devoted much of her latter working life as a royal to supporting the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and is passionate about championing gender equality. Shocking stories of the use of rape and sexual assault as a weapon of war against both women and men have emerged from the current conflict in Ukraine, including a powerful report just weeks ago in the Daily Mail. Sophie, dressed elegantly in a Gabriela Hearst pink silk maxi dress and Jimmy Choo heels, was keen to ensure that survivors has been consulted on the exhibition, saying: 'This is about them, their voice matters'. The Duchess of Edinburgh with curator Helen Upcraft during a visit to the Imperial War Museum's new exhibition. Sophie looked amazed when told that the British Royal Air Force didn't ban 'nose art' - the drawing of scantily-clad women on the front of their fighter planes - until 2007 And she was assured their stories had been 'integral' to the process by exhibitions manager Jack Davies manage and curator Helen Upcraft. 'Unsilenced' examines how and why gender violence is perpetrated, its impact on victims and the pursuit of justice and reconciliation, with powerful testimonies from survivors and interviews with experts in the field. The Duchess spoke movingly about a visit she had made to Kosovo in 2019 and how deeply moved she had been when speaking to women about the 'shame and stigma' they experienced as a result of being brutalised. Discussing the horror of the many women who fell pregnant by their attackers, she said: 'The stigma that is sadly placed on the women….it's about the mothers. In so many countries they can't even go back into the home place,' she said. 'I met a woman in Kosovo. A number of years ago there was a programme on what had happened [there] and the numbers they estimated of the women who had been raped. She told me how her husband had been so empathetic and he had been horrified [about the statistics] because they didn't know. And because he had been so empathetic and saying this was just so awful that she felt brave enough to admit to him that she had been one of them. And that was the end of her marriage. 'This is the problem. It's the legacy. And unless we as a society help, we have to help people understand that they are not the ones who have the shame. It is not their lives who should be destroyed. We have to do better.' Sophie was also shown displays of wartime propaganda, which can itself create an atmosphere where sexual violence can occur. This includes the sexual slavery of the 'Comfort Women Corps' in the Second World War, the state-sanctioned violence against Yazidi women and girls by ISIS in 2014, as well as the Soviet Red Army in Berlin in 1945 , and even the US treatment of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib in 2004. 'This is not just something that happens to foreigners by foreigners, this is something we all need to address,' the duchess said. Turning to another display on women forced to have sex for rations so that their families can survive, she added sadly: 'It's a way of some people staying alive.' The duchess also looked particularly horrified at a display of drawings by Sudanese children depicting the sexual violence they had seen their mothers, sisters and even grandmothers subjected to, including a particularly shocking image of a soldier turning his eyes away in shame at what his colleague was doing. 'It's so vivid,' she gasped. Justice, she said, was a perennial problems for victims. 'It's a tiny, tiny scratch on the surface…The issue of prosecution, it's so hard to ever get any kind of closure on any of this. To try and prosecute. Where do you start? Do you prosecute a country? A leader? Of course this does happen. But it's important to recognise this at the highest level,' she insisted. Thanked for her own role in highlighting the issue, the royal added: 'It's a privilege. If we could all do ourselves out of a job…it would be great.'

Where was world's first missile made 70 years ago? The country is..., over 20000 missiles were fired at...
Where was world's first missile made 70 years ago? The country is..., over 20000 missiles were fired at...

India.com

time13-05-2025

  • Science
  • India.com

Where was world's first missile made 70 years ago? The country is..., over 20000 missiles were fired at...

(Image: World's first missile: The world's first missile was developed by two German scientists, Walter Dornberger and Werner von Braun. During World War II, the German dictator Hitler ordered both of them to create a weapon for the Nazi army that could strike from a distance, utilizing combat aircraft or other launchers. These were the V-1 and V-2 rockets. In 1944, they were used in a barrage of attacks on London. In fact, as early as 1935, German engineer Braun started working on a classified missile programme. Walter Dornberger was the head of artillery for the German army. Dornberger played a crucial role in both World War I and World War II. He was in charge of Germany's V-2 rocket missile and the Peenemünde Army Research Center project. Following Hitler's directives, the German village of Peenemünde was converted into a missile manufacturing factory before World War II. Hitler's Terrible Blunder According to a BBC report, these German engineers assured Hitler that success in rocket testing would easily allow them to win World War II. German scientist Albert Speer was also with them, but Hitler did not agree. The Second World War began in 1939, while the missile program started in 1935. However, Hitler approved the programme to create missiles from rockets in 1943. By then, the German army had already suffered defeats on many fronts in the war. If Hitler had granted approval in the early stages, the story might have been different. Hitler's Secret Missile Factory The village of Peenemünde in Germany was turned into a secret missile factory. Peenemünde was located on the banks of the Peene River in an island of Germany, where this river flows into the Baltic Sea. This large tourist spot was where engineers conducted the rocket missile program from 1936 to 1945, as the area within a 400-kilometer radius was extremely desolate. About 12,000 Jewish workers were assembled for the missile factory and testing. The world's first cruise missile factory was spread over 25 kilometers. There is a museum in Peenemünde where pieces of rockets, engines, and other equipment are preserved. Germany's Successful Missile Test Germany's rocket Aggregate 4 (A-4) was successfully tested in 1942. This was the world's first long-range rocket. It was named the Vengeance Weapon or revenge weapon. The British intelligence agency learned about this rocket factory in 1943. The British Royal Air Force conducted the largest air raid here on August 17, 1943. The factory was relocated to the town of Mittelwerk. After the war, the Allied powers led by the United States, Russia, and Britain tried to acquire the A-4/V-2 missile technology. The first operational cruise missile V-1 was the world's first operational cruise missile. Due to its loud motor, it was called a buzz bomb or doodlebug. Between 1943 and 1945, more than 20,000 missile attacks were carried out on Britain and its allied countries using this rocket. Most of these were conducted on London and the Belgian city of Antwerp between June 1944 and March 1945. It had about one ton of explosive and a range of up to 240 kilometers, but it failed to hit its targets. The first attack was carried out from Germany on Britain on June 13, 1944, during Normandy. The British forces were taken by surprise by this new weapon and it was dubbed the flying bomb. In 1944, Dornberger he was made the chief artillery commander in the German army. But as soon as World War II ended, he was captured again. He was accused of torturing slave labourers for preparing the world's first missile, the V-2 rocket. Von Braun was, in true terms, was the missile man of Germany. He developed ballistic missiles for the U.S. Army, making it a superpower. With the help of such powerful rockets, America launched its first satellite. After World War II, German scientists received invitations from allied countries such as America, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. Von Braun preferred to stay in America. He was part of America's classified space mission Apollo, which enabled American astronauts to reach the moon. With Von Braun's rocket technology, America developed intercontinental missiles capable of striking from one continent to another.

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