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Time of India
a day ago
- General
- Time of India
Who pays the price?
When the MSC ELSA-3 sank off the Kerala coast, identifying a clear line of liability or even a coherent chain of operational command proved almost impossible. The flag state, Liberia, refused to participate in the investigation. The Classification Society that had certified the ship as seaworthy only months earlier bore no accountability for oversight lapses. The German owner company maintained distance through limited liability. The Cyprus-based manager handled operations but carried no ultimate legal responsibility. Meanwhile, MSC—one of the world's largest shipping conglomerates—claimed only a commercial interest through charter. This tangled structure is no anomaly. It is the result of a deliberately opaque system designed to prioritize legal insulation over accountability. The MSC ELSA-3 had changed names and flags at least 10 times in under two decades—moving from CSAV Barcelona to TMM Hidalgo to Delmas Tourville to MSC ELSA-3—each change coinciding with opportunities to limit legal exposure, avoid scrutiny, or benefit from lenient regulation. While not illegal, this practice of shifting ownership, registry, and management undermines transparency and accountability. It stands at odds with the spirit of the international maritime framework set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which promotes safety and environmental responsibility. At the time of the incident, MSC ELSA-3 flew the Liberian flag—a classic example of a Flag of Convenience (FoC), often chosen for minimal regulatory scrutiny. But the vessel's operational complexity ran far deeper. It was owned by a German company, managed from Cyprus, chartered by MSC—a Swiss-based conglomerate—and certified by French classification society Bureau Veritas. Its crew was multinational, comprising seafarers from countries including Russia, the Philippines, and Ukraine. This spiderweb of ownership, management, registry, and operation illustrates how modern commercial shipping is designed to disperse responsibility across jurisdictions. In such setups, legal obligations are diluted across national borders, making it extraordinarily difficult for coastal states like India to enforce accountability or secure timely cooperation. The issue is compounded by the lack of mandatory public disclosure on beneficial ownership, the actual role of commercial operators in daily navigation decisions, and the operational influence of ship managers. Even in cases where insurers such as P&I Clubs are involved, jurisdictional complications and multi-layered contracting structures delay compensation, investigation, and resolution. For India, the lesson is urgent and clear. It must challenge this structural opacity. Ships calling at Indian ports must be subject to stricter requirements on transparency in ownership, crew composition, and management accountability. India must also push at the IMO for reforms mandating full disclosure of beneficial ownership, enhanced flag state obligations, and clearer delineation of managerial vs. operational control responsibilities. The MSC ELSA-3 wasn't merely lost to rough seas or human error. It was a victim of a system that fragments responsibility until it disappears. Unless this system is challenged, similar disasters will keep playing out in coastal waters, with little hope for justice or meaningful accountability. At the same time, such tragedies test not only our systems of rescue and recovery but also our sense of fairness, proportion, and justice. The contrast in societal, legal, and media response to such events reveals a disquieting inconsistency in how accountability is perceived—and demanded—depending on the domain of disaster. In the MSC ELSA-3 case, India's directorate general of shipping (DGS) promptly invoked provisions under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, launching a statutory investigation aligned with IMO's Casualty Investigation Code. Pollution control and salvage efforts began swiftly. Nonetheless, public anger surged. Kerala Police filed criminal cases under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The high court questioned why arrests hadn't been made. Demands arose to apply international oil pollution laws—even though such conventions don't govern container vessels. Now contrast this with the Air India Dreamliner crash. No FIRs were filed. No pilot's family was harassed. The ministry of civil aviation launched an ICAO-compliant probe. Public debate remained within the bounds of regulatory procedure. The US handling of the Baltimore bridge collapse offers a further contrast. Despite major loss and global media coverage, there was no rush to criminalise the incident. A factual investigation was led by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), consistent with IMO protocols. Only after evidence emerged did the US department of justice weigh criminal action. India, too, is a party to multiple international conventions. The law is clear. The Merchant Shipping Act outlines a well-established process for marine casualty investigations. Internationally, the IMO framework is built on objectivity, fairness, and due process. Short-circuiting that process to satisfy public sentiment erodes global confidence in India's maritime administration. Investigations must be about finding facts—not scapegoats. The writer is a senior official with the shipping ministry. The views expressed are personal. Identity has been withheld on request Follow more information on Air India plane crash in Ahmedabad here . Get real-time live updates on rescue operations and check full list of passengers onboard AI 171 .
Indian Express
30-05-2025
- General
- Indian Express
Who is responsible for the container ship that capsized off Kerala's coast? The answer is intentionally confusing
Written by Prasanth Nair On May 25, the MSC ELSA 3 — a container ship sailing under the flag of Liberia — was officially declared a 'total loss' following its capsizing off the Kerala coast. What appeared to be a maritime accident at first glance, upon closer scrutiny, unravels a troubling trail of red flags, regulatory laxity, and legal voids. The capsizing is not just the story of one ship's failure, but a symbol of a deeper rot in the global shipping regulatory architecture, where loopholes in law, flag registries, and oversight regimes collide to produce disasters waiting to happen. A Vessel of Many Names—and Many Escapes The vessel's history is, by itself, a narrative of evasion. Since 2000, MSC ELSA 3 has borne at least 10 different names, including CSAV Barcelona, TMM Hidalgo, Delmas Tourville, and Alexandra N. The ship has alternated flags between Liberia and Germany, switching its legal identity as frequently as its commercial one. These frequent changes — often referred to in the shipping industry as 'flag-hopping'— are a common tactic used to escape stricter inspections, debt liabilities, or ageing ship regulations. This persistent history of regulatory circumvention raises serious questions about the due diligence exercised by classification societies and international maritime registries. Flags of Convenience and the Dilution of Responsibility The MSC ELSA 3 was operating under a Flag of Convenience (FoC) — a system where ships are registered in a country other than that of the ship's owners to benefit from more lenient regulatory regimes. Liberia, Panama, and the Marshall Islands dominate this space. While FoC is not illegal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it has often been criticised for diluting safety and labour standards. In this case, Liberia — despite being the official flag state — has refused to participate in the investigation into the ship's capsizing, effectively forcing Indian authorities to conduct an independent probe. This refusal is permitted under international law but undermines the idea of shared global accountability and allows shipowners to operate in a legal grey zone. As India invokes the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, the absence of the flag state from the proceedings sets up a complicated path to legal enforcement and environmental restitution. This adversely impacts the affected parties. Ignored Warnings from Port State Inspections From 1999 to 2024, MSC ELSA 3 underwent dozens of Port State Control inspections across Europe, Asia, and the Americas. A more detailed examination reveals a disturbing pattern: The ship was frequently flagged for deficiencies related to crew preparedness, equipment failure, and structural risks. Notably, in July 2023, the Indian port of Tuticorin flagged nine deficiencies, four of them in the 'human element' category — an indication of training and competency issues among the crew. Such cutting corners by the ship-owners to maximise their profit endangers innocent citizens of unsuspecting distant countries. In Rotterdam (2010), this ship was detained for two days after being found with 21 deficiencies — a staggering number by maritime standards. Similar patterns occurred in Hamburg, Bilbao, and Dunkirk over the years. Yet, the ship was never declared unseaworthy by classification agencies. The Role of P&I Insurers and Cross-Jurisdictional Quagmires As of May this year, the ship was listed as being insured by multiple Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs — namely, Steamship Mutual (as recently as May 21), the UK P&I Club, and earlier, North of England P&I Association. While P&I insurers are tasked with covering liabilities like pollution and wreck removal, their involvement also underscores the complex legal web that must now be navigated across jurisdictions — Liberia, Switzerland (where the owner company is registered), and India. Certificates in Order — But to What Effect? MSC ELSA 3 had all the paperwork: A valid Safety Management Certificate issued by Bureau Veritas (valid until November 2025) and a classification survey as recent as November 13, 2023, certifying its seaworthiness until 2028. That a ship with such 'clean' certification could capsize within months is a striking indictment of the efficacy or superficiality of the inspection and certification ecosystem. It calls into question whether some inspections are conducted merely as procedural checkboxes, with minimal probing into actual risks. Questions of corruption and lax regulatory inspections also come in. The involvement of multiple Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs within a short span of time may also indicate transitions in ownership, coverage gaps, or underwriting hesitations — all signs of a vessel falling out of insurability comfort zones. Additionally, if Automatic Identification System (AIS) data during parts of its voyage are found missing or erratic, it would indicate deliberate obfuscation of route or port activity, a tactic commonly associated with higher-risk ships. Finally, the ship's certification was extended till 2028 despite its age and history of deficiencies — a highly unusual decision that may point to weak oversight by the classification society. The Cargo: A Hidden Danger The capsized ship reportedly carried 640 containers, including some that contained hazardous chemicals like calcium carbide — which can react explosively with water. Coastal communities and fishermen were later warned not to touch floating containers. It is now confirmed that the MSC ELSA 3 had loaded its cargo, including 12 containers of calcium carbide, from Vizhinjam Port before heading towards Kochi. Calcium carbide, a highly reactive chemical used primarily in the production of acetylene gas for industrial welding and cutting, poses severe risks when exposed to moisture — potentially triggering explosions or toxic gas release. While the cargo manifest listing calcium carbide was accessible to Indian authorities at Vizhinjam, the absence of urgent local advisories or preparedness protocols after the capsize reveals a systemic gap in translating technical information into public safety measures. Parallels with Similar Maritime Incidents The MSC ELSA 3 incident is not unique. In 2012, the MV Rena, a Liberian-flagged vessel, ran aground near New Zealand, spilling oil and cargo. Liberia again distanced itself from the investigation. In 2020, the MV Wakashio, a Japanese-owned but Panamanian-flagged bulk carrier, spilled over 1,000 tonnes of fuel oil off Mauritius. Investigations revealed lapses in route planning and fatigue among the crew — red flags similar to those noted in the MSC ELSA 3's history. These incidents show that the flag of convenience model disproportionately shields shipowners from liability while exposing coastal nations to ecological and legal fallout. When the System Sinks Alongside the Ship The story of MSC ELSA 3 is not just about a capsized vessel; it's about a regulatory system that failed at every level — certification, enforcement, transparency, and accountability. The ship may have gone down physically on May 25, but its structural failure had been foretold through years of ignored warnings, regulatory loopholes, and paper-thin oversight. India must leverage this moment to advocate for a stronger Port State Control regime, real-time public disclosure of hazardous cargo, and a review of legal powers under the Merchant Shipping Act and UNCLOS. It is time for the international community to reform the FoC system and ensure that accountability does not sink with the ship. The world cannot continue to tolerate a system where flags can be chosen like wallpaper, red flags are ignored, and accountability disappears as easily as a sunken hull. Nair is an IAS officer, author and filmmaker. Views are personal
