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Economist
15-05-2025
- Business
- Economist
Lessons from the US-China trade war
America and China have agreed to a 90-day truce of their month-long trade war, but the economic uncertainty has not yet ended. Beyond tariffs, the spat had begun spilling over into other areas, with China imposing a ban on the export of critical minerals designed to hobble American industries. Could global supply chains and financial systems be weaponised in a similar way? If so, could such actions further fragment the global economy to everyone's detriment? And what would stop economic warfare escalating into full-blown military conflicts? Hosts: Mike Bird and Ethan Wu. Guests: Edward Fishman of the Center on Global Energy Policy and Columbia University, and author of 'Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare'; and Dan Wang, research fellow at Stanford's Hoover History Lab and author of 'Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer th e Future'.
The Hindu
06-05-2025
- Business
- The Hindu
Goyal reiterates India will retaliate against carbon tax
Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal once again warned that India would retaliate with taxes of its own if Europe goes ahead with its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) plan. The CBAM is basically a mechanism through which European countries would impose a carbon tax on select imports. 'If they put in a carbon tax, we will retaliate,' Mr. Goyal said, while speaking at the 2025 Columbia India Energy Dialogue, hosted by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. 'They will put it on products that will hurt their economy and the retaliation will be on products which will further hurt their economy.' Mr. Goyal has previously — as far back as 2023, for example — also spoken about how India would retaliate to CBAM. 'India has contributed to only 3-3.5% of the carbon emissions,' he said on Tuesday. 'We support 17% of the world population. Yet, if we are going to be asked to contribute at the same level as a European company, I think that is going to be patently unfair, improper and irregular.' However, at a time when India has successfully concluded a Free Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom on Tuesday, Mr. Goyal painted a fairly rosy picture of the trade talks with the U.S. and Europe as well. 'Trade talks with Europe are continuing well and are separate from climate issues,' he said, adding that talks with the U.S. are 'going fabulously well'. India is in talks with both regions to conclude trade agreements with each.
Time of India
23-04-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
The US doesn't have a climate policy now — until Washington is back at the global table, world environmental progress will be slow: Noah Kaufman
Noah Kaufman is Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das, he discusses America's new ecological aims: Q. What is the core of your research? A. I am an economist and focus on energy and climate policy as well as their inter sections with economic policy. For some time now, I've been researching communities around the United States which are heavily dependent on fossil fuels to fund public services and provide jobs. I've been working on viable economic strategies for these communities as the world transitions away from fossil fuels. Q. Can you explain the surprising US turn towards coal though? A. All the rhetoric from the federal government these days is certainly about moving back to fossil fuels — including, as per the recent executive order on this, coal. So far, this is just rhetoric though — actual data in the US shows two decades of declining coal production and use. The biggest reason is economic — we have natural gas and renewables which are much lower-cost and cleaner. This combination — economics with environmental regulations — caused a gradual transition away from coal. There are still cultural drivers though. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like People In Telangana Say Goodbye To Mosquitoes With This Revolutionary Solution Mosquito Eliminator Read More Undo In the Appalachian region, whch encompasses West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, etc., there is a long history of coal being central to local economies, jobs, electricity systems and ways of life. However, those are relatively small pockets — around 25 counties in the country produce 75% of the entire coal in the US. Still, this is a cultural issue which also resonates with President Donald Trump 's base — in his first term too, he announced big measures with fanfare and coal miners standing behind him. However, the data thereafter also shows the decline of coal at a similar pace as under Presidents Obama and then Biden. Yet, coal's centrality in some places can't be downplayed — in certain areas, as coal mines close, elementary schools shut down because tax revenue declines. Live Events Q. Why have you written earlier of oil and gas communities being a 'blind spot' in America's climate policies? A. I was talking then of President Biden's administration which had taken strong steps to spur the energy transition in the US. Regarding coal communities, it was acknowledged that if we continue rapidly decarbonising, coal would decline even more, causing further economic issues. So, the Biden administration took measures to address this, including economic deve-lopment grants for these groups. However, oil and gas communities actually face an 'out of sight, out of mind' situation because they are seen as doing much better than coal — oil and gas production are at an all-time high in the US. We are the leading global producers of both fuels and economically, oil and gas-dependent counties have outperformed the national economy. Most politicians aren't looking into the future of a decarbonised world and thinking of these communities. My research was a call to ensure policies are planned now, so these groups don't end up suffering the same fate as coal communities today. Q. How would you define America's climate policies now? A. At the federal level, the US has no climate policy today — we have some incentives left over from previous legislation, like the Inflation Reduction Act. A. The fate of those is yet to be determined. Congress is controlled by Republicans and they may get rid of these. Federal agencies may not be incentivised to implement them. The department of energy is led by Secretary Chris Wright, formerly CEO of an oil and gas company. Many of President Trump's advisors are heavy supporters of fossil fuels. So, currently, we don't have a broad climate policy at the federal level — what we have are subnational actors, states, regions and companies, at work. Q. How could President Trump's tariff war impact the clean energy transition? A. The main effect will be to raise prices and serve as a drag on economies, including the US — that will slow the energy transition as lowered economic growth means pullbacks in investments. We are already seeing a pullback in wind, solar and battery manufacturing plants. If the US enters a recession, those will deepen. Of course, the Biden administration also placed tariffs on some green technologies from China but that was part of a strategy to build a US solar manufacturing base — that doesn't seem like a goal shared by the Trump administration. Q. Experts suggest an obstructionist US exiting global climate agreements could be positive — how do you analyse that? A. The world could make some progress — everything developed in China is at an entirely different scale now while Europe's always been ahead of the US on climate action. However, the amount and pace of progress will be limited if the world's largest economy — and the greatest historical emitter of greenhouse gases — won't act. If other nations see the US abdicating its climate role — in a situation it is most responsible for making — they might not want to make sacrifices either. Until the US is back at the climate table, I'd keep my expectations for global progress in check. Views expressed are personal
Miami Herald
11-04-2025
- Politics
- Miami Herald
Will Donald Trump Finally Get His Moment of Peace With Iran?
As representatives of the United States and Iran prepare to officially explore the possibility of reviving nuclear diplomacy on Saturday, President Donald Trump stands on the precipice of a major step toward his stated vision of peace in the Middle East. Such an achievement would offer the president a long-awaited win in proving his case for a new style of U.S. leadership in a region that has otherwise trended toward growing instability. But the road to a new Iran deal, as was the case with the ill-fated attempt to strike an agreement with North Korea during his first term, is laden with pitfalls. U.S. and Iranian officials have not even publicly agreed to the format of the talks set to take place this weekend in Oman, much less their scope. Analysts and former officials say both sides will have to carefully calibrate their expectations in order to achieve a peaceful outcome and avoid a serious escalation that could even lead to war. Richard Nephew, former U.S. State Department official and now senior research scholar at the Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, argued that Trump's strategy currently appeared to be caught between "two diametrically opposed visions"—White House national security adviser Mike Waltz's call for the dismantling of Iran's nuclear program in its entirety and Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff's talk of implementing stricter transparency and limits on Iran's nuclear activities. Only the latter course, he said, was likely to be met with meaningful engagement from Tehran, which has always insisted its nuclear facilities were solely for peaceful purposes. "Iran will not accept elimination," Nephew, who served as lead global sanctions coordinator during the negotiations that led to the last major nuclear agreement, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under then-President Barack Obama and later as anti-corruption chief under former President Joe Biden, told Newsweek. "If they are only interested in a deal that eliminates Iran's nuclear program, then they're not serious. It is not a thing Iran will agree to diplomatically," Nephew said. "They may be able to eventually force Iran to accept such terms after the use of military force, but even then, my strong view is that would only come after regime change." On the other hand, he said Iranian leadership "would accept a limited deal with transparency improvements." Witkoff, a longtime friend of Trump who shares his background as a billionaire New York real estate mogul, has further earned the president's trust in his breakthrough of a ceasefire deal between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement in January. Last month, he was deployed to Moscow to meet with President Vladimir Putin in talks on ending the war in Ukraine. With the envoy now set to reportedly lead the U.S. delegation meeting Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his team in Oman on Saturday, Nephew said that, "if, as Witkoff has indicated, [the Trump administration's] demands are less total, then they may be able to find a way to obtain greater transparency into Iran's nuclear program, perhaps even a small amount of rollback (e.g., limits on Iranian centrifuge or enriched uranium stocks)." But this approach "is unlikely to satisfy the U.S. team in full or certainly the Israelis, who retain the ability to attack Iran themselves," Nephew said. "The real question is whether Trump is prepared to side with the group looking at a realistic deal." Newsweek has reached out to the Iranian Mission to the United Nations for comment. Contacted for comment, National Security Council spokesperson James Hewitt denied any rifts between the two men tasked with executing Trump's policy on Iran. "NSA Waltz and Special Envoy Witkoff are in constant communication to ensure the President's policy of dismantling Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons capabilities is carried out," Hewitt told Newsweek. "Any 'analysts' who suggest otherwise have no clue what they're talking about." Trump's efforts are further complicated by the rampant mistrust that exists between the U.S. and Iran, two longtime foes whose most significant diplomatic breakthrough was scrapped by Trump in 2018. Two years after abandoning the hard-won JCPOA, Trump's order to kill Major General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran's elite Quds Force, in 2020 made the U.S. president public enemy number for the Islamic Republic. After the Biden administration's failed attempt to restore U.S. participation in the JCPOA, Trump in his second term has offered to pursue a new "verifiable nuclear peace agreement" with Iran. At the same time, he has repeatedly warned that military action was on the table if a deal could not be reached. The bad blood has prompted Iranian officials to question the degree to which Trump is truly committed to seeing a deal through. And while it would not be the first time Trump has swapped his saber for an olive branch, past setbacks haunt the quest for a successful deal. "All of this will require sanctions relief and acceptance of Iran having a nuclear program to start," Nephew said. "That remains unclear, and it is worth noting that this is exactly what happened with North Korea." Just around the same time that Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA, he also pressed ahead on a separate agreement entailing peace for denuclearization and sanctions relief with North Korea. The move marked a major shift from soaring tensions between Washington and Pyongyang that saw Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un resorting to insults and nuclear-fueled threats toward the end of 2017. Trump would go on to become the only sitting U.S. president to meet with a North Korean ruler in June 2018 in a high-profile summit intended to outline the framework for a deal. In the months that followed, however, working-level talks had begun stalled, and their second summit in February 2019 ended abruptly without a deal. Tensions ultimately returned to the Korean Peninsula. Then, too, there appeared to be dissonance within Trump's own corner, as figures such as then-national security adviser John Bolton adopted markedly less compromising rhetoric during the negotiations. After firing Bolton months later, Trump would go on to blame his former national security chief for sabotaging the negotiations by referring to a "Libyan model" for Pyongyang's denuclearization. Back in 2003, just months after the U.S. invaded Iraq, toppling President Saddam Hussein on the pretext of supposed weapons of mass destruction that never materialized, Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi agreed to shutter his nation's burgeoning nuclear program in exchange for peace with Washington. Qaddafi was later ousted and brutally slain by a NATO-backed rebellion in 2011, serving as a cautionary tale for those considering surrendering their nuclear programs. "We were set back very badly when John Bolton talked about the Libyan model," Trump said during a September 2019 news conference at the White House. "And he made a mistake. And as soon as he mentioned that, the 'Libyan model,' what a disaster. Take a look at what happened to Qaddafi, with the Libyan model. And he's using that to make a deal with North Korea?" During a June 2020 interview with Fox News, Trump later called Bolton's comments in the midst of the North Korea talks "one of the dumbest things I've ever seen on television, frankly." Now, as Trump looks to court another supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, with nuclear negotiations, it's Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who is drawing parallels to Libya. The Israeli premier called Monday for Iran's denuclearization "the way it was done in Libya" during a joint news conference with Trump after talks in which many analysts saw new rifts emerge between the two allies. Though often portrayed as a staunch admirer of Netanyahu, Trump has also demonstrated on several key occasions a willingness to push back against the Israeli premier amid his war with Hamas, which sparked the current conflict in a shocking October 2023 attack. Tehran and its Axis of Resistance coalition joined in the fight, bringing Iran and Israel into direct open conflict for the first time and accelerating Netanyahu's calls for joint action with the U.S. against the Islamic Republic. But even as Trump issued his own warnings to Iran, he has downplayed his enthusiasm for towing the Israeli line on pursuing such a joint strike as "greatly exaggerated." Nimrod Novik, an Israel Policy Forum fellow who served as senior foreign policy adviser to former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, argued that, after the Israeli leader's latest visit, "the experienced Netanyahu must have no illusions about his leverage—or, more accurately, lack thereof—when it comes to standing up to Trump on issues the president deems important." "Thus far, Trump proves to be neither Obama nor Biden in tolerating his defiance," Novik told Newsweek. "Four times in as many months, when Washington did not see eye to eye with him, Netanyahu was forced to blink, or at least to hold his peace. First, even before assuming office, Trump forced him to accept a Gaza deal he had rejected for months. Shortly thereafter, when Netanyahu blocked progress on that deal, he was stunned by Trump authorizing a direct contact with Hamas." "More recently, Netanyahu's predictable rejection of the Arab League Gaza plan did not stop Washington from declaring it 'a good-faith first move' worthy of further discussion, and now Iran..." Novik said. "The message from all four instances is that those who share the conventional wisdom whereby Trump is in Netanyahu's pocket need take a second look." Novik said that Netanyahu, often referred to by his nickname, "Bibi," was looking to signal strength and influence back home, where he also faces legal troubles and mounting protests, only for a growing chorus of observers in Israel to urge him not to overplay his hand with Trump. "Consequently, in setting the high—indeed, unrealistic—bar of 'like Libya,' Bibi was spinning his strategic setback for domestic consumption," Novik said. "Having invested in persuading Israelis of his unique relations with Trump, and with the president's popularity among Israelis far exceeding that of Netanyahu's, portraying Trump's move as hostile to Israel—the way he did with Obama—would ring hollow, and standing up to him would neither enjoy domestic support nor yield political dividend." "It is no accident that most analysts back home call upon Netanyahu to learn from his previous mistake: you can't stop Trump from trying," he said. "You'd better make sure to have his ear in seeking to improve the terms of a negotiated deal and his goodwill should negotiations fail and more drastic measures need to be taken to block Iran from going nuclear." While the fallout of Netanyahu's trip may have signaled a triumph for Trump's more diplomatic tendencies, overcoming Iran's deep-rooted suspicions of the U.S. leader's intentions is another task altogether. Amir Hossein Vazirian, a Tehran-based analyst, said that the experiences of Iraq, Libya as well as Ukraine, which ceded Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia following independence in the 1990s only to face invasion three decades later, still loom heavy in Iran's decision-making. With this in mind, he argued, any discussion of "the Libyan model and the Iraqi model," or any other effort to dismantle Iran's nuclear program in its entirety, much less its vast missile arsenal, amounted to nothing more than "imaginary talk." Otherwise, he said, talks specifically about instituting limits on Iran's nuclear program "will be accessible" for both sides. "Iran, several times, announced that it doesn't have any problem with controls on its nuclear program," Vazirian told Newsweek. "Iran is seeking a kind of trust building with United States in the nuclear case." "But if the United States wants in this negotiation to remove Iran's nuclear program, Iran will not accept," he added, "first of all, because of national pride, and the second factor goes back to the Libyan and Ukrainian experience in disarmament of nuclear facilities." Still, Vazirian saw some positive signals amid the mixed messages being sent from Washington at a time when Tehran's appetite for diplomacy may be heightened by blows suffered to its Axis of Resistance, particularly the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December. "Iran needs a deal, and even before Assad's fall in Syria, Iran's ambassador to the U.N., Amir Saeid Iravani, and Elon Musk met each other in New York," Vazirian said. "This is the best, most important signal by Iran to the United States and Trump administration. And after that, many Iranian officials like Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, President Masoud Pezeshkian and recently Ali Larijani, the most important political advisor of Ayatollah Khomeini, talk about the United States interest in Iran and in the Middle East." "Even today, Pezeshkian talks about an agreement and the point that Iran is looking forward to United States investment in Iran and that Iran's supreme leader agrees with this method," he added. "This is a new and strong signal by Iran to the Trump administration." At the same time, he argued that "Trump also needs an agreement with Iran" to fulfill one of his key campaign promises. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat who served on Iran's nuclear negotiations team in the mid-2000s and now a specialist at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security, echoed the prospects of an investment deal cutting through the dense air of distrust between Tehran and Washington. "The distrust is mutual, and both sides need to work to overcome it," Mousavian told Newsweek. "However, what could truly transform Iran–U.S. relations is a multi-trillion-dollar economic agreement that could sweep away the problems between them like a massive flood." Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat who served on Iran's nuclear negotiations team in the mid-2000s and is now a specialist at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security, echoed the prospects of an investment deal cutting through the dense air of mistrust between Tehran and Washington. "The distrust is mutual, and both sides need to work to overcome it," Mousavian told Newsweek. "However, what could truly transform Iran–U.S. relations is a multi-trillion-dollar economic agreement that could sweep away the problems between them like a massive flood." Despite being hit by crippling sanctions, Iran remains one of the largest economies in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic may not appear at first glance as a potential hub for U.S. investment, but in his businesslike approach to diplomacy, Trump has consistently spoke of Iran's potential over the years. Still, if mutual prosperity is sought by the Trump administration, Mousavian warned Iran would prove resistant to the old tactics of "maximum pressure" that failed to sway Tehran in past attempts at diplomacy, even if "Iran's regional allies have suffered significant setbacks" throughout their current conflict with Israel. "Trump wants a deal and is not inclined toward war," Mousavian said. "But he has taken the wrong approach. A train can never run on two tracks at the same time. The simultaneous policy of diplomacy and sanctions is the same dual containment policy introduced by [then-U.S. Ambassador to Israel] Martin Indyk during the Bill Clinton era in 1993." While Tehran and Washington have both voiced their preference to avoid open conflict, the threat of a runaway escalation, deliberate or inadvertent, remains real. Rahman Ghahremanpour, a freelance researcher and writer specializing in Iran's nuclear diplomacy, argued that there is "a growing consensus in the U.S. that coercive diplomacy is the most effective framework to deal with Iran," yet such an approach "can also be a threat." "The success of this type of diplomacy lies in creating a balance between diplomacy and force," Ghahremanpour told Newsweek. "However, it is difficult to determine this balance point, which is why some analysts are talking about the possibility of a military confrontation between Iran and the United States." "That is, if Trump cannot use this coercive diplomacy correctly, it could lead to war," he added, "and this is something that Trump does not want, and of course, Iran does not like at all." And while Ghahremanpour argued that "Iran has taken Trump's threats seriously," he also outlined divisions within Tehran, where hard-liners already skeptical of the JCPOA now "oppose any kind of negotiation" toward a new deal that would have to be endorsed by Khamenei. Some have even advocated for reconsidering the supreme leader's longstanding ban on nuclear weapons production. "Therefore," Ghahremanpour said, "Iran is trying to strike a balance between Trump's threats and domestic challenges." The upcoming talks in Oman, long known as the "Switzerland of the Middle East" for its neutrality amid regional conflicts, could serve to provide some clarity to both parties. Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, told Newsweek that the meeting "provides a critical opportunity for Trump to articulate pragmatic objectives for an agreement and distance himself from needlessly provocative references to complete dismantlement." Given that "Witkoff appears to share Trump's view that a deal should focus on limits and monitoring," she argued that sending the envoy "and exercising some message discipline would be a step in the right direction." "Trump needs to demonstrate that he is negotiating in good faith and create an environment conducive to talks," Davenport said. "Minimizing references to military strikes and pausing further sanctions could go a long way toward demonstrating to Iran that the United States is serious about reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. Iran knows the United States can ratchet up sanctions quickly. The Trump administration has to show it can also ease up on pressure." "Trump should use the Oman talks as an opportunity to lay out a vision for the end-state of Iran's nuclear program under a deal," she added. "This could include making clear that the United States will respect Iran's rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if Tehran moves back from the threshold of nuclear weapons and accepts intrusive monitoring." Related Articles Iran Signals 'Earnest' Nuclear Talks Amid More Trump SanctionsSecond U.S. Aircraft Carrier Now Deployed Near Iran: VideoIran Threatens to Expel Nuclear Inspectors Over Trump PressureSatellite Images Show US Aircraft Carrier at War With Iran-backed Houthis 2025 NEWSWEEK DIGITAL LLC.
Reuters
07-04-2025
- Business
- Reuters
Trump strategy threatens critical mineral supplies for clean power
Summary President Trump's sweeping tariff and policy shifts could undermine plans to expand U.S. production of critical minerals for clean power. April 7 - U.S. solar, wind and battery developers depend heavily on imports of highly processed critical minerals from China, making them particularly sensitive to an escalating global tariff war under the Trump administration. On April 4, China placed export restrictions on rare earth elements as part of a sweeping response to U.S. President Donald Trump's tariffs, squeezing supply to the West of minerals used to make a wide range of goods in energy, defense, and electronics. President Trump has introduced a 20% tariff on all Chinese imports, retained the Biden administration's decision to increase tariffs on lithium batteries from China from 7.5% to 25% from January 2026 and slapped a 25% tariff on all steel and aluminium imports and all imports from Mexico and Canada. Meanwhile, U.S. antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD) are set to be imposed on imports of Chinese active anode materials used in battery storage technology. The U.S Geological Survey classifies 50 minerals as critical. Cobalt, lithium, manganese and nickel are used in energy storage systems and electric vehicles while copper is used in solar panels and electrical connections, silicon in PV panels, and graphite in lithium-ion batteries. Arsenic, gallium and tellurium are also used in solar cells. China controls about 60% of global critical minerals' production and 85% of global processing capacity, with much of the remaining capacity located in countries with heavy Chinese investment, such as Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) and Indonesia. CHART: Critical minerals - share of top three countries Source: Federation of American Scientists. Data source: IEA. Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab Consumption of minerals is rising rapidly and high level processing and refining of lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earth elements are the key bottlenecks for the clean power industry, Tom Moerenhout, Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, told Reuters Events. Global demand for lithium is forecast to rise tenfold between 2022 and 2050 while demand for cobalt is predicted to triple, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). On March 20, Trump invoked the Defense Production Act to mobilise industry and expand domestic mineral output to reduce the country's reliance on China. This enables the federal government to finance new mining and requires federal agencies to speed up project approvals and prioritise mining on federal land. The Trump administration is keen to build a domestic supply chain but it takes years to build such upstream activities and a combination of Trump tariffs and anti-climate energy policies could severely hamper plans. Further U.S.-Chinese trade restrictions and tariffs 'could escalate faster than the U.S. is able to secure alternative supply chains, jeopardizing attempts to develop domestic clean energy manufacturing industries," Alice Wu, Senior Associate at the Federation of American Scientists, told Reuters Events. The lack of a stable policy environment will 'have a chilling effect on future investments in the domestic critical minerals industry," she said. China years ahead The U.S. has little cobalt and no graphite mining or processing capacity, while its share of global processing capacity is just 3% for nickel and 1% for lithium. The average critical minerals' mine takes more than 16 years from discovery to first production, according to Deutsche Bank. U.S. critical mineral suppliers have struggled to compete against low-cost facilities in China that benefit from state subsidies. China's lead is the result of developing comprehensive supply chains over 20 years, so 'they have reached a level of standardization and technology development' that the U.S. lacks, Moerenhout said. Join hundreds of senior executives across energy, industry and finance at Reuters Events Global Energy Transition 2025. Tariffs on Chinese imports can help higher cost domestic producers compete but raising them too quickly could make critical minerals too expensive for downstream industries, such as battery manufacturing, Wu noted. The Biden administration sought to strengthen domestic supply chains by providing tax credits and funding for mining and processing facilities via the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL). If these support mechanisms remain in place, domestic lithium supplies could meet demand from domestic battery manufacturing plants by 2030, Argonne National Laboratory said last year, but there has been less progress with other critical minerals including cobalt, graphite and nickel. MAP: US clean power manufacturing facilities operational or planned Source: American Clean Power Association (ACP) report 'Snapshot of clean power in 2024' (March 2025). Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab Other efforts by the Biden administration included the negotiation of bilateral agreements with allied countries, such as Australia and Argentina, and the provision of direct funding from the Department of Defense and U.S. Export-Import Bank to critical minerals projects abroad, Wu noted. Growing U.S.-China tensions and Europe's reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggered new mining and processing projects, but 'those have yet to begin quantitatively shifting the global critical mineral supply picture', Seaver Wang, Director, Climate and Energy at The Breakthrough Institute, an environmental research center, told Reuters Events. Barriers rise The Trump administration is seeking to secure more critical mineral assets in DR Congo and has touted plans to expand its control of critical minerals in countries like Greenland and Ukraine. It also plans to streamline the regulatory process for new U.S. mines and processing sites, but its wider policies on energy threaten to hamper supply chain plans, Wang said. Trump has frozen funding from the inflation act and BIL pending a review while aggressive reductions in federal workforces, such as the Forest Service, 'have dramatically reduced the ability of key agencies involved in mining to carry out their duties,' Wang noted. Meanwhile, tariffs imposed on Chinese imports by the Trump administration in February 2025 led to Beijing imposing export controls on five critical minerals: bismuth, indium, molybdenum, tungsten and tellurium – the last of which is needed for cadmium telluride (CdTe) thin-film solar cells. It has also made it more difficult for engineers and equipment to leave the country. Surging demand from tech groups is accelerating clean power activity - download our exclusive report. An escalating tariff war with Canada is also a key risk for critical minerals supply. Canada exported $29.8 billion in critical minerals to the U.S. in 2023 but these supplies are threatened by the imposition of tariffs on a wide range of Canadian goods by the Trump administration. British Columbia Premier David Eby has threatened to ban critical mineral exports to the U.S. in retaliation. Picking fights with China, Canada and Mexico – the U.S.'s three biggest raw materials' suppliers – 'is not going to help supply chain resilience,' said Moerenhout. To boost domestic supply chains, the U.S. government could provide project-specific grants and loans, support R&D in new mining and processing technologies and help with geologic mapping, alongside permitting reforms, Wang said. But the U.S. cannot satisfy all its own needs and must build secure supply chains with overseas partners, he noted. The U.S. government needs to recognise that some extraction and processing will be 'much more competitive' in key trade partner countries like Canada, Chile and Australia, Moerenhout said. Opinions expressed are those of the author. They do not reflect the views of Reuters News, which, under the Trust Principles, is committed to integrity, independence, and freedom from bias. Reuters Events, a part of Reuters Professional, is owned by Thomson Reuters and operates independently of Reuters News. Neil Ford Neil provides news and analysis to a number of energy and African business publications. He also writes reports on Africa for the United Nations and the African Development Bank.
