Latest news with #CentralEuropeanUniversity
Japan Today
a day ago
- Politics
- Japan Today
Autocrats don't act like Hitler or Stalin anymore − instead of governing with violence, they use manipulation
By Daniel Treisman President Donald Trump's critics often accuse him of harboring authoritarian ambitions. Journalists and scholars have drawn parallels between his leadership style and that of strongmen abroad. Some Democrats warn that the U.S. is sliding toward autocracy – a system in which one leader holds unchecked power. Others counter that labeling Trump an autocrat is alarmist. After all, he hasn't suspended the Constitution, forced school children to memorize his sayings or executed his rivals, as dictators such as Augusto Pinochet, Mao Zedong and Saddam Hussein once did. But modern autocrats don't always resemble their 20th-century predecessors. Instead, they project a polished image, avoid overt violence and speak the language of democracy. They wear suits, hold elections and talk about the will of the people. Rather than terrorizing citizens, many use media control and messaging to shape public opinion and promote nationalist narratives. Many gain power not through military coups but at the ballot box. The softer power of today's autocrats In the early 2000s, political scientist Andreas Schedler coined the term 'electoral authoritarianism' to describe regimes that hold elections without real competition. Scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way use another phrase, 'competitive authoritarianism,' for systems in which opposition parties exist but leaders undermine them through censorship, electoral fraud or legal manipulation. In my own work with economist Sergei Guriev, we explore a broader strategy that modern autocrats use to gain and maintain power. We call this 'informational autocracy' or 'spin dictatorship.' These leaders don't rely on violent repression. Instead, they craft the illusion that they are competent, democratic defenders of the nation – protecting it from foreign threats or internal enemies who seek to undermine its culture or steal its wealth. Hungary's democratic facade Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán exemplifies this approach. He first served from 1998 to 2002, returned to power in 2010 and has since won three more elections – in 2014, 2018 and 2022 – after campaigns that international observers criticized as 'intimidating and xenophobic.' Orbán has preserved the formal structures of democracy – courts, a parliament and regular elections – but has systematically hollowed them out. In his first two years he packed Hungary's constitutional court, which reviews laws for constitutionality, with loyalists, forced judges off the bench by mandating a lower retirement age and rewrote the constitution to limit judicial review of his actions. He also tightened government control over independent media. To boost his image, Orbán funneled state advertising funds to friendly news outlets. In 2016, an ally bought Hungary's largest opposition newspaper – then shut it down. Orbán has also targeted advocacy groups and universities. The Central European University, which was registered in both Budapest and the U.S., was once a symbol of the new democratic Hungary. But a law penalizing foreign-accredited institutions forced it to relocate to Vienna in 2020. Yet Orbán has mostly avoided violence. Journalists are harassed rather than jailed or killed. Critics are discredited for their beliefs but not abducted. His appeal rests on a narrative that Hungary is under siege – by immigrants, liberal elites and foreign influences – and that only he can defend its sovereignty and Christian identity. That message resonates with older, rural, conservative voters, even as it alienates younger, urban populations. A global shift in autocrats In recent decades, variants of spin dictatorship have appeared in Singapore, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Leaders such as Hugo Chávez and the early Vladimir Putin consolidated power and marginalized opposition with minimal violence. Data confirm this trend. Drawing from human rights reports, historical records and local media, my colleague Sergei Guriev and I found that the global incidence of political killings and imprisonments by autocrats dropped significantly from the 1980s to the 2010s. Why? In an interconnected world, overt repression has costs. Attacking journalists and dissidents can prompt foreign governments to impose economic sanctions and discourage international companies from investing. Curbing free expression risks stifling scientific and technological innovation – something even autocrats need in modern, knowledge-based economies. Still, when crises erupt, even spin dictators often revert to more traditional tactics. Russia's Putin has cracked down violently on protesters and jailed opposition leaders. Meanwhile, more brutal regimes such as those in North Korea and China continue to rule by spreading fear, combining mass incarceration with advanced surveillance technologies. But overall, spin is replacing terror. America too? Most experts, myself included, agree that the U.S. remains a democracy. Yet some of Trump's tactics resemble those of informational autocrats. He has attacked the press, defied court rulings and pressured universities to curtail academic independence and limit international admissions. His admiration for strongmen such as Putin, China's Xi Jinping and El Salvador's Nayib Bukele alarms observers. At the same time, Trump routinely denigrates democratic allies and international institutions such as the United Nations and NATO. Some experts say democracy depends on politicians' self restraint. But a system that survives only if leaders choose to respect its limits is not much of a system at all. What matters more is whether the press, judiciary, nonprofit organizations, professional associations, churches, unions, universities and citizens have the power – and the will – to hold leaders accountable. Preserving democracy in the US Wealthy democracies such as the U.S., Canada and many Western European countries benefit from robust institutions such as newspapers, universities, courts and advocacy groups that act as checks on government. Such institutions help explain why populists such as Italy's Silvio Berlusconi or Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu, although accused of bending electoral rules and threatening judicial independence, have not dismantled democracy outright in their countries. In the U.S., the Constitution provides another layer of protection. Amending it requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states – a far steeper hurdle than in Hungary, where Orbán needed only a two-thirds parliamentary majority to rewrite the constitution. Of course, even the U.S. Constitution can be undermined if a president defies the Supreme Court. But doing so risks igniting a constitutional crisis and alienating key supporters. That doesn't mean American democracy is safe from erosion. But its institutional foundations are older, deeper and more decentralized than those of many newer democracies. Its federal structure, with overlapping jurisdictions and multiple veto points, makes it harder for any one leader to dominate. Still, the global rise of spin dictatorships should sharpen awareness of what is happening in the U.S. Around the world, autocrats have learned to control their citizens by faking democracy. Understanding their techniques may help Americans to preserve the real thing. Daniel Treisman is Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles. The Conversation is an independent and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts. External Link © The Conversation
New York Times
2 days ago
- Politics
- New York Times
Harvard's Battle Is Familiar to a University the Right Forced into Exile
In a former bank building, away from Vienna's palaces and opera houses, Central European University lives in exile. The school, founded by George Soros, was once an example of academia flourishing in post-Soviet Europe. Now, less than a decade after Hungary's right-wing government forced it to move out of Budapest, people there are sounding warnings as President Trump seeks to bring America's top universities to heel. 'It's like we keep screaming at the void, and no one is listening,' said Sepphora Llanes, a graduate student from Colorado. But some are. As the Trump administration escalates its pressure campaign, more people in American higher education — and in Vienna — believe the U.S. government is borrowing from a playbook refined in recent years by Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who used state power to menace a university he disdained, upend academic independence and strengthen his ideological grip on Hungary. 'At the abstract level, it's the same,' said Carsten Q. Schneider, a German scholar who has worked for C.E.U. for more than 20 years and will become its interim president and rector in August. Want all of The Times? Subscribe.
Yahoo
7 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Autocrats don't act like Hitler or Stalin anymore − instead of governing with violence, they use manipulation
President Donald Trump's critics often accuse him of harboring authoritarian ambitions. Journalists and scholars have drawn parallels between his leadership style and that of strongmen abroad. Some Democrats warn that the U.S. is sliding toward autocracy – a system in which one leader holds unchecked power. Others counter that labeling Trump an autocrat is alarmist. After all, he hasn't suspended the Constitution, forced school children to memorize his sayings or executed his rivals, as dictators such as Augusto Pinochet, Mao Zedong and Saddam Hussein once did. But modern autocrats don't always resemble their 20th-century predecessors. Instead, they project a polished image, avoid overt violence and speak the language of democracy. They wear suits, hold elections and talk about the will of the people. Rather than terrorizing citizens, many use media control and messaging to shape public opinion and promote nationalist narratives. Many gain power not through military coups but at the ballot box. In the early 2000s, political scientist Andreas Schedler coined the term 'electoral authoritarianism' to describe regimes that hold elections without real competition. Scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way use another phrase, 'competitive authoritarianism,' for systems in which opposition parties exist but leaders undermine them through censorship, electoral fraud or legal manipulation. In my own work with economist Sergei Guriev, we explore a broader strategy that modern autocrats use to gain and maintain power. We call this 'informational autocracy' or 'spin dictatorship.' These leaders don't rely on violent repression. Instead, they craft the illusion that they are competent, democratic defenders of the nation – protecting it from foreign threats or internal enemies who seek to undermine its culture or steal its wealth. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán exemplifies this approach. He first served from 1998 to 2002, returned to power in 2010 and has since won three more elections – in 2014, 2018 and 2022 – after campaigns that international observers criticized as 'intimidating and xenophobic.' Orbán has preserved the formal structures of democracy – courts, a parliament and regular elections – but has systematically hollowed them out. In his first two years he packed Hungary's constitutional court, which reviews laws for constitutionality, with loyalists, forced judges off the bench by mandating a lower retirement age and rewrote the constitution to limit judicial review of his actions. He also tightened government control over independent media. To boost his image, Orbán funneled state advertising funds to friendly news outlets. In 2016, an ally bought Hungary's largest opposition newspaper – then shut it down. Orbán has also targeted advocacy groups and universities. The Central European University, which was registered in both Budapest and the U.S., was once a symbol of the new democratic Hungary. But a law penalizing foreign-accredited institutions forced it to relocate to Vienna in 2020. Yet Orbán has mostly avoided violence. Journalists are harassed rather than jailed or killed. Critics are discredited for their beliefs but not abducted. His appeal rests on a narrative that Hungary is under siege – by immigrants, liberal elites and foreign influences – and that only he can defend its sovereignty and Christian identity. That message resonates with older, rural, conservative voters, even as it alienates younger, urban populations. In recent decades, variants of spin dictatorship have appeared in Singapore, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Leaders such as Hugo Chávez and the early Vladimir Putin consolidated power and marginalized opposition with minimal violence. Data confirm this trend. Drawing from human rights reports, historical records and local media, my colleague Sergei Guriev and I found that the global incidence of political killings and imprisonments by autocrats dropped significantly from the 1980s to the 2010s. Why? In an interconnected world, overt repression has costs. Attacking journalists and dissidents can prompt foreign governments to impose economic sanctions and discourage international companies from investing. Curbing free expression risks stifling scientific and technological innovation – something even autocrats need in modern, knowledge-based economies. Still, when crises erupt, even spin dictators often revert to more traditional tactics. Russia's Putin has cracked down violently on protesters and jailed opposition leaders. Meanwhile, more brutal regimes such as those in North Korea and China continue to rule by spreading fear, combining mass incarceration with advanced surveillance technologies. But overall, spin is replacing terror. Most experts, myself included, agree that the U.S. remains a democracy. Yet some of Trump's tactics resemble those of informational autocrats. He has attacked the press, defied court rulings and pressured universities to curtail academic independence and limit international admissions. His admiration for strongmen such as Putin, China's Xi Jinping and El Salvador's Nayib Bukele alarms observers. At the same time, Trump routinely denigrates democratic allies and international institutions such as the United Nations and NATO. Some experts say democracy depends on politicians' self restraint. But a system that survives only if leaders choose to respect its limits is not much of a system at all. What matters more is whether the press, judiciary, nonprofit organizations, professional associations, churches, unions, universities and citizens have the power – and the will – to hold leaders accountable. Wealthy democracies such as the U.S., Canada and many Western European countries benefit from robust institutions such as newspapers, universities, courts and advocacy groups that act as checks on government. Such institutions help explain why populists such as Italy's Silvio Berlusconi or Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu, although accused of bending electoral rules and threatening judicial independence, have not dismantled democracy outright in their countries. In the U.S., the Constitution provides another layer of protection. Amending it requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states – a far steeper hurdle than in Hungary, where Orbán needed only a two-thirds parliamentary majority to rewrite the constitution. Of course, even the U.S. Constitution can be undermined if a president defies the Supreme Court. But doing so risks igniting a constitutional crisis and alienating key supporters. That doesn't mean American democracy is safe from erosion. But its institutional foundations are older, deeper and more decentralized than those of many newer democracies. Its federal structure, with overlapping jurisdictions and multiple veto points, makes it harder for any one leader to dominate. Still, the global rise of spin dictatorships should sharpen awareness of what is happening in the U.S. Around the world, autocrats have learned to control their citizens by faking democracy. Understanding their techniques may help Americans to preserve the real thing. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Daniel Treisman, University of California, Los Angeles Read more: US swing toward autocracy doesn't have to be permanent – but swinging back to democracy requires vigilance, stamina and elections I watched Hungary's democracy dissolve into authoritarianism as a member of parliament − and I see troubling parallels in Trumpism and its appeal to workers Trump's promotion of an image of strength after assassination attempt borrows from authoritarian playbook Daniel Treisman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Washington Post
02-06-2025
- General
- Washington Post
Hungary's leader came for my university. Now Trump is coming for Harvard.
Michael Ignatieff, a Canadian historian, was president and rector of Central European University from 2016 to 2021. The Trump administration's attacks on Harvard University and higher education are the most serious assault on academic freedom in American history. Nothing compares to it: not the clampdown on free speech during World War I, not Sen. Joseph McCarthy's harassment of professors in the 1950s. The administration has demanded control over hiring and curriculum, canceled billions in federal research funding, and, most recently, wants to annul the university's ability to accept foreign students.
Boston Globe
24-05-2025
- Politics
- Boston Globe
Trump won't stop attacking Harvard. We need to treat it like an emergency.
They include multiple bogus investigations, including the school and its partners for various reasons, from the school's purported failure to stem antisemitism on campus, to discrimination against white students, to its failure to include enough conservative faculty and orthodoxy to satisfy the administration. Advertisement The university has received juvenile threats from Education Secretary Linda McMahon, including a May 5 On Thursday, deeming Harvard insufficiently cooperative, Advertisement On Friday, a federal judge in Boston give a flying fig about antisemitism. Trump is cozy with white supremacists and straight-up Nazis, and even has a few on the payroll. Fifty of the people who bought Obviously, universities should be doing all they can to combat antisemitism and other bigotry. But Trump and his people are lying when they say their attacks on Harvard are about protecting Jewish students. Their real goals are to break independent academic inquiry, stifle the dissent universities foster, demonstrate their power to bring even the most storied institutions to heel, and remake Harvard into a place that reflects and disseminates their white Christian nationalist ideals. They have been open about this: Advertisement What could be clearer? Florida Governor Ron DeSantis put this playbook into action But the true model for the administration's attacks on Harvard can be found 4,000 miles away, in Hungary, where 'Universities are often a very big target for particularly right-wing populist governments because they tend to rail against the elites and the deep state,' said Kim Lane Scheppele, a professor of sociology and international affairs at Princeton, and an expert on the rise and fall of democracies. 'Their followers are very attracted by the rhetoric that elites are plotting against them, and that often connects to an assault on the universities.' Scheppele ought to know. During the 1990s, she was a professor at Central European University in Budapest, which became a particular target of Orbán's. He started with fiscal attacks, just as Trump has, weaponizing taxes and subsidies against CEU and other universities, which are largely publicly funded in Hungary. He cut faculty salaries, and when teachers continued to work for free, he introduced high tuitions that few students could afford. He gave scholarships to the children of supporters, stacking classes with students who pushed back at pro-democracy professors, who were reported to Orbán's hand-picked higher-ups. Advertisement 'Now, if you want a real university education in Hungary, you have to leave the country,' Scheppele said. 'It was a pretty complete destruction of what had been one of the best systems in Eastern Europe.' She does not think Trump will succeed as well as Orbán when it comes to destroying colleges like Harvard and Princeton, given they have other sources of funding. But he will do — is already doing — massive damage. Even if Harvard ultimately wins in the courts, funding cuts have curtailed research in the meantime, and the administration's attacks on international students have created so much uncertainty that many will choose to study elsewhere to avoid risking deportation. Maybe you figure Harvard doesn't need your help, that your people never went there or never will, that a school as rich and storied as that one will be fine. It won't. And if the extremists who run the country get away with doing this to Harvard, they can destroy any school, kicking crucial pillars out from under our democracy. This is an emergency. Could we please start acting like it? Globe columnist Yvonne Abraham can be reached at
