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Asia Times
26-03-2025
- Science
- Asia Times
China brandishes cutter for snipping deep-sea cables
China has unveiled a compact device for cutting deep-sea cables, introducing a potential new dimension in underwater warfare. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China has unveiled a deep-sea cable-cutting device capable of slicing through the world's most fortified undersea communication and power cables at depths of up to 4,000 meters. Built by the China Ship Scientific Research Centre (CSSRC) in collaboration with the State Key Laboratory of Deep-Sea Manned Vehicles, the device is designed for use with China's sophisticated submersibles, including the Fendouzhe and Haidou series. While officially presented as a tool for civilian salvage and seabed mining, the device clearly has dual-use potential. The tool utilizes a diamond-coated grinding wheel spinning at 1,600 revolutions per minute, mounted on a submersible-compatible platform with a 1-kilowatt motor, to cut through steel-armored cables that carry approximately 95% of the world's data. Its titanium shell and pressure-resistant seals allow operation in extreme depths, with robotic arms enabling use in low-visibility conditions. The disclosure, published this February in the journal Mechanical Engineer, marks the first time a nation has officially revealed such a capability. Analysts warn that the tool could covertly target strategic chokepoints, such as Guam, a linchpin in US Indo-Pacific defense. The announcement comes amid China's deep-sea fleet expansion and its growing technological edge over aging US and Japanese counterparts, heightening global concerns about undersea security. Underscoring the threat to undersea cable infrastructure, Raghvendra Kumar mentions in a 2023 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that sabotaging such infrastructure could be viewed as a prelude to kinetic warfare. Aside from cables, Kumar points out that landing stations are also vulnerable targets for sabotage. Kumar also notes that undersea cables and landing stations are high-value targets for espionage, with such operations often conducted covertly to intercept the data flowing through the infrastructure. In line with that, Sam Dumesh mentions in an American Security Project (ASP) article this month that a breach of cable landing stations could allow China to reroute internet traffic, including US-based services. Dumesh points out that access may already be assured if such data is rerouted to Chinese-owned infrastructure. While he says encryption can help secure compromised data, such data can be harvested, stored and decrypted later using quantum computing technology. Despite the threat of US data routed through China-controlled undersea cable infrastructure, Anna Gross and other writers mention in a June 2023 Financial Times (FT) report that the US has, with relative success, blocked China out of most undersea cable projects. However, Gross and others point out that China has responded by implementing undersea cable projects in friendly countries, raising concerns about who owns and manages the global Internet infrastructure. Given those threats, China's unveiling of its deep-sea cable cutter device possibly amplifies the vulnerability of undersea cables surrounding Taiwan and Guam. In a July 2024 report for the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, Charles Mok and Kenny Huang note that Taiwan's digital lifeline relies on 15 undersea cables that carry over 100 terabits per second of bandwidth; however, this vital infrastructure is acutely vulnerable to both natural and man-made disruptions. Mok and Huang note that Taiwan is surrounded by seismically active seas and dependent on foreign repair ships, of which only 22 globally are dedicated to maintenance. As a result, they mention Taiwan faces logistical delays in restoring connectivity after damage. They point out that incidents such as the repeated severing of cables to Matsu Island, allegedly by Chinese vessels, highlight risks of strategic sabotage. Compounding the threat, they note that the global cable repair industry is overstretched, while Taiwan lacks domestic repair capabilities, making its network resilience precarious amid rising geopolitical tensions. As with Taiwan, Teleguam Holdings points out that Guam is dubbed 'The Big Switch in the Pacific,' as its position in the Pacific connects the Indo-Pacific with the US west coast. Teleguam Holdings emphasizes that the island's strategic location between the US and Asia offers a direct route for data transmission, which decreases latency and enhances bandwidth. Teleguam Holdings reports that Guam hosts 12 undersea cables, providing robust connectivity and redundancy, establishing the island as a digital link. Highlighting the potential military consequences of major cable breakages in Taiwan, Yau-Chin Tsai notes in an August 2023 article for the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) that submarine cables remain the primary connection between Taiwan and its frontline islands, such as Dongyin and Matsu. Tsai mentions that severing the connecting cables could paralyze the islands' defenses, making Taiwan unable to use its military capabilities fully. However, Elizabeth Braw points out in a January 2025 Foreign Policy article that during an undersea cable break between Matsu and Taiwan that month, line-of-sight microwave transmission and satellite internet ensured that most of the former's 12,000 residents remained unaffected. Similarly, Andrew Niedbala and Ryan Berry mention in an August 2023 Proceedings article that a coordinated severing of undersea cables connecting Guam, Asia, Hawaii and the US could result in an information blackout, significantly impairing US military command and control capabilities. However, China's announcement of its deep-sea cable-cutting device may be more propaganda than actual capability. In a Lowy Institute article this month, Cynthia Mehoob points out that China's claims may not align with technical realities. Mehoob mentions that undersea cables are neither armored nor notably fortified at extreme depths, such as 4,000 meters. She notes that undersea cables are typically 17 to 21 millimeters thick at extreme depths and armored cables may be employed where the seabed terrain is exceptionally rugged; however, using such cables generates additional challenges. She points out that armored cables are difficult to bend, and bringing them up to the surface for repairs is costly. Additionally, Mehoob notes that armoring cables is a standard practice only in shallow waters at 1,500 meters, where there is a real risk of damage from anchors and fishing activities. She notes that at extreme depths, armored cables could snap under their weight, rendering such protective measures counterproductive. Mehoob says China's announcement is part of a carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign – first published in a peer-reviewed journal, then disseminated through a major media outlet such as SCMP, and subsequently amplified through sensationalist global media coverage. The goal, she says, is to assert deterrence capabilities, project power and extend its maritime reach without actual conflict. Whether a real threat or clever theater, China's cable cutter signals a new era in which information warfare may begin not in cyberspace but 4,000 meters under the sea.
Yahoo
24-03-2025
- Science
- Yahoo
Revealed: China's new weapon that can cut any undersea cable
Chinese researchers have developed a compact, deep-sea device capable of severing even the most fortified underwater cables. The development raises concerns that Beijing could target critical communication and power lines, especially in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The tool can slice armoured cables at depths of up to 4,000 metres (13,123 feet), which is twice the maximum operational range of existing subsea communication infrastructure, according to an academic paper seen by the South China Morning Post. While the cutting tool was developed for civilian salvage and seabed mining, it will raise alarm bells amid fears China and Russia are becoming increasingly brazen in deploying 'grey zone tactics' to assert their influence and isolate adversaries. The new technology contains a six-inch diamond-coated grinding wheel, which can spin at 1,600rpm – giving Beijing the ability to slice through deep-sea cables layered with steel, rubber and polymer sheaths. These underpin roughly 95 per cent of global data transmission and have emerged as a key vulnerability for governments in an era of geopolitical instability. The tool – developed by the China Ship Scientific Research Centre and the State Key Laboratory of Deep-sea Manned Vehicles – has been designed to be integrated into the crewed and uncrewed submersibles China already has. The technology is also armed with a titanium alloy shell, while oil-compensated seals prevent the tool from imploding because of the intense water pressure found 4,000 metres underwater. Robotic arms have been designed to operate with advanced positioning technology to ensure accuracy despite limited visibility in the depths. The paper summarising the technology was published in a Chinese-language journal called Mechanical Engineer in February, according to the South China Morning Post, and it is the first time that any country has officially confirmed access to an asset of this type. The authors of the report insisted that the tool is a resource to assist maritime development. 'Nations are now compelled to redirect their resource exploitation focus towards the seas,' they wrote. 'The 21st century is the century of the oceans. Enhancing marine resource development capabilities, advancing the blue economy and building China into a maritime powerhouse constitute critical components of realising the Chinese dream.' But its existence will raise alarm bells internationally. Beijing already has the world's largest fleet of crewed and uncrewed submersibles and last month began construction of a 2,000-metre-deep 'space station' at the bottom of the South China Sea. But there have also been mounting accusations that China, alongside Russia, is targeting the underwater cables that power global energy flows and communications. Raymond Powell, a retired US Air Force colonel and founder of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University, told The Diplomat last month that 'we are witnessing a much more brazen Beijing'. 'China continues to expand its already vast grey zone toolkit, having long ago calculated that its willingness to blur the lines between peace and hostilities provides it with an asymmetric advantage,' he said. 'Cable and pipeline sabotage is more than mere harassment. It is a reminder that Beijing has the ability to cause far more damage to its enemies, should it choose to do so.' He also pointed to a new strategy, where Beijing deploys third-country flagged cargo vessels to sabotage undersea cables, allowing it a degree of deniability. For instance this year, Taiwan has already reported five cases of cable malfunctions – compared to just three each in 2023 and 2024. In February, the island's government seized a Togo-flagged cargo ship crewed by Chinese workers, called Hong Tai 58, amid suspicions that it deliberately severed an undersea telecom cable. China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory, has piled military pressure on the self-governing island in recent years, deploying warships and fighter jets to simulate a future blockade and an invasion. Analysts say China would deploy grey zone tactics, working to isolate Taiwan, before launching any military invasion of the island. China is not alone in this tactic: there have been 11 incidents of underwater cable damage in the Baltic Sea since 2023. 'What we appear to be seeing is a growing Russia-China grey zone collaboration, perhaps moving in the direction of a full-fledged 'axis',' said Col Powell. He said this helps the two superpowers maintain a 'layer of deniability'. But other regions and countries may also be at risk. The new super-deep cable cutter could target strategic points near Guam, for instance, a cornerstone of the US military's Indo-Pacific strategy which hosts more than a dozen civilian and defence fibre-optic cables. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.


Telegraph
24-03-2025
- Science
- Telegraph
Revealed: China's new weapon that can cut any undersea cable
Chinese researchers have developed a compact, deep-sea device capable of severing even the most fortified underwater cables. The development raises concerns that Beijing could target critical communication and power lines, especially in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The tool can slice armoured cables at depths of up to 4,000 metres (13,123 feet), which is twice the maximum operational range of existing subsea communication infrastructure, according to an academic paper seen by the South China Morning Post. While the cutting tool was developed for civilian salvage and seabed mining, it will raise alarm bells amid fears China and Russia are becoming increasingly brazen in deploying 'grey zone tactics' to assert their influence and isolate adversaries. The new technology contains a six-inch diamond-coated grinding wheel, which can spin at 1,600rpm – giving Beijing the ability to slice through deep-sea cables layered with steel, rubber and polymer sheaths. These underpin roughly 95 per cent of global data transmission and have emerged as a key vulnerability for governments in an era of geopolitical instability. The tool – developed by the China Ship Scientific Research Centre and the State Key Laboratory of Deep-sea Manned Vehicles – has been designed to be integrated into the crewed and uncrewed submersibles China already has. The technology is also armed with a titanium alloy shell, while oil-compensated seals prevent the tool from imploding because of the intense water pressure found 4,000 metres underwater. Robotic arms have been designed to operate with advanced positioning technology to ensure accuracy despite limited visibility in the depths. Beijing 'much more brazen' The paper summarising the technology was published in a Chinese-language journal called Mechanical Engineer in February, according to the South China Morning Post, and it is the first time that any country has officially confirmed access to an asset of this type. The authors of the report insisted that the tool is a resource to assist maritime development. 'Nations are now compelled to redirect their resource exploitation focus towards the seas,' they wrote. 'The 21st century is the century of the oceans. Enhancing marine resource development capabilities, advancing the blue economy and building China into a maritime powerhouse constitute critical components of realising the Chinese dream.' But its existence will raise alarm bells internationally. Beijing already has the world's largest fleet of crewed and uncrewed submersibles and last month began construction of a 2,000-metre-deep 'space station' at the bottom of the South China Sea. But there have also been mounting accusations that China, alongside Russia, is targeting the underwater cables that power global energy flows and communications. Raymond Powell, a retired US Air Force colonel and founder of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University, told The Diplomat last month that 'we are witnessing a much more brazen Beijing'. 'China continues to expand its already vast grey zone toolkit, having long ago calculated that its willingness to blur the lines between peace and hostilities provides it with an asymmetric advantage,' he said. 'Cable and pipeline sabotage is more than mere harassment. It is a reminder that Beijing has the ability to cause far more damage to its enemies, should it choose to do so.' He also pointed to a new strategy, where Beijing deploys third-country flagged cargo vessels to sabotage undersea cables, allowing it a degree of deniability. For instance this year, Taiwan has already reported five cases of cable malfunctions – compared to just three each in 2023 and 2024. In February, the island's government seized a Togo-flagged cargo ship crewed by Chinese workers, called Hong Tai 58, amid suspicions that it deliberately severed an undersea telecom cable. China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory, has piled military pressure on the self-governing island in recent years, deploying warships and fighter jets to simulate a future blockade and an invasion. Analysts say China would deploy grey zone tactics, working to isolate Taiwan, before launching any military invasion of the island. China is not alone in this tactic: there have been 11 incidents of underwater cable damage in the Baltic Sea since 2023. 'What we appear to be seeing is a growing Russia-China grey zone collaboration, perhaps moving in the direction of a full-fledged 'axis',' said Col Powell. He said this helps the two superpowers maintain a 'layer of deniability'. But other regions and countries may also be at risk. The new super-deep cable cutter could target strategic points near Guam, for instance, a cornerstone of the US military's Indo-Pacific strategy which hosts more than a dozen civilian and defence fibre-optic cables.


South China Morning Post
22-03-2025
- Science
- South China Morning Post
China unveils a powerful deep-sea cable cutter that could reset the world order
A compact, deep-sea, cable-cutting device, capable of severing the world's most fortified underwater communication or power lines, has been unveiled by China – and it could shake up global maritime power dynamics. Advertisement The revelation marks the first time any country has officially disclosed that it has such an asset, capable of disrupting critical undersea networks. The tool, which is able to cut lines at depths of up to 4,000 metres (13,123 feet) – twice the maximum operational range of existing subsea communication infrastructure – has been designed specifically for integration with China's advanced crewed and uncrewed submersibles like the Fendouzhe, or Striver, and the Haidou series. Developed by the China Ship Scientific Research Centre (CSSRC) and its affiliated State Key Laboratory of Deep-sea Manned Vehicles, the device targets armoured cables – layered with steel, rubber and polymer sheaths – that underpin 95 per cent of global data transmission. While it was created as a tool for civilian salvage and seabed mining, the dual-use potential of the tool could send alarm bells ringing for other nations. Advertisement