Latest news with #CompartmentedInformation
Time Business News
13-05-2025
- Business
- Time Business News
Everything You Need to Know About SCIF Rental
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) are secure environments designed for the handling, storage, and transmission of classified national security information. As the need for secure spaces to process sensitive data continues to grow, many businesses and government agencies are looking for SCIFs for rent. The option for SCIF rental allows organizations to access secure facilities without the large upfront investment required to build and maintain a SCIF themselves. In this article, we will explore the benefits of SCIF rental, the process for finding the right SCIF for your needs, and the essential considerations when entering into a SCIF rental agreement. A SCIF rental refers to leasing a pre-existing Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) for use in handling classified national security information. SCIFs are purpose-built spaces designed to meet stringent physical and technical security requirements. These facilities are often required for government contractors, intelligence agencies, and organizations working with sensitive military, defense, or government data. A SCIF for rent typically comes fully equipped with the necessary security features, such as soundproofing, access control systems, video surveillance, and alarm systems. Leasing SCIF space provides businesses and contractors with a secure environment for managing sensitive data without having to worry about building, maintaining, or securing a facility themselves. Leasing a SCIF space offers several advantages over constructing and managing your own secure facility. Some of the primary benefits of SCIF rental include: Building a SCIF is a costly endeavor. The expenses involved in designing and constructing a SCIF that meets federal security standards can be prohibitive. The process requires specialized construction materials, soundproofing, advanced security systems, and ongoing maintenance. For most businesses and contractors, the costs involved in constructing a SCIF far outweigh the need. By opting for SCIF rental, companies can avoid these high initial costs and instead pay a monthly fee to access a fully-equipped, secure space. This arrangement also eliminates the need for long-term investments in facility management, security updates, and infrastructure. SCIF rentals are typically ready for immediate use, which can be a major advantage when your organization needs secure space quickly. Whether you're a contractor needing a facility for a government contract or a business working with sensitive data, a SCIF rental allows you to begin your operations without the time-consuming process of designing, building, and certifying a SCIF. Many SCIF rental facilities are designed to comply with all government regulations and security standards, so they can be utilized right away. This is especially beneficial for organizations that need to meet tight deadlines or that are dealing with time-sensitive projects. Leasing a SCIF offers flexibility and scalability that building a SCIF cannot provide. If your business is working on a short-term government contract or you need secure space for a specific project, a SCIF rental gives you the ability to rent a facility for as long as you need without being tied to a long-term commitment. Additionally, SCIF rental offers scalability. If your business expands and requires more secure space, you can easily move to a larger facility or take on additional rented SCIFs. Conversely, if your needs decrease, you can downsize without the burdens of maintaining a facility. One of the main reasons SCIFs are required is their ability to meet strict security standards. SCIFs must comply with regulations such as the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) and Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705. These regulations ensure that SCIFs provide the highest levels of protection for classified information. When you choose a SCIF rental, you can be confident that the space already meets these requirements. The landlord or facility manager will typically handle all the necessary certifications and security upgrades, allowing you to focus on your business operations instead of security compliance. Renting a SCIF space often includes maintenance and support services, which are typically handled by the property owner or facility manager. This includes routine security updates, system checks, and facility inspections. As the renter, you are not responsible for managing these aspects, reducing your operational burden. In addition, SCIF rental agreements often include 24/7 security and surveillance services, ensuring that the facility is monitored at all times. Having these services in place means you can trust that your SCIF is always secure and up to date with necessary protections. Leasing a SCIF is not a one-size-fits-all solution. There are several factors to take into account when deciding whether SCIF rental is the right choice for your organization. Here are some key considerations to keep in mind: The location of your SCIF rental is one of the most important factors to consider. The facility should be easily accessible to your team and contractors, but also in a secure location that reduces the likelihood of security breaches. Proximity to your organization's headquarters or government offices may be a factor, especially if frequent collaboration or communication with external parties is required. Additionally, the building should be in an area with strong physical security. This can include being located within a government-secured area or having nearby security services. It's also crucial to ensure the facility has reliable transportation options for your staff to access it without compromising security. Before entering into a SCIF rental agreement, you should verify that the facility complies with federal security standards. SCIFs must meet specific physical, technical, and operational requirements, including soundproofing, reinforced walls, limited access, and continuous surveillance. Make sure that the SCIF space includes: Access control systems such as biometric authentication or keycard entry such as biometric authentication or keycard entry Intrusion detection systems to alert security to unauthorized access to alert security to unauthorized access Video surveillance for monitoring the facility for monitoring the facility Environmental controls to prevent the detection of electronic emissions to prevent the detection of electronic emissions Secure communications systems to ensure all data remains protected In addition, ensure that the SCIF has been certified by the appropriate government agencies and that it is regularly inspected to maintain compliance with current security standards. Rental agreements for SCIFs can vary significantly depending on the property owner and the length of your project. It is essential to understand the terms of the lease before committing. The SCIF rental agreement should clearly outline the duration of the lease, the cost, the responsibilities of both parties, and any penalties for early termination. Make sure the lease allows for flexibility in case your needs change over time. If your company's security requirements evolve or you find that you need additional secure space, the lease should provide options for expansion. Conversely, if your project ends earlier than expected, ensure that there is an option for an early exit without severe penalties. Leasing SCIF space typically comes with higher costs than regular office space due to the specialized security features. When considering a SCIF rental in Chantilly, Virginia, it's crucial to understand the full cost structure, including base rent, maintenance fees, utilities, and any additional security or compliance charges. Be sure to ask about any hidden fees, such as charges for facility upgrades, security system updates, or special requests for additional security measures. Make sure that the total cost of leasing the SCIF fits within your project budget. Some SCIF rental properties offer additional services that can make your operations smoother. These services may include: 24/7 security and monitoring for enhanced protection for enhanced protection Technical support for managing classified data and secure communications systems for managing classified data and secure communications systems Facility management for maintenance and upkeep of the physical space for maintenance and upkeep of the physical space IT infrastructure such as secure networks or servers to handle classified information It's worth considering the value of these services when negotiating the lease, as they can significantly reduce the burden on your team. Finding SCIF rental spaces typically requires working with specialized property management companies that handle secure government and defense-related leases. These companies have experience in managing properties that meet the stringent requirements for SCIF certification. You can also reach out to defense contractors, government agencies, or security firms that may have SCIF space available for rent. Be sure to consider the following when looking for SCIF rental options: Reputation of the Facility: Choose a facility that has a proven track record of compliance and reliability in the security sector. Choose a facility that has a proven track record of compliance and reliability in the security sector. Facility Inspections and Audits: Make sure the SCIF has been inspected and certified by relevant government agencies. Make sure the SCIF has been inspected and certified by relevant government agencies. Scalability and Location: Ensure that the space is large enough for your current needs, with room to expand if necessary, and that it is in a convenient and secure location. Choosing SCIF rental is an ideal option for businesses, contractors, and government agencies that need access to secure facilities for classified operations without the expense and complexity of constructing their own SCIF. By leasing a SCIF, organizations can gain immediate access to a secure, compliant space, with the flexibility to adjust their lease terms as their needs change. When considering SCIF rental, be sure to evaluate key factors such as location, security features, lease terms, and associated costs. With the right SCIF rental, you can ensure the highest levels of security for your sensitive data while maintaining the flexibility and scalability needed for your business or project. TIME BUSINESS NEWS
Engadget
05-05-2025
- Politics
- Engadget
TeleMessage, a Signal clone the Trump administration uses, has been hacked
A hacker has exploited a vulnerability in TeleMessage to breach the service and steal data, according to reporting by 404 Media . TeleMessage is an Israeli company that provides modded versions of encrypted messaging apps like Signal and Telegram. It was revealed last week that former US National Security Adviser Mike Waltz used TeleMessage's modified version of Signal to archive messages. Today's report indicated the presence of other high-ranking government officials in archived chats on the app, including Marco Rubio, Tulsi Gabbard and Vice President JD Vance. The unnamed hacker was able to access archived chats, but it doesn't look like they got into any of Waltz's conversations. The hack does, however, prove that the app's message archiving service is not end-to-end encrypted. The hacker also accessed contact information of government officials, login credentials for TeleMessage and data pertaining to the US Customs and Border Protection agency. Some businesses who use the service, like Coinbase and Scotiabank, were also hacked. 404 Medi a spoke to the anonymous hacker, who said the whole thing only "took about 15-20 minutes" and that it "wasn't much effort at all." TeleMessage's parent company Smarsh has yet to comment on the matter. To view this content, you'll need to update your privacy settings. Please click here and view the "Content and social-media partners" setting to do so. All of this happened after Waltz accidentally revealed he used TeleMessage during a cabinet meeting last week. This led people to question what kind of information was being shared on the app and how it was being secured. Now we know it wasn't secured all that well. Of course, it's only been a few weeks since Signalgate, in which it was revealed that top US officials were using the messaging app Signal to discuss active combat operations. Prior to the Trump administration, government officials typically avoided consumer-grade messaging apps to hash out military plans. Instead, they used Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and in-house encrypted communication channels.
Yahoo
29-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
What is a SCIF? Inside the high-security rooms that keep military secrets safe — unlike a Signal chat
Trump officials mistakenly included a journalist in a Signal chat about strikes on Houthi rebels. High-security rooms called SCIFs are used for classified discussions to prevent information leaks. The breach highlights the risks of using encrypted apps for sensitive national security talks. As digital surveillance, hacking, and cyber espionage become more sophisticated, protecting the security of government communications is more important than ever. US officials typically have classified discussions within the walls of highly secure facilities to safeguard top-secret information from foreign adversaries. The same level of security, however, can't be provided by even encrypted messaging apps like Signal, which the Pentagon warns is vulnerable to hacking. Earlier this week, The Atlantic's editor in chief Jeffrey Goldberg was inadvertently added to a Signal group chat with Trump administration officials, including Vice President JD Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, discussing plans for a military strike on Houthi rebels in Yemen. Trump officials deny that classified information was shared, but there are arguments to the contrary. They didn't include things like names and locations, but they did discuss time on station, weather conditions, target details, and strike packages for the mission. The extraordinary operational security failure underscored a deeply troubling, dangerous reality in modern national security — some highly sensitive military conversations may not be happening inside a SCIF as they probably should. What is a SCIF? The US government invests billions in building Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, or SCIFs (pronounced "skiff")— highly secure rooms designed to safeguard sensitive discussions and operations from hacking and foreign surveillance. US military and intelligence officials use these SCIFs to have classified conversations about military strategy, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic negotiations. These facilities can be used to discuss any level of classified material, but they are specifically for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI). What does a SCIF look like? SCIFs can vary in size from a small room to an entire building, and the average cost per square foot for one of these rooms ranges between $350 and $1,000. Federal agencies like the CIA and NSA, as well as some US embassies and government offices, have SCIFs within their buildings. The US Capitol has a SCIF where congressional committees can host closed meetings or hearings. The SCIF in the White House — commonly referred to as the Situation Room — is one of the most well-known examples of a secure room. It's where the president and senior staff are often photographed monitoring significant international crises or coordinating US military operations overseas. How are SCIFs used remotely? SCIFs are also constructed at some US military bases, either in permanent installations or within temporary facilities like shipping containers or tents. Hotel rooms and temporary accommodations for the president and other high-ranking government officials can often become SCIFs so they can participate in classified conversations at a moment's notice. In 2017, President Donald Trump and his security team set up a makeshift situation room at his Mar-a-Lago resort to monitor the US strikes on Syria. Some Cabinet-level members even have rooms in their homes converted into SCIFs equipped with essential government-approved teleconference equipment. What security measures are in place inside a SCIF? US intelligence agencies have strict requirements for maintaining the airtight security expected from SCIFs, including restricting the construction of the secure rooms to American companies. Some SCIFs only allow personnel with proper security clearances to enter, restricting unauthorized access with security measures such as armed guards, biometric access, and 24/7 surveillance. Documents and other information remain confined inside the secure walls of the facility. Inside a SCIF, phones, laptops, smartwatches, and other communication devices are prohibited. People new to a SCIF often mistakenly bring their personal devices in and have to be instructed to step back out and put them in a locker or other storage option. The reinforced walls of a SCIF are typically soundproofed to prevent outside physical eavesdropping and covered in signal-shielding materials designed to control and block electronic eavesdropping. Why are military officials required to use SCIFs? Military officials are required to use government-approved compartmentalized environments like SCIFs for the highly sensitive information they handle. SCIFs enforce strict "need-to-know" protocols, reducing the risk of unauthorized access, unlike chat apps where users can accidentally be added or hackers can force their way inside. While Signal features the same kind of end-to-end encryption used by the US government, it can still be compromised. The app's popularity among troops and government officials makes it a prime target for hacking groups, prompting the Pentagon to issue an advisory on the vulnerabilities of the digital platform just days before The Atlantic published its initial bombshell report. "It was a chilling thing to realize that I've inadvertently discovered a massive security breach in the national security system of the United States," Goldberg told NPR in the aftermath. President Donald Trump downplayed the serious national security breach as a "glitch" and said that no classified information was discussed in the chat, which was called "Houthi PC small group," PC standing for "principals committee." Hegseth doubled down on that particular point, arguing that "nobody was texting war plans" in the Signal chat. Michael Waltz, Trump's national security advisor who added Goldberg to the group, took "full responsibility" for the "embarrassing" security breach. "There's a difference between inadvertent release versus careless and sloppy, malicious leaks of classified information," Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified during a congressional hearing. In response to these characterizations of the chat, The Atlantic later released the messages almost completely unredacted to allow people "to reach their own conclusions" about the significance of the content. The group chat included details like types of weapons to be used and expected times of impact, as well as strategic discussions over the duration of the operation. "There is a clear public interest in disclosing the sort of information that Trump advisors included in nonsecure communications channels," The Atlantic wrote in the follow-up report, "especially because senior administration figures are attempting to downplay the significance of the messages that were shared." Read the original article on Business Insider
Miami Herald
25-03-2025
- Politics
- Miami Herald
‘Tip of the iceberg': Can Trump's National Security adviser survive Signal scandal?
National Security Advisor Mike Waltz expressed bewilderment Tuesday about how a prominent journalist was added to a text thread of high-level Trump administration officials a day after a report implicated himself as the offender. Jeffrey Goldberg, editor in chief of The Atlantic, wrote that Waltz had connected with him earlier this month on Signal, a commercial messaging app, before being added to a group of national security officials who were convening electronically to discuss imminent strikes on the Houthis, a Yemen-based military movement. While Goldberg said he had met Waltz in the past, the Trump adviser from Florida denied knowing Goldberg in comments delivered Tuesday at a White House meeting. Waltz said he 'never met, don't know,' and 'never communicated with' the journalist, who broke the explosive story of Trump officials communicating about military plans on a non-secure app. 'We are looking into and reviewing how the heck he got into this room,' Waltz said. President Donald Trump expressed confidence in Waltz, calling him a good man who 'learned a lesson,' and attacked Goldberg as a 'sleazebag' who 'has made up a lot of stories.' 'The only glitch in two months, and it turned out not to be a serious one,' Trump told NBC News. But a spokesman for the National Security Council already validated the authenticity of the text chain Goldberg published, which included 18 individuals, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Vice President JD Vance and an unnamed active U.S. intelligence officer. The messages included intelligence operations, a policy debate around the timing of the strikes against the Houthis and operational details, including information on targets, weapons and the sequencing of attacks. Now, Waltz, who represented northeast Florida in Congress, is at the center of mounting questions about a seismic intelligence failure that placed secret pending military operations at risk and might have exposed highly sensitive information to foreign intelligence adversaries. 'If the world's hostile intelligence services, and even some friendly ones, were to go after one single Signal chain, this would be it,' said Ned Price, a former State Department spokesman and National Security Council staffer. The White House maintains that no war plans were discussed and no classified material was placed in the thread, but Goldberg withheld publishing some of the details he was exposed to because he believed some of the information conveyed could be 'used to harm American military and intelligence personnel, particularly in the broader Middle East.' John Bolton, national security advisor adviser in Trump's first term, said his brain fails when he tries to think about why top officials would communicate this way. Bolton said during his tenure he was never more than a few feet away from a secure government phone or a SCIF, referring to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility where government officials review classified information. Nonetheless, he predicted Trump would not move to fire anyone unless he noticed political damage to himself. 'I don't think Trump will take any more definitive action against anybody unless it looks like he's going to start taking heat for it. If his political fortunes begin to come into question, then I think he will look to find somebody to blame for it,' Bolton told The Miami Herald. At the moment, only Democrats have called for Waltz's resignation, along with Hegseth's. 'When the stakes are this high, incompetence is not an option. Pete Hegseth should resign. Mike Waltz should resign,' posted Sen. Mark Warner, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee. Sen. Jon Ossoff of Georgia lambasted CIA Director John Ratcliffe during a hearing Tuesday for downplaying the gravity of the leaked Signal chat. 'This is an embarassment. This is utterly unprofessional. There's been no apology, there has been no recogition of the gravity of this error,' Ossoff said. South Florida GOP Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar defended Waltz as a patriot, posting: 'Let the first person who has never made a mistake cast the first stone.' Price agreed with Bolton, expressing skepticism that Waltz would lose his job over the blunder, even if the White House determines the national security adviser was responsible for exposing the chat to an unfriendly journalist. What may ultimately determine Waltz's fate is how prevalent he used Signal to conduct national security policy. 'How many other Signal chains are out there? Is there a China XYZ Signal chat? Is there a Russia ABC Signal chat? Is this the tip of the iceberg? That's the worst case scenario, that they've routinely been using a commercial application to discuss our nation's most guarded secrets,' said Price. 'If this is sort of a first drip of a leaky faucet, maybe Trump throws someone overboard,' he added. ''There's no way to clean up the damage. There is a way to clean up the fallout. Do I think they will actually do that? No, I don't. Far from it.'
The Hill
25-03-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
The ‘Houthi PC small group' chat and the tragedy that was barely averted
Jeffrey Goldberg's lengthy account in The Atlantic of his inclusion into a highly sensitive war planning discussion at the most senior levels of government has quickly made the rounds of both national and international media. Reactions have ranged from total incredulity to hilarity and ridicule. No one can understand, much less justify, how National Security Advisor Mike Waltz could have enabled a journalist, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, to be privy to highly classified conversations that Waltz and his Cabinet-level colleagues held in what was called 'the Houthi PC small group.' It was this group that debated and ultimately recommended that the president approve a carrier-based aerial strike against the Yemeni Houthis. Even more shocking was that these conversations took place over Signal, an encrypted messaging service that nevertheless is vulnerable to penetration by any sophisticated foreign intelligence service. Equally puzzling is why none of the 17 other members of the group — which included Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, Middle East negotiator Steve Witkoff, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and CIA Director John Ratcliffe — alerted their counterparts that Signal was insufficiently secure. Some of those involved had experience during the first Trump administration and knew, or should have known, that such conversations, if conducted face-to-face, would normally take place in a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). They should also have recalled that if participants in classified discussions could not gather in one place, as was the case with the preplanning for the operation against the Houthis, those involved would all be located in various secure offices and linked via Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC), pronounced 'civits,' or on secure government devices. Goldberg initially, and not surprisingly, thought that the 'Houthi PC small group' wasn't real and simply an elaborate and sophisticated hoax. When the plans to which he had inadvertently been made privy actually took place, he dropped out of the conversation. As he writes, 'no one seemed to notice that I was there. And I received no subsequent questions about why I left — or, more to the point, who I was' since he was only identified by his initials 'JG.' Goldberg reported the conversations in considerable detail. In particular, he documented Vance's opposition to the operation. That Vance was unable to sway his colleagues and went with the consensus, and that the president sided with their recommendation rather than his, may indicate the limits of the vice president's influence. Although he was privy to all the discussions leading up to the first attack on the Houthis on March 15, Goldberg carefully avoided revealing elements of the conversations that, as he put it, 'if they had been read by an adversary of the United States, could conceivably have been used to harm American military and intelligence personnel.' All told, however, he concludes that 'I have never seen as breach quite like this' and he argues that Waltz and others may have violated the Espionage Act, federal records laws and other provisions relating to the dissemination of classified information. Goldberg does not address the question of why those members of the 'Houthi PC small group,' or their deputies who had prior executive branch experience, did not raise a red flag as soon as Signal began to be used. Nor does he query why Hegseth's various military and civilian assistants, and those who supported the other members of the group, did not inform their respective bosses that it is improper, if not illegal, to use Signal for anything other than unclassified routine information. There can be no denying that responsibility for the security breach must rest with the principals who actually used Signal on their cell phones to discuss highly classified matters. Nevertheless, if a military or civilian assistant fails to keep the boss out of trouble, he or she is not doing his or her job. There is more than enough blame to go around in what can only be termed a fiasco. It was saved only by the fact that Goldberg acted responsibly even before he realized that he had been included in a conversation to which he did not belong. Someone else might not have been as careful. If the attack plans on the Houthis had fallen into the wrong hands, the result of the leaked discussions could well have been the tragic and unnecessary loss of American military lives. Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.
