10-05-2025
Conflict with India cannot paper over the deep divisions in the Pakistani army
The Pakistani military has never been a united, disciplined, or monolithic institution. Its ranks seethe with ruthless ambition, extra-constitutional aspirations, and divisions. The first fissures surfaced as long ago as 1951, with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, a coup planned by the then Pakistani Chief of Staff, Major General Akbar Khan. The handling of the Kashmir issue by the Liaquat Ali Khan dispensation had triggered the attempt to usurp power. Seven years later, in 1958, the Pakistani military under General Ayub Khan would seize power from the Iskandar Ali Mirza presidency. Since then, the military has been omnipresent in power, either formally (1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2008) or informally, wielding the real power from the garrison township of Rawalpindi.
But whether it has been in power or not, there have always been deep social tensions within the Pakistani barracks. General Yahya Khan was the last Shia chief of the army. There is discrimination against the Ahmadiyyas (Major General Iftikhar Khan Janjua, the senior-most officer to be killed in action, is diminished in official history owing to his Ahmadiyya faith). There has been Punjabi-Pathan domination in the military. There are also ideological and political fissures: Imran Khan loyalist and former DG-ISI Faiz Hameed was sacked by the decidedly anti-Imran Khan General Qamar Javed Bajwa.
These divisions have led to frequent institutional purges and 'cleanups', ensuring that those who are not ideologically aligned with the powers of the day are booted out.
Amidst these fractures, India serves as the binding factor, offering the rationale for the existence of the disparate institutions of the Pakistani military. Casting India as the 'enemy' is critical to its legitimacy in the national narrative. The lingering humiliation of 1971, under the watch of the inept, power-drunk and undisciplined Pakistani military, has led to internalised hate against India. General Pervez Musharraf noted the unforgivable hurt in his memoir, In the Line of Fire: 'It remains the saddest and most painful day of my life. My anger at the generals who had taken charge of the government and at some of the politicians of the time still makes me see red.' He added, 'What happened in East Pakistan is the saddest episode in Pakistan's history.' Musharraf's views point to the unhealed wounds within the military ranks and a sense of vengeance. Musharraf was, sadly, to continue the legacy of machinations and overambition as he planned the Kargil incursion in 1999 and met with the same fate as those who preceded him.
The proverbial 'state within a state' (as the Pakistani military, with its outsized role, is described) is prone to internal disagreements on the handling of sensitive issues like relationships with the US and India, dealing with the Taliban, preferences regarding the political party in power, and even about succession plans that are based on fundamentally non-professional criteria. The passing of the baton from General Bajwa to the current chief, General Asim Munir, was not a foregone conclusion. His selection had more to do with the prevailing circumstances, including his personal beef with General Bajwa's nemesis, Imran Khan.
In terms of their personalities and backgrounds, the two chiefs are very different. While Bajwa is relatively westernised and moderate, Munir is an austere, non-westernised and madrasa-educated hafiz (trained to recite the Quran from memory). The latter's recent unwarranted comments on the Two Nation Theory and his assertion that Kashmir is Pakistan's 'jugular vein', along with his reiteration of Pakistan's regressive stance on religion, show that he follows the General Zia-ul-Haq school of military leadership.
The current escalation bears the unmistakable imprint of Munir. Yet, the action may not have the full support of the Pakistani military top brass. While hatred of India may be universal in the Pakistani barracks, not everyone is likely to be aligned with the present approach. In some ways, the shaky nature of power also forces the ruler (in this case, General Munir) to act in a more 'muscular' way in order to endear himself to a larger constituency, even as by doing so he runs the risk of biting off more than he can realistically chew.
Has the recent escalation boxed General Munir into a position of limited choices? Most likely, yes. There is enough to blame on the military, given the disastrous handling of its protégé, the Taliban, in Afghanistan; the loss of lives in terror attacks in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; profligacy in times of economic stress; and the misadventure in Pulwama. Like Yahya in 1971 and Musharraf in 1999, General Asim Munir faces as much threat from within for sullying his legacy as he does from India.
The current tensions have also curtailed General Munir's ability to persist with the traditional playbook of attempting to 'bleed India to death with a thousand cuts' — any more Pulwama-like terror attacks attributed to this playbook will be indefensible for a nation surviving on international dole.
History is instructive: If senior military generals like Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan, A A K Niazi, Zia-ul-Haq, and even Pervez Musharraf can be sacrificed at the altar of exigency, Asim Munir might well be next. As his gambit is sure to fail, Pakistan will need someone to blame.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general and a former lieutenant-governor of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry
