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IOL News
2 days ago
- Politics
- IOL News
Navigating the Ideological Divide: The Litmus Test for Fragile GNU
President Cyril Ramaphosa hosted a working dinner with leaders of political parties that are signatories to the Government of National Unity (GNU) at Genadendal, the President's official residence in Cape Town on November 11, 2024. Image: GCIS Prof Dirk Kotzé South Africa's second Government of National Unity (GNU) reached its first anniversary this week. Comparisons with the GNU of 1994 were initially made, but the ensuing debates made it clear that they are not comparable. The first point of debate was whether the new multiparty government was indeed a GNU or a coalition government. For some, the distinction was merely a matter of semantics, while for others, it represented a political stance on black unity in government. The fact that the uMkhonto weSizwe party (MKP) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) were not included in the new government disqualified it as a national unity government. In the meantime, this debate has petered out, mainly because the ANC and DA continue to use the name GNU. The GNU's formal foundation is very limited in nature: in essence, it is the Statement of Intent first signed by the ANC and DA, and later by the other eight parties. The Statement included ten Foundational Principles, the Basic Minimum Programme of (nine) Priorities and the GNU's Modalities or main procedural arrangements. The programme of priorities came the closest to an agreement about policy matters, though they were formulated in very general terms. Compared with new coalition governments in many parts of the world who first negotiate a coalition agreement over an extended period, a combination of sections 51 and 86 in the South African constitution determines that a new president must be elected by Parliament not more than 14 days after the results of the election were announced. That sets the maximum time available to establish a coalition of at least 50%+1 in parliament that is required to elect a president. The fact that the election of the president is linked to a parliamentary majority (and therefore in some cases a coalition) is because the president is not directly elected. The coalition also does not allow for the outgoing cabinet to continue until a new one is formed by the president but is dissolved when the new president is inaugurated (section 94) five days after the presidential election. The impact of these constitutional arrangements are lessons already learnt from the GNU's first year of existence. Given the fact that coalition governments appear to be the norm in South Africa for the foreseeable future, constitutional re-engineering might be required, because the GNU's early history demonstrated that the Constitution was not designed to include a coalition government. A potential complication for a coalition government – especially for one in a stalemate situation – is the Constitution's section 50(1)(b) which states that an early general election cannot be held within three years after the previous election. It means that no early election can be held before May 2027. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. 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Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Next Stay Close ✕ Coalition governments sometimes collapse, like the German one not long ago, and then an early election is held to form a new government. If it were to happen in South Africa before 2027, such an option would not exist. Its desirability in South Africa under new conditions should be considered. A counterintuitive consequence of the GNU's emergence is that it enhanced the prominence of Parliament. In the past, the ANC government (cabinet) dominated Parliament, especially when the opposition was small. The ANC also did not accommodate parliamentary backbenchers who could ask difficult questions. With the GNU, these dynamics are changing. Portfolio committees are now chaired by members of the GNU parties and even other small parties such as Rise Mzansi, BOSA and ActionSA. DA and other GNU parliamentarians play often the role of critical backbenchers. The official opposition (MKP) and the EFF are often vocal in debates but not necessarily an effective opposition that can enhance public accountability by the GNU executive. In this regard, the oversized 70% coalition government suffocates the parliamentary opposition. That might be one of the considerations why GNUs are normally only a one-term government arrangement. It is noteworthy that opinion surveys done by the Social Research Foundation suggest that the bigger parties in the GNU (except for the ANC) have increased their support since the May 2024 elections, while the opposition parties have lost support, notably the MKP and EFF. It suggests that the downside of the GNU already mentioned, as well as the policy differences, the GNU as a concept, is not discredited in the public mind. Despite the absence of a coalition policy agreement – or maybe because of it – policy matters have become very prominent during the GNU lifespan. South African politics are dominated by the socio-economic issues of increasing unemployment, crime, illegal immigration and transformation policies, as well as the governance issues of service delivery and corruption. In the context of the GNU, the policy issues that became prominent have been school education (BELA Act), health care (NHI Act), fiscal policies (Budget), property rights (Expropriation Act) and international relations. In the areas of home affairs, agriculture and trade & industry a process of convergence is seen. While the conventional approach for coalitions is to negotiate an agreement on policy matters, largely as a consequence of the 14-day limitation on the formation of a coalition, the alternative is a piecemeal approach to dealing with policy issues one by one as they emerge. Some of them, like the BELA Act, went to the GNU's 'clearing house' or dispute resolution mechanism, chaired by Deputy President Mashatile, and thereafter to the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac). The Budget issue was resolved by different negotiation and consultation processes, mainly by the ANC and DA, while other policy matters, like the BELA and NHI Acts as well as the Budget, were taken to court. The result so far is therefore an incremental development of a policy framework in the absence of a comprehensive agreement.
IOL News
18-05-2025
- Politics
- IOL News
Afrikaner Genocide, Persecution Claims Lacks Legal Foundation
Afrikaners waiting to be briefed by U.S. government officials in a hangar at Dulles International Airport, Washington on May 12, 2025. President Trump's decision to grant refugee status to white Afrikaners is unique and makes a general political statement about South Africa, says the writer. Image: AFP Prof Dirk Kotzé Immigration, asylum and refugee status have become controversial global issues and affect the politics of many countries. President Trump's decision to grant refugee status to white Afrikaners is unique and makes a general political statement about South Africa. In only one other country this issue has emerged, namely. At three different points in time South African families applied for refugee status in Canada. The first one was granted in 2009 but revoked in 2014, the second one was in 2010, when their asylum application was denied but refugee status later granted, and in 2016 when their refugee status was also denied. The grounds on which refugee status is claimed are in all cases the same: the physical security situation is regarded as a threat to their lives, and it is because of their racial identity. In the case of President Trump, it is worth looking at his executive order, 'Addressing Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa' on 7 February 2025 as an indication of what is the American motivation for this decision. Mainly three points emerged. The first is South Africa's new Expropriation Act. The order described the Act as a 'shocking disregard of its citizens' rights' and it enables 'the government of South Africa to seize ethnic minority Afrikaners' agricultural property without compensation'. Furthermore, it accuses the South African government of 'government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation'. The second motivation is 'countless government policies designed to dismantle equal opportunity in employment, education and business'. The third point is 'hateful rhetoric and government actions fueling disproportionate violence against racially disfavored landowners'. In summary, the American motivation is based on land expropriation in the agricultural sector, specifically focused not on white but 'ethnic minority' Afrikaner farmers. Secondly, it is based on racial (white or Afrikaner) discrimination, presumably employment equity and black economic empowerment. These are all political, policy and constitutional human rights issues. No reference to genocide in South Africa is included in the executive order. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Next Stay Close ✕ Are these the grounds for claiming refugee status? The United Nations convention on the status of refugees adopted in 1951 and its protocol of 1967 defines a refugee based on 'well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion' or when a person is 'outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country'. The essence of this definition is the fear of persecution. In the current situation, the fear of persecution is not articulated in the executive order or in statements made by the Solidarity movement or persons who applied for refugee status. Their focus has been on safety concerns on farms, the risk posed by expropriation of farms, and their criticism of the affirmative action policies. The objective, legal criteria for refugee status are therefore not met in this case. Ordinary immigration, especially if they have sought-after skills like farming, would have been a much easier and less controversial option. Except if the controversy is part of the strategy. The American domestic response to the arrival of the group of 49 Afrikaners with refugee status has been more negative than expected. The Trump policy in general is to close down most of the options for refugee or asylum status and to formalise immigration to the US much more. At the moment, persons in war-torn areas or where persecution is a daily reality, such as in Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria, Myanmar, Venezuela or even journalists in Türkiye, are mostly denied American refugee status. The question is, therefore asked why such an exception for the Afrikaners? No clear answer is readily available, and therefore, only conjecture is possible. Concepts like 'ethnic minority Afrikaners' and 'racially disfavoured landowners' are used. Culturally and racially, they are closer to Trump than those from Asia, the Middle East or South America. Trump also has a principled problem with equity and inclusivity policies, both in the US and elsewhere. He even opposed South Africa's theme of the G20 summit (Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability). What explains the current predicament? The most likely answer is that the conservative groups in South Africa, like the Solidarity Movement, have invested over an extended period a lot in lobbying conservative parties and movements in North America and Europe to accept their political programme in South Africa. Solidarity has a full-time section responsible for international liaison. They align with their counterparts globally during times of national elections and other major political events. It amounts to an international network of like-minded groups. The conservative turn in many countries, such as the USA and now also Germany, strengthens the conservative resolve in South Africa. Solidarity's latest visit earlier this year to Washington, DC, found fertile ground for their sentiments. At the same time, South Africa's public diplomacy and bilateral communication with the USA over an extended period did not present a clear message of the latest domestic developments and policies. There is, therefore, no clear counter-narrative available in Washington, DC. Diplomacy with the US requires extensive lobbying over a long period to cultivate networks of support at different levels. Longer-term scenario-planning is necessary to be better positioned to be able to anticipate new developments in future. The message for the South African government is that much more long-term investment in professional diplomatic lobbying, networking and national branding is required. Countries like Türkiye, Rwanda (despite the eastern DRC situation), Ethiopia (despite the Tigray conflict) or Qatar are good examples of how it can be done. *Prof Dirk Kotzé, Department of Political Sciences, Unisa. **The views in this article do not necessarily represent those of Independent Media, IOL and The African.
IOL News
29-04-2025
- Business
- IOL News
GNU Survival: Cyril Ramaphosa's Tough Balancing Act as Pressure Mounts to Address DA Conundrum
The GNU is under serious pressure, which is even more exacerbated by the concomitant pressure from President Trump on South Africa, and the ANC in particular, says the writer. Prof Dirk Kotzé Approval of the annual Budget in any country is comparable to a vote of confidence in the government. In presidential systems, it is often characterized by negotiations and deal-making between the Executive and Parliament. This year the Budget vote in South Africa became a test for the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the ANC's control of the finance portfolio. The main bone of contention was a proposed increase of 2% in the value-added tax (VAT). Only hours before the Finance Minister's Budget speech, he informed his colleagues in the GNU of the main announcements. The Democratic Alliance indicated that they would not support the VAT increase and therefore the proposed Budget. Hence, the speech was postponed. In the revised Budget proposal, an increase of 0.5% in VAT in two consecutive years was included. The DA still opposed it and a series of negotiations followed. While ostensibly a small issue in a much larger budget, it became clear that the ANC miscalculated the public impact of VAT and that quickly it developed a symbolic value of how the parliamentary parties positioned themselves in relation to the budget proposals. The DA, on the other hand, underestimated the extent of the public political response against a VAT increase by parties and trade unions especially on the Left. It was not ready to respond with a comprehensive strategy, except to reaffirm its opposition to it. Quite soon in the public debates and talks between parties, it was clear that almost all the parties were not in favour of a 0.5% VAT increase and that it would require amendments to the Treasury's proposed fiscal structure framework. The DA saw an opportunity in its negotiations with the ANC to link the VAT issue to other economic restructuring issues. These negotiations developed a brinkmanship character and continued until the last moment when it stalled in a stalemate. The question is why this issue escalated so much and polarized the ANC and DA to the point of threatening the GNU's existence. At least three answers are possible. The first is that it became a contest between the two parties of who has the veto power on this matter. Given the elevated prominence of VAT as a budget issue, the second answer is that it will determine who receives the credit for acting in the public interest and stopping the VAT increase. The third possibility is that it was about who would win the public opinion contest and would be the most credible party in this situation. ActionSA later made the following observation in this respect: 'All that remains is for South Africans to observe which political parties acted to protect their already strained household income and which parties saw them as collateral damage in political manoeuvring'. The matter had to be decided in a joint committee of the two houses of Parliament on 1 April. The question before the committee was whether it supported the Finance Minister's amended fiscal structure proposals which included the 0.5% VAT increase, or agreed on amendments with alternative revenue measures. ActionSA, supported by the ANC, tabled a motion to accept the Minister's proposals (and therefore the VAT increase) but to recommend at the same time that the fiscal structure be returned to the Treasury so that the VAT increase can be replaced by alternative revenue sources. The DA opposed it - also on procedural grounds. This episode in which ActionSA acted as a decoy, reaffirmed the ANC's support for the VAT increase but at the same time, they also agreed that it should be referred back to the Treasury to remove it from the fiscal structure. Step 1 was therefore to approve the fiscal structure and step 2 was to change it and bring it in line with the DA's position. Why? A clear answer is not readily available but the following is a possibility: if an amendment of the fiscal structure was the main resolution, then the DA's position would have prevailed. If the committee's main decision was that the structure is endorsed, then the Minister's (and by implication, the ANC's) position is affirmed. The power relationship between the ANC and DA was therefore at stake, given the fact that the DA's objection a few weeks earlier that postponed the Minister's Budget speech already undermined the ANC's dominant position. At the same time, the ANC could use the recommendation in the committee resolution that the fiscal structure be referred back to the Treasury for amendment of the VAT increase, as a decoy against potential public criticism that it supported a VAT increase. In the parliamentary debate on the next day, the legality of the committee's procedures became a bone of contention. The divide between the ANC (and ActionSA) and the DA repeated itself and the same arguments were repeated. With a majority of only 12 votes, the committee's report was accepted. Interestingly, the divide in the vote was not an ideological one. The majority included most of the GNU parties as well as ActionSA, Rise Mzansi and Build One South Africa of Mmusi Maimane. They were opposed by two GNU members (the DA and Freedom Front Plus), and the EFF, MK party, ATM and ACDP. Three of the four biggest parties therefore opposed it. When these developments are analysed more closely, the VAT issue developed a larger significance which the DA used to bind the ANC into policy discussions about the GNU. The DA complains regularly that the ANC does not consult the GNU parties and rather acts on its own. One can summarise it by saying that the DA wants to change its relationship with the ANC and the nature of the GNU from government collaboration to power-sharing between them. It is not only applicable at the national level but also at provincial level in the Gauteng government. An illustration of how the ANC resists any attempt to accept this is in its statement after the parliamentary approval of the fiscal structure which does not acknowledge either ActionSA's role in it or the recommendation that the VAT increase must be referred back to the Treasury. 'The ANC has always acted in the best interests of the people. The adjustment of VAT by 0.5% was a difficult decision, done transparently and with a firm commitment to cushion the poor … The ANC-led GNU is a caring government that listens and responds to the needs of the people'. For the first time, the parliamentary participation in the Budget process has been broadened to include much more engagement by the different parties. It is due partly to the ANC's decline in dominance and the GNU's more active engagement in executive and public debates. At the same time, the ANC experiences it as a challenge to its status as a party, and the DA is the focus point of its discomfort and frustration. The GNU is therefore at the moment under serious pressure, which is even more exacerbated by the concomitant pressure from President Trump on South Africa, and the ANC in particular. * Prof Dirk Kotzé, Department of Political Sciences, Unisa ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.
