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Asia Times
2 days ago
- Business
- Asia Times
UK's strategic defense posture still includes East of Suez roles
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The launch of the United Kingdom's Strategic Defence Review has finally set down a clear direction for the UK's strategic posture for at least a parliament, perhaps longer. The most instrumental element in the paper is the decision to focus on the Euro-Atlantic as the priority region. This was already understood, but there have been at least two decades of the UK flirting with an East of Suez strategy. This included development of a robust defense attaché network in Southeast Asia, the long courtship of China – and then India – for growth, and the resurgence of UK military assets to the region in the name of defending maritime sea lanes and a 'free and open' Indo-Pacific. While it's true that this SDR was written by externals, led by Lord George Robertson, Dr. Fiona Hill, CMG, and General Sir Richard Barrons, the Labour government has already stamped its seal of approval by accepting all 62 recommendations. So what exactly does it say about the UK's 'Indo-Pacific strategy?' Well, the document is a realization that the US 'Pivot' to the Indo-Pacific region is here to stay. This was made clear after the Biden administration re-released an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 to put its stamp on the Trump strategy of 2019. Both strategies began with the starting point that the United States as an 'Indo-Pacific power' or 'Indo-Pacific nation.' While resources and political attention have – at times – remained stubbornly centered around the Middle East and CENTCOM and with Europe and EUCOM, the arrival of Elbridge Colby (a one-time Pacific Forum 'young leader') on the strategic scene in the United States has for now crowned the Indo-Pacific Pivot as the United States' priority region. The rise of China in this region, and the shift of political, military, and economic weight from Europe to Asia has cemented this shift. Colby's ratification as undersecretary of defense for policy has also added an explicit message to the Europeans: The dribbling of small amounts of assets to the Indo-Pacific is unnecessary; the United States would infinitely prefer that European powers – France, Germany and the UK – focus on the Euro-Atlantic and deal with Russia. The SDR wisely accommodates this resource imperative, while still providing a place for UK interests and support to the US and its allies in the region. If one looks at the number of times 'Indo-Pacific' is mentioned in the document (17), it is notable that this is down from a high of 32 mentions in the 2021 Integrated Review. Still, it is still better than the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 or the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, documents which mentioned 'Asia' five times and two times respectively. The 2025 SDR states that NATO-first does not mean NATO-only, putting the list of priorities as Euro-Atlantic, Middle East, and Indo-Pacific in that order. It states that 'the Indo-Pacific is strategically important to the UK as a global economic and political powerhouse and arena of increasing geopolitical tension.' It notes the strong partnerships the UK has in the region – ASEAN, Australia, Brunei, Japan, India, Indonesia, Nepal, New Zealand and Pakistan come in for special mention – and, of course, China. The SDR's position on China is probably closest to that of the UK Ministry of Defence and –sadly – does not reflect broader opinion across government in Whitehall. China is a 'sophisticated and persistent threat,' which behaves aggressively in the South China Sea and has escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait. It notes the fact that China has supported Russia in its invasion of Ukraine and that the US-China relationship will be a 'key factor' in global security. It also notes the threats provided by Beijing's military build-up, nuclear modernization and technological and cyber capabilities and recommends the maintenance of UK-China military-to-military communications. Given that US-China mil-to-mil relations are extremely limited now and constantly under pressure from China over US arms sales to Taiwan, this might prove a helpful channel in time. Notably, it recognizes that most of the UK's adversaries will likely field Chinese technology – an important observation in its own right. The SDR's integrated approach toward the Indo-Pacific region is consistent with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and consistent with the overall security interests of its closest partners, Japan and Australia, which are rapidly becoming the more important partners of choice across a number of different metrics. First, both are key partners in intelligence-sharing, both work closely with the United States to demonstrate deterrent capability in military exercises in the region and both are defense industrial partners of choice. With Japan, the UK is developing the Meteor, a joint new air-to-air missile (JNAAM) and the Global Combat Air Programme (with Italy), though this latter effort is under pressure. With Australia, there is even more by way of 'production deterrence' in the form of the AUKUS submarine and technology programs. The rotation of UK Astute-class submarines to HMAS Stiling, in Australia, planned as early as 2027 will be an immense boon to deterrence and warfighting capability. So what's missing from the SDR? Well, with respect to the authors, there are a few things: The recent murmurings of disquiet about a lack of progress in AUKUS Pillar 2 is an issue. London and Canberra now need to press upon newly arrived Trump officials their thoughts on the blockage and what can be done to expedite things at the resourcing, regulatory, and organizational level. This needs to be done at a time when the White House is shifting the US trade environment, so this will be difficult. In addition, the UK Ministry of Defence needs to think about what posture it needs to 'surge' military forces into the region in a crisis. The MOD needs to provide options and these range from inter-changeability exercises for UK assets visiting the region to developing a more mature presence in INDOPACOM – through a mid-size consulate in Honolulu run at the ambassadorial level by someone with close links to MOD. The options include joining the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience – if this has not already occurred – and supporting 'production deterrence.' It might mean co-production on long-range munitions in the wide expanse of the Pacific. And, finally, it needs to develop – alone or in tandem with the US – hubs for maintenance, repair, and operations (MRO) so that it can operate at the long-distances required by the operational environment. Dr. John Hemmings (john. @ is deputy director at the Council on Geostrategy in London and senior advisor at Pacific Forum.
Yahoo
27-05-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Starmer has just handed China a massive victory
Britain is going ahead with the handover of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. Despite intense legal challenges, Starmer has agreed to pay Mauritius 3.4 billion pounds for the privilege of surrendering a critical group of Indian Ocean atolls. While supporters of the Chagos Islands handover hail it as the endpoint of British colonialism in Africa, its critics rail against the agreement's devastating impact on Britain's status as a world power. As the UK wants to be a powerful bridge state between the US and Europe and views the East of Suez strategy as a critical component of Global Britain, this loss of prestige is detrimental for Britain's post-Brexit foreign policy vision. Outrage over Britain's Chagos Islands handover is about more than imperial nostalgia or concerns about geopolitical decline. It also stems from a righteous indignation about Britain's empowerment of its primary great power adversaries. Mauritius's foreign policy orientation makes Starmer's Chagos Islands handover a dangerous proposition. In 1972, Mauritius became the first African country to establish an embassy in Beijing. It has since become a valuable beachhead for Chinese economic influence in Africa's Indian Ocean littoral region. In October 2019, China and Mauritius signed a free trade agreement which ensconced a trade imbalance that is highly beneficial for Chinese exporters. Even though Mauritius's entire GDP is just over $14 billion, China exports $1 billion to the country each year. Mauritius is also strengthening its partnership with Russia. In April 2023, Mauritius's Ambassador in Moscow Heswar Janke declared that Russia had grown in prominence as a 'player' for the island nation. Mauritius is deepening cooperation with Russia in the fisheries sector and has mulled granting access to Russian Mir credit cards. Mauritius's tightening partnerships with China and Russia amplify its role as a force multiplier for the Indian Ocean strategies of both countries. Since its first anti-piracy deployment to the region in 2008, China has markedly increased its hard power footprint in the Indian Ocean. From 2022-25, China carried out four trilateral maritime exercises with Russia and Iran, which signifies the region's rising strategic importance for Britain's most dangerous adversaries. Mauritius's Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam has countered these critiques by insisting that he will not enable China's purported military ambitions in the Chagos Islands. This narrative has been implicitly amplified by Starmer's government which insists that the Chagos Islands handover would guarantee the long-term sustainability of the UK-US Diego Garcia base. These claims are less reassuring than they seem. Mauritius's negotiations with Britain over the Chagos Islands were fraught with heated disagreements. Mauritius expressed concerns about Britain's unilateral ability to extend the original ninety-nine-year lease for Diego Garcia without its input. It argued that the lease did not adequately account for inflation or currency exchange rates. While Britain's final offer to Mauritius made compromises on key areas of objection, frustrations with the past negotiations still linger. These grievances raise questions about the sincerity of Mauritius's willingness to abide by Starmer's Chagos Islands deal. Minister of State for Europe, North America and the Overseas Territories Stephen Doughty justified the negotiations with Mauritius by warning that international legal courts could deny Britain sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. With China and Russia's tacit backing, Mauritius could be tempted to renege on what it sees as an undesirable agreement and disrupt the Diego Garcia base's operations. As China sees its military presence in the Indian Ocean as a potential enabler of its aggressive designs in the Indo-Pacific region, this scenario could unfold during a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea. This would neuter Diego Garcia's effectiveness and Western power projection to counter China when it is needed most. To forestall this outcome, India is strengthening its ties with Mauritius and leveraging this relationship to counter Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. In March, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Ramgoolam announced that the India-Mauritius relationship had been upgraded to the status of an 'enhanced strategic partnership.' India's praise of Britain's Chagos Islands handover deal reflects its glee at its elevated geopolitical role. Starmer's handover of Chagos Islands is an unforced error that reduces the autonomy and efficacy of British defence policy. An increasingly insecure Indo-Pacific theatre just got much more parlous. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.
