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Daily News Egypt
27-05-2025
- Business
- Daily News Egypt
Nouakchott hosts Egypt-Mauritania Joint Committee; 13 pacts inked
Egypt and Mauritania held the second session of their joint committee in Nouakchott on Tuesday, signing 13 agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) across various sectors. The meeting, the first in 19 years since the inaugural session in Cairo in 2006, aimed to bolster bilateral relations. The Egyptian delegation was headed by Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Mauritanian side was led by Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug, Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Mauritanians Abroad. The Mauritanian delegation also included Kodioro Moussa Inkono, Minister Delegate to the Minister of Economy and Finance in charge of the Budget, and Aly Ould Sidi Ahmed El Freek, Minister of Equipment and Transport. A statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migration said discussions reflected the two countries' keenness to resume mechanisms for consultation, coordination, and joint cooperation. This is intended to enhance bilateral relations and elevate them to broader horizons, in implementation of the directives of their respective leaderships and to meet the aspirations of their peoples. The committee meetings involved productive discussions on bilateral relations. The 13 agreements and MoUs signed cover areas including: bilateral investment relations, labour, higher education, social affairs, fisheries and aquaculture, water resources and irrigation, capacity building, civil protection, territorial administration, securing civil documents, Islamic affairs and endowments, culture, media, and youth and sports. An agreement for the delivery of a copy of the Ould Tlamid Library was also signed, alongside an extension of the MoU for the Nouakchott tramway project. The minutes of the second session were signed, which included several executive plans and steps aimed at strengthening cooperation and exchanging technical expertise in various fields of common interest. It was agreed to maintain the regularity of the Egyptian-Mauritanian Joint Committee meetings, to be held annually and alternately between the two countries, and to build on the momentum from this second session in Nouakchott. In a related development, Abdelatty welcomed the convening of a joint economic forum between businesspeople from both countries. The ministry statement described this as an important platform for enhancing links between the public and private sectors in both nations and building effective investment and trade partnerships that serve the interests of both peoples. The statement noted promising opportunities for investment and trade, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, mining, energy, transport, and logistics. The two sides agreed to hold this economic forum annually and alternately to promote and elevate economic cooperation. The joint committee also addressed a number of regional and international issues of common concern. Foremost among these were the Palestinian issue and the situation in the Gaza Strip. Discussions also covered the latest developments in Libya and Sudan, as well as the situation in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region, and efforts to combat terrorism.
Korea Herald
21-05-2025
- Business
- Korea Herald
Korea deploys W28tr support to shield industries from US tariffs
The Korean government is accelerating its financial and diplomatic campaigns to curb the damage from US-led tariffs, launching a massive new policy funding amid tariff negotiations with the US to safeguard key industries from escalating trade barriers. Acting Minister of Economy and Finance Kim Beom-seok revealed Wednesday an additional 28.6 trillion won ($20.6 billion) in policy financing, supported by a supplementary budget of 15.5 trillion won, as part of a broader strategy to bolster industries vulnerable to rising tariffs and trade barriers. Kim vowed to mobilize all government resources to minimize the fallout from tariff hikes. 'To ensure rapid delivery of policy funds to the field, relevant government agencies will jointly conduct thorough oversight of execution status, and will support financial institutions with shields from potential risks to enable proactive funding when necessary,' he said during a ministerial meeting on economic affairs at the Seoul government complex. The new financial package coincides with the launch of a three-day negotiation session between Korean officials and US representatives in Washington. Seoul's primary goal remains to reduce or eliminate the 25 percent mutual tariffs imposed by the Donald Trump administration, which includes a 10 percent basic tariff plus additional industry-specific tariffs up to 15 percent, along with tariffs on steel, aluminum and cars imposed globally. Wednesday's fiscal measures aim to use 16.3 trillion won to stabilize impacted companies, 1.7 trillion won too promote market diversification, and 4.9 trillion won to enhance industrial competitiveness via machinery investments. Kim said that the government, in coordination with financial institutions, would ensure the rapid deployment of funds and implement measures to shield lenders from potential risks where necessary. Support for core industries such as pharmaceuticals and semiconductors will be reinforced with preemptive tariff strategies and investments, including incentivizing returnees to Korea. The government also aims to accelerate restructuring in the petrochemical and steel sectors, promising swift completion of consulting initiatives and sector-specific modernization plans to rekindle competitiveness. In parallel, Seoul is intensifying diplomatic and trade negotiations with Washington. Led by Industry Minister Jang Sung-gil, Korea's delegation is engaging with US officials amid rising tensions over tariffs on steel, aluminum, autos and other products. This meeting comes just 19 days after the first round of technical talks and is expected to be the last face-to-face negotiation before Korea's new government takes office following the June 3 presidential election. Both sides are expected to discuss six key areas — balanced trade, non-tariff measures, economic security, digital trade, the country of origin issue and commercial considerations — in line with the agreements reached during a ministerial trade meeting in Jeju on May 16.
Qatar Tribune
20-05-2025
- Business
- Qatar Tribune
Qatar and Benin sign six cooperation agreements, MoUs
DOHA: The State of Qatar and the Republic of Benin have signed six joint cooperation agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), on the sidelines of the working visit of President of the Republic of Benin HE Patrice Talon to the country. The signed agreements and MoUs include an agreement to exempt both countries' diplomatic and special passport holders from visa requirements, an MoU to establish a mechanism for political and diplomatic consultations, an MoU between Qatar's Ministry of Municipality and Benin's Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries to cooperate in the fields of agriculture and food security, a cooperation agreement in the fields of education, higher education, and scientific research and an MoU on the mutual recognition of seafarers' certificates, along with an MoU to cooperate in tourism and business events. In this context, the agreement on visa exemptions and the MoU on mechanism for political and diplomatic consultations, were signed by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs HE Sultan bin Saad Al Muraikhi and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Benin HE Olushegun Adjadi Bakari. Al Muraikhi also signed the MoU on agriculture and food security together with Beninese Minister of State, Minister of Economy and Finance in charge of Cooperation HE Romuald Wadagni. Minister of Education and Higher Education HE Lolwah bint Rashid bin Mohammed Al Khater and Beninese Minister of State, Minister of Economy and Finance in charge of Cooperation HE Romuald Wadagni signed the cooperation agreement on education, higher education, and scientific research. Minister of Transport HE Sheikh Mohammedآ bin Abdulla bin Mohammed Al Thani and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Benin HE Olushegun Adjadi Bakari signed an MoU on the mutual recognition of seafarers' certificates. Moreover, Chairman of Qatar Tourism Saad bin Ali bin Saad Al Kharji and Beninese Minister of State, Minister of Economy and Finance in charge of Cooperation HE Romuald Wadagni signed an MoU to cooperate in tourism and business events.
Morocco World
14-05-2025
- Business
- Morocco World
Moroccan Government Spends Over $10 Billion to Shield Citizens from Rising Costs
Rabat – Between 2022 and 2025, Morocco allocated more than MAD 100 billion ($10 billion) to subsidize basic goods, said Minister of Economy and Finance Nadia Fettah during a Tuesday session at the Chamber of Counselors. The intervention came in response to concerns raised by the Haraki group about consumer protection amid global economic turbulence and the spiking inflation that struck Morocco in recent years. Fettah acknowledged inflation's weight on Moroccan households and said the government took early steps to ease that pressure. Yet, the problem persists. Inflation in Morocco is estimated to have reached 2.2% in the first quarter of 2025, up sharply from 0.7% just three months earlier, according to figures released by the High Commission for Planning (HCP). The HCP points to a 3.7% increase in food prices and a 1.1% rise in non-food costs as the main drivers behind this surge. One of the most visible efforts, according to the minister, involved monitoring prices at local markets. Since 2022, inspection teams visited roughly 350,000 sales points across the country, only to find over 15,000 violations. These operations, she explained, form part of a wider push to ensure fairness in the market and make sure families can afford daily essentials. In parallel, the government maintained stable prices for electricity and water, two sectors that have seen global increases. Fettah also referred to emergency programs aimed at easing the effects of drought, particularly in rural areas where livelihoods depend on agriculture. Rather than passing rising global costs onto citizens, Fettah said Morocco chose another path. The government cut VAT on key products and offered targeted support to supply chains to avoid shortages. The minister also linked these efforts to broader economic policies, including raising the minimum wage through negotiations with unions and employers. Moreover, Fettah underlined that the government's role does not end at financial assistance. It must also stay present, adjust to changing conditions, and ensure that ongoing reforms and investments do not lose momentum. The minister concluded by reaffirming the government's intention to strike a balance between economic reform and social stability, without letting Moroccan households bear the brunt of global instability. While the government's efforts to curb inflation and support households help mitigate the issue, many families continue to struggle to make ends meet. Staples are still expensive for large segments of the population, and despite subsidies and wage adjustments, purchasing power has not fully recovered. For many Moroccans, the gap between official measures and daily reality still feels too wide. Tags: economyfood pricesinflationMorococ inflationrising costs
13-05-2025
- Politics
The US-Japan-ROK Trilateral After Yoon: Japan's and Korea's Security Choices in the Trump 2.0 Era
In August 2023 a historic summit of leaders from South Korea, Japan, and the United States was held at Camp David. Now that all three nations are under new leadership, with the next Korean president to be chosen on June 3, how Donald Trump, Ishiba Shigeru, and the new leader in Seoul will approach trilateral ties will determine their relationship's future in this uncertain security environment. Japan-Korea Strategic Cooperation: Essential, Not Optional South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's imposition of martial law on December 3, 2024, precipitated a train of events that have raised grave concerns in Japan and globally about political stability in Korea. First, the South Korean National Assembly impeached President Yoon on December 14, at which point presidential duties were transferred to Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. Han was then himself impeached on December 27, resulting in Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choi Sang-mok taking over the role of acting president. Han returned to the role on March 24 following his acquittal by the Constitutional Court of Korea. However, the same court then upheld the original impeachment of President Yoon on April 4, triggering an election to choose a new president. The current political vacuum is set to last until that election on June 3. At that point, South Korea's 'national crisis' will have extended for more than six months. The lack of both domestic and high-level diplomatic leadership could not have come at a worse time, given the return of Donald Trump to the American presidency and his administration's subsequent imposition of tariffs on the highly export-dependent nation. Japan has paid close attention to events during this period of instability and the absence of stable South Korean leadership. The Japanese government has provided resolute diplomatic support to South Korea and coordinated closely with the government in Seoul. Tokyo and Seoul have also not hesitated to push forward on closer Japan-ROK and US-ROK-Japan cooperation in the meantime. In a March 21, 2025, written response to questions from the Asahi Shimbun, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul expressed appreciation to Japan and other countries that provided encouragement and support during a difficult time for the ROK, and expressed 'sincere gratitude' to Minister of Foreign Affairs Iwaya Takeshi for his decision to visit Korea in January earlier this year. When South Korea's constitutional court finalized Yoon's impeachment on April 4, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru was quick to affirm that 'this year marks the sixtieth anniversary of the restoration of ROK-Japan relations. Regardless of the circumstances, we are going to make close cooperation between Japan and South Korea one of our top priorities.' What is behind this strengthened emphasis on Japan-Korea relations at such a delicate time? One reason is that constructive relations between Seoul and Tokyo are strategically more vital than ever to the respective government's diplomacy and security. Echoing former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio's sentiment that 'Today's Ukraine may be tomorrow's East Asia,' Cho also recognized the implications of the challenging international situation and current 'tectonic shifts' in the geopolitical environment. To this end, the foreign minister noted that 'the peoples of the two nations must firmly realize that cooperation is not an option but absolutely essential.' A High Point in Trilateral Relations Building on the improved bilateral relationship, in recent years Seoul and Tokyo have also pushed forward on trilateral strategic cooperation with the United States. While cooperation dates back to the Korean War in 1950, the first US-ROK-Japan summit, held in 1994 on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Jakarta, represented the first effort at officializing trilateral cooperation tying together two of the United States' most important regional bilateral alliances. In 2019, near the end of the first Donald Trump administration, diplomatic developments threatened to unravel trilateral cooperation. Against the backdrop of the US-China strategic competition, the US State Department and Pentagon had invested significant energy into enhancing 'Indo-Pacific' strategic partnerships such as the Quad (Japan, the United States, India, Australia) and the trilateral with Japan and Korea. President Trump was more interested in engaging in dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The progressive leader of South Korea at the time, President Moon Jae-in, also prioritized North-South dialogue over strategic cooperation with allies and partners. The sudden shift in diplomatic priorities between the three countries also overlapped with a historical nadir in bilateral ROK-Japan relations. Over the two-year period of 2018–19, bilateral tensions broke out over the issue of compensation for wartime Korean laborers, Japan's tightening of export controls on South Korea, Seoul's announcement of the suspension of the GSOMIA information sharing agreement, and an incident where Japanese authorities complained that an ROK naval vessel directed its fire-control radar at a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft. Domestic sentiment in both countries toward the other soured considerably. As these wide-ranging diplomatic, economic, and national security issues were unfolding between two critical American allies, President Trump made no effort to mediate. This situation was transformed, however, with changes in the leadership in both Washington DC and Seoul. Inaugurated in 2022, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol was particularly proactive in restoring ROK-Japan relations, while Yoon and Trump's successor, President Joe Biden, were eager to enhance bilateral US-ROK and trilateral US-ROK-Japan security cooperation. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida responded positively to such overtures, leading to the August 2023 US-Japan-Korea summit meeting that produced the 'Camp David Principles'—the first-ever stand-alone summit held among the three countries. The Camp David meeting was groundbreaking not only for spelling out the strategic importance of deepened security coordination, but also for broadening the focus of trilateral cooperation beyond the traditional focus on North Korean and Korean Peninsula issues. The reinvigorated trilateral relationship was positioned by the leaders as one of the core institutions underpinning the three nations' Indo-Pacific strategy—with an eye on China. Responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the three countries also committed themselves to upholding the rule of law, common values, and the international order. Beyond the geopolitical realm, the three leaders agreed at Camp David to forge a 'comprehensive partnership' to address and coordinate on issues such as economic and technological security, development assistance, and climate change. A 'Trilateral Coordinating Secretariat' was also established to promote consultation and implement shared commitments, to further institutionalize the trilateral relationship. In hindsight, the Camp David years were a result of a rare coincidence of events and leaders that moved the wheels of history. Adapting to Trump 2.0: The China-Taiwan Challenge The inauguration of the second Trump administration in January 2025 raised concerns about the sustainability of the trilateral relationship, but so far, the framework has been sustained. The Joint Leaders' Statement released on February 7, following Prime Minister Ishiba's visit to Washington DC for his first official meeting with President Trump, omitted 'Camp David,' but mentioned that 'the two leaders intend to advance multilayered and aligned cooperation among likeminded countries,' noting the importance of the Quad and the US-ROK-Japan, US-Japan-Australia, and US-Japan-Philippines trilaterals. The Japanese and American leaders also 'affirmed the importance of the Japan-US-ROK trilateral partnership,' particularly in addressing North Korea–related issues. Two foreign-minister-level meetings have subsequently taken place among the trilateral partners, suggesting that the Trump administration will preserve the trilateral framework forged under the previous administration for the time being. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru (left) receives a commemorative gift from President Donald Trump at a joint press conference following the US-Japan summit, April 7, 2025, in Washington DC. (© Jiji) The relationship, however, is likely to be shaped to meet the priorities of the Trump administration. One of these is Washington's 'China-Taiwan shift' as it relates to the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Attitudes toward foreign affairs in the Trump administration can be roughly divided into two factions. One faction is represented by Vice President JD Vance, who has been described as a 'soft isolationist' when it comes to the commitment of American military forces overseas. Another faction contains traditional Republicans who support a hardline stance against American strategic rivals like China and tend to be more alliance-oriented. The latter group includes National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby. Both factions demand that allies bear their share of the burden and aim for the United States to take a focused approach to strategic competition and foreign affairs. While there is significant debate over the American defense posture as it relates to Ukraine and Europe, there is no sign of a desire to withdraw or reduce US forces in the Indo-Pacific. The United States may well strengthen its Indo-Pacific military posture—predicated on cooperation and increased burden sharing from allies and like-minded countries. How this relates to China and Taiwan is reflected in the US Department of Defense's Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, as detailed by the Washington Post on March 29, 2025. In the document, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth identifies China as 'the Department's sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan . . . [as] the Department's sole pacing scenario.' This points to a China-Taiwan-related contingency as the focus of force planning, considering the much-discussed '2027' timeline regarding preparations for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. As the United States focuses on potential conflict with China, most of the burden for deterrence measures against Russia, Iran, and North Korea will fall on allies in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. If the Interim Guidelines are followed through, the US alliances with Korea and Japan and the trilateral partnership will face greater challenges. The 'complex contingency' scenario in which a Korea contingency is interlocked with a Taiwan contingency has been an issue, but due to its sensitivities, official talks regarding the division of roles for the three partners have not progressed. Seoul in particular would be further concerned by the prioritization of a Taiwan contingency as the 'sole pacing scenario' and its implications for the Korean Peninsula. There is also a lack of clarity about whether President Trump will embrace the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group established under his predecessor. The NCG was established to reassure Seoul about the United States' commitment to extended deterrence through the nuclear umbrella in the face of an increasingly capable North Korean nuclear weapons and missile development program. The aforementioned Interim Guidance also stimulated South Korean concerns that past discussions about 'strategic flexibility' will re-emerge and result in the reduction of American troops on the peninsula, or the deployment of United States Forces Korea to other areas of the Indo-Pacific, leaving the ROK potentially vulnerable. These worries have further complicated discussions about the long-delayed transfer of wartime operational control of Korean military forces under the US-ROK Combined Forces Command from an American to a Korean commander. The US-Japan alliance also faces a similar dilemma of how to balance its response to Taiwan and Korean Peninsula contingencies while ensuring that Japan remains appropriately protected. Additionally, the United States is seeking cooperation from its allies in a wide range of areas with a view to enhancing deterrence against China. In addition to joint exercises and operational cooperation, the United States wants to see the establishment of integrated logistics and industrial supply chains that would include US Navy ships to receive better access to MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) and replenishment while deployed to the region. Cooperation among allies on shipbuilding is also a focus for the Trump administration, given the current limited capacity of the United States' own industry. This was made clear in the joint statement released following a foreign-minister-level trilateral meeting in Brussels on April 3. While the issue had previously been raised at the July 2024 trilateral meeting, the three sides at Brussels recognized the need to collectively maintain 'a modern maritime fleet, a robust shipbuilding industry, and a strong workforce.' Making progress in defense logistics and industrial integration will also require cooperation with the Philippines, as well as with Australia and Britain through the AUKUS initiative. If successful, deepened industrial and logistical cooperation between regional allies and the United States could contribute to avoiding war with China over Taiwan by enhancing deterrence. President Trump's deal-focused style of transactional diplomacy, however, will continue to pose risks by exposing allies to sudden geopolitical changes. Trump continues to express interest in dialogue with Kim Jong-un, which would likely result in Japan and South Korea being sidelined. Trump's attachment to tariffs to address perceived economic imbalances, meanwhile, undermines the principles of free trade, but can also become an obstacle to enhanced industrial and defense supply chain cooperation. There is clearly a pressing need to discuss these issues from both economic and national security points of view and restore stability to Indo-Pacific strategic relationships. Tokyo and Seoul should make use of the Trilateral Coordinating Secretariat, among other mechanisms, to push forward policy coordination and ensure dialogue on regional security hotspots. South Korea's Choice: Is a Center Shift Possible? Another factor that will have a major impact on the sustainability of trilateral US-ROK-Japan strategic coordination is the domestic political situation in South Korea. During his short presidency, Yoon Suk Yeol committed Seoul to a much more ambitious foreign policy based on his vision of South Korea as a 'Global Pivotal State.' In this vision, Yoon positioned the US-ROK alliance as the main pillar of South Korea's foreign policy. In terms of South Korea's role in US strategic competition with China, the former president also moved Seoul's position away from 'strategic ambiguity'—as pursued under the Moon administration—to one of 'strategic clarity.' Describing Korean security interests as going beyond the peninsula, Yoon quickly moved to widen Seoul's strategic vision. He adopted a Korean version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, committed South Korea to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and committed to the principles agreed to at the Camp David Summit. Previously, when the Moon administration announced its New Southern Policy in 2021, it indicated that it would align with the United States on Indo-Pacific strategy, including on the Taiwan Strait. In reality, however, Moon's vision remained peninsula-focused. Strategic alignment with the Indo-Pacific was constrained by Moon's own China policy when he committed to 'Three Nos': no additional deployments of the THAAD, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, missile defense system, no involvement in a wider US-led missile defense network, and no involvement in a 'trilateral military alliance' with the United States and Japan. Cooperation among the three nations would be limited to issues with North Korea. Despite the deterioration of the security environment, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, deeper Russia–North Korea security cooperation, and tensions across the Taiwan Strait, it is possible that there will be another sudden shift in Seoul's strategic orientation, if there is a change of leadership from conservative to progressive. Will South Korea's next president continue an approach to national security based on a global and Indo-Pacific vision of South Korea's role? Will cooperation with Japan, bilaterally and in the trilateral framework with the United States, continue to be seen as 'not an option but absolutely essential' in Seoul? As South Korea emerges out of its leadership vacuum, it will attempt to find 'balance' in its diplomacy in its own way. Seoul's choice in the post-Yoon era should be watched with great interest given its potential significance for regional and global cooperation. Clearly, the ruling conservative People Power Party faces an uphill battle to keep the presidency due to Yoon's declaration of martial law and his subsequent impeachment. The election, after all, is taking place only two months after the constitutional court ruling affirmed his removal. Focus has therefore shifted to the possibility of a return to progressive leadership. The opposition's leading candidate is Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party of Korea, who previously ran against Yoon in the 2022 presidential election. The extent of current Korean political division has purportedly alienated political independents, who want to see a return to stability above all else. Thus, Lee must win the support of the 'middle-of-the-road' voters to prevail in the presidential race. Diplomatically, facing various national crises, a progressive president will also have little choice but to cooperate with the United States and Japan. Recently, Lee and the DPK are promoting a more pragmatic line based on 'realism' at home and abroad. This realism includes recognition of value of the US-ROK alliance, strengthened ROK-Japan cooperation, and the US-ROK-Japan trilateral. However, there remains substantial ambiguity on progressive positions on China and the Taiwan challenge, as well as toward North Korea as the situation on the Korean peninsula rapidly changes. For example, in a recent interview with the Washington Post (February 14, 2025), Lee welcomed the idea of US–North Korea dialogue. He went as far to say that he would nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize if the president was able to achieve a 'significant breakthrough' on nuclear weapons and missile issues, saying that 'it would be beneficial for everyone.' Although concerns remain, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of ROK-Japan diplomatic normalization, one hopes for a shift toward the political center, the 'middle of the road,' in South Korea. It will be essential for both countries to overcome the challenging security environment together. (Originally published in Japanese on April 12, 2025. Banner photo: From left, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi at a sideline meeting at the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs gathering in Brussels on April 3, 2025. © AFP/Jiji.)
