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The Wire
7 days ago
- Business
- The Wire
India's Fighter Jet Ambitions: From Russian Roulette to Indigenous Dreams
For the best experience, open on your mobile browser or Download our App. Next Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security Rahul Bedi 5 minutes ago After abandoning a $295 million joint project with Russia, India fast-tracks its indigenous fifth-generation fighter programme—but faces familiar challenges that have plagued its defence manufacturing for decades. In this image released by @SpokespersonMoD via X on May 27, 2025, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved the Execution Model for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) will lead the project in partnership with Indian industry. (@SpokespersonMoD via PTI Photo) Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute Now Chandigarh: The Ministry of Defence's intent, announced earlier this week, to fast-track development of its indigenous fifth-generation fighter via the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme, is not its first brush with such lofty ambitions. For 11 years, until 2018, the MoD and the Indian Air Force (IAF) were in advanced negotiations with Russia's Sukhoi Design Bureau to co-develop a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) under a 2007 agreement, aimed at delivering a near-bespoke advanced stealth platform tailored largely to Indian requirements. Designated the Perspective Multi-Role Fighter by the MoD, the FGFA was based on the Sukhoi T-50—then known as PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks-Frontovoi Aviatsii)—which later morphed into the Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter. This putative 30-tonne, twin-engine platform promised super-cruise capabilities, advanced stealth, internal weapon bays and next-generation avionics. Consequently, in 2010-11 India paid $295 million towards the FGFA's preliminary design, as part of its equal financial but partial technical partnership. Thereafter, in 2013 Russia demanded an additional $5 billion as half its share to further progress the fighter's developmental costs, which it had pegged at around $10 billion. The MoD refused to pay but continued negotiating, and in 2016 reached a compromise under which it was agreed that each side would contribute $3.7 billion apiece—to be paid over six to seven years—towards the FGFA's further development, in addition to incorporating IAF-specific requirements on the platform. These comprised some 50-odd major and minor modifications, like replacing the fighter's NPO Saturn AL-41F1 engine with a more powerful power pack and improving its stealth features and weapons carriage system. The IAF also called for an advanced version of the fighter's nose-mounted Byelka electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, easier maintainability and assorted additional safety features. Industry sources said that at the time Sukhoi also agreed to share critical FGFA design information with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)—the platform's designated series manufacturing agency—which it had earlier withheld, and to try and restore its work share in the programme, which had been reduced by more than half to merely around 13%. This included providing tyres for the under-development fighter, basic navigation equipment, laser designation pods, heads-up displays and coolant for its radar, as there was little of major technological input that HAL or the IAF had to offer to the FGFA programme. Sukhoi also undertook, in principle, to deliver three single-seat FGFA prototypes by 2019-20 to the IAF for user trials, ahead of erecting a series production line for the fighters at HAL's facility in Nashik. Pulling the plug on Sukhoi Initially, the IAF had planned on procuring 200-250 single and twin-seat licence-built FGFAs, with deliveries scheduled to begin by 2017-18. This number was later reduced to 127 single-seat FGFAs, but soon after in April 2018, India opted to withdraw from the programme, forgoing all the money it had advanced to it. No accountability for any of the officials involved in the stillborn project was forthcoming. Many IAF veterans, however, were of the view that had India stayed the course with the FGFA project, by overcoming myriad shortcomings in its dealings with Russia, it would have been operating a fleet of Su-57-like fifth-generation fighters years earlier, like other advanced air forces, including China's. Besides, by staying the FGFA course, despite the hurdles, it could also have built up a firmer research and development base for future indigenous projects like the AMCA. Instead, it now faces a longer, costlier and technologically riskier path toward vindicating its fifth-generation combat aircraft goals. Industry sources, meanwhile, clarified that the decision to call off the FGFA was not taken lightly, as years of delays, cost escalation, performance shortfalls in the FGFA prototype and lack of transparency from the Russian side had steadily undermined Indian confidence. More critically, both the MoD and the IAF were dissatisfied with the level of technology transfer, the aircraft's underwhelming stealth profile and its engines, which did not meet the expected thrust-vectoring and super-cruise benchmarks. New attempt to fast-track 5th gen But the retreat from the FGFA programme did not signal a withdrawal from India's fifth-generation fighter ambitions, which sluggishly lumbered on until operational urgency thrust upon the IAF after Operation Sindoor prompted Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to pre-approve and advance the AMCA project on May 27. Alongside, the prevailing decline in the IAF's fighter squadrons from a sanctioned strength of 42.5 to merely 30-odd squadrons presently had also triggered urgency in the AMCA project. Under it, the MoD has sanctioned the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and HAL to develop a fifth-generation fighter from the ground up, by leapfrogging technological barriers using local resources, timelines and control. The ADA-HAL combine aims to involve a wide consortium of public sector and private vendors like Bharat Electronics, Larsen & Toubro and Godrej Aerospace under the government's Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) policy, and from lessons drawn from past setbacks with the snail-paced Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) programme. Unlike the FGFA, the AMCA is being designed to meet specific Indian doctrinal needs from the outset. Conceived as a twin-engine, 25-tonne multi-role stealth fighter, the AMCA aims to integrate internal weapons bays, serpentine air intakes, radar-absorbent materials, AI-assisted mission systems and sensor fusion. It is also envisioned in two variants—a Mark 1 with an imported engine (possibly General Electric's GE F414 power pack) and a Mark II with an indigenous to-be-developed engine. Delivery of the first few prototypes is scheduled by 2035. Obstacles ahead Analysts, however, said the pathway to AMCA's development was riddled with multiple challenges. They maintained that though the FGFA was flawed, it did offer the IAF a relatively fast track to a stealth platform. Furthermore, by exiting the FGFA, India had ceded early stealth fighter experience that might have enriched its R&D ecosystem in the AMCA project. In contrast, the AMCA's development trajectory was wholly unproven. The technological risks—especially in stealth shaping, low-observable materials, propulsion and mission computers—were significant. The most pressing hurdle remained engine development, as India could still not produce a fifth-generation capable power pack, relying instead on US-origin General Electric GE F414 engines, whose full technology transfer under a 2023 agreement for HAL to make them locally remained riddled with uncertainties. GE has historically been cautious about sharing sensitive 'hot section' technologies with overseas customers, like those involving single-crystal turbine blades, thermal barrier coatings and cooling channels—core to engine durability and thrust-to-weight ratios. And while India seeks full transfer of manufacturing know-how for these components to reduce dependence on the US, Washington's export control laws under its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and internal GE risk assessments had reportedly limited its scope. Indian officials had also flagged ambiguity over intellectual property (IPR) ownership for technologies co-produced or indigenised with regard to the GE-414s. The fundamental concern, industry sources said, was over HAL or the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), or both, not being able to modify, even minutely, any indigenously built version of the F414 power pack without GE consent. This, in effect, would put paid to jugaad or innovation that had, over decades, served India's military industry admirably. Moreover, establishing a full-scale production line domestically for a 4.5/5-generation jet engine is a massive industrial effort, for which HAL is reportedly still amassing specialised tooling and a quality-controlled supply chain ecosystem to meet GE's strict quality audits and oversight. Unhelpful history India's failure in building a domestic modern fighter manufacturing network can be traced back to the unravelling of the 2007-08 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal, which many senior IAF officers and veterans consider a 'turning point' in which a major opportunity was lost. The MMRCA project sought to procure 126 fighter jets, with a clear mandate that 108 would be built in India under transfer of technology (ToT) agreements. France's Rafale emerged as the winner in 2012 from amongst six competing rivals, but protracted negotiations over cost, technology transfer and liability clauses led to the collapse of the deal in 2015. Instead, India opted for a direct purchase of 36 Rafales in flyaway condition, further delaying the development of indigenous manufacturing capability. This missed opportunity meant India continued to depend heavily on foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for advanced combat aircraft, without acquiring the institutional knowledge and industrial base needed for independent production. Unlike China, which leveraged joint ventures and aggressive reverse-engineering to build a competent domestic fighter aircraft industry, India's public sector defence units like HAL remained underfunded and over-regulated. In the meantime, indigenous programmes like the Tejas LCA were beset by delays and capability gaps, and when its Mk1 variant eventually entered limited service, its combat potential was initially constrained by issues related to engine performance, radar integration and weapons payload. Efforts to address these shortcomings through the Mk1A and Mk2 variants are presently underway, delayed by several years. In the interim, the FGFA was expected to usher India's entry into fifth-generation capabilities, but this too was called off, cumulatively delaying India's goal of building a robust domestic fighter manufacturing base. And though the AMCA project now seeks to course-correct—but without an established supply chain, proven stealth technology or a domestic jet engine—it faces an uphill battle. It proposes to feature a cleaner stealth profile fighter with internal weapon bays and fully indigenous avionics, including an AESA radar, AI-based sensor fusion and advanced electronic warfare systems. And unlike the FGFA, AMCA emphasises modularity, digital fly-by-wire systems and next-generation cockpit ergonomics, aiming for full design authority and autonomy in both development and future upgrades. That being said, India's ability to manufacture a fifth-generation fighter hinges not just on technology, but on policy coherence, private sector integration and decisive leadership—elements sorely missing in earlier decades. So unless these structural issues are swiftly and meaningfully addressed, India risks repeating its earlier FGFA missteps with the AMCA. World The French Are Anxious to Know the Fate of Rafales in Operation Sindoor Combat View More
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India.com
27-05-2025
- Business
- India.com
World Turns Cold On Su-57E: Will India Still Consider To Buy Russia's ‘Stealth Beast'?
New Delhi: Su-57E - Russia's fifth-generation stealth fighter - is under scrutiny once again. No country across the globe seems to be interested acquiring the fighter jet despite Moscow's consistent efforts to sell it to countries such as India, Algeria and Malaysia. Rosoboronexport, a Russian defence firm, said that it would put on display the aircraft at the LIMA 2025 International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Malaysia. However, the fighter jet, as reported by the media, never made it to the exhibition. In an absence that raised many eyebrows, only a scale model of the jet was showcased at a booth of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) in the Malaysian exhibition. Malaysia's indifference towards Su-57E in its Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), India's exit from the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme and the fighter aircraft's absence at LIMA 2025 all narrated the same saga - the Russian "Felon" is likely to turn out are a big "failure". Let's understand the Su-57E. It is an export variant of Russian Su-57 fighter jet, which is a fifth-generation stealth aircraft that is armed with cutting-edge missile systems and designed for multi-role operations and radar evasion. It is capable of carrying long-range air-to-air missiles such as R-37M and can strike targets up to 400 kilometres away. Without disclosing the name of the country, a confident Russia had earlier claimed that the first buyer of the jet would start operating it by this year (2025). Algeria was seen as the possible acquirer. But neither the countr nor Russia has so far confirmed the deal. Why is Malaysia delaying its fighter jet programme? Began in 2009, Malaysia's MRCA programme is aimed at replacing its aging MiG-29s. Earlier, the programme featured jets such as Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, Saab Gripen, Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon, but the country's focus in recent years seems to have turned towards acquiring fifth-generation or near-fifth-generation fighter aircraft. Malaysia, despite this apparent shift, has not so far made any final decision. As a result, the role of Su-57E remains uncertain. Russia's Continued India Push Meanwhile, Russia continues to try pushing India to buy the Su-57E even after the latter's withdrawal from the FGFA project in 2018. India exited from the project, as reports suggest, because of unsatisfactory performance of the fighter jet and its high cost. Russia apparently has not given up and continues to pursue the deal. It is seeming attempting to capitalise on India's rising need for advanced fighter aircraft. Russia offered India a "Golden Deal" during Aero India 2025 - a mega aerospace and defence exhibition organised at Bangaluru's Yelahanka Air Force Station from February 10 to 14. Moscow offered New Delhi prompt delivery of Su-57E's, its local production in India and assistance in India's indegenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft program (AMCA). Moscow also told India that if it accepts the deal, Indian firms manufacturing the Su-30MKI can soon begin producing the Su-57E. New Approach Post Pakistan Conflict Following recent exchange of firepower with Pakistan in response to the April 22 deadly terror attack on tourists at Baisaran meadows in Jammu and Kashmir's Pahalgam, Russia has been aggressively making efforts aimed at promoting the Su-57E. In an interview with Sputnik, a Russian state-run news agency and radia broadcast service, a military observer from Moscow, Igor Korotchenko, said India should, without a second thought, go for acquiring the Su-57MKI that is especially designed for New Delhi and equipped with long-range missiles like the R-37M - keeping its requirements in mind. At the same time, a few Russian bloggers are trying to project Su-57 as superior to the Rafale. They are leaving no stone unturned to urge India to invest in it. New Delhi, however, has not so far respond to the suggestions, either unofficially or officially. It appears that the path for Su-57E's acquisition is not an easy one. It will be interesting to note that whether the fighter jet manages to find a place in the international defense market in the years to come.
