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Five years since Galwan: The two-front threat looms larger for India

In recent years, China–Pakistan military cooperation has deepened significantly. In response, India has enhanced its preparedness and strategic coordination, even as managing simultaneous threats on two fronts demands careful resource prioritisation and long-term capability building read more It has been five years since India and China's skirmish in the Galwan Valley, giving rise to bitter relations between the two. It was after nearly 45 years, after the Tulung La conflict in the Arunachal Valley in 1975, in which four Indian soldiers were killed in the Chinese ambush, that India and China suffered military casualties at the borders. There was another incident in Sikkim in which the Indian soldiers chased away the Chinese soldiers; however, no casualties were reported on either side. This led to a worsening of the relations between the two Asian giants, leading India to reorient its approach towards its relations with China. India managed to control the situation from a position of strength and refused to be cowed under pressure from China. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD During the night of June 15-16, 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged themselves in hand-to-hand combat with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Both sides incurred casualties; India conceded that twenty soldiers died in the combat, and the Chinese acknowledged only four casualties, but sources confirmed 45 deaths on the Chinese side. Over the next eighteen months both the countries increased the number of forces on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and even exchanged shots against each other. This episode was a landmark in India-China relations, and India revised its strategy towards LAC. Indian forces had minimal armed forces present at the LAC earlier; now it was decided that India would maintain at least 50 to 60 thousand troops permanently besides 40 thousand troops on a rotational basis depending upon the climatic conditions and operational requirements. The Indian foreign minister termed it a 'premeditated and planned action' by the PLA to change the status quo on the borders. How have things changed for India after the conflict? How has the Galwan Conflict changed the dynamics between Pakistan and China, and is India prepared for a two-front war? These are the questions that are being asked by the Indian citizens. Have things changed on the India-China borders? Things have eased up, but tensions are still there. The troop numbers have increased, and it has made a qualitative difference in the situation at the borders before the Galwan. The talks have been going on at three levels between India and China. They are: STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD 1. Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) These are mainly at the diplomatic level and practical level to manage the borders and for de-escalation of conflicts. As of March 2025, 30 rounds of WMCC have taken place, the last one being in August 2024. 2. Corps Commander Level Talks These are aimed at de-escalation and toning down of conflicts at specific levels along the LAC. There have been 21 commander-level talks between China and India. 3. Special Representative Level Dialogue These are high-level talks between political representatives of both countries and are focused on a long-term boundary settlement. 21 rounds of discussions have been held between the two countries. In terms of securing the borders, India undertook significant military and strategic reforms to bolster its security posture along the China border. India is now in a position to rapidly reinforce its troop presence at the borders and has established robust defensive positions besides maintaining a regular deployment of acclimatised troops for high-altitude deployment, giving it an advantage over China. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD India has also initiated what it terms the 'Cold Start' doctrine for quick mobilisation and created multiple mountain strike corps focused on the Indo-Tibetan borders to promptly respond to these threats in the border regions. In terms of deployment of military equipment, Indigenous artillery, armoured vehicles, and heavy tanks (like T-90 and T-72) were deployed. The Indian Air Force upgraded and expanded air bases near the border, improving logistics and strike capabilities. Diplomatic messages going across the borders have also been very strong. India increased diplomatic engagement, sought international support, and deepened strategic partnerships, notably with the US and the Quad, signalling a readiness to counterbalance China's assertiveness. Has the Galwan Crisis brought India and Pakistan together? The Galwan crisis has proved to a large extent the Kautilyan theory that an enemy's enemy can be a good friend. The collaboration between Chinese and Pakistani militaries has increased. This is not only because of the crisis in the Galwan Valley but also because there have been ongoing investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in which China has invested approximately $50 billion, linking China to the Gwadar port in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. This route flows via Indian territory in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD There is a strategic alignment between China and Pakistan and a sort of 'collusive threat' from both towards India; this was seen partly in the recent escalations between India and Pakistan over the Pahalgam terrorist attacks. Pakistan used large numbers of Air Force and military hardware against Indian armed forces which are of Chinese origin. China and Pakistan are also colluding economically, politically and diplomatically with each other at a deeper level and with a greater understanding. Is India prepared for a two-front war? India has made significant progress in its military preparedness, but challenges remain on the two-front war on the question of a hypothetical conflict between India and its northern and western neighbours. India has dwelt upon this at a military level and is acutely aware of this. In January 2020 Chief of Army Staff MM Narvane was confronted with this question, and later Chief of Defence Staff Bipin Rawat also acknowledged this hypothetical situation. Even the Chinese have similar fears. As it has India on one side and other adversaries in the Indo-Pacific and the China seas on the other. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In terms of India, we need to address this in the right earnest. In view of increasingly powerful and assertive China, Indian armed forces strategy and preparedness need a complete overhaul. Military observers feel that Indian armed forces' preparedness is constrained and its resources overstretched, and the conversion of some strike corps for China-facing roles has reduced offensive power against Pakistan. India's strategy involves deterring Pakistan with credible military threats, as observed in Operation Sindoor, while seeking to diplomatically avoid escalation with China, recognising that fighting on both fronts simultaneously would strain resources and in the meantime keep preparing itself for such operational readiness. Conclusion Since the 2020 Galwan crisis, India has made incremental security improvements through diplomatic agreements and infrastructure development, yet significant challenges remain. The Pakistan-China strategic partnership has deepened considerably, with China providing substantial military assistance to Pakistan. While recent border agreements with China show promise for tension reduction, India needs to be prepared for a potential two-front war. The sustained deployment of over 100,000 troops along contested borders reflects ongoing security concerns. Despite diplomatic progress, India must continue strengthening its military capabilities and border infrastructure to effectively counter coordinated threats from both Pakistan and China in an increasingly complex regional security environment. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Amitabh Singh teaches at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.