Latest news with #GlobalFragilityAct
Libya Review
2 days ago
- Politics
- Libya Review
US Congress Receives Briefing on Libya Policy & Frozen Assets
A recent report submitted to members of the US Congress outlines several growing concerns over Washington's approach to the political and security crisis in Libya. As the country remains fragmented and foreign influence intensifies, lawmakers are being urged to reassess the direction of US engagement and oversight. According to the report, billions of dollars in Libyan state assets, frozen abroad since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi under UN sanctions, remain at the center of internal disputes. Competing Libyan authorities have called for access to these funds, raising alarm about the lack of unified oversight and the potential misuse of national wealth. The report notes that the US has resumed contact with a wide range of Libyan actors, including individuals previously accused of corruption, human rights abuses, or close ties to foreign powers. Some have even attempted to seize control of the country by military force in the past. While engagement with all sides may be part of a pragmatic approach, it has raised concerns in Congress, particularly about the lack of transparency and the risk of legitimizing destabilizing figures. Several countries, among them Egypt, Turkey, Russia, the UAE, France, and Italy, continue to pursue their own interests in Libya, often backing rival factions. This has complicated any attempts to forge national unity and has weakened US leverage on the ground. Meanwhile, Turkey has extended its military presence in the west until 2026, supporting allied forces and further dividing the country's security landscape. Congress has also been briefed on the rollback of certain US assistance programs, including parts of the Global Fragility Act. Still, funding remains available through alternative channels, such as global security programs and operational assistance, which could be redirected to support renewed diplomatic efforts and possibly reopen a formal US presence in Libya. As the situation evolves, members of Congress may push to increase oversight over American foreign policy in Libya. Areas of focus could include aid allocation, asset management, the terms of engagement with Libyan actors, and the security implications of foreign military activity on Libyan soil. Tags: CongressForeign PowerslibyaMilitary Tiesus
Yahoo
25-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - Market logic can't compute the true impact of US foreign aid
The U.S. Agency for International Development has its critics, who argue that its lack of accountability led to its downfall. But this argument not only oversimplifies the challenges of measuring impact in humanitarian and development work but wrongly applies a market-driven lens to a complex, multifaceted field. If foreign aid were run solely on a market logic, it would fail to address the nuanced political, social and conflict-related dynamics inherent in efforts to promote democracy, build peace and foster development. USAID was not a rogue agency. It was accountable to Congress, which played a significant role in overseeing its activities. This oversight was regulated by a set of U.S. government agencies focused on oversight, accountability and measurement including the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. This meant that USAID had to have an extensive monitoring, evaluation and learning system that required multiple levels of accountability. It also meant that when Congress wanted to see improvement in USAID's accountability mechanisms, it included that requirement in appropriations legislation. Was USAID perfect? Of course not, as indicated in critiques in reports of the Inspector General. And USAID itself recognized that improving its systems was essential. But the key to understanding USAID's accountability challenges is to understand that measurement in development work is not as straightforward as it is in traditional business models. In fact, short-term funding cycles, combined with the shift towards rigid regulations and quantifiable results, has come at the expense of effective development practices like institution-building, increasing local support and trust for new democratic institutions and long-term sustainability. Unlike commercial enterprises, where success is measured through profit and loss, development work involves long-term structural change, often in volatile environments. Measuring success in governance reform, development or conflict prevention is inherently complex. For example, increasing trust in local government institutions — a key goal of many USAID programs — cannot be easily quantified. It is challenging to measure precisely in the conflict-affected, insecure environments that matter most, where it may be impossible to conduct public opinion surveys or focus groups. Instead, its success must often be observed through gradual behavioral shifts over time. Of course, the difficulty of measuring impact does not mean that the work lacks value. For instance, the Global Fragility Act, signed into law by President Trump in 2019, emphasized the importance of conflict prevention. It is, of course, inherently difficult to know what conflicts have not occurred (although new techniques are continuously being developed). But that does not detract from the benefits — both moral and financial — of preventing violent conflict from erupting. In recent years, advances in evaluation and monitoring techniques have been facilitating data collection in challenging environments, including by USAID's Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization Peacebuilding Evaluation, Analysis, Research and Learning project. These analytical tools include data science, geographic information systems, remote sensing and satellite imagery analysis. Development programs differ significantly in their ability to be quantified. Some USAID initiatives, such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, can be measured in more concrete terms — tracking mortality rates or the number of medications administered. But it is the programs that address root causes of injustice and conflict that are the most difficult to quantify. Experts such as Andrew Natsios have argued that development programs most precisely and easily measured are the least transformational, whereas the most transformational are the least measurable. Under the current administration's logic of accountability, the least transformational programs, because their outputs and impacts are easy to quantify, are the ones that will most likely come back under the USAID reorganization into the State Department. Rather than focusing solely on quantifiable outcomes, the emphasis should be on understanding the processes that lead to change. Effective development work is about more than numbers — it requires assessing whether institutions are strengthening, communities are becoming more resilient, and whether people feel empowered to participate in governance. This type of change is incremental and cannot always be captured through rigid, data-driven assessments. Furthermore, the immediate impact of an intervention may be transitory and dissipate over time. Therefore, a purely results-driven approach risks not only incentivizing short-term, easily measurable projects over longer-term structural reforms but can result in funding initiatives that are ineffective. Likewise, what might seem like a prudent decision based on perceived financial efficiencies, may in fact undermine the overall program goals. For instance, the numbers might make it seem prudent to close AIDS clinics in a particular city that treats fewer patients and maintain the ones that treat more patients. Yet, if the broader social and political context of that city is not taken into account — what development professionals refer to as the conflict sensitivity lens — such closings may, without intending to, exacerbate communal conflicts and imperil rather than improve health interventions. If we believe that the kind of development, conflict resolution and democracy promotion work that USAID was engaged in had value, then we must carefully consider how to balance accountability with flexibility. We must also ask questions about whether we should be only accountable to U.S. taxpayers or also to the everyday people in developing, war-torn and unstable contexts we hope to help. The demand for quantifiable results should not come at the expense of meaningful, long-term change. Instead of dismantling aid agencies, reforms should focus on enhancing learning mechanisms, refining evaluation standards to respond to constituents and beneficiaries and improving communication with constituents. Ultimately, the debate should not be about whether foreign assistance should continue — it should be about how to ensure it is as effective as possible. The question is not just how to track every dollar, but how to measure success in a way that reflects the complexity of development and peacebuilding efforts. Effective oversight should be informed by both quantitative data and qualitative insights, ensuring that foreign assistance remains both accountable and impactful in the ways that matter most. Pamina Firchow is an associate professor of conflict resolution and coexistence in The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University. Agnieszka Paczyńska is professor of conflict analysis and resolution in the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
25-03-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
Market logic can't compute the true impact of US foreign aid
The U.S. Agency for International Development has its critics, who argue that its lack of accountability led to its downfall. But this argument not only oversimplifies the challenges of measuring impact in humanitarian and development work but wrongly applies a market-driven lens to a complex, multifaceted field. If foreign aid were run solely on a market logic, it would fail to address the nuanced political, social and conflict-related dynamics inherent in efforts to promote democracy, build peace and foster development. USAID was not a rogue agency. It was accountable to Congress, which played a significant role in overseeing its activities. This oversight was regulated by a set of U.S. government agencies focused on oversight, accountability and measurement including the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. This meant that USAID had to have an extensive monitoring, evaluation and learning system that required multiple levels of accountability. It also meant that when Congress wanted to see improvement in USAID's accountability mechanisms, it included that requirement in appropriations legislation. Was USAID perfect? Of course not, as indicated in critiques in reports of the Inspector General. And USAID itself recognized that improving its systems was essential. But the key to understanding USAID's accountability challenges is to understand that measurement in development work is not as straightforward as it is in traditional business models. In fact, short-term funding cycles, combined with the shift towards rigid regulations and quantifiable results, has come at the expense of effective development practices like institution-building, increasing local support and trust for new democratic institutions and long-term sustainability. Unlike commercial enterprises, where success is measured through profit and loss, development work involves long-term structural change, often in volatile environments. Measuring success in governance reform, development or conflict prevention is inherently complex. For example, increasing trust in local government institutions — a key goal of many USAID programs — cannot be easily quantified. It is challenging to measure precisely in the conflict-affected, insecure environments that matter most, where it may be impossible to conduct public opinion surveys or focus groups. Instead, its success must often be observed through gradual behavioral shifts over time. Of course, the difficulty of measuring impact does not mean that the work lacks value. For instance, the Global Fragility Act, signed into law by President Trump in 2019, emphasized the importance of conflict prevention. It is, of course, inherently difficult to know what conflicts have not occurred (although new techniques are continuously being developed). But that does not detract from the benefits — both moral and financial — of preventing violent conflict from erupting. In recent years, advances in evaluation and monitoring techniques have been facilitating data collection in challenging environments, including by USAID's Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization Peacebuilding Evaluation, Analysis, Research and Learning project. These analytical tools include data science, geographic information systems, remote sensing and satellite imagery analysis. Development programs differ significantly in their ability to be quantified. Some USAID initiatives, such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, can be measured in more concrete terms — tracking mortality rates or the number of medications administered. But it is the programs that address root causes of injustice and conflict that are the most difficult to quantify. Experts such as Andrew Natsios have argued that development programs most precisely and easily measured are the least transformational, whereas the most transformational are the least measurable. Under the current administration's logic of accountability, the least transformational programs, because their outputs and impacts are easy to quantify, are the ones that will most likely come back under the USAID reorganization into the State Department. Rather than focusing solely on quantifiable outcomes, the emphasis should be on understanding the processes that lead to change. Effective development work is about more than numbers — it requires assessing whether institutions are strengthening, communities are becoming more resilient, and whether people feel empowered to participate in governance. This type of change is incremental and cannot always be captured through rigid, data-driven assessments. Furthermore, the immediate impact of an intervention may be transitory and dissipate over time. Therefore, a purely results-driven approach risks not only incentivizing short-term, easily measurable projects over longer-term structural reforms but can result in funding initiatives that are ineffective. Likewise, what might seem like a prudent decision based on perceived financial efficiencies, may in fact undermine the overall program goals. For instance, the numbers might make it seem prudent to close AIDS clinics in a particular city that treats fewer patients and maintain the ones that treat more patients. Yet, if the broader social and political context of that city is not taken into account — what development professionals refer to as the conflict sensitivity lens — such closings may, without intending to, exacerbate communal conflicts and imperil rather than improve health interventions. If we believe that the kind of development, conflict resolution and democracy promotion work that USAID was engaged in had value, then we must carefully consider how to balance accountability with flexibility. We must also ask questions about whether we should be only accountable to U.S. taxpayers or also to the everyday people in developing, war-torn and unstable contexts we hope to help. The demand for quantifiable results should not come at the expense of meaningful, long-term change. Instead of dismantling aid agencies, reforms should focus on enhancing learning mechanisms, refining evaluation standards to respond to constituents and beneficiaries and improving communication with constituents. Ultimately, the debate should not be about whether foreign assistance should continue — it should be about how to ensure it is as effective as possible. The question is not just how to track every dollar, but how to measure success in a way that reflects the complexity of development and peacebuilding efforts. Effective oversight should be informed by both quantitative data and qualitative insights, ensuring that foreign assistance remains both accountable and impactful in the ways that matter most. Pamina Firchow is an associate professor of conflict resolution and coexistence in The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University. Agnieszka Paczyńska is professor of conflict analysis and resolution in the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University.
Arab Times
17-03-2025
- Politics
- Arab Times
Ivory Coast losing US aid as al-Qaeda, other extremist groups approaching
KIMBIRILA-NORD, Ivory Coast, March 16, (AP): With its tomato patches and grazing cattle, the Ivory Coast village of Kimbirila-Nord hardly looks like a front line of the global fight against extremism. But after jihadis attacked a nearby community in Mali five years ago and set up a base in a forest straddling the border, the US committed to spending $20 million to counter the spread of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group here and in dozens of other villages. The Trump administration's sweeping foreign aid cuts mean that support is now gone, even as violence in Mali and other countries in the Sahel region south of the Sahara has reached record levels and sent tens of thousands refugees streaming into northern Ivory Coast. Locals worry they have been abandoned. Diplomats and aid officials said the termination of aid jeopardizes counterterrorism efforts and weakens US influence in a part of the world where some countries have turned to Russian mercenaries for help. In Kimbirila-Nord, US funding, among other things, helped young people get job training, built parks for cattle to graze so they are no longer stolen by jihadis on Malian territory, and helped establish an information-sharing system so residents can flag violent encounters to each other and state services. "What attracts young people to extremists is poverty and hunger,' said Yacouba Doumbia, 78-year-old chief of Kimbirila-Nord. "There was a very dangerous moment in 2020. The project came at the right time, and allowed us to protect ourselves.' Over the last decade, West Africa has been shaken by extremist uprisings and military coups. Groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group have conquered large areas and killed thousands in the Sahel and have been spreading into wealthier West African coastal states, such as Ivory Coast, Benin and Togo. In 2019, President Donald Trump signed the Global Fragility Act that led to the initiatives in northern Ivory Coast. The U.S. goal in this area was to "seize a narrowing prevention window,' according to this year's congressional report about the implementation of the bipartisan legislation. Experts say local concerns help drive the popularity of extremist groups: competition for land and resources, exclusion, marginalization and lack of economic opportunities. Across the region, Islamic extremists have recruited among groups marginalized and neglected by central governments. "Ivory Coast is one of the few countries that still resist the terrorist threat in the Sahel,' said a UN official working in the country who was not authorized to speak on the matter publicly. "If we do not continue to support border communities, a minor issue could send them into the arms of extremists.'
Arab News
16-03-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Ivory Coast is losing US aid as Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups are approaching
KIMBIRILA-NORD, Ivory Coast: With its tomato patches and grazing cattle, the Ivory Coast village of Kimbirila-Nord hardly looks like a front line of the global fight against extremism. But after jihadis attacked a nearby community in Mali five years ago and set up a base in a forest straddling the border, the US committed to spending $20 million to counter the spread of Al-Qaeda and the Daesh group here and in dozens of other villages. The Trump administration's sweeping foreign aid cuts mean that support is now gone, even as violence in Mali and other countries in the Sahel region south of the Sahara has reached record levels and sent tens of thousands refugees streaming into northern Ivory Coast. Locals worry they have been abandoned. Diplomats and aid officials said the termination of aid jeopardizes counterterrorism efforts and weakens US influence in a part of the world where some countries have turned to Russian mercenaries for help. In Kimbirila-Nord, US funding, among other things, helped young people get job training, built parks for cattle to graze so they are no longer stolen by jihadis on Malian territory, and helped establish an information-sharing system so residents can flag violent encounters to each other and state services. 'What attracts young people to extremists is poverty and hunger,' said Yacouba Doumbia, 78-year-old chief of Kimbirila-Nord. 'There was a very dangerous moment in 2020. The project came at the right time, and allowed us to protect ourselves.' 'Seize a narrow prevention window' Over the last decade, West Africa has been shaken by extremist uprisings and military coups. Groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Daesh group have conquered large areas and killed thousands in the Sahel and have been spreading into wealthier West African coastal states, such as Ivory Coast, Benin and Togo. In 2019, President Donald Trump signed the Global Fragility Act that led to the initiatives in northern Ivory Coast. The US goal in this area was to 'seize a narrowing prevention window,' according to this year's congressional report about the implementation of the bipartisan legislation. Experts say local concerns help drive the popularity of extremist groups: competition for land and resources, exclusion, marginalization and lack of economic opportunities. Across the region, Islamic extremists have recruited among groups marginalized and neglected by central governments. 'Ivory Coast is one of the few countries that still resist the terrorist threat in the Sahel,' said a UN official working in the country who was not authorized to speak on the matter publicly. 'If we do not continue to support border communities, a minor issue could send them into the arms of extremists.' Trump issued an executive order in January directing a freeze on foreign assistance and a review of all US aid and development work abroad. He charged that much of foreign aid was wasteful and advanced a liberal agenda. 'Everyone was just looking out for themselves' In 2020, when the jihadis struck a Malian village 10 kilometers (6 miles) away, Kimbirila-Nord in many ways fit the description of a community susceptible to extremism. The lives of Malians and Ivorians were intertwined. People crossed the border freely, making it easy for extremists, who like residents spoke Bambara, to access Kimbirila-Nord. Many residents did not have identity cards and few spoke French, leaving them with no access to states services or official information. Different ethnic groups lived next to each other but were divided by conflicts over scarce natural resources and suspicions toward the state. And young people did not have opportunities to make money. 'We were very scared' when the extremists attacked, said Aminata Doumbia, the head of the village's female farmers cooperative. 'Everyone was just looking out for themselves.' The Ivorian government runs a program that provides professional training, grants and microloans. But access is difficult in villages such as Kimbirila-Nord. Kimbirila-Nord is home to refugees from Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Sifata Berte, 23, fled there with his family two years ago from Mali. He is not eligible for the government-run program, but got training through the project funded by the US Agency for International Development and now works as an apprentice in an iron workshop. Other things the USAID-funded project set up included a network of community radios in local languages, so people could get access to information. It also used mobile government trucks to help tens of thousands of people across the region get their identity documents. And it brought people together with microcredit cooperatives and with a special committee of ranchers and farmers that helps resolve tensions over land. 'It's thanks to the project that we can sleep at night,' Doumbia, the village chief, said. 'We learned how to be together.' Equal Access International, an international nonprofit, designed and implemented the US-funded project. The USAID project also has been the only direct source of information on the ground in northern Ivory Coast on violent events for the US-based Armed Conflict and Location & Event Data Project, the main provider of data on violence in the Sahel. The village had big plans Ivory Coast became known as a target for extremists in 2016, when an attack on the seaside resort of Grand Bassam killed tourists. In 2021, a string of attacks occurred near the country's northern border, but the violence has been largely contained after Ivorian authorities, Western governments and aid groups rushed into this impoverished and isolated part of the country with military build up and development projects. In 2024, the US Africa Command provided over $65 million to projects in Ivory Coast, most of which 'focused on counterterrorism and border security' in the northern part of the country, according to the group's website. The Pentagon said in a statement that it was 'not aware of any budget cuts that have undermined counterterrorism training or partnership programs in Africa.' Ivory Coast has the second-highest GDP per capita in West Africa, but according to the UN it remains one of the world's least developed countries. Many in remote villages like Kimbirila-Nord do not have access to running water. 'At first we thought that we only had to solve these problems with a military solution,' Famy Rene, the prefect of Korhogo, the region's capital, said. 'But we saw that this was not enough. We had to put in place programs that strengthen the resilience of the population.' Residents of Kimbirila-Nord had big plans before the US froze aid. The US was supposed to finance the first well in the village, help create a collective farm, and expand vocational training, Now they fear they have been left alone to deal with extremists. 'If you forget, they will come back,' said Doumbia, the village chief. 'As long as there is war on the other side of the border, we must remain on a high alert.'
