Latest news with #GregGrandin
Yahoo
02-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Don't ban this book
'Children will be taught to love America. Children will be taught to be patriots,' Stephen Miller said on Thursday. 'We're gonna make sure these funds are not being used to promote communist ideology.' He said that right after I'd talked to Greg Grandin, the Pulitzer-winning historian and author of , a massive new book that covers the creation of the United States and its neighbors as one big story. Alternative histories of our country have had a rough ride, recently, epitomized by that Miller quote. 'The 1619 Project,' in which the true founding was the arrival of slaves in North America, was adopted by blue state classrooms, then drummed out of red state classrooms. Grandin doesn't expect the same fate for his book, which is full of revelations, even for people with a solid understanding of the United States. The Trump administration's talk about annexing Canada, which helped Prime Minister Mark Carney win this week's election, gets covered as a wild departure from norms. So does the new right's affinity for El Salvador and the deportation of illegal immigrants here to a mega-prison there. This book, the best piece of nonfiction so far this year, corrects some of the lazy thinking about what America (the country) does and doesn't do, and clarifies what, exactly, is new about its Trump-led strategy of domination. 'During WWII, Latin Americans, and much of the world, thought they were not only fighting against Nazism but for social democracy, for social rights and social citizens. Latin Americans today, fending off the forces of darkness, still think so, still believe that if democracy is to be something more than a heraldic device, it must confront entrenched power.' This is an edited transcript of my talk with Grandin. David Weigel: How were the British colonization and the Spanish colonization of the Americas intertwined, ideologically? Greg Grandin: When I look at the Spanish conquest, I look at the moral critique that emerges out of it. The key figures are Bartolomé de las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, and they create a formidable critique, a moral judgment against what Spain is doing. Of course, it doesn't stop the Spanish conquest in any way. But it certainly is a crisis within Catholicism that produces this debate, giving rise to the principle of human equality, questioning the right of conquest. So the Virginia Company is sitting around in 1609 in London, wondering if they should issue some proclamation to justify colonization of what will become Jamestown and then eventually Plymouth. They've read Vitoria, they've read de las Casas. They say, well, the Spaniards have been arguing about this for a century, and they can't find a coherent justification for conquest, much less slavery. Maybe it's better that we don't say anything at all. Eventually, after the Powhatan attack on Jamestown in 1622, they do claim justification — saying that they were fighting a 'just war.' But for the most part, moral evasion was the hallmark of English settlement, while, for Spanish Catholics, the dispossession of Native Americans was an ongoing moral problem. Once they're being settled, why do they head in such different directions? It's rooted in the social structures of the Spanish empire, and the ideological justifications for Spanish colonialism. The Spanish built an empire that was assumed to be universal. Catholicism was the bearer of universal history and universal wisdom. In the Americas, even as they build an empire they claimed was universal, they did so by creating an administrative system that recognized differences, and created legal redress, for different ethnic racial groups. Even as those racial groups were divided and subdivided, and new categories were created. Centuries later, independence leaders understood their break with Spain as a chance to right the wrongs of the conquest and colonialism. Now, the gap between reality and practice was something else, and we can talk about that. But that gap matters, right? It creates the conditions of what's possible. In contrast to Spanish republicans, the leaders of US independence didn't feel like they were atoning for the settlement of Plymouth. They didn't feel like they had any grievances with British colonialism, except for the grievances with King George III that they put into the Declaration of Independence. Spanish republicanism was much more capacious in its emancipationist vision. It understood enslavement not just as chattel slavery of African Americans, but of the servitude of Native Americans. In some countries, slavery persisted. In other countries, it was abolished immediately. But the idea of emancipation was built into the revolution. Simón Bolívar admired the United States, but he didn't think that the social basis of US republicanism — of restraining the state to free individual ambition — would lead to a virtuous society. So is there some historical basis for what's going on now with the United States and El Salvador — of saying, you get to take our prisoners and we'll pay for it? No, I think it's unprecedented. We could talk about different plans to export Native Americans beyond the frontier to Oklahoma and elsewhere. We could talk about Liberia. We could talk about Guantanamo, a place that can deal with the excess of people that don't fit within the legal regime or social structure of the country. But to actually make a deal with somebody who, by all accounts, is a dictator, is something else entirely. Bukele created social peace by cutting a deal with the upper echelon of the gangs. He allowed them to make money if they decreased their killings, and he said, we're going to throw your rank and file in prison. There is no precedent for working with that. The meeting with Bukele in the White House — I had never seen anything like it. The glee, the laughing, the impunity that was on display. When we interned the Japanese, we built camps and put the people in them on US soil, right? We didn't send them to Peru. Although we did get Peru to intern their own Japanese immigrants. In fact, Peru wound up sending many of their Japanese citizens the US to be interned. Right now, you see an Alberta independence movement in Canada; you have Trump talking about annexing Canada or Greenland, and re-taking the Panama canal. That's often covered as a break from American tradition: This isn't who we are. But how much of this expansionism is rooted in our histories? I do think Trump is unique. What he's doing is a reassertion of the doctrine of conquest. He's not going to get Canada. I don't know what he's going to do with Greenland. But he's signaling very clearly that he rejects the premise of the rules-based order, of cooperation and shared interests. And that premise, to a large degree, comes out of Latin America. It joins the world order as a league of nations. It's not one republic against Great Britain. It's seven republics against Spain, and they have to learn how to live with each other. They have to learn how to deal with each other. What would have stopped Argentina from looking at the United States and saying: You know what? We want the Pacific, too. Well: Chile was there. So, the weakening of the doctrine of conquest begins in Latin America, along with this sense that the international order should be organized around cooperation, not competition, and should be geared towards solving common problems. Trump is clearly saying that is no longer the premise. Maybe James K. Polk and Andrew Jackson believed some of that, but even Theodore Roosevelt was very willing to work with the international law movement to figure out a way to organize the nations of the world. We've seen the Trump administration take more control of museums and historical associations, and talk about the sort of patriotic curricula they want in schools. Do you see anything in your book that might cross with them, and get it banned? You know, I've come to the conclusion that you can say and write whatever you want about Latin America. It's not Israel. I mean, how did I become the C. Vann Woodward professor of history at Yale University? If there was some effort to get it banned, I think that would be great. It would mean some attention is finally being paid to Latin America.
New York Times
03-04-2025
- Business
- New York Times
Trump's Trade War Risks Forfeiting America's Economic Primacy
The global economic system that the United States has shaped and steered for more than three-quarters of a century was animated by a powerful guiding vision: that trade and finance would be based on cooperation and consent rather than coercion. That system, for all its faults, entrenched the United States as the world's richest nation and its sole financial superpower. The rule of law and the stability and trust that this approach generated helped make the dollar the world's go-to currency for transactions and America a center of global investment. By provoking a worldwide trade war, President Trump risks abandoning that vision of shared interests and replacing it with one that assumes sharp economic conflicts are unavoidable. Gone are appeals to a larger purpose, mutual agreements or shared values. In this new order, the strongest powers determine the rules and enforce them through intimidation and bare-knuckled power. 'This is a completely different vision,' said Greg Grandin, a historian at Yale, 'one in which the first principle is that nations don't have shared interests; they have inherent conflicts of interests.' That view is behind the president's decision to slap sweeping tariffs on Wednesday including a 10 percent tax on nearly every import to the United States. Mr. Trump's trade policies after a little over two months in office have prompted a sharp drop in the stock market and in business and consumer confidence. Wall Street analysts have been projecting higher inflation rates and slower growth in the United States and around the world. But quarterly gains and losses are trivial, many economists and political leaders said, compared with the potential long-term damage to the unique power and privileges that the United States has built up in the postwar global order. At stake are the country's unmatched influence over the world's financial system, the advantages its businesses enjoy and a reputation that attracts investors and innovators. Mr. Trump's turn away from cooperation, said Abraham Newman, a professor at Georgetown University, 'will undermine U.S. economic security in the long term.' The dollar's perks and power Consider the pre-eminent role of the dollar as the world's reserve currency, the one that virtually every nation uses for everyday commerce and stows for rainy days. Because global trade and transactions are conducted in dollars, everyone needs them. That demand means the United States can pay less interest when it sells Treasury bonds, which lowers borrowing costs. In addition, American businesses are free from many of the worries that stem from the ups-and-downs of foreign exchange markets or capital flight. When unrest and uncertainty roil the global economy, the dollar is seen as a safe haven — even when the United States is responsible for the turmoil. American dominance of the global financial system has also enabled Washington to shape the world's economy around its own security concerns. After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks revealed how terrorists were using the global financial system to send money across borders, the United States was in a position to tighten controls. Republican and Democratic administrations have expanded their use of sanctions and export controls to cement U.S. dominance over global finance and, later, over technology like artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Such power is what enabled the United States to restrict the export of advanced computing equipment to China and freeze Russian-owned foreign currency reserves after Ukraine was invaded. Yet every time the Trump administration says it wants to push down the dollar's value on the foreign exchange market or threatens tariffs and other consequences, trust in the dollar takes a hit, said Barry Eichengreen, the author of 'Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System.' A weaker dollar means foreign holders of it lose money. 'In that sense,' Mr. Eichengreen said, 'the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, which is trying to depreciate away its external obligations, is impaired.' The downsides of winner takes all The failure to account for mutual interests can undermine longer-term goals, said Joseph S. Nye Jr., a professor at Harvard. In his eyes, the administration's transactional attitude reflects Mr. Trump's background as a real estate developer in New York and New Jersey, where bullying can be common and each deal is a one-and-done. That approach made Mr. Trump money but also resulted in his having to declare his properties bankrupt multiple times. What it does not achieve, Mr. Nye said, are the growth, credibility and influence that accrue from being a reliable partner over years and decades. When White House officials discussed plans to strike Houthi militants in Yemen who have been attacking ships in the Suez Canal, they complained about 'European freeloading' and considered extracting some kind of payment 'in return.' But keeping the canal open was not just a favor for Europe. It discourages other countries, militias and pirates from interfering with the passage of trade. 'In the long run, it is in our interests to have freedom of navigation of the seas and not have a group like the Houthis destroy it,' Mr. Nye said. Similarly, it was in the United States' interest to organize a $50 billion bailout for Mexico after a financial crisis hit in 1994. Washington was worried that a devastated economy would encourage half a million Mexicans to illegally migrate across the border. And keeping the world supplied with dollars during crises is also what keeps the global financial system's plumbing working. At the same time, American deposits in the favor bank build up credit. The United States has been able to successfully pressure allies like the Netherlands and Japan to limit the sale of advanced semiconductor equipment — and their domestic manufacturers' profits — to China. Successive administrations, including Mr. Trump's, have worried about military uses of the technology as well as the possibility that China could eventually create its own version of products it now buys from American businesses. The reliance on coercion instead of cooperation was standard after World War I. And it eventually spurred Germany's Nazification, Japanese imperialism and a ruinous tariff war. That grim history prompted the United States and other nations after World War II to adopt an approach that focused on mutual interests. Seizing the lead position, Washington provided enormous economic support through the Marshall Plan because it believed a stronger Europe would be in America's long-term interest. The guiding principle was that commercial ties would bind countries together and mitigate military conflict. It was an idea that won its primary proponent at the time, the former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, a Nobel Peace Prize in 1945. Mr. Trump, though, has turned this theory on its head. Instead of focusing on the shared interests that economic ties create, he is seeking to exploit the vulnerabilities they generate. Indeed, Mr. Trump is the first president since the end of World War II to pursue American interests by regularly violating international agreements, turning on allies and scorning tools of soft power like economic and humanitarian aid. 'What we're seeing is so dramatic,' said Mr. Newman, the Georgetown political scientist. Among America's allies, he said, a deep fear is developing that the Trump administration is looking to create a new global order narrowly focused on American self-aggrandizement. The approach may produce immediate gains. When Colombia's president turned away U.S. military planes carrying deportees, Mr. Trump's threat to impose financial sanctions and 50 percent tariffs on all Colombian products forced a policy reversal. But if countries believe the global order is dominated by a capricious leader, they will look for alternatives. Over time, that could downgrade the dollar's status and reduce allies' reliance on American weapons, technology and products. It could also strengthen China's hand at the expense of the United States. On Sunday, trade ministers for Japan and South Korea, America's economic partners in efforts to counter China, met with Chinese representatives in Seoul for the first time in five years to discuss expanding regional trade ties. Any closer commercial ties they might forge with China could significantly undermine Washington's goal of slowing the breakout advancements in technology by China. And that, said Mr. Newman, is 'the opposite of what the U.S. would hope to achieve.'
