Latest news with #HansMorgenthau
Express Tribune
4 days ago
- Politics
- Express Tribune
India — indiscretion or prudence
Listen to article Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace is a book on political science published in 1948. The author has outlined six principles of political realism in this book. It is interesting to see Prime Minister Narendra Modi's actions and Indian state behaviour against Pakistan in view of these principles. The six principles are: 1) politics like society in general is governed by objective laws that have roots in human nature; 2) a statesman sees certain problems of foreign policy under certain circumstances; 3) key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category and is universally valid; 4) universal moral principles cannot be applied to actions of the state; 5) political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the world; and 6) there is a profound difference of policymaking in different schools of thought. I would like to start with the last principle. The nature of a man, the nature of society, and the nature of the politics all three combine to produce a typical school of thought and the consequential nature of the state behaviour which aims at the realisation of any evil or good. In this context, it is important to correctly understand the motives and ideological preferences of the man, PM Modi of India, who drives the process of policymaking. If, through his actions, he represents illiberalism, autocracy, nationalism, protectionism and territorial revisionism, then he represents the dark force of regional politics that seeks war and not peace. To view the Indian state behaviour in light of the 5th principle of political realism is to see how India under the Modi-led government has deprived the people of occupied Kashmir of justice, freedom, equality, dignity and security - which are some of the moral laws that are universally applicable and govern the world. The 4th principle of political realism speaks of the universal moral principles such as honesty, respect for life, justice, fairness, compassion, empathy and forgiveness. It's not just India but its partner and ally Israel that practices this principle of political realism and considers that these universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of their states. The third principle of realism, which identifies with interests being defined as power, showcases Indian political realism being practiced under the dark shadows of the Modi-led government for over a decade now. When history is written, the chronicles of this short war between India and Pakistan will buzz with PM Modi's motives, ideological preference and appetite for resorting to violence for his own political gains. Since Modi has come to power, the direction of Indian foreign policy has gone in no other way but the resolution of Pakistan-India conflicts through war-making. PM Modi's intentions about Pakistan have always been questionable. His anti-Muslim rhetoric earns him praise and political points from the Indian electorate, but the policies that result from his motivational speeches, diplomatic directions and political dictates throw up an interesting question: Will his Pakistan-specific policies be politically successful and sustainable in the long run? The second principle of political realism talks of policymaking as circumstantial. Currently, the government policies and the politics between India and Pakistan are a popular topic of global discussion and at the centre of global debate. Leadership of both countries is being critically viewed, as what they decide and do would mean the implementation of peace or the commencement of war. This pause in fighting that some of us consider as ceasefire has created a much-needed space for the leadership of both countries for reflection and clarity on the circumstances and the regional and global environment under which fighting a war may or may not be a preferred option. PM Modi of India is not backing off, and the hatred that he brews against Pakistan is a reflection of a political leader who is bent upon seeking war and not peace as an end. One can contextualise the politics of the Indian PM as an outcome of political realism, but he must carefully consider the consequences of his actions and avoid the Indian state policy from being driven by lust for conflict, self-interest and power maximisation. Ironically, the majority in Pakistan believe that there will remain little likelihood for reconciliation or room for compromise in Indian politics as long as India, under PM Modi, continues to behave as a regional hegemon and treats Pakistan as unequal. However, Pakistan may be unequal in size and strength, but it is not unequal in its resolve — something that Pakistan proved in its response through Operation Bunyan Marsoos. The first principle of political realism suggests that ethical norms can be drawn from human nature. Some of the objective laws that govern human nature are the spirit of survival, fair play, inclusivity, cognitive ability for future orientation and curiosity for problem-solving. One can only wish that India's politics against Pakistan is also governed under these objective laws that govern the nature of human beings. The Indian public judges their PM's motives through the lens of his ideological preferences and thus considers the resulting anti-Pakistan policies as morally right. What the Indian public needs to do is to judge these policies from the point of view of the probability of their success. The best metric to do that is to see if, following these policies, the lives of the people living in India or even the entire region will become better or worse? Even if PM Modi has convinced the Indian electorate that fighting a war with Pakistan is morally justified, rationality demands that India must weigh the benefits of alternate political action, which is indulging in a dialogue — a pure act of prudence. It is not the question of who dominates — hawks or doves — in the Indian policymaking circle, but the real question is the rationality of Indian policymaking. Rational minds will have to come to the forefront and comprehend the Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan, minus the policy being overshadowed by the Indian PM's personal motives, ideological preferences and anti-Pakistan biases. Sane minds in India must distinguish between the Indian PM's official duty and his wish in analysing what is desirable and what is truly possible under the concrete circumstances of availability of tremendous military capability being showcased by both sides, including military platforms that demonstrate destructive powers with nuclear armed warheads.
Yahoo
31-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
What is a ‘revisionist' state, and what are they trying to revise?
Once upon a time, 'revisionist power' was a term reserved for nations trying to overturn the postwar liberal order – the usual suspects being countries like Russia, China or Iran. But lately, that concept is starting to fray. When Beijing's top diplomat says the United States is the one disrupting global stability, and respected analysts argue that Washington itself is acting like a revisionist state, the label suddenly looks a lot less tidy. And yet the term is everywhere – in think tank reports, in political speeches, in headlines about political hot spots. But what does revisionist really mean? And why should we care? At its core, 'revisionist power' is a label applied to nations that want to change the way the world is ordered. The concept dates back to the period between the two world wars, when it described countries opposing the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I. Political scientist Hans Morgenthau later distinguished between status quo powers and those seeking to overturn the balance of power. The label itself was popularized in the mid-20th century, especially through A.F.K. Organski's 1958 work on power transition, which defined revisionist powers as those dissatisfied with the existing order and determined to reshape it. The change desired by nations can take many forms: redrawing borders, rebalancing regional power balances or creating alternative rules, norms and institutions to the ones that currently structure international politics. The key is that revisionists nations aren't just unhappy with specific policies – they're dissatisfied with the broader system and want to reshape it in fundamental ways. The concept comes out of the realist tradition in international relations, which sees the world as an arena of power politics. In that framework, countries operate in an anarchic international system with no higher authority to enforce the rules. The most powerful nations construct or impose a particular set of rules, norms and institutions on the international system, creating an order that reflects their values and serves their interests. In this tradition, status quo powers benefit from the system and want to keep it more or less as it is. But revisionist powers see the system as constraining or unjust – and seek to alter it. This doesn't always mean war or open confrontation. Revisionism isn't inherently aggressive, nor is it always destabilizing. It simply describes a nation's support for or opposition to the prevailing international order. How that desire is expressed can include diplomacy, economic coercion or even armed conflict. Consider Russia. Its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were not just violations of international law – they were clear efforts to overturn the post-Cold War, NATO-based security order in Europe. Russia was not lashing out at individual policies; it was challenging – or seeking to revise – the legitimacy of the existing system. China presents a different kind of case. Beijing has made use of existing international institutions and benefited enormously from global trade, but it's also been building alternatives, including regional banks, trade blocs and digital infrastructure designed to reduce dependence on Western systems. China's expanding presence in the South China Sea, its pressure on Taiwan and its desire to shape global norms on everything from human rights to internet governance point to a broader effort to revise the current order – though more gradually than Russia's approach. Iran, meanwhile, operates mostly at the regional level. Through its support for proxy groups like Hezbollah, its influence in Iraq and Yemen, and its confrontational stance toward Israel and the Gulf monarchies, Iran has long sought to reshape the Middle East's power dynamics. It's not trying to rewrite the entire international system, but it's certainly revisionist in the region. Of course, calling a nation 'revisionist' is not a neutral act. It reflects a judgment about whose vision of world order is legitimate and whose is not. A rising power might see itself as correcting historical imbalances, not disrupting stability. The term can be useful, but it can also obscure as much as it reveals. Still, the label captures something real – though maybe not as cleanly as it used to. Much of today's geopolitical tension does hinge on a basic divide: Some nations want to preserve the existing order, and others want to reshape it. But it's no longer obvious who belongs in which camp. Now, when the U.S. sidelines institutions it once championed, imposes extraterritorial sanctions or pushes for new tech and trade regimes that bypass rivals, it starts to blur the line between defender and challenger of the status quo. Maybe the more useful question now isn't just which great power is revisionist – but whether any of them are still committed to the post-World War II international order created in the U.S.'s image. This article is part of a series explaining foreign policy terms commonly used, but rarely explained. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Andrew Latham, Macalester College Read more: What is the rules-based order? How this global system has shifted from 'liberal' origins − and where it could be heading next What is isolationism? The history and politics of an often-maligned foreign policy concept The Global South is on the rise – but what exactly is the Global South? Andrew Latham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Guardian
16-03-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Australia is a 21st century power. Why hide behind the sham comfort of ‘punching above our weight'?
The second Trump presidency has ushered in a world where bluster and capriciousness combine to generate retaliation and uncertainty. Many think that, during his first presidency, Trump normalised the dog-eat-dog behaviours that generate human suffering and economic adversity, legitimising autocrats and authorising the kleptocratic tendencies of the small band of the world's super-rich. Many fear that his second term is making the world an even more dangerous place. To avoid the consequences of impetuous self-interest and transactional chaos, we need constantly to return to first principles: what helps us control the forces of instability? Not quite 80 years ago, Hans Morgenthau published his magisterial Politics Among Nations. A groundbreaking analysis of what constitutes national power, Morgenthau explained America's rise to global dominance. But he also described the template that enabled the nations smashed by the horrors of the second world war – victors and vanquished alike – to rebuild. Britain was bankrupt. France was deeply divided and about to embark on disastrous post-colonial wars. Germany was divided and had effectively ceased to exist as a state, as had Japan. China was reeling from nearly two decades of civil war, and the Soviet Union's victory in eastern Europe had come at vast social and economic cost. Only America emerged from the second world war with its national power enhanced, thereby affording it the agency to build a postwar world in its own image. Fast forward to the present and a very different power distribution is in play. The US remains top dog, largely by virtue of its military power, though it finds it difficult to come to terms with the fact that 'power' is not univocal. Power takes many forms, and the immense cultural power that largely defines China and Russia is something that America finds difficult to contemplate, much less accommodate. The countries in the G20 have established their identities through the myriad elements of national power, which in turn determine how they relate to other nation states. Australia is no exception. By any measure, Australia enjoys considerable national power. The constant retreat into the sham comfort of 'middle power' (as though we were an southern hemisphere version of the Baltic states) and 'punching above our weight' represents a serious failure of confidence, imagination and political leadership. We occupy a continent. Our resource base is practically limitless. Our economy currently ranks 12th, perhaps just in front of Russia in current circumstances. On some calculations, four of our capital cities are in the top hundred in terms of amenity and habitability. On other measures, eight of our universities are in the top hundred global tertiary institutions – a remarkable achievement for a population of 26 million. Sign up for Guardian Australia's breaking news email Even in terms of military spending, Australia ranks 13th in the world – albeit a long way behind the US and China. On Morgenthau's reckoning, we are a well educated society demonstrating high levels of acceptance and inclusion, though always capable of improvement of course, as the failure of the voice referendum demonstrated only too starkly. Australia also boasts a robust health and social security system with strong safety nets across the entire population. This is what 21st-century power looks like. Yet when it comes to the exercise of national power – performing as a constructive and independent actor on the global stage, Australia is defensive, uncertain and timid. On what we like to describe as 'strategic' matters (though we do not seem to have much of an idea of what a strategic issue really is), we fall in behind America and, amazingly, Great Britain, and take comfort from fictions like the Quad where India's and Japan's roles are ambiguous, to say the least. We are constantly embarrassed in our dealings with our Asian neighbours, at once condescending and culturally uncomprehending. For all our fear of the so-called threat from China in the Pacific, we retreat behind platitudes like 'our Pacific family' but remain tight-fisted when it comes to constructive economic development. To take just one example: the paucity of health services in the Pacific, especially for women and children, is nothing short of a national disgrace for a wealthy country that claims to care about its neighbours. Papua New Guinea's health system is on the verge of collapse, and instead of offering financial and medical support, we lecture PNG on governance. Really? There are some deep pathologies that constrain Australia's agency. For all our protestations to the contrary, we are widely seen in Asia and the Pacific as deeply racist, and we are. Again, just contemplate the voice referendum. We are a structurally misogynistic society, with male entitlement continuing to dominate business and the professions. We are insecure, afraid of abandonment and constantly in search of reassurance from a great and powerful protector. And we are diffident in our ability to self-affirm, always looking for American or British approval. There is, however, a remedy to these constraints on our national agency, and the remedy is well within our grasp if only we were to draw on our considerable national power. And what is the key to mobilising the elements of national power and creating agency? As Morgenthau pointed out, agency comes into its own when the quality of a nation's diplomacy combines the elements of national power into an integrated whole, giving them direction and weight. Australia conducts its foreign policy in fits and starts, alternating initial enthusiasm with a reluctance to sustain delivery. Foreign ministers such as Doc Evatt, Percy Spender, Gough Whitlam, Andrew Peacock, Gareth Evans and more recently Penny Wong have shown what can be done when there is clarity of purpose and drive. Yet a successful and sustained diplomacy takes more than ambition and imagination. It takes resources, which we are simply unwilling to allocate. There is bipartisan support for a defence budget of just under $60bn per annum, while the Dfat allocation on diplomacy is just over $1.8bn – less than half the allocation to official development assistance at $4.2bn. Notwithstanding its fatuous and oft-repeated claim to 'punch above its weight', Australia ranks 26th on the Global Diplomacy Index and within the G20 it fields the second smallest diplomatic network. And as the global south expands in power and influence, Australia is barely visible in Africa, the Americas, the Middle East and Central Asia. Complacency is a sure track to irrelevance. Successive governments have talked about disruption and uncertainty, mostly in response to China's economic growth. Yet our response to that disruption and uncertainty is not to increase our diplomatic effort but to acquire long-range nuclear-powered submarines that may never materialise, while we hunker down behind nervous disengagement. If we are serious about the need for a global rules-based order that it is not just an artefact of the Pax Americana but a genuinely inclusive approach to human wellbeing and global prosperity, we need to practise our advocacy everywhere, not just where we feel comfortable. We have the national power to do this, just as we have the key elements of diplomatic agency. But we need the policies and funding to perform a more active and engaged internationalist role. * This is an adapted extract of his essay National Power, Agency, and a Foreign Policy that Delivers in What's the Big Idea? 34 Ideas for a Better Australia (Australia Institute Press)
