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NBC News
2 days ago
- Business
- NBC News
How rare earth minerals could give China the upper hand in U.S. trade talks
'China doesn't just mine rare earth materials. They refine them and manufacture the magnets as well. So in fact, the closer you get to the final industrial use, the more dominant China becomes,' Andersson said. Demand for rare earths has only increased as the automobile and electronics industries advanced in recent decades and began their clean energy transitions. That has given China 'real leverage, not just economically, but geopolitically too,' Andersson said. 'They can influence global prices, supply availability, and really even the pace of green tech development.' How China is using that leverage China has long signaled its willingness to leverage its dominance in rare earths and the broader group of critical minerals, temporarily banning rare earths exports to Japan in 2010 over a territorial dispute. Since 2023, it has also imposed export curbs on gallium, germanium, antimony, graphite, and tungsten, which are critical minerals but not rare earths. Also in 2023, Beijing banned the export of technology to extract and separate rare earths. Export restrictions are not uncommon and countries around the world often impose them on products and materials they consider key for national security. The U.S., for example, has levied curbs on the export of its semiconductors to China in an attempt to slow Beijing's artificial intelligence advancements. China has also introduced a licensing system requiring exporters to provide documents proving that the end products will not be used for military purposes, which can be difficult. 'This whole mechanism is such that it gives China visibility into where the minerals are going, who's using them and for what,' said John Seaman, a research fellow at the French Institute of International Relations. 'It allows China to sort of map the supply chain and map the usage, and therefore also map the vulnerabilities of countries.' Experts also say that in the long term, the situation could give Chinese manufacturers an edge. 'The alternative is then to basically rely on Chinese-made technology. So you're not going to get your rare earth magnet, but you're going to get a Chinese wind turbine,' Seaman said.
Yahoo
26-03-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Can the EU win in the rare earths game?
The European Union needs rare earths and critical raw materials to push forward its strategic economic agenda, but the 27-nation bloc is highly dependent on imports from countries such as China, creating geopolitical vulnerabilities. First things first: What kind of materials are we talking about? The EU has identified 34 critical raw materials (CRMs). They are of high importance for the EU economy, but have a high risk of supply disruption: Their sources are highly concentrated and there is a lack of good substitutes. "Some of these elements are more or less irreplaceable, or at high cost," said John Seaman, a researcher at the French Institute of International Relations. Of the 34 CRMs, 17 are classified as strategic raw materials (SRMs) - those where difficulties in meeting a projected increase in demand make supply risks likely in the near future. This list includes cobalt, copper, tungsten, lithium and nickel. The SRMs are not to be confused with rare earths. Rare earths are a separate group of 17 chemical elements. They are mostly metals and some of them are not even that rare. The group contains elements such as cerium, europium, erbium and yttrium. All rare earths are part of the EU's list of CRMs. "The more demand grows for these raw materials, the more people look for them and the more they find. The problem lies more in the relationship between extraction costs and market prices,' Seaman said. Why does the EU need them? CRMs and rare earths are essential for the EU's plans to move away from fossil fuels. They are necessary for key components of the EU's green transition, such as batteries or solar panels. Demand is expected to increase sharply in the coming years. Likewise, CRMs are part of industrial supply chains and are used to make common products such as mobile phones. They are also needed to develop strategic technologies in sectors such as defence. One example: The European Commission expects EU demand for lithium batteries, which power electric and energy storage vehicles, to increase 12-fold by 2030 and 21-fold by 2050, compared to current figures. The EU's demand for rare earth metals, also used in wind turbines and electric vehicles, is expected to increase five to six times by 2030 and six to seven times by 2050. In May 2024 the European CRM Act entered into force, with the aim of strengthening the EU's strategic autonomy by increasing and diversifying supplies. The act sets benchmarks along the SRM supply chain for the bloc to reach by 2030: 10% of the EU's annual needs for extraction; 40% for processing and 25% for recycling. No more than 65% of the EU's annual needs of each SRM at any relevant stage of processing should come from a single non-EU country. The commission plans to support a range of almost 50 projects and companies in the bloc to reach these goals. On Tuesday, the EU executive published a list of 47 "strategic projects" which include opening lithium and tungsten mines, in an effort to reduce over-reliance on China. "This is a landmark moment for European sovereignty as an industrial powerhouse," said Stéphane Séjourné, commission vice-president for industrial strategy. What supplies exist within the bloc? The EU can only rely on its member states for a fraction of its needs for some CRMs. There are currently no rare earth elements mined in Europe, although some deposits are known of. Portugal for example has Europe's largest reserves of lithium - a CRM but not a rare earth - and the eighth largest globally, and is the only significant producer in the EU. Its extraction has been contested by local communities in Portugal. The Spanish Confederation of Mineral Raw Materials Industries believes that Europe urgently needs to conduct exhaustive geological research to regain the autonomy that it has lost due to its 40 years of dependence on foreign resources. According to the confederation, Spain is among the countries with the greatest potential for mining key raw materials. It is already the EU's second largest producer of copper and manganese. Under pressure from Brussels, the Spanish government has just presented a plan to accelerate subsoil exploration. Extraction is met with local resistance however, amid concern about the nuisance and environmental impact of these projects, particularly related to their high water consumption and the use of chemicals to recover metals held underground. Friends of the Earth environmental group recently warned that a revival of the mining sector will increase the risk of accidents and worsen "the social and environmental impacts inherent in extractive activity." It accused the authorities of a lack of transparency. Where does the EU import raw materials from? The EU currently sources most of its critical raw materials from outside the bloc. For example, Turkey provided 98% of the EU's boron as of 2024, and China provided the entire EU supply of heavy rare earth elements such as europium, terbium or yttrium. For its part, South Africa is responsible for 71% of the EU's need for platinum metals. Another important supplier is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): 63% of the world's cobalt - used in batteries and high-strength light alloys for the defence and aerospace sectors - comes from the war-torn state. The EU has tried hard to diversify its sources, with mixed success. Last year, the commission signed a deal with Rwanda on CRMs. The hope for Brussels was to reduce its dependence on China for raw materials such as lithium, tin or gold. Rwanda would get funding to develop mining operations. However, there has been controversy from the start as Rwandan fighters have been involved in clashes in a minerals-rich border region in neighbouring DRC. Due to the military escalation in North Kivu, the European Parliament in February called for a suspension of the deal. Belgium has lobbied intensively to impose sanctions on Rwanda over its support for the M23 rebel group in the DRC and suspend the agreement. The commission however argues that a suspension would be counterproductive. Rwanda, for its part, severed diplomatic relations with Belgium last week. Are Greenland and Ukraine the answer? Greenland's resources have been the object of US desire. President Donald Trump's talk of taking over the autonomous Danish territory has raised alarm bells in Copenhagen and Brussels. Greenland's subsoil contains lithium and graphite for batteries and rare earth elements. Greenland's rare earths are estimated at 36.1 billion tons by the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS). Despite the great interest however, the number of planned mining projects is quite limited, according to Jakob Kløve Keiding, a senior consultant at GEUS. "The companies all have ambitions to start a mine, but not many projects are close to being realized," he says. The industry only accounts for about 1% of Greenland's economy. Greenland remains almost entirely unexploited, while its minerals are seen as a potential springboard to independence, a goal backed by a majority of the island's 57,000 inhabitants. In reality it is a long way from an exploitation licence to profitable production. Administrative challenges, difficult Arctic conditions and the limited infrastructure in Greenland all make it difficult to make money from extracting raw materials. Looking eastwards, the commission has described Ukraine as "a potential source of more than twenty critical raw materials." The country produces three critical minerals in particular: manganese, titanium and graphite, essential for electric batteries. Of the latter mineral, Ukraine accounts for "20% of the estimated global resources," notes the French Bureau of Geological and Mining Research. However, much of Ukraine's rare earths and strategic material deposits are located in the Russian-controlled eastern region of the country. Kiev is once again close to signing an agreement on minerals with the United States, Trump said a few days ago. He has been pressuring Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to sign economic deals to compensate the US for its support in resisting Russia's invasion. The EU had tried to get in on the minerals game with Ukraine back in 2021, launching a strategic partnership on raw materials. Russia's invasion in 2022 put a stopper on implementing the plans. Afterwards, the EU failed to establish a mutual framework, so now the bloc is late to the party. Last month, France said it was in discussions with Ukraine to access its mineral wealth, including for military use. The talks started in October and were led by both countries' defence ministries, French Defence Minister Sebastien Lecornu said. Unlike Trump, France was not seeking any payback from Kiev for aid granted in support of Ukraine's war against Russia, he noted. The content of this article is based on reporting by AFP, ANSA, Belga, dpa, EFE, LUSA and Ritzau as part of the European Newsroom (enr) project.
New York Times
07-03-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
Alarmed by Trump, Poland Must Look at Nuclear Options, Premier Says
Warning that a 'profound change of American geopolitics' had put Poland, as well as Ukraine, in an 'objectively more difficult situation,' Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland on Friday said his country must drastically increase the size of its military and even 'reach for opportunities related to nuclear weapons.' Mr. Tusk, in a detailed speech on security to the Polish Parliament, did not explicitly propose developing a nuclear arsenal, but said that 'it is time for us to look boldly at our possibilities of having the most modern weapons' and explore options for nuclear and 'modern unconventional weapons.' He added that his government was 'talking seriously' with France, Europe's only nuclear power aside from Britain and Russia, about the possibility of extending the French nuclear umbrella to other European countries. In addition, he said, Poland needs to ensure that all adult men are 'trained in the event of war.' His comments reflect the stark turnabout at the White House with the return of President Trump, who has publicly denigrated the NATO alliance, cast doubt on the U.S. commitment to defend much of Europe in the event of a Russian attack and falsely shifted the blame for Russia's invasion of Ukraine onto Kyiv. Mr. Trump's views were received with deep alarm in Warsaw and other parts of Eastern Europe that have bitter memories of being bullied and repeatedly occupied by Russia over centuries. Poland is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which prohibits countries that were not among five declared nuclear powers in 1970, when the treaty took effect, from acquiring atomic weapons. But Israel, India and Pakistan, which never signed onto the ban, and North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty, have all developed nuclear weapons, and there has been sporadic discussion in Poland of trying to join the nuclear club. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of Poland's former governing party, said in 2022 that he would, 'as a citizen,' like to see Poland acquire nuclear weapons but added: 'As a responsible politician, I must assess this idea as unrealistic.' Russian officials have suggested repeatedly that they could use nuclear arms in the fight against Ukraine, which is not a NATO member, particularly if the West ramps up its military aid to Ukraine. But repeated escalations in that aid so far have not prompted such a response. The French Institute of International Relations warned in a report last year that 'the war in Ukraine has the potential to increase proliferation risks, as it signals that nuclear powers can attack an adversary with conventional capabilities while backing its actions with nuclear threats to deter third-party intervention.' 'The war also sends the message that nuclear weapons are a necessary guarantor of national security,' the report said. When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, Ukraine held on its territory the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal but relinquished it in 1994, in return for a pledge from Russia, as well as the United States and Britain, to respect Ukrainian borders and refrain from the use or threat of military force. Many Ukrainians now regret giving up this arsenal, as their government has appealed in vain for NATO membership and direct involvement of Western forces in the war. Poland is the biggest military power among former members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military alliance that are now members of NATO. But those nations have long looked to the United States, with its nuclear arsenal and thousands of troops stationed in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, as the guarantor of its security. Poland has a long tradition of nuclear expertise, dating to Marie Sklodowska-Curie, the Polish-born French scientist who won Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry for her pioneering work in discovering radioactivity — a word she coined — and radioactive elements in the early 20th century. Stanislaw Ulam, a Polish mathematician and physicist, played an important role in the Manhattan Project, the United States' secret atomic bomb program during World War II, and in the subsequent invention of the hydrogen bomb. Under Communism, Poland trained a large group of nuclear engineers in preparation for a nuclear power plant that it started building with Soviet assistance but never finished. Poland last year approved plans for the construction of its first atomic power station under a contract with America's Westinghouse Electric. Mr. Tusk dedicated most of his speech to the new security situation created by Mr. Trump's abrupt upending of what had been the pillars of American foreign policy since the end of World War II. 'We cannot deny these facts: Today, Poland's situation, objectively, and Ukraine's situation, in particular, is more difficult than it was a few months ago, and we must deal with this fact,' he said. 'Washington's much more symmetrical attitude toward Moscow and Kyiv, much more symmetrical than we had become accustomed to, is a little different — I am also putting it mildly — from what we feel in Poland or in Europe,' he said. But Mr. Tusk avoided criticism of Mr. Trump and said the 'closest possible ties' with the United States remained essential. At the same time, he said Poland would expand its military to around half a million personnel, including reservists, more than double its current size and raise spending on defense to 5 percent of its economic output. But Mr. Tusk ruled out sending Polish soldiers to Ukraine 'as part of some contingent,' an apparent reference to French proposals that European countries provide troops for a future security force if U.S. efforts to broker a peace deal bear fruit. Poland is already one of Europe's biggest spenders on defense, spending around 4 percent of gross domestic product last year, double the 2 percent minimum set by NATO for its member nations. Most NATO countries are above that threshold now, unlike during Mr. Trump's first term, when he berated them for not spending more, but he continues to question the U.S. obligation to defend its allies. Poles, Mr. Tusk said, 'will not accept the philosophy that we are powerless and helpless, that if President Trump decides to change his policy, we have no chance.' 'I will repeat once again what seems incredible but is true: 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans to protect us from 180 million Russians who have not been able to cope with 40 million Ukrainians for three years,' he said. Europe has the means to defend itself but needs to 'eliminate one important deficit,' he added — 'the lack of will to act, uncertainty and, sometimes, even cowardice.'
