Latest news with #InstrumentFlightRules
Business Wire
20-05-2025
- Business
- Business Wire
Wisk and NASA Sign Five-Year Research Partnership to Advance Autonomous Flight
MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- Wisk Aero, a leading Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) company and developer of the first all-electric, self-flying air taxi in the U.S., today announced it has entered into a new five-year Non-Reimbursable Space Act Agreement (NRSAA) with NASA. This agreement focuses on critical research led by NASA's Air Traffic Management Exploration (ATM-X) project aimed at advancing autonomous aircraft under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) in the National Airspace System (NAS). Wisk and NASA sign new 5 year agreement to advance autonomous aircraft under Instrument Flight Rules in the National Airspace System. Share As an autonomous electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) air taxi, Wisk is working with NASA to help define the industry standards that will support the introduction of autonomous aircraft in the NAS. This research will help regulators consider future flight procedures and capabilities to accelerate U.S. leadership in automated aviation technology. , Wisk and NASA have collaborated to develop key guidance for the safe integration of autonomous aircraft systems for UAM operations under an initial Space Act Agreement. This expanded collaboration will focus on research using advanced simulation and Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) flight environments that combine live flights with a simulated airspace to enable researchers to assess future operations. This work is instrumental in informing the development of: Airspace and route design optimized for highly automated Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations Critical aircraft and ground-based safety system requirements necessary for autonomous flight in urban environments Air Traffic Control (ATC) communications protocols and procedures for seamless integration of UAM aircraft 'This new, long-term agreement with NASA is a significant step forward for Wisk and the broader UAM industry,' said Erick Corona, Director of Airspace Operational Integration at Wisk. 'With NASA's simulation and LVC capabilities, we can accelerate the development of our Gen 6 autonomous systems to safely and efficiently integrate into the U.S. NAS before the end of the decade.' To initiate early work under this annex, the Wisk and NASA teams held a workshop last month at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City. The teams discussed how instrument flight procedures and advanced technologies would work hand-in-hand to enable safe and efficient autonomous passenger flight. Over the course of the five-year agreement, Wisk and NASA will continue to conduct the research testing necessary to inform requirements and procedures for future operations. About Wisk Wisk is an Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) company dedicated to creating a future for air travel that elevates people, communities, and aviation. Wisk is developing the first autonomous, passenger-carrying electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) air taxi in the U.S. Wisk is a fully-owned Boeing subsidiary and is headquartered in the San Francisco Bay Area, with locations around the world. With over a decade of experience and over 1750+ test flights, Wisk is shaping the future of daily commutes and urban travel, safely and sustainably. Learn more about Wisk here.
Yahoo
30-01-2025
- General
- Yahoo
Here's What Air Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems Can And Can't Do
Yesterday's tragic mid-air collision between an American Eagle Bombardier CRJ-700 regional jetliner and a U.S. Army H-60 Black Hawk helicopter close to Reagan National Airport, near Washington, D.C., has led to many questions about the role played by the Traffic Collision Avoidance System, or TCAS. While you can read our report of the incident here, it should be restated that, at this early stage we have no clue as to exactly what might have gone wrong. In the meantime, however, it's worth looking at TCAS in more detail, and, especially, what it can and can't do to prevent mid-air collisions. Fundamentally, TCAS exists to help maintain separation between aircraft while they are flying. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which regulates international air transport, aircraft need a minimum of 1,000 feet of vertical separation at the point at which their paths cross, provided they are flying at 29,000 feet or below, under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). Flying above 29,000 feet, the separation requirement increases to 2,000 feet or greater, although there are some exceptions, in specific busy air the most part, the responsibility for ensuring this vertical separation — and therefore removing the chance of a collision — falls upon the relevant air traffic control authorities and, in some cases, the aircrew. TCAS exists, above all, as a backup to this, providing the aircraft crew with a warning that is independent of aircraft navigation equipment and ground-based systems. TCAS emerged from the lessons learned from a much earlier fatal collision, the 1956 accident involving a United Airlines Douglas DC-7 and a Trans World Airlines Lockheed L-1049 Super Constellation over Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona. This led to an overhaul of how air traffic control was operated in the United States. In particular, there was recognition of the need for a backup collision avoidance system that could operate even if air traffic control failed. Early efforts during the late 1950s and early 1960s focused on passive and non-cooperating systems, but over the years, the TCAS concept has been considerably refined, and this collision-avoidance aid is now a fundamental part of aircraft operations not only in the United States but also around the world. A major development in the 1970s concerned the emergence of the Beacon Collision Avoidance System (BCAS), using Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) transponders that began to be installed in large numbers of airliners, military aircraft, and also general aviation aircraft. In 1978, the collision between a light aircraft and an airliner over San Diego spurred efforts to refine this technology, leading to TCAS II, the development of which began in 1981. This built on BCAS, providing the same kind of transponder-based interrogation and tracking, but adding some additional TCAS works using transponder signals from nearby aircraft, meaning it's independent of air traffic control, but also that it requires aircraft with transponders fitted and switched on in order to function. Using the transponder signals, the system builds a three-dimensional map of the surrounding airspace, with aircraft movements plotted within this. Based on respective aircraft and flight paths, speeds, and altitudes, TCAS then automatically provides the crews with an alert of a possible mid-air collision danger. In some modern airliners, the process of avoiding action will be taken without any pilot action, using a technology known as auto-TCAS. The crews of the aircraft in question will receive an audible and visible warning, directing them to take the appropriate action: either climbing or descending to avoid a potential collision. For various reasons, however, and especially in the case of the collision at Reagan National Airport, TCAS is not a major guarantee of flight safety across all parts of an aircraft's flight profile. To begin with, the H-60 Black Hawk wouldn't necessarily have had TCAS fitted to start with, although it is an option for the Black Hawk. ICAO demands that TCAS be fitted to an aircraft that has a capacity of more than 19 passengers or a maximum takeoff weight of more than 5,700 kilograms, but these regulations only cover civil aviation and apply specifically to fixed-wing, turbine-powered aircraft. It's worth noting that, despite this, TCAS is also found on military aircraft, especially larger ones, such as tankers and transports. An added impetus for this came after the mid-air collision between a German Luftwaffe Tupolev Tu-154 and a U.S. Air Force C-141 StarLifter, off the coast of Namibia in September 1997. Furthermore, TCAS is intended to ensure flight safety at higher altitudes, thereby reinforcing the requirement to maintain at least 1,000 feet of vertical separation — or more, depending on flight level. For aircraft operating at lower altitudes, TCAS is inhibited. Specifically, 'Increase Descent' warnings are inhibited below 1,550 feet AGL, 'Descend' warnings are inhibited below 1,100 feet AGL, and all types of warnings are inhibited below 1,000 feet AGL. Terrain and other obstacles can also interfere with transponder signals during very low-level flight. There is a key safety reason behind these limitations, namely that providing warnings at lower altitudes could result in aircraft crews making rapid maneuvers, which could be very dangerous during low and slow flight. For example, a flight crew receiving a 'Descend' warning at low level could quickly take action that would end up with the aircraft flying into terrain. In these situations, therefore, TCAS isn't used to ensure collision avoidance. Initial reports suggest that Flight 5342 and the Black Hawk helicopter collided at an altitude of somewhere between 200 feet and around 400 feet, although this is not confirmed. Moreover, even at flight levels in which TCAS is engaged and is working as intended, the system is not foolproof. In one tragic example, in 2002, a Tupolev Tu-154 and a Boeing 757 collided over southwest Germany, killing 71. An investigation found that, although they received TCAS warnings, the crew of the Tu-154 relied instead on contradictory instructions from air traffic control, leading to a collision. There have also been incidents of mid-air collision in recent years in which TCAS has not provided warnings since one or more of the aircraft involved were flying without their transponders activated. Since the accident yesterday, there's been much speculation about what might have exactly happened and questions have been asked about whether TCAS could have prevented it. Again, we really have no idea at this point what happened or what role TCAS did or didn't play. Regardless, even when aircraft are fitted with fully functional Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems, these will not necessarily prevent or even warn of a mid-air collision, especially at low altitude. In the meantime, we will have to await more official information before we can better understand what might have gone wrong. Contact the author: thomas@
