Latest news with #Iranian-aligned
Newsweek
26-05-2025
- Politics
- Newsweek
Iran Threatens Strike on Israel as US Talks Hang in Balance
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, Commander-in-Chief of Iran's Army, said on Monday that Tehran is "fully ready" for another aerial strike, calling it a justified response to perceived Israeli aggression. He used the codename "True Promise" to describe Iran's direct attacks, echoing terminology previously employed during prior strikes. The warning came just as U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem visited Israel to brief Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the status of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks. Newsweek has reached out the State Department as well as the foreign ministries of Iran and Israel for comment. Why It Matters The threat of a third Iranian strike on Israel marks the potential for a significant escalation in a broader regional conflict, involving Iranian-aligned groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen amid Israel's war on Gaza following Hamas's October 7, 2023 attacks. Mousavi's remarks reflect mounting pressure on Iran's leadership to respond forcefully to Israel's military operations and Western sanctions. The warning also comes as the U.S. continues to support Israel while maintaining negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. The situation underscores the delicate balance between diplomacy and deterrence. Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Army Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi speaks during a rally outside the former US embassy in the capital Tehran on November 4, 2019, to mark the 40th anniversary of the Iran hostage... Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Army Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi speaks during a rally outside the former US embassy in the capital Tehran on November 4, 2019, to mark the 40th anniversary of the Iran hostage crisis. On November 4, 1979, less than nine months after the toppling of Iran's American-backed shah, students overran the embassy complex to demand the United States hand over the ousted ruler after he was admitted to a US hospital. MoreWhat to Know Mousavi's warning follows what he described as "rhetoric" from Israeli leaders. He said their threats are meaningless and claimed they "lack the capacity to harm the greatness of Iran." He vowed that any escalation would bring "extraordinary challenges" to Israel and its allies. The two previous operations dubbed "True Promise" involved mass missile and drone attacks. The first, on April 13, 2024, saw over 300 projectiles fired at Israeli military installations following the killing of two Iranian generals in Damascus. A second attack, on October 1 last year, launched roughly 200 missiles in response to assassinations of militant leaders tied to Hezbollah and Hamas. Noem to Isreal Meanwhile on Monday, Noem said she was personally dispatched by President Donald Trump to brief Netanyahu on the status of U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, as diplomatic efforts continue despite rising regional tensions. "It was a very candid conversation," Noem said on Fox & Friends. "President Trump specifically sent me here to have a conversation with the prime minister about how those negotiations are going and how important it is that we stay united and let this process play out." Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem departs after placing a note at the Western Wall, the holiest site where Jews can pray, in the Old City of Jerusalem, Sunday, May 25, 2025. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon, Pool Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem departs after placing a note at the Western Wall, the holiest site where Jews can pray, in the Old City of Jerusalem, Sunday, May 25, 2025. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon, Pool Alex Brandon/AP Photo 'Something Good' Her visit followed the conclusion of a fifth round of talks between U.S. and Iranian officials in Rome last week. Trump expressed optimism about the negotiations, saying, "We've had some very, very good talks with Iran," and adding that "something good" might be announced in the coming days. What People Are Saying Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, Commander-in-Chief of Iran's Army: "If they [Israel] are in a rush to receive another True Promise operation, we are fully ready to deliver an appropriate strike — and collect on what they already owe us." U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem: "President Trump specifically sent me here to have a conversation with the prime minister about how those negotiations are going and how important it is that we stay united and let this process play out." U.S. President Donald Trump: "We've had some very, very good talks with Iran." What Happens Next While Iran signals readiness for more military action, U.S. and Israeli officials say that sanctions, regional containment policies, and continued diplomatic engagement—set to resume in a sixth round of nuclear talks—are effectively constraining Tehran's strategic ambitions, though they warn that failure at the negotiating table could heighten the risk of escalation.
Yahoo
19-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - I have seen State's dysfunction up close — Rubio's reshuffle is just what it needs
Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently announced a major restructuring of the U.S. State Department. Although the media quickly lamented the downsizing efforts and focused disproportionately on the purging of liberal influence, the overwhelming bulk of Rubio's statements have been focused on the need to align the department with national interests and consolidate manpower in regional offices and at embassy and consulate posts around the world. Rubio has emphasized that this is not a cost-cutting exercise. It also isn't a neutering of U.S. diplomatic prowess. Just the opposite — he claims that, by pushing manpower out of stove-piped functional offices and into regional bureaus, he is 'reversing decades of bloat and bureaucracy' while empowering the 'talented diplomats' who serve on the front lines of America's whole-of-government national security strategy and policy. It is by this reasonable intent that his efforts must be judged. To emphasize Rubio's concerns about the stifling nature of the D.C.-based bureaucracy, the following personal anecdote is instructive. I was deployed as the U.S. senior defense official to Iraq for 14 months during a particularly challenging time — May 2020 until July 2021. Iranian-aligned militia groups were acting on a regular basis to hinder the authority and sovereignty of the rightfully selected leaders of Iraq, and they were still fuming about the American airstrike that had killed Iranian military leader Qasem Soleimani in early January 2020. These groups expressed their displeasure through regular demands for a withdrawal of residual American forces, which were in Iraq there at the invitation of its government to support continued operations against the forces of the Islamic State. They also expressed their anger by conducting regular rocket strikes against American personnel, including those at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and by threatening to kidnap high-ranking members of the American military. The security situation grew tense for Americans in Iraq as we approached the anniversary of Soleimani's killing. The State Department decided to evacuate the vast majority of diplomatic personnel in Baghdad for a period that dragged on for nearly six months. Ninety percent of my organization was repositioned to Kuwait during that period. A few of us remained in Baghdad to continue performing the local mission as best we could in direct support of the ambassador. During this time, the State Department closely controlled the numbers of American personnel in the embassy to abide by the constraints established by the secretary of State and his senior leadership team. This was part of a reasonable decision-making process based on authority, responsibility, risk and visibility. Yet, a maze of D.C.-based bureaucrats went overboard in their close control of embassy activities. Instead of allowing the ambassador to manage to the personnel constraints on his own within the limits of manpower caps, Main State's byzantine bureaucratic structure tightly controlled not only the numbers of personnel allowed in the embassy but the individual names as well. Any swaps of personnel required explicit approval by name from Washington. It became a cumbersome exercise to get approvals even for simple manpower changes. Such a mismatch of decision-making authority consumed a large amount of the time and energy of the remaining, sparse personnel in Baghdad. They were being micromanaged by offices that had seized control from Washington and lacked on-the-ground knowledge of the situation. The bureaucrats acted without regard to the burden they were imposing in-country. This situation revealed itself as extreme folly when I took my first trip to visit my team that had been displaced to Kuwait. I purposefully did not swap another member of our team from Kuwait into my slot in Baghdad so that I would have the flexibility to return as needed without State Department interference — or at least, that was the flexibility I thought I was retaining by doing so. When it was time to return, I was told that Main State needed to provide approval for such a swap. I argued that there was no swap, as my slot was vacant, but that wasn't the way the number-crunchers at Foggy Bottom saw it. They proceeded to consume several man-hours and a few extra days to get approval coordinated through 21 different people at State Department headquarters to swap Teichert for Teichert. It was pure bureaucratic, organizational sabotage. It ran counter to the needs of the important mission, and it subverted the authority of the ambassador — the singular individual responsible to the president for U.S. relationships with Iraq. Rubio is enacting his organizational change to break the stranglehold of this type of bureaucratic quagmire that runs counter to American diplomatic effectiveness and responsiveness. In doing so, he will cut 700 positions and 132 offices in the sprawling structure of the State Department while shifting functional roles into regional offices where they can be managed in accordance with the needs of country teams and through the lens of regional expertise. It is right to oversee and judge the progress of Rubio's measures with a focus on State's ability to perform its critical diplomatic functions in accordance with U.S. national interests. Cuts and shifts that could potentially harm U.S. priorities should be thoroughly questioned to confirm a sound rationale and rigorously judged according to outcomes. Lingering concerns about the loss of USAID functions that have historically furthered U.S. interests should also be considered through such a robust lens, as should any manpower and functional cuts or closures at embassies or consulates around the world. After all, vital interagency roles are conducted from these locations. Any loss of American presence can quickly erode access and influence that are essential elements of national power. In contrast, to pretend that streamlining a lumbering bureaucracy in D.C. will automatically harm U.S. interests is to neglect the bloat and dysfunction that currently suffocates U.S. diplomatic efforts. Retired Air Force Brig. Gen. John Teichert is a leading expert on foreign affairs and military strategy. He served as commander of Joint Base Andrews and Edwards Air Force Base, was the U.S. senior defense official to Iraq, and recently retired as the assistant deputy undersecretary of the Air Force ofr international affairs. A prolific author, he can be followed at and on LinkedIn. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
19-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
I have seen State's dysfunction up close — Rubio's reshuffle is just what it needs
Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently announced a major restructuring of the U.S. State Department. Although the media quickly lamented the downsizing efforts and focused disproportionately on the purging of liberal influence, the overwhelming bulk of Rubio's statements have been focused on the need to align the department with national interests and consolidate manpower in regional offices and at embassy and consulate posts around the world. Rubio has emphasized that this is not a cost-cutting exercise. It also isn't a neutering of U.S. diplomatic prowess. Just the opposite — he claims that, by pushing manpower out of stove-piped functional offices and into regional bureaus, he is 'reversing decades of bloat and bureaucracy' while empowering the 'talented diplomats' who serve on the front lines of America's whole-of-government national security strategy and policy. It is by this reasonable intent that his efforts must be judged. To emphasize Rubio's concerns about the stifling nature of the D.C.-based bureaucracy, the following personal anecdote is instructive. I was deployed as the U.S. senior defense official to Iraq for 14 months during a particularly challenging time — May 2020 until July 2021. Iranian-aligned militia groups were acting on a regular basis to hinder the authority and sovereignty of the rightfully selected leaders of Iraq, and they were still fuming about the American airstrike that had killed Iranian military leader Qasem Soleimani in early January 2020. These groups expressed their displeasure through regular demands for a withdrawal of residual American forces, which were in Iraq there at the invitation of its government to support continued operations against the forces of the Islamic State. They also expressed their anger by conducting regular rocket strikes against American personnel, including those at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and by threatening to kidnap high-ranking members of the American military. The security situation grew tense for Americans in Iraq as we approached the anniversary of Soleimani's killing. The State Department decided to evacuate the vast majority of diplomatic personnel in Baghdad for a period that dragged on for nearly six months. Ninety percent of my organization was repositioned to Kuwait during that period. A few of us remained in Baghdad to continue performing the local mission as best we could in direct support of the ambassador. During this time, the State Department closely controlled the numbers of American personnel in the embassy to abide by the constraints established by the secretary of State and his senior leadership team. This was part of a reasonable decision-making process based on authority, responsibility, risk and visibility. Yet, a maze of D.C.-based bureaucrats went overboard in their close control of embassy activities. Instead of allowing the ambassador to manage to the personnel constraints on his own within the limits of manpower caps, Main State's byzantine bureaucratic structure tightly controlled not only the numbers of personnel allowed in the embassy but the individual names as well. Any swaps of personnel required explicit approval by name from Washington. It became a cumbersome exercise to get approvals even for simple manpower changes. Such a mismatch of decision-making authority consumed a large amount of the time and energy of the remaining, sparse personnel in Baghdad. They were being micromanaged by offices that had seized control from Washington and lacked on-the-ground knowledge of the situation. The bureaucrats acted without regard to the burden they were imposing in-country. This situation revealed itself as extreme folly when I took my first trip to visit my team that had been displaced to Kuwait. I purposefully did not swap another member of our team from Kuwait into my slot in Baghdad so that I would have the flexibility to return as needed without State Department interference — or at least, that was the flexibility I thought I was retaining by doing so. When it was time to return, I was told that Main State needed to provide approval for such a swap. I argued that there was no swap, as my slot was vacant, but that wasn't the way the number-crunchers at Foggy Bottom saw it. They proceeded to consume several man-hours and a few extra days to get approval coordinated through 21 different people at State Department headquarters to swap Teichert for Teichert. It was pure bureaucratic, organizational sabotage. It ran counter to the needs of the important mission, and it subverted the authority of the ambassador — the singular individual responsible to the president for U.S. relationships with Iraq. Rubio is enacting his organizational change to break the stranglehold of this type of bureaucratic quagmire that runs counter to American diplomatic effectiveness and responsiveness. In doing so, he will cut 700 positions and 132 offices in the sprawling structure of the State Department while shifting functional roles into regional offices where they can be managed in accordance with the needs of country teams and through the lens of regional expertise. It is right to oversee and judge the progress of Rubio's measures with a focus on State's ability to perform its critical diplomatic functions in accordance with U.S. national interests. Cuts and shifts that could potentially harm U.S. priorities should be thoroughly questioned to confirm a sound rationale and rigorously judged according to outcomes. Lingering concerns about the loss of USAID functions that have historically furthered U.S. interests should also be considered through such a robust lens, as should any manpower and functional cuts or closures at embassies or consulates around the world. After all, vital interagency roles are conducted from these locations. Any loss of American presence can quickly erode access and influence that are essential elements of national power. In contrast, to pretend that streamlining a lumbering bureaucracy in D.C. will automatically erode U.S. interests is to neglect the bloat and dysfunction that current suffocates U.S. diplomatic efforts. Retired Air Force Brig. Gen. John Teichert is a leading expert on foreign affairs and military strategy. He served as commander of Joint Base Andrews and Edwards Air Force Base, was the U.S. senior defense official to Iraq, and recently retired as the assistant deputy undersecretary of the Air Force ofr international affairs. A prolific author, he can be followed at and on LinkedIn.
Asia Times
06-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Trump risks falling into an 'airpower trap' in Yemen
In the first 100 days of his second term, US President Donald Trump has shown a willingness to lean on airpower when his administration decides that military force is necessary abroad. So far, the second Trump administration has launched limited airstrikes in Somalia and carried out a weekslong air campaign against the Iranian-aligned Houthis who rule most of Yemen. The president has also threatened direct strikes against Iran itself should talks on a new nuclear deal collapse. This turn to airpower for Trump makes sense to me. Airpower is cheap when compared with ground wars, and it usually comes with fewer casualties for those conducting the strikes. This helps explain why US leaders, including Trump as a self-proclaimed 'anti-war president,' typically find it attractive. But if the Trump administration is not careful, it could fall into what military strategists informally call the 'airpower trap.' This happens when the stated objectives of military force are too big for airpower alone to achieve, potentially leading to a face-saving escalation of conflict that could – if history is a guide – draw in ground forces from the US or their local allies. US presidents such as Lyndon Johnson, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama all fell into this trap. In Vietnam, the Balkans and Syria, respectively, all ended up with far bigger wars than they bargained for, with consequences for civilian casualties, international peace and damage to America's reputation abroad. As an expert on US national security policy and the Middle East region, I believe the Trump administration is in danger of falling into the airpower trap in Yemen and could potentially do the same in Iran should it elect to use direct force against Tehran. Recognizing this military and historical risk, and opting for some kind of off-ramp from continued airstrikes, might be the best hope the US government has to avoid a further escalation into full-scale war. Research shows airpower is most effective when it's used for limited objectives – things like taking out leaders of terrorist groups or degrading rival capabilities – or in support of ground operations for more ambitious ends, like bolstering or overturning governments. Given the sophistication of US airpower, a common fallacy among American strategists in particular is to think that big strategic gains can be achieved solely by dropping bombs from above. But when airpower alone fails, leaders can feel the pressure to expand the scope of conflict and end up with bigger military commitments than expected. Johnson's initial airpower-only strategy for attempting to stop communism in South Vietnam failed miserably, leading to his decision to commit half a million US troops to the war. That expanded conflict presaged years of war, with massive humanitarian and political consequences for people in Southeast Asia and America, as well as lasting reputational damage to the US. Yemenis carry the coffins of civilians killed in U.S. airstrikes while participating in their funeral procession on May 1, 2025, in Sanaa, Yemen. Photo: Mohammed Hamoud / Getty Images via The Conversation Worried about US and NATO credibility, Clinton escalated airstrikes – nearly to the point of introducing ground troops – for the ambitious end of stopping genocide in the Balkans during the early 1990s. Likewise, Obama's initial airpower-only strategy to 'degrade and destroy' the Islamic State group quickly faltered, leading Obama, under intense pressure at home and abroad, to introduce thousands of ground troops to combat the group's territorial gains across Syria and Iraq. In each case, relying on airpower alone ultimately failed to meet their objectives. There are reasons to believe that conditions in Yemen mean that Trump, too, could be falling into a similar trap. Trump has adopted an airpower-only strategy to 'completely annihilate' the Houthis, a powerful rebel movement that all but won the recent Yemeni civil war. The proximate cause of the air campaign, a policy inaugurated by the Biden administration and expanded dramatically by Trump, is to restore the free flow of shipping in the Red Sea that the Houthis have disrupted by force to protest Israel's ongoing war in Gaza. The early signs are that this air campaign isn't going well. Despite the US burning through finite munitions supplies at a cost of US$1 billion to bomb at least 800 sites since March 15, the Houthis are undeterred and the volume of Red Sea shipping remains as depressed as ever. Houthi attacks on US ships and Israel continue. A Houthi missile narrowly missed Israel's Ben-Gurion airport on May 4. In fact, the direct attacks on the Houthis and the rapidly growing casualty count among Yemeni civilians from the Trump administration's bombing campaign appear to be strengthening the Houthis' political position in Yemen. In a particularly shocking case, US bombs reportedly hit an African migrant camp, killing and injuring dozens of people. The humanitarian crisis from the brutal bombing campaign by the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in the late 2010s had a similar effect. Airpower played a big part then, too. The Saudi coalition, supported by the U.S., engaged in some 25,000 air raids against the Houthis, killing or maiming approximately 19,000 civilians. Yet despite such overwhelming force, the Houthis kept seizing territory and eventually won the civil war, according to experts. They have been the country's de facto rulers ever since. Now, Trump is exploring options to further escalate to defeat the Houthis. Reports indicate his administration is considering arming, training and enabling anti-Houthi resistance fighters who are loosely affiliated with Yemen's government in exile to launch ground operations. Proxies are a common tool US leaders turn to when caught in the airpower trap. Sometimes those proxies fulfill American policy objectives, such as the Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG, which helped the US defeat the Islamic State caliphate in 2019. A US Air Force F-5 Skoshi Tiger drops three general-purpose bombs on Vietnam on Feb. 28, 1966. Photo: Underwood Archives / Getty Images via The Conversation Often, US proxies fail on both strategic and humanitarian terms, leading to further escalation, strategic quagmires for the US, and loss of life and political sovereignty for the people under attack. South Vietnam was an instructive example. Riven by corruption, poor governance, weakness and political infighting, the South Vietnamese army and government proved so ineffective at fighting the North Vietnamese that Johnson decided to launch a ground war once US airpower failed. Today, the anti-Houthi resistance in Yemen looks a lot more like the South Vietnamese government than the Kurdish YPG. According to a 2025 report from the Soufan Center, a security think tank, the anti-Houthi forces are poorly trained and considered incapable of pulling off victories over the Houthis without major US support. Meanwhile, the anti-Houthi resistance consists of an estimated 85,000 fighters, compared with some 350,000 for the Houthis. Absent continuing the air war or escalating it into a more all-encompassing conflict, US officials can still pursue diplomacy in order to try to find a political solution to the Yemen conflict. Despite the Trump administration's public threats, the US is already negotiating with the Houthis' main sponsor, Iran. For their part, the Houthis continue to insist that they will stop attacking ships in the Red Sea if the US-backed Israeli war in Gaza halts, something that happened during the recent Gaza ceasefire. The Trump administration might consider seeking alternatives, such as direct or indirect talks, if it wants to avoid getting stuck in a widening conflict in Yemen. History is full of examples of what happens when airpower takes on a logic of its own. Charles Walldorf is professor of politics and international affairs, Wake Forest University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Yahoo
05-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
In Yemen, Trump risks falling into an ‘airpower trap' that has drawn past US presidents into costly wars
In the first 100 days of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has shown a willingness to lean on airpower when his administration decides that military force is necessary abroad. So far, the second Trump administration has launched limited airstrikes in Somalia and carried out a weekslong air campaign against the Iranian-aligned Houthis who rule most of Yemen. The president has also threatened direct strikes against Iran itself should talks on a new nuclear deal collapse. This turn to airpower for Trump makes sense to me. Airpower is cheap when compared with ground wars, and it usually comes with fewer casualties for those conducting the strikes. This helps explain why U.S. leaders, including Trump as a self-proclaimed 'anti-war president,' typically find it attractive. But if the Trump administration is not careful, it could fall into what military strategists informally call the 'airpower trap.' This happens when the stated objectives of military force are too big for airpower alone to achieve, potentially leading to a face-saving escalation of conflict that could – if history is a guide – draw in ground forces from the U.S. or their local allies. U.S. presidents such as Lyndon Johnson, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama all fell into this trap. In Vietnam, the Balkans and Syria, respectively, all ended up with far bigger wars than they bargained for, with consequences for civilian casualties, international peace and damage to America's reputation abroad. As an expert on U.S. national security policy and the Middle East region, I believe the Trump administration is in danger of falling into the airpower trap in Yemen and could potentially do the same in Iran should it elect to use direct force against Tehran. Recognizing this military and historical risk, and opting for some kind of off ramp from continued airstrikes, might be the best hope the U.S. government has to avoid a further escalation into full-scale war. Research shows airpower is most effective when it's used for limited objectives – things like taking out leaders of terrorist groups or degrading rival capabilities – or in support of ground operations for more ambitious ends, like bolstering or overturning governments. Given the sophistication of U.S. airpower, a common fallacy among American strategists in particular is to think big strategic gains can be achieved solely by dropping bombs from above. But when airpower alone fails, leaders can feel the pressure to expand the scope of conflict and end up with bigger military commitments than expected. Johnson's initial airpower-only strategy for attempting to stop communism in South Vietnam failed miserably, leading to his decision to commit half a million U.S. troops into war. That expanded conflict presaged years of war, with massive humanitarian and political consequences for people in Southeast Asia and America, as well as lasting reputational damage to the U.S. Worried about U.S. and NATO credibility, Clinton escalated airstrikes – nearly to the point of introducing ground troops – for the ambitious end of stopping genocide in the Balkans during the early 1990s. Likewise, Obama's initial airpower-only strategy to 'degrade and destroy' the Islamic State group quickly faltered, leading Obama, under intense pressure at home and abroad, to introduce thousands of ground troops to combat the group's territorial gains across Syria and Iraq. In each case, relying on airpower alone ultimately failed to meet their objectives. There are reasons to believe that conditions in Yemen mean that Trump, too, could be falling into a similar trap. Trump has adopted an airpower-only strategy to 'completely annihilate' the Houthis, a powerful rebel movement that all but won the recent Yemeni civil war. The proximate cause of the air campaign, a policy inaugurated by the Biden administration and expanded dramatically by Trump, is to restore the free flow of shipping in the Red Sea that the Houthis have disrupted by force to protest Israel's ongoing war in Gaza. The early signs are that this air campaign isn't going well. Despite the U.S. burning through finite munitions supplies at a cost of US$1 billion to bomb at least 800 sites since March 15, the Houthis are undeterred and the volume of Red Sea shipping remains as depressed as ever. Houthi attacks on U.S. ships and Israel continue. A Houthi missile narrowly missed Israel's Ben-Gurion airport on May 4. In fact, the direct attacks on the Houthis and the rapidly growing casualty count among Yemeni civilians from the Trump administration's bombing campaign appear to be strengthening the Houthis' political position in Yemen. In a particularly shocking case, U.S. bombs reportedly hit an African migrant camp, killing and injuring dozens of people. The humanitarian crisis from the brutal bombing campaign by the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in the late 2010s had a similar effect. Airpower played a big part then, too. The Saudi coalition, supported by the U.S., engaged in some 25,000 air raids against the Houthis, killing or maiming approximately 19,000 civilians. Yet despite such overwhelming force, the Houthis kept seizing territory and eventually won the civil war, according to experts. They have been the country's de facto rulers ever since. Now, Trump is exploring options to further escalate to defeat the Houthis. Reports indicate his administration is considering arming, training and enabling anti-Houthi resistance fighters who are loosely affiliated with Yemen's government in exile to launch ground operations. Proxies are a common tool U.S. leaders turn to when caught in the airpower trap. Sometimes those proxies fulfill American policy objectives, such as the Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG, which helped the U.S. defeat the Islamic state caliphate in 2019. Often, U.S. proxies fail on both strategic and humanitarian terms, leading to further escalation, strategic quagmires for the U.S., and loss of life and political sovereignty for the people under attack. South Vietnam was an instructive example. Riven by corruption, poor governance, weakness and political infighting, the South Vietnamese army and government proved so ineffective at fighting the North Vietnamese that Johnson decided to launch a ground war once U.S. airpower failed. Today, the anti-Houthi resistance in Yemen looks a lot more like the South Vietnamese government than the Kurdish YPG. According to a 2025 report from the Soufan Center, a security think tank, the anti-Houthi forces are poorly trained and considered incapable of pulling off victories over the Houthis without major U.S. support. Meanwhile, the anti-Houthi resistance consists of an estimated 85,000 fighters, compared with some 350,000 for the Houthis. Absent continuing the air war or escalating it into a more all-encompassing conflict, U.S. officials can still pursue diplomacy in order to try to find a political solution to the Yemen conflict. Despite the Trump's administration public threats, the U.S. is already negotiating with the Houthis' main sponsor, Iran. For their part, the Houthis continue to insist that they will stop attacking ships in the Red Sea if the U.S.-backed Israeli war in Gaza halts, something that happened during the recent Gaza ceasefire. The Trump administration might consider seeking alternatives, such as direct or indirect talks, if it wants to avoid getting stuck in a widening conflict in Yemen. History is full of examples of what happens when airpower takes on a logic of its own. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Charles Walldorf, Wake Forest University Read more: Hurricane forecasts are more accurate than ever – NOAA funding cuts could change that, with a busy storm season coming View from The Hill: a budding Trump-Albanese bromance? After its landslide win, Labor should have courage and confidence on security – and our alliance with the US Charles Walldorf is a Senior Fellow at the think tank Defense Priorities.
