Latest news with #IsraeliIranConflict
News.com.au
an hour ago
- Politics
- News.com.au
Liberal frontbencher Andrew Hastie tipped ‘strike of some sort' moments before Donald Trump confirmed Iran attack
Coalition home affairs spokesman Andrew Hastie made a grim prediction on the future of the Israeli-Iran conflict, stating that 'diplomacy will probably fail' and we would likely 'see a strike of some sort'. Moments later, Donald Trump confirmed the US had 'completed our very successful attack' on three nuclear sites in Iran, dropping a 'full payload of bombs' on Fordow – a uranium enrichment site buried 90m inside a mountain. Two other nuclear sites in Natanz and Esfahan were also targeted. Posting on Truth Social at 9.40am Sunday, the US President confirmed the planes were now 'outside of Iran air space' and were 'safely on their way home'. His comments come just days after he said a decision would likely come 'within the next two weeks'. Appearing on ABC's Insiders on Sunday, Mr Hastie - a former SAS commander - said while he hoped negotitations would see Iran willingly stand down its nuclear programs and subject themselves to independents inspections, he feared it would escalate further. 'We have to take this seriously. Iran is a deeply ideological regime, committed to the destruction of Israel. The supreme leader said he wants to wipe Israel off the map,' he told host David Speers. 'I suspect diplomacy will probably fail and we will see a strike of some sort (in) the next two weeks. 'It will be tough for innocent people caught in the war.' Mr Hastie also backed the Labor government's approach to date, which has focused on calling for further dialogue between the US, Iran and Israel, while also condemning Iran for its nuclear programs. 'I think broadly speaking they've made it clear, Iran shouldn't get a nuclear weapon,' he said. 'Israel has a right to self-defence. We want to see this war ended quickly. That's mine and the Coalition's position. 'I think Foreign Minister (Penny) Wong made that clear as well.'
Arab News
9 hours ago
- Politics
- Arab News
Saudi FM reaffirms support for Palestine, condemns Israeli strikes on Iran at OIC meeting in Istanbul
RIYADH: Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reaffirmed the Kingdom's unwavering support for the Palestinian cause during the opening session of the 51st meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, held in Istanbul on Saturday. The foreign minister also condemned the Israeli strikes on Iran, describing them as a 'blatant' violation of international law and an infringement on Iranian sovereignty and security. The meeting, hosted by Turkiye, marked the start of its presidency of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers. Prince Faisal congratulated Turkiye on assuming the role and extended thanks to Cameroon for its efforts during its previous term. In his address, Prince Faisal underscored the importance Saudi Arabia placed on the Palestinian issue, highlighting the Kingdom's ongoing efforts to end the war in Gaza, alleviate the worsening humanitarian crisis, and unify Arab and Islamic positions on the conflict. He reiterated Saudi Arabia's firm support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Turning to the Israeli-Iranian conflict, he said: 'These attacks threaten the security and stability of the region,' and called for an immediate halt to military operations, de-escalation, and a return to negotiations between Iran and the international community. Prince Faisal also reiterated Saudi Arabia's continued backing of efforts to resolve the crisis in Yemen, expressing support for a comprehensive political solution and the restoration of peace, stability, and security in the country.
Forbes
4 days ago
- Business
- Forbes
China Loses Big In Israel-Iran Conflict
The ongoing Israeli-Iran Conflict risks China's carefully but shakily constructed policy in the ... More Middle East. A few years ago, it seemed China's position in the Middle East was secure. Beijing successfully brokered the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, creating the tantalizing possibility of a breakthrough peace deal and the diplomatic prestige long sought by China. The gargantuan scope of China's demand for oil made it the region's largest energy consumer by far, generating considerable theoretical leverage. Iran's proxies and asymmetric networks gave a Chinese partner considerable influence and means to act. Concurrently, successive U.S. Presidents failed to influence local energy production while America's domestic energy production climbed, further decreasing America's interventionist incentives. Well, it turns out such a position wasn't as secure as Chairman Xi hoped. Hegemony is hard. China has discovered that one marginalizes geopolitics and regional rivalries at their peril. Regional flashpoints have now put China in an awkward position. China must balance competing mutually exclusive desires: regional peace to keep exports flowing, the aspirations of upstart geopolitical actors, an outward commitment to avoid military deployments, and the confidence in Beijing held by competing entities. China's embrace of a wide portfolio of energy investments signals serious commitment, but time ... More remains a structural limiter. Xi Jinping considers Chinese energy security a key plank in his policy platform. In January this year, China unveiled its first nationwide energy law aiming to synchronize disparate local policies as a part of Xi's energy agenda. This obsession with energy is why China is so invested in many energy-adjacent projects from critical minerals and electric vehicles to nuclear reactors. Energy is seen both as a developmental tool and an area where China can surpass Western competitors and as a national security priority. Under Xi's assessment, Chinese energy imports constitute a national weakness, and as such need to be marginalized to reduce vulnerabilities that arise on foreign dependency. For example, China imports roughly three-quarters of its crude oil from overseas, with over 43% of the crude oil that China does import coming from the Middle East. Most of that oil must be imported through a tiny strait vulnerable to being cut off by naval power which is beyond China's ability to project military power. China calls this its 'Malacca Dilemma.' It has long inspired China's push for domestic energy development and international initiatives such as parts of the Belt and Road Initiative. While China is genuinely embracing future and alternative energy sources while attempting to move past hydrocarbons, such an undertaking is easier said than done. Sustained investments in alternative forms of energy production are pricey and take time to yield results – Middle Eastern energy is comparatively cheap. While they come online, China is forced to deepen its dependency and increase imports due to the energy and capital-intensive nature of new energy investment. Even if there was a total unwavering commitment to moving past hydrocarbons inside China, the logistics of phasing billions off them is daunting. Time is also a key obstacle for China that incentives its suppliers to act aggressively. Chinese moves are transparent and suppliers to China know that China's serious long-term goal is their own marginalization. The size and scale of the Chinese economy, its consumer base, and its energy investments means that it's very likely to set the tenor of the global energy transformation, compared with rhetoric but lagging action from the West. So, why wouldn't suppliers of Chinese energy act regardless of overall export conditions if they think it can force Beijing into supporting them now while in the future support cannot be relied upon? Peacemaking with Chinese characteristics has not been sufficient to temper Saudi Iranian rivalry. China's overwhelming dependency on Middle Eastern energy from many sources make it vulnerable to regional shocks. The ongoing Israeli Iranian conflict is only the latest in a string of Middle Eastern crises sub optimally managed by Beijing. The October 7th attacks by Hamas, a proxy of Iran, succeeded in their strategic objective of derailing the Abraham Accords, the initiative to normalize relations between Israel and Arab-majority states such as Saudi Arabia. It was the first large broach in Saudi Iranian relations since normalization and the impact of the act and the subsequent scuttling of the accords on their shared Chinese partner appears to have been a marginal calculation. The subsequent Red Sea Crisis which was kicked off by Iranian-backed Houthis based in Yemen impacted global commodity stability, including in China, and was a testament to both regional instability and China's lack of control over its competing oil suppliers. While Houthis didn't target Chinese or Russian flagged vessels, the crisis still stymied trade to China's detriment. At the core of the problem is the Saudi Iranian rivalry. Should China take decisive action and defend Iran, which militarily it is probably too late to do anyway, then China alienates Saudi Arabia and many gulf suppliers. This is why even before the conflict, the alleged purchase of materials by Iran to make over 800 ballistic missiles from China set off alarms in the region, and not just in Israel. China also has to keep the Straits of Hormuz open in the event of conflict, a significant structural divergence from Iran's military incentives. If China chose to do nothing on Iran's benefit, Israeli strikes will continue to degrade Iranian export capacity, and Chinese partners outside the region such as Pakistan and Russia (whom have both expressed support for Iran) are likely to take a dim view and remember what Chinese commitment under pressure looks like. The energy tightrope that helped China through the supply shocks of the beginning of the war in Ukraine and subsequent global inflation appears to no longer be navigable. While China's foreign ministry is by all indicators feverishly searching for some sort of deal, any ceasefire and return to exports as usual is far removed. China now has to make hard choices. Will it become more involved politically and militarily in the Middle East in defense of its economic incentives? Will it value Iran's political and military utility over Saudi Arabia's and other gulf energy exporters' sheer hydrocarbon reserves? Is China willing to risk relations elsewhere to bail out its Middle Eastern policy, or will it re prioritize? Ultimately these answers will shape much of the next few decades of the global energy market and international geoeconomics, and only Xi can answer them.
