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Yahoo
27-03-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
The Tariff Man Is Coming for America's Entrepreneurs
Over the past two months, Stuart and Susan Rosen say they have paid nearly $30,000 in tariffs to the American government. Their Burbank–based small business designs costume jewelry, manufactures it in China, imports it to the United States, and sells it to department stores and online boutiques. When Donald Trump took office, he slapped a 10 percent tariff on their imports, and then another 10 percent. Tariffs cause 'a little disturbance' and require 'a little bit of an adjustment period,' the president has conceded—and the Rosens confirmed. Their retail partners have declined to increase in-store prices for their necklaces and earrings, leaving their business with no choice but to eat the cost of the levy. 'Trump gets online and says, This is great! These tariffs, we're going to make a lot of money,' Susan told me. 'Well, you're stealing money from me.' After this adjustment period, Trump has promised, the tariffs will 'protect our businesses and our people.' Business owners will dump their foreign trading partners and foreign firms will invest in the United States. Companies will hire American workers, open American factories, and buy American goods. The trade deficit will decline and employment will go up. 'Tariffs are about making America rich again,' Trump said, addressing a Joint Session of Congress earlier this month. 'It's happening.' It sounds great. But it is not happening. Many entrepreneurs, such as the Rosens, have no practical way to onshore their supply chain. If they managed to do so, their jewelry would cost more than imported jewelry, making their business uncompetitive. If the tens of thousands of American firms relying on imported goods did the same, the country's rate of productivity growth and consumers' purchasing power would go down. 'If we try to make every damn thing here, it's a road to poverty,' Kimberley Clausing, an economist at UCLA, told me. 'The idea that there's going to be some sort of long-term benefit is hogwash.' The White House is not creating a little disturbance in service of making America rich again; it's creating a huge disturbance in service of making America poor again. Tariffs will encourage American firms to use more American products and American workers. Yet that still does not mean they will bolster American employment or improve American lives. Washington's yen for onshoring is bipartisan, and predates Trump by more than a decade. After the Great Recession, Barack Obama pushed a 'Make It in America' plan, praising businesses that created manufacturing jobs stateside. In 2016, Trump, Bernie Sanders, and Hillary Clinton issued competing policies to promote factory employment. In 2021, Joe Biden called industrial production the 'engine of American prosperity' before spending hundreds of billions of dollars on tax credits and subsidies for semiconductor factories and clean-energy plants. This 21st-century push for 19th-century industry is about hope for the future and, perhaps even more so, fears from the past. From the 1970s to the 2000s, deindustrialization and globalization eviscerated the country's heartland, the Steel Belt corroding into the Rust Belt. It would be hard to overstate the financial and social ramifications: persistent depopulation, permanent income loss, severe regional inequality, increasing drug overdoses, rising political polarization, ascendant right-wing populism. Moreover, studies have indicated that the erosion of the country's manufacturing base might have reduced productivity and innovation economy-wide. The dislocations caused by the coronavirus pandemic and rising tensions with Beijing gave Washington a strong security justification for supporting domestic supply chains too. A self-proclaimed 'tariff man,' Trump has taken these arguments to extremes, bellowing that foreign countries are ripping off Americans and promising to eliminate the country's trade deficit. 'Globalization has made the financial elite, who donate to politicians, very, very wealthy,' he said while campaigning against Clinton. 'It has left millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache.' During his first term, he implemented tariffs on aluminum, steel, and $380 billion in Chinese imports, and renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement. In his second, he has levied tariffs on Chinese, Mexican, and Canadian goods, and is preparing tariffs on trillions of dollars of imports from around the globe. But there is a difference between using trade policy to generate new jobs and to restore old ones, as Trump wants to do, promising to take the country back and make it great again. 'Rectifying the bad things we went through in the past—and I am not minimizing that there were costs—this is not going to fix that, and I fear that it's holding out false promise,' Chad Bown of Peterson Institute for International Economics told me. Tariffs aren't reparations. Trump's nostalgia notwithstanding, the American economy was not more prosperous when a large share of its workers were toiling on assembly lines. Fifty years ago, the middle class was larger and inequality was lower. But wages and household incomes were smaller, and consumer goods were much more dear. Trade liberalization and automation made most Americans better off. Trump's crackbrained understanding of trade economics threatens to reverse those welfare gains, and without aiding the Rust Belt. He insists that tariffs are paid by foreign exporters, when they are paid by domestic businesses and consumers, as the Rosens show. He argues that the United States' trade imbalances indicate that other countries are taking advantage of us, when it simply means that we sell fewer goods and services to foreign nations than we buy from them. (Savings rates, currency prices, industrial policy, trade barriers, and labor costs figure into countries' trade imbalances.) He argues that making everything in America would bolster GDP growth rate, when it would reduce it. China's ascension to the World Trade Organization and decades of automation beforehand did damage the Rust Belt economy. But economists told me that trade policy has no way to reverse the phenomenon. Washington cannot dictate where business executives choose to build new plants; those decisions take into account not just tariffs but tax incentives, labor rules, the location of ports and highways, and local employment conditions. 'If we try to undo the China Shock, those jobs are probably going to go to the South or Southwest'—where wages are cheaper and labor laws are laxer—'not the industrial heartland,' Douglas Irwin, a trade economist at Dartmouth, told me. Placed-based policies could help, he said, but 'trade barriers just aren't going to do it.' When companies build plants in the United States today, they look nothing like the Manhattan garment factories and Big Three assembly lines of yore. Automation has diminished the number of manufacturing positions globally; countries such as Ethiopia and Bangladesh have seen most of their job growth in the service sector. Given the high cost of labor in the United States, manufacturing firms tend to invest heavily in robotics, machine tools, and AI systems. In the 1930s, the biggest Detroit auto plant employed more than 100,000 workers. Hyundai's new electric-vehicle plant outside Savannah is expected to employ 8,500. Modern factories tend to be not unitary production facilities but nodes in complex, globe-spanning networks. A car finished in Illinois might contain components from Mexico, Canada, Japan, and Germany, with parts crossing in and out of the United States multiple times during assembly. 'If you don't have tariff-free access to those parts, your car is going to be more expensive than the same-quality car made in South Korea or Germany,' Clausing told me. Tariffs would make it 'harder to make things in America, not easier,' she added: A company would pay only a single tariff to import a car made entirely abroad, but multiple rounds of tariffs on a vehicle produced inside and outside the United States. Tariffs, she told me, 'could decimate the U.S. auto industry.' Trump's proposed tariffs do not emphasize strategically important or high-tech industries, as prior administrations have done. As a result, 'we're going to reallocate production away from stuff we were good at making and towards stuff that we're not good at making,' Clausing told me, and away from crucial goods and toward trivial ones. Trump's policies could squeeze capital away from weaponry, batteries, and semiconductor chips and toward toasters, sports equipment, and, well, costume jewelry. Other countries that have engaged in this kind of autarky have generally given up, Clausing noted. 'You realize that you can't make everything yourself and it ultimately makes your citizens poor.' Trump's enormous tariffs would increase consumer prices and limit the quantity and quality of goods available for American households to purchase. The policies would kill off firms reliant on imported goods or parts. The misallocation of investment capital would make the country less vibrant in the long term. Trade experts anticipate that Trump will reduce or withdraw his tariffs before that happens; business executives are likely to wait out the administration rather than scrambling their supply networks. 'To really bring manufacturing back in a big way, tariffs have to be permanent,' Irwin told me. 'Firms are not going to spend millions of dollars on a plant if they think the policy is going to change in three years.' The Rosens told me that they would love to commission costume jewelry from an American factory or produce it themselves, as they used to do. Before they owned their import business, they operated a firm called Accessories du Jour. A 'very vertical business,' as Susan put it, Accessories du Jour designed pieces and fabricated them in a 72,000-square-foot factory with as many as 800 employees. 'We made the plastic stones. We did our own plating, our own color, our own gluing of stones, our own assembly,' Susan said. 'There wasn't anything we didn't do.' The cost of hiring American workers and operating in one of the most expensive regions on Earth made it impossible for the company to compete with imports from South Korea and China. 'It was so sad to watch that evolution happen,' Susan told me. Trump's tariffs would not make Accessories du Jour a viable business today, the Rosens thought. 'Reassembling that factory would take years, years, years,' and millions of dollars of investment, Susan said. 'Where do you get the actual workers who want to plate, and work with chemicals all day, and glue with epoxy?' she added. 'The employees that we would probably need are all being deported.' The Rosens were looking into getting an exemption from Trump's tariffs, on the basis that they could not find a domestic fabricator for their jewelry. I asked what would happen if the exemption did not come through. 'That's the question,' Stuart told me. 'We're very loyal to our employees. I mean, we're stupid! What can you do?' They hope that their retailers would agree to raise retail prices. If they don't, the Rosens might not make it through Trump's adjustment period. They would go out of business again. Article originally published at The Atlantic
Atlantic
27-03-2025
- Business
- Atlantic
Tariffs Aren't Reparations
Over the past two months, Stuart and Susan Rosen say they have paid nearly $30,000 in tariffs to the American government. Their Burbank–based small business designs costume jewelry, manufactures it in China, imports it to the United States, and sells it to department stores and online boutiques. When Donald Trump took office, he slapped a 10 percent tariff on their imports, and then another 10 percent. Tariffs cause 'a little disturbance' and require 'a little bit of an adjustment period,' the president has conceded—and the Rosens confirmed. Their retail partners have declined to increase in-store prices for their necklaces and earrings, leaving their business with no choice but to eat the cost of the levy. 'Trump gets online and says, This is great! These tariffs, we're going to make a lot of money,' Susan told me. 'Well, you're stealing money from me.' After this adjustment period, Trump has promised, the tariffs will 'protect our businesses and our people.' Business owners will dump their foreign trading partners and foreign firms will invest in the United States. Companies will hire American workers, open American factories, and buy American goods. The trade deficit will decline and employment will go up. 'Tariffs are about making America rich again,' Trump said, addressing a Joint Session of Congress earlier this month. 'It's happening.' It sounds great. But it is not happening. Many entrepreneurs, such as the Rosens, have no practical way to onshore their supply chain. If they managed to do so, their jewelry would cost more than imported jewelry, making their business uncompetitive. If the tens of thousands of American firms relying on imported goods did the same, the country's rate of productivity growth and consumers' purchasing power would go down. 'If we try to make every damn thing here, it's a road to poverty,' Kimberley Clausing, an economist at UCLA, told me. 'The idea that there's going to be some sort of long-term benefit is hogwash.' The White House is not creating a little disturbance in service of making America rich again; it's creating a huge disturbance in service of making America poor again. Tariffs will encourage American firms to use more American products and American workers. Yet that still does not mean they will bolster American employment or improve American lives. Washington's yen for onshoring is bipartisan, and predates Trump by more than a decade. After the Great Recession, Barack Obama pushed a ' Make It in America ' plan, praising businesses that created manufacturing jobs stateside. In 2016, Trump, Bernie Sanders, and Hillary Clinton issued competing policies to promote factory employment. In 2021, Joe Biden called industrial production the 'engine of American prosperity' before spending hundreds of billions of dollars on tax credits and subsidies for semiconductor factories and clean-energy plants. This 21st-century push for 19th-century industry is about hope for the future and, perhaps even more so, fears from the past. From the 1970s to the 2000s, deindustrialization and globalization eviscerated the country's heartland, the Steel Belt corroding into the Rust Belt. It would be hard to overstate the financial and social ramifications: persistent depopulation, permanent income loss, severe regional inequality, increasing drug overdoses, rising political polarization, ascendant right-wing populism. Moreover, studies have indicated that the erosion of the country's manufacturing base might have reduced productivity and innovation economy-wide. The dislocations caused by the coronavirus pandemic and rising tensions with Beijing gave Washington a strong security justification for supporting domestic supply chains too. A self-proclaimed 'tariff man,' Trump has taken these arguments to extremes, bellowing that foreign countries are ripping off Americans and promising to eliminate the country's trade deficit. 'Globalization has made the financial elite, who donate to politicians, very, very wealthy,' he said while campaigning against Clinton. 'It has left millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache.' During his first term, he implemented tariffs on aluminum, steel, and $380 billion in Chinese imports, and renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement. In his second, he has levied tariffs on Chinese, Mexican, and Canadian goods, and is preparing tariffs on trillions of dollars of imports from around the globe. But there is a difference between using trade policy to generate new jobs and to restore old ones, as Trump wants to do, promising to take the country back and make it great again. 'Rectifying the bad things we went through in the past—and I am not minimizing that there were costs—this is not going to fix that, and I fear that it's holding out false promise,' Chad Bown of Peterson Institute for International Economics told me. Tariffs aren't reparations. Trump's nostalgia notwithstanding, the American economy was not more prosperous when a large share of its workers were toiling on assembly lines. Fifty years ago, the middle class was larger and inequality was lower. But wages and household incomes were smaller, and consumer goods were much more dear. Trade liberalization and automation made most Americans better off. Trump's crackbrained understanding of trade economics threatens to reverse those welfare gains, and without aiding the Rust Belt. He insists that tariffs are paid by foreign exporters, when they are paid by domestic businesses and consumers, as the Rosens show. He argues that the United States' trade imbalances indicate that other countries are taking advantage of us, when it simply means that we sell fewer goods and services to foreign nations than we buy from them. (Savings rates, currency prices, industrial policy, trade barriers, and labor costs figure into countries' trade imbalances.) He argues that making everything in America would bolster GDP growth rate, when it would reduce it. China's ascension to the World Trade Organization and decades of automation beforehand did damage the Rust Belt economy. But economists told me that trade policy has no way to reverse the phenomenon. Washington cannot dictate where business executives choose to build new plants; those decisions take into account not just tariffs but tax incentives, labor rules, the location of ports and highways, and local employment conditions. 'If we try to undo the China Shock, those jobs are probably going to go to the South or Southwest'—where wages are cheaper and labor laws are laxer—'not the industrial heartland,' Douglas Irwin, a trade economist at Dartmouth, told me. Placed-based policies could help, he said, but 'trade barriers just aren't going to do it.' When companies build plants in the United States today, they look nothing like the Manhattan garment factories and Big Three assembly lines of yore. Automation has diminished the number of manufacturing positions globally; countries such as Ethiopia and Bangladesh have seen most of their job growth in the service sector. Given the high cost of labor in the United States, manufacturing firms tend to invest heavily in robotics, machine tools, and AI systems. In the 1930s, the biggest Detroit auto plant employed more than 100,000 workers. Hyundai's new electric-vehicle plant outside Savannah is expected to employ 8,500. Modern factories tend to be not unitary production facilities but nodes in complex, globe-spanning networks. A car finished in Illinois might contain components from Mexico, Canada, Japan, and Germany, with parts crossing in and out of the United States multiple times during assembly. 'If you don't have tariff-free access to those parts, your car is going to be more expensive than the same-quality car made in South Korea or Germany,' Clausing told me. Tariffs would make it 'harder to make things in America, not easier,' she added: A company would pay only a single tariff to import a car made entirely abroad, but multiple rounds of tariffs on a vehicle produced inside and outside the United States. Tariffs, she told me, 'could decimate the U.S. auto industry.' Trump's proposed tariffs do not emphasize strategically important or high-tech industries, as prior administrations have done. As a result, 'we're going to reallocate production away from stuff we were good at making and towards stuff that we're not good at making,' Clausing told me, and away from crucial goods and toward trivial ones. Trump's policies could squeeze capital away from weaponry, batteries, and semiconductor chips and toward toasters, sports equipment, and, well, costume jewelry. Other countries that have engaged in this kind of autarky have generally given up, Clausing noted. 'You realize that you can't make everything yourself and it ultimately makes your citizens poor.' Trump's enormous tariffs would increase consumer prices and limit the quantity and quality of goods available for American households to purchase. The policies would kill off firms reliant on imported goods or parts. The misallocation of investment capital would make the country less vibrant in the long term. Trade experts anticipate that Trump will reduce or withdraw his tariffs before that happens; business executives are likely to wait out the administration rather than scrambling their supply networks. 'To really bring manufacturing back in a big way, tariffs have to be permanent,' Irwin told me. 'Firms are not going to spend millions of dollars on a plant if they think the policy is going to change in three years.' The Rosens told me that they would love to commission costume jewelry from an American factory or produce it themselves, as they used to do. Before they owned their import business, they operated a firm called Accessories du Jour. A 'very vertical business,' as Susan put it, Accessories du Jour designed pieces and fabricated them in a 72,000-square-foot factory with as many as 800 employees. 'We made the plastic stones. We did our own plating, our own color, our own gluing of stones, our own assembly,' Susan said. 'There wasn't anything we didn't do.' The cost of hiring American workers and operating in one of the most expensive regions on Earth made it impossible for the company to compete with imports from South Korea and China. 'It was so sad to watch that evolution happen,' Susan told me. Trump's tariffs would not make Accessories du Jour a viable business today, the Rosens thought. 'Reassembling that factory would take years, years, years,' and millions of dollars of investment, Susan said. 'Where do you get the actual workers who want to plate, and work with chemicals all day, and glue with epoxy?' she added. 'The employees that we would probably need are all being deported.' The Rosens were looking into getting an exemption from Trump's tariffs, on the basis that they could not find a domestic fabricator for their jewelry. I asked what would happen if the exemption did not come through. 'That's the question,' Stuart told me. 'We're very loyal to our employees. I mean, we're stupid! What can you do?' They hope that their retailers would agree to raise retail prices. If they don't, the Rosens might not make it through Trump's adjustment period. They would go out of business again.
CBS News
09-03-2025
- Politics
- CBS News
One-on-one with Congressman Jared Moskowitz
ONE-ON-ONE WITH CONGRESSMAN JARED MOSKOWITZ After another eventful week in Washington, which included President Donald Trump 's address to a Joint Session of Congress, Jim goes one-on-one with Florida Democratic Congressman Jared Moskowitz. The two tackle a variety of topics which include the President's speech, and why Moskowitz voted to censure fellow Democrat Al Green of Texas for repeatedly interrupting Mr. Trump's address.
Fox News
07-03-2025
- Politics
- Fox News
NEWT GINGRICH: How House Democrats became zombies
As I wrote earlier this week, after attending President Donald J. Trump's address to the Joint Session of Congress, it occurred to me that the House Democrats have become like zombies. Their members sat mute and motionless no matter what the president said or who he honored – including a young cancer survivor, a newly accepted West Point cadet, and an American who had been held hostage in Russia. Not one House Democrat exhibited any trace of human compassion or interest. It was a bit eerie. As I thought more about this, a lot of other things began to make sense. The House Democrats have evolved from being a relatively rough and tumble, argumentative, and rebellious bunch in the 1960s and 1970s into a tame, passive, robotic group today. Of course, historically, the Democratic Party has had a deep tradition of machine politics going back to the founding of Tammany Hall in New York City in 1786. Virtually every major city run by Democrats today operates this way. Over the long-term, the Democratic system simply tends to breed conformity. But this zombie-ism is a new, more extreme phenomenon. You can start to track it with Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Recall when Pelosi held up the nearly 1,000-page Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) and said, "we have to pass the bill so you can find out what is in it." At the time, I thought it was a foolish slip of the tongue. In hindsight, the Pelosi Speakership often involved Democratic members voting blindly as instructed by their elected leadership. As Speaker in the first two years of Joe Biden's presidency, Pelosi took full advantage of this blind loyalty to pass a slew of massive bills with no elected officials really knowing the details. Democrat after Democrat voted for deeply unpopular policies which barred parents from knowing what their children were doing and learning in school, allowed men to play women's sports, opposed tax cuts, left the southern border open, etc. For a long time, I could not figure out how House Democrats could so brazenly ignore the will of the American people. Now I get it. They were turning into zombies. For a long time, I could not figure out how House Democrats could so brazenly ignore the will of the American people. Now I get it. They were turning into zombies. Of course, Pelosi didn't do it alone. The teachers' and public employee unions kept people in line by threatening to fund primary opponents. The left-wing billionaires and activist groups also policed House Democratic members. The propaganda media also gladly reminded Democrats of the party-movement line. From "The View," to MSNBC, to the New York Times, and the Washington Post, the signals went out. This is who we are. This is what we believe. Those who broke rank became ostracized and isolated. Just ask Sen. Joe Manchin, Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., or Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. Finally, there was sheer social pressure from other Democrats. Walking to vote and getting on an elevator with five or six hard-left-wing members could have a significant influence on whether someone voted against Democratic leadership. At a practical level, losing committee assignments and watching more obedient members get the better committees is a real lever of power. I encountered this in the 1980s when several southern Democrats voted with President Ronald Reagan. They suddenly found their committee assignments and proposed legislation in jeopardy. The ultimate example of zombie behavior in the Democratic Party was the replacement of President Biden by Vice President Kamala Harris. President Biden had won every primary. He had a virtually unanimous delegation which would have dominated the Democratic National Convention. Vice President Harris had received zero votes. Yet within a few hours, the zombies took down Biden and elevated Harris. In a party which had spent four years lecturing about democracy, this instant switch would only have been possible in a party of zombies. They did as they were told. Applauded when they were told. And lied to themselves when they were told. It will be interesting to see how House Democrats deal with the challenges of a dynamic, creative, and aggressive Republican Party. I expect President Trump will cheerfully run circles around the House Democrat zombies just as he did Tuesday night.
Fox News
06-03-2025
- Politics
- Fox News
Morning Glory: The Democrats try outrage theater
Is that how you want your children to act in public? Recall your days of school assemblies. All classes dutifully assembled on the bleachers, and for what? Some pretty awful speeches, awards, skits, earnest appeals to not drive drunk and more. Rallies before big games could be fun, and decorum then went out the window—but not totally. There may have been some discipline issues at all of them. Catholic high schools like my own had standards that were at least as demanding when it came to in-school behavior as our public school counterparts. My kids had the same general ground rules when a parent or parents were obliged to attend one of their schools' gatherings. (The only "mandatory" such occasion was for sessions covering the rules governing high school athletics in California, which were neither boring nor exciting. They were the rules. If your kids played a sport, one or both parents had to attend and sign a form signifying that they did. The would-be student athletes were obliged to do so as well.) Every memory of every assembly concerning the grades 9-12 is faded, but it is a certainty that all of them were more decorous than Tuesday night's address by President Trump to the Joint Session of Congress. There have been low points at such gathering before, such as Speaker Pelosi's tearing-up of President Trump's February 2020 State of the Union address. But nothing like Tuesday night. Of course Democrats cannot adjust to President Trump. He has broken them, just as he has broken so many former Republicans and many in the commentariat. They cannot react to him in anything approaching a normal way. Their internal emotional thermostats are shattered and there's no evidence—none—that those so impacted will be seeking the help they need much less obtaining an effective intervention. Disagreeing with the president is routine for half the chambers. Stunts such as arriving early to claim a chair in order to gather an annual grip and grin are somewhat amusing, even quaint. But not Tuesday night. The walkouts. The paddles. Texas Representative Al Green yelling at Trump that "You have no mandate to cut Medicaid!" The Dean of Students removed Green but no doubt some of his colleagues gave him attaboys. Perhaps these were auditions for guest slots of MSNBC's rapidly evolving line-up of resistance shows. Perhaps there is some gratification for a general mention in a late-night comedy monologue that no longer commands even a traditional late night audience which was small to begin with. More than anything else, though, Congressional Democrats don't know what to do and don't have "leaders" who they respect and thus from whom they take cues. They are, in a word, lost. Like the lost boys of J.M. Barrie's 1904 play, Peter Pan, Congressional Democrats don't want to grow up if only for an annual occasion ofstate. I used to think the GOP would lose its House majority in 2026 given the tide charts of Congressional elections over the decades. But now? Who knows? Do you want the "disrupters" of Tuesday night running the federal government? Do you want them in charge or, say, the education of your children? Hugh Hewitt is host of "The Hugh Hewitt Show," heard weekday mornings 6am to 9am ET on the Salem Radio Network, and simulcast on Salem News Channel. Hugh wakes up America on over 400 affiliates nationwide, and on all the streaming platforms where SNC can be seen. He is a frequent guest on the Fox News Channel's news roundtable hosted by Bret Baier weekdays at 6pm ET. A son of Ohio and a graduate of Harvard College and the University of Michigan Law School, Hewitt has been a Professor of Law at Chapman University's Fowler School of Law since 1996 where he teaches Constitutional Law. Hewitt launched his eponymous radio show from Los Angeles in 1990. Hewitt has frequently appeared on every major national news television network, hosted television shows for PBS and MSNBC, written for every major American paper, has authored a dozen books and moderated a score of Republican candidate debates, most recently the November 2023 Republican presidential debate in Miami and four Republican presidential debates in the 2015-16 cycle. Hewitt focuses his radio show and his column on the Constitution, national security, American politics and the Cleveland Browns and Guardians. Hewitt has interviewed tens of thousands of guests from Democrats Hillary Clinton and John Kerry to Republican Presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump over his 40 years in broadcast, and this column previews the lead story that will drive his radio/ TV show today.
