Latest news with #JosephNye
France 24
28-05-2025
- Politics
- France 24
Thought police? U.S. scrutinizes foreign student visas
44:22 The man who coined the term 'soft power' recently died. It's ironic that Joseph Nye taught at Harvard University… … the institution that's in the eye of the storm of the Trump administration's crackdown on foreign students. A court's now stopped the U-S government from banning foreign student enrollment at the country's most elite university but more suspensions of federal funding are in the works… and now comes a broader move... The U-S state department pausing visa applications for the country's more than one million foreign students this quote 'in preparation for an expansion of required social media screening and vetting.» In a land that prides itself on its first amendment of the constitution guaranteeing free speech, who decides when posting a picture of a Palestinian flag constitutes a national security threat? A passing fancy or the true decline of US soft power? As Europeans try to lure students and researchers to migrate to these shores, as the UK moves towards rejoining the Erasmus foreign student exchange program that the pro-Brexit Conservatives quit – we'll ask what the pushback against foreign students and the use of social media posts as evidence for the prosecution say about our times… and the free flow of ideas and information.
Yahoo
26-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - Joseph Nye is dead, and the illusion of ethical power politics should die too
Joseph Nye died earlier this month at the age of 88, and with him passes one of the most influential voices of post-Cold War American internationalism. The tributes have been swift and respectful, as they should be. The renowned Harvard professor was not only a gifted scholar but a consummate Washington insider, serving as assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs in the Clinton administration. He bridged the worlds of academia and power like few others of his generation. Nye's concept of 'soft power' became gospel in the foreign policy establishment. His calls for an ethical foreign policy won plaudits from policymakers who wanted to believe that American primacy could be both virtuous and enduring. But now that the official remembrances have piled up, it is time to say something different. Nye was a man of ideas. His passing should invite not just mourning, but reevaluation. And the hard truth is that the world Nye helped interpret, shape and justify no longer exists. Nye's signature ideas — soft power, the liberal order, ethical realism — are artifacts of an age that is over. What remains is a harsher and more tragic world, one that calls not for the ethics of Harvard seminars but clarity, hard-nosed realism and morally unsettling truths. Let's begin with the concept Nye made famous: soft power. In his telling, the ability to attract and co-opt, rather than coerce, was the future of global leadership. Cultural appeal, democratic norms and economic openness would draw others toward America's orbit, making the world safer, more liberal and more cooperative. Nye did not reject hard power; he sought a synthesis, famously urging policymakers to wield 'smart power' — the judicious blend of persuasion and coercion. But soft power was never a strategy. It was a theory of influence in a world where U.S. cultural and economic hegemony was taken for granted. At its core, soft power depended on a set of illusions: that America's values were universally attractive, that its economic system was the endpoint of development, that its leadership was benevolent rather than self-interested. These illusions worked, for a while, because there was no real alternative. In the unipolar moment of the 1990s, even critics of the U.S. had to live within the order it dominated. Soft power was, in truth, a polite name for power with no challengers. That world is gone. The appeal of American liberalism is weaker than it has been in decades. China offers a model of techno-authoritarian capitalism that has growing appeal across the Global South. Russia, for all its brutality, has demonstrated that hard power can still shape borders and revise status quos. Even U.S. allies no longer assume that America's cultural gravity is irresistible. And at home, the U.S. is mired in political division, moral confusion and social decay. The foundations of soft power have cracked, and no amount of elite consensus can put them back together. To his credit, Nye tried to grapple with these changes. He remained a realist (at least in the academic sense), and his later writings explored how presidents might pursue ethical foreign policies in a world of limits. But this effort, too, ultimately fails. Nye's vision of 'ethical realism' relied on the idea that America's power could be used for moral ends — that statesmen could balance national interest with cosmopolitan responsibility, and that the exercise of power could be squared with the principles of justice. His final works urge policymakers to consider the intentions behind policy, the means by which it is pursued and the consequences it unleashes. But what if the world doesn't allow that kind of neat calculus? What if, as Thucydides wrote in the Melian Dialogue, 'the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must'? What if tragedy — not ethics — is the defining logic of international relations? That power always outruns virtue? That necessity, not morality, determines action in an anarchic world? Nye was too much a liberal, and too much a moralist, to follow this thought to its end. And so his ethical realism amounts to little more than a comforting fiction for elites desperate to believe that U.S. leadership still carries moral weight. The most damning critique of Nye, however, is not that he was wrong. It is that his ideas provided the intellectual scaffolding for an era of American overreach. Soft power lulled Washington into complacency about its real sources of strength. Ethical realism gave moral cover to disastrous interventions in Iraq, Libya and beyond. And the concept of 'smart power' became a euphemism for a bipartisan consensus that dressed up brute force in the language of benevolence. The wreckage of these policies can be seen around the world — from Kabul to Kyiv, from the South China Sea to the Sahel. Nye's legacy, however well-intentioned, cannot be separated from the failures that it helped legitimize. We are left with a need for a new realism — one not rooted in morality tales or campus abstractions, but in the grim realities of power, fear and ambition. Carl von Clausewitz reminds us that war is a continuation of politics by other means, not a failure of diplomacy. Machiavelli teaches that the appearance of virtue is often more important than its substance. And Thucydides shows that human nature and the structure of international politics make conflict all but inevitable. These are not comforting truths, but they are truths nonetheless. Nye's death marks the passing of an era — the final twilight of the American imperium imagined in the 1990s. It is fitting that we honor his contributions. He was a serious thinker, a patriot and a decent man. But let us not honor him with empty praise or uncritical nostalgia. Instead, let's bury the illusions that his ideas inspired. The post-Cold War liberal order is gone and the dream of ethical hegemony has faded. In its place stands a world of multipolar competition, civilizational rivalry and structural disorder. This world will not be managed by soft power, nor redeemed by ethical realism. It will be shaped — if we are lucky — by hard choices, clear thinking and a new generation of statesmen unafraid to look tragedy in the face. That is the true task of our time. And that is the epitaph that Nye's legacy deserves. Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
26-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
Joseph Nye is dead, and the illusion of ethical power politics should die too
Joseph Nye died earlier this month at the age of 88, and with him passes one of the most influential voices of post-Cold War American internationalism. The tributes have been swift and respectful, as they should be. The renowned Harvard professor was not only a gifted scholar but a consummate Washington insider, serving as assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs in the Clinton administration. He bridged the worlds of academia and power like few others of his generation. Nye's concept of 'soft power' became gospel in the foreign policy establishment. His calls for an ethical foreign policy won plaudits from policymakers who wanted to believe that American primacy could be both virtuous and enduring. But now that the official remembrances have piled up, it is time to say something different. Nye was a man of ideas. His passing should invite not just mourning, but reevaluation. And the hard truth is that the world Nye helped interpret, shape and justify no longer exists. Nye's signature ideas — soft power, the liberal order, ethical realism — are artifacts of an age that is over. What remains is a harsher and more tragic world, one that calls not for the ethics of Harvard seminars but clarity, hard-nosed realism and morally unsettling truths. Let's begin with the concept Nye made famous: soft power. In his telling, the ability to attract and co-opt, rather than coerce, was the future of global leadership. Cultural appeal, democratic norms and economic openness would draw others toward America's orbit, making the world safer, more liberal and more cooperative. Nye did not reject hard power; he sought a synthesis, famously urging policymakers to wield 'smart power' — the judicious blend of persuasion and coercion. But soft power was never a strategy. It was a theory of influence in a world where U.S. cultural and economic hegemony was taken for granted. At its core, soft power depended on a set of illusions: that America's values were universally attractive, that its economic system was the endpoint of development, that its leadership was benevolent rather than self-interested. These illusions worked, for a while, because there was no real alternative. In the unipolar moment of the 1990s, even critics of the U.S. had to live within the order it dominated. Soft power was, in truth, a polite name for power with no challengers. That world is gone. The appeal of American liberalism is weaker than it has been in decades. China offers a model of techno-authoritarian capitalism that has growing appeal across the Global South. Russia, for all its brutality, has demonstrated that hard power can still shape borders and revise status quos. Even U.S. allies no longer assume that America's cultural gravity is irresistible. And at home, the U.S. is mired in political division, moral confusion and social decay. The foundations of soft power have cracked, and no amount of elite consensus can put them back together. To his credit, Nye tried to grapple with these changes. He remained a realist (at least in the academic sense), and his later writings explored how presidents might pursue ethical foreign policies in a world of limits. But this effort, too, ultimately fails. Nye's vision of 'ethical realism' relied on the idea that America's power could be used for moral ends — that statesmen could balance national interest with cosmopolitan responsibility, and that the exercise of power could be squared with the principles of justice. His final works urge policymakers to consider the intentions behind policy, the means by which it is pursued and the consequences it unleashes. But what if the world doesn't allow that kind of neat calculus? What if, as Thucydides wrote in the Melian Dialogue, 'the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must'? What if tragedy — not ethics — is the defining logic of international relations? That power always outruns virtue? That necessity, not morality, determines action in an anarchic world? Nye was too much a liberal, and too much a moralist, to follow this thought to its end. And so his ethical realism amounts to little more than a comforting fiction for elites desperate to believe that U.S. leadership still carries moral weight. The most damning critique of Nye, however, is not that he was wrong. It is that his ideas provided the intellectual scaffolding for an era of American overreach. Soft power lulled Washington into complacency about its real sources of strength. Ethical realism gave moral cover to disastrous interventions in Iraq, Libya and beyond. And the concept of 'smart power' became a euphemism for a bipartisan consensus that dressed up brute force in the language of benevolence. The wreckage of these policies can be seen around the world — from Kabul to Kyiv, from the South China Sea to the Sahel. Nye's legacy, however well-intentioned, cannot be separated from the failures that it helped legitimize. We are left with a need for a new realism — one not rooted in morality tales or campus abstractions, but in the grim realities of power, fear and ambition. Carl von Clausewitz reminds us that war is a continuation of politics by other means, not a failure of diplomacy. Machiavelli teaches that the appearance of virtue is often more important than its substance. And Thucydides shows that human nature and the structure of international politics make conflict all but inevitable. These are not comforting truths, but they are truths nonetheless. Nye's death marks the passing of an era — the final twilight of the American imperium imagined in the 1990s. It is fitting that we honor his contributions. He was a serious thinker, a patriot and a decent man. But let us not honor him with empty praise or uncritical nostalgia. Instead, let's bury the illusions that his ideas inspired. The post-Cold War liberal order is gone and the dream of ethical hegemony has faded. In its place stands a world of multipolar competition, civilizational rivalry and structural disorder. This world will not be managed by soft power, nor redeemed by ethical realism. It will be shaped — if we are lucky — by hard choices, clear thinking and a new generation of statesmen unafraid to look tragedy in the face. That is the true task of our time. And that is the epitaph that Nye's legacy deserves. Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C.
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First Post
24-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
India fights alone: Narrative wars, Western gaslighting, and a missed opportunity
What we saw this time was that the Pakistanis were taken by surprise, and India had a massive advantage. But now that the cat is out of the bag, Pakistanis and Chinese will regroup and figure out corrective tactics read more From May 1 until the 20th, I was travelling in the US and thus had to depend on Western media (mostly Twitter/X) for news about Operation Sindoor and the aftermath. It was self-evident that there was no point in reading things like the NYTimes, Wapo, The Economist, etc, because one look at their headlines confirmed that they were 'manufacturing consent'. Soft Power Given the difference in X posts that I read in the US and those in India, I think the algorithms were deprecating posts for me in ways that are hard to detect. In other words, there is a narrative war where India has no say but lots at stake. India's soft power is seriously wanting. Joseph Nye, the academic who popularised that phrase, passed away this week; following his theories, it behooves India to make a concerted attempt to improve its storytelling. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD It faces an uphill battle because Western, especially American, media have shown an ability to gaslight at scale in three major stories in the recent past: the COVID panic, the 'Trump-is-a-Russian-stooge' meme, and the 'Biden is mentally sharp as a tack' story. They are good at it and have no love lost for India, and so India needs a long-term plan to get its own propaganda story out, for instance, developing an Al Jazeera-style global footprint or an X-style social medium. The entire Western narrative, for self-serving purposes, continues to be against India, for good reason: they do not wish to see India grow into a peer-level competitor at the G3 level. In this, both China and the West are of one mind, and it shows. Besides, the West has every incentive to try to block India from becoming a major arms exporter: they would prefer India to continue to be one of the biggest importers, preferably from them. Narrative warfare is a Western speciality, as I said in Information Warfare, Narrative-Building: That Kind of Warfare. In addition to kinetic warfare, India needs to up its game here too. Narratives have real-life consequences. The Pakistanis have been quite successful in their own narratives, riding on Western media: here is an example from the Nikkei (which owns the Financial Times) from a Pakistani journalist. This is typical of the stories created by Pakistanis and amplified by western media: basically, that India took a major hit, with five or six high-end aircraft downed by Pakistani/Chinese weaponry. The story was repeated so many times that it essentially became the Truth. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD A Step Change in Aerial Warfare My personal belief is that India won a victory on the ground and in the air, humiliating Pakistan, attacking it at will and exposing its Chinese armaments as below-par. Some thoughtful neutral experts support this view: See . India also demonstrated surprising competence in the new age of electronics-based warfare. It may no longer be expensive fighter jets (and by extension, aircraft carriers) that tilt the balance, but missiles, drones and integrated air defence. This must be emphasised. There are periodic step functions in warfare that render earlier, victorious technologies/processes less valuable: this is similar to disruptive innovation, where the 'insurgent' firm nullifies the apparent advantages of the 'incumbent' firm. Often that means a point of inflection. An example is the arrival of the longbow in mediaeval times that made hitherto unstoppable heavy cavalry stumble. Another is the arrival of air power itself. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Today there may be another point of inflection. Experts have suggested that warfare going forward will be software-driven, including drone swarms that can autonomously reshape their formations (reminiscent of the murmurations of flocks of starlings). Presumably, there will be plenty of predictive AI built in as well. Given India's poor track record in software products, it was generally assumed that India would not do so well in such a new environment. In reality, there appears to have been a clever integration of indigenous and imported technology to create an 'iron dome' of sorts against Pakistan's Chinese missiles, of which an advanced variant, PL-15, was apparently shot down intact. More interestingly, it appears that Lakshya and Banshee drones were programmed to masquerade as Rafales, Sukhois, etc, by emitting their radar signals, thus attracting enemy fire towards themselves. This might explain the claims of five or six Indian aircraft shot down by Pakistan, whereas in reality they may have simply shot down the phantom, mimic drones. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The implications are large: in effect, India was able to attack Pakistan at will; video evidence shows significant damage to terrorist sites in the first round and to military sites in the second round, including to key Pakistani air bases, as well as, it is said, the entrance tunnel to the nuclear storage facilities in the Kirana Hills. Indian air dominance appears to have forced the Pakistanis to beg for US support to suggest a cessation of hostilities. This skirmish was proof in the heat of battle for India's indigenous weapons, especially the BrahMos (although, of course, that is a joint venture with Russia). It may result in a number of serious queries from prospective customers, especially in Southeast Asia, who will be interested in battlefield performance against Chinese missiles and aircraft. This would be a win for India's arms industry. Conversely, there is a singular sore spot: fighter jets. For a variety of reasons, most especially the fact that the Kaveri engine has not been allowed to complete its testing and development phase, India is still dependent on others for advanced fighters. And this is just fine as far as they are concerned, because the Americans want to sell F-35s, the French want to sell more Rafales, and the Russians want to sell Su-57s. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Here's an X comment by a military historian who suggests that India's fighter jets are inadequate. He deleted his further comment that indigenisation is fine as an industrial policy, but it doesn't work for advanced weaponry. This is a typically sniffy attitude towards India, which is grist to the mill for the Chandigarh Lobby's successful efforts to trash local weapons and gain lucrative middleman deals for foreign weapons. Strategic Dilemma: To Push On or Not There is also a strategic dilemma. India has an unfortunate habit of wasting its soldiers' hard-won victories at the negotiating table due to bad political calculations. The epitome of this is, of course, Indira Gandhi's 1971 giveaway of 93,000 Pakistani PoWs in exchange for essentially… nothing. There is some reason to wonder if something similar happened in 2025 as well. A tactical victory was possibly converted into a stalemate, and the old era of hyphenation and the nuclear bogey has returned. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD What we saw in 2025 was that the Pakistanis were taken by surprise, and India had a massive advantage. But now that the cat is out of the bag, Pakistanis and Chinese will regroup and figure out corrective tactics. Thus India has, to use an American expression, 'shot its wad', and the element of surprise is gone forever. The endgame for India is the dissolution of Pakistan into four or five statelets, which, one hopes, will then concentrate on Pakistani Punjab as the root of all their troubles. In that case, they will keep each other occupied, and India can live in peace without regular terrorist attacks. Of course, that may be a pipe dream, given the Ghazwa-e-Hind formula many entertain, but the collapse of the Pakistani state is anyway desirable for India. Should India have continued its offensive? Forget the murky issue of the nuclear assets in Sargodha. Should India have moved the Line of Control (LoC) forward into some areas, perhaps into Gilgit-Baltistan (with Sharda Peeth and the Kishenganga) and up to the Jhelum River in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir? The problem though, is that once you start moving past the border posts, you have hostile civilians to contend with, and your supply lines start getting stretched. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Even though it is tragic to let go of an opportunity to thrash an enemy that's on the back foot, and Pakistan will inevitably use the truce to rearm itself and come back ever stronger (the Treaty of Hudaybiyah is not a meme in the Islamic world for nothing), it is not clear to me what India could have done to militarily make the LoC irrelevant and make Pakistan implode, especially in the context of American pushback. The Role of the US Why was there pressure from President Trump? One of the things I observed during my US stay is the total absence of DOGE and Elon Musk from the headlines after Trump's 100 days, very contrary to their ubiquity early on. Similarly, the security implications of Trump's recent embrace of Syria's President Al-Sharaa contradict Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard's views on Syria, as evidenced by her tweets. Further, there are U-turns on tariffs. This means Trump is being mercurial as ever. Furthermore, there might be something to the idea that his family's embrace of crypto may have endeared Pakistan – which is making noises about supporting crypto at scale – to him. All this is red-pilling many about Trump. Indeed, he may be allowing short-term, commercial considerations to drive policy, which may return to haunt the US: that is exactly what Clinton, Bush, Obama, et al did with respect to China. On the other hand, there are longer-term considerations, too. Pakistan is essentially a Potemkin nation, which has no particular reason to exist, other than it is being propped up. Initially, it was a British project for the Russian Great Game; then it was taken over by the US Deep State in order to fend off the Soviet Union. Pakistan was a 'major non-NATO ally' (MNNA) according to Obama, if I remember right, and earlier it was a member of CENTO and SEATO. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to Pakistan, approved in the middle of the hostilities, is not surprising, either: this has happened before. In a way, it is a complicated money-laundering activity. Funds from somewhere (possibly Qatar) are chanelled to Pakistan, which then buys American arms. Thus, the Deep State Military Industrial Complex is the winner. With the end of the Afghanistan wars, Pakistan offers no obvious geographic and strategic value to the US. Unless, of course, the target is no longer Russia but India. Perhaps in anticipation of its being a check on India, the US had helped Pakistan nuclearise, according to this archived article from the NYTimes: US and China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb, from a time when it was possibly more truthful. I am indebted to Brahma Chellaney for this link. This may suggest that Pakistan's nuclear 'assets' are not theirs but are managed by an American crew. On the other hand, though, the greater possibility is that such assets are loaned by China. Pakistan is a fantastic force multiplier for China. Abhimanyu Syndrome The bottom line, then, is that India is on its own: sort of an Abhimanyu Syndrome, with nobody to help. The most obvious 'friend' is Japan (because of the China threat), but it is severely constrained by American red lines: see how there was not a murmur from the Quad after Pahalgam. India's very possible rise is in fact encouraging other powers to put it down: grow so much, but no farther. There really is no alternative for India but to industrialise, make everything possible for its large internal market, and increase the level of strategic autonomy in everything it makes: no more dependence on third parties, who may feel free to use kill switches or deny spares or components at will. In this round, India did surprisingly well with indigenous technology, and it has articulated a strategy of escalating deterrence. To put teeth into this, innovation at home must continue. The writer has been a conservative columnist for over 25 years. His academic interest is innovation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
Jordan Times
24-05-2025
- Politics
- Jordan Times
Education as Soft Power: Shaping Influence in a Divided World
In an era shaped by globalization, international cooperation, and rapid communication, intercultural dialogue is more urgent than ever. It remains one of the most effective tools for building mutual understanding and bridging divides in an increasingly polarized world. Amid these global shifts, education has stepped into the spotlight—not just as a means of personal advancement but as a powerful lever of soft power. Defined by Harvard's Joseph Nye as the ability to influence others through attraction rather than force, soft power allows nations to shape perceptions through shared values, cultural exchange, and knowledge. The 2024 Global Soft Power Index shows that countries investing in ethical, inclusive education often enjoy stronger international credibility. Yet turning this promise into meaningful impact remains a challenge. In this light, education becomes more than a tool of national influence—it's a bridge connecting cultures, diplomacy, and mutual understanding. At its best, it promotes trust by sharing ideas and values across borders. Beyond coexistence, interculturalism calls for deeper engagement. It encourages respect, challenges assumptions, and nurtures empathy—skills essential for navigating difference while remaining rooted in one's identity. Challenges to Interculturalism in a Multi-Polar World Yet this ideal is under strain. In today's fragmented world, national agendas often assert themselves more aggressively—sometimes tipping into cultural dominance. As Edward Said once warned, cultural imperialism can hide behind noble intentions. Education, once a hopeful bridge-builder, is increasingly caught in this tension. This raises questions: Can education still act as a genuine force for soft power, or is it becoming just another tool of influence? How can interculturalism evolve in modern systems to foster global awareness? And what conditions are needed to ensure education connects, not divides? Expanding the Scope of Soft Power: The Notion of Smart Power As global competition grows, soft power alone may no longer suffice. Its subtlety often lacks the speed or force needed in urgent geopolitical situations. This has led to the rise of 'smart power'—a blend of persuasion and pressure, combining soft influence with economic or strategic tools. Education plays a key role in this shift. Now tied to broader policy aims, it's shaped by diplomacy, national priorities, and emerging technologies like AI. Governments are using AI not only to enhance learning but to influence civic behavior and national identity. Separately, Russian analyst Shabalov has argued that strategies like 'controlled chaos,' 'color revolutions,' and 'cultural hegemony' are being deployed in cultural arenas—including education. While not directly tied to AI, his insights show how learning environments have become front lines in wider battles over influence and perception. Moral Dilemmas of Evolving Strategies This shift brings ethical questions. Can education stay grounded in values like dialogue and trust while also serving strategic aims? As the lines blur, the risk grows that influence overshadows integrity. Yet education's potential remains—if rooted in fairness, transparency, and open exchange, it can still guide global engagement. Education as a Hybrid Tool in Soft and Smart Power Education now blends cultural outreach with strategic goals. Exchange programs still foster understanding, but they also support diplomacy. Governments invest in innovation—especially AI—while using curricula to reinforce civic values and national narratives. These trends show how education can inspire global respect even as it advances domestic priorities. Contradictions and Opportunities So what happens next? Can education evolve without losing its ethical foundation? Can it support national aims and still promote cross-cultural dialogue? And how can we keep it from being co-opted as a tool of manipulation? These questions go beyond education policy—they speak to the core of democratic society. As strategic interests increasingly shape public discourse, education's role as a space for reflection and open exchange has never been more important. Countries with greater resources often dominate education systems and the narratives they promote, sidelining local voices. Western models, seen as universal, can drown out diverse worldviews. Another concern is financial influence. Foreign funding can shape curriculum direction. Confucius Institutes, for example, have been accused of promoting selective narratives and silencing dissent. U.S.-backed exchanges face similar criticism. These programs aim to build goodwill—but may embed ideological agendas. This financial reliance can compromise academic integrity. Universities dependent on international donors may feel pressured to align with those interests. In the U.S., controversial donations have sparked debate about freedom of thought and institutional independence. The line between partnership and compromise can blur. In 2022, the University of Helsinki ended its Confucius Institute partnership due to concerns about censorship and ties to the Chinese government. The move reflected wider fears over academic freedom and politicized learning. Education is also part of the global fight against disinformation. In the UK, the Open Information Partnership works with schools to teach media literacy. Across the Arab world, ALECSO supports efforts to protect cultural integrity and challenge misinformation. But this strategy has a double edge. As education enters the information war, the line between cultural diplomacy and propaganda grows blurry. While every country has the right to protect its national interests—especially from foreign interference—this must be balanced with efforts to promote digital literacy, critical thinking, and open inquiry. These tools help learners engage globally while upholding academic freedom and mutual respect. The Way Forward Looking ahead, education must stay anchored to its core values. That means protecting academic freedom, using AI ethically, and promoting global citizenship through equity, openness, and trust. If done right, education can still shape a better world—not just by informing minds, but by connecting them. By Razan B. Nweiran | Policy Researcher in Global Education and Diplomacy
