Latest news with #JulyWar
Asharq Al-Awsat
a day ago
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Why Did Israel Succeed in Lebanon but Not in Yemen?
Israel's crushing victory in its war against Hezbollah in Lebanon last year is considered one of its military triumphs, ranked alongside the Six-Day War victory in 1967. Meanwhile, its operations against the Houthis in Yemen, so far, have been more theatrical than effective, resembling its 2006 war in Lebanon. This, despite the fact that the armed group has no air defense capabilities or a missile arsenal to strike back. Israel's current goals in Yemen resemble its attacks on Lebanon during what became known as the July War. Most of the attacks destroyed civilian or semi-civilian facilities. This may be because Israel doesn't have a strong target bank in Yemen, which is why it resorted to bombing ports, the airport, and roads to halt the reception and transport of weapons. The difference between the two fronts is significant. Against Hezbollah, Israel showed overwhelming and terrifying superiority last year; its operations seemed like science fiction. It eliminated most of the top leadership, whether they were in their homes, cars, or hiding underground in ten-story bunkers, and destroyed or disabled most of Hezbollah's offensive arsenal. If we recall what happened in 2006 during the 34-day war, Hezbollah wasn't destroyed, but Israel paralyzed the Lebanese state. It bombed the airport, the port, power and water stations, highways, around a hundred bridges and crossings, and vast residential neighborhoods. Within two years, Hezbollah had fully restored its capabilities. In contrast, during last year's battles in Lebanon, which lasted 13 months, civilian life in most of the country remained nearly normal, and infrastructure wasn't targeted. Civilian airplanes were taking off and landing at Rafik Hariri International Airport even as Israel bombed Hezbollah positions in the southern suburb of Beirut. The strikes were visible to airline passengers flying in and out of the nearby airport, which remained fully operational. Photographers and journalists would wait for announcements of airstrikes and their targets, sitting across from the buildings awaiting the attack in order to film them up close. Since January, Israel has struck Yemen six times, but not with the same effectiveness as in Lebanon. Few of these attacks actually targeted Houthi forces or leadership. Just last month, Israel bombed Sanaa International Airport and destroyed the last civilian aircraft there, which belonged to the legitimate Yemeni government, not the Houthis. This Yemeni militia resembles ISIS and al-Qaeda and shows little concern for civilian losses or infrastructure damage. Israeli strikes have not deterred the Iran-backed group from launching drones and missiles. Their arsenal is modest compared to Hezbollah's, which suffered massive destruction of its offensive capabilities. Houthi projectiles are limited and do not pose a major threat to Israel. Most have missed their targets, and those that did enter Israeli airspace briefly disrupted air traffic and forced residents into shelters for a short time. This ideologically driven Yemeni group comes from a small minority, no more than 7 percent of the population, and relies on terrorizing civilians with its militias to maintain control in cities under its grip. In other areas, it holds sway through a network of allied tribal forces. These groups will abandon the Houthis once they sense a decline in the militia's military strength. As for why Israel's performance has been so lackluster, I believe there are two possible reasons: First, a lack of intelligence in Yemen, unlike in Lebanon, where it enjoys a vast network of informants and agents, even within Hezbollah itself. This network enabled Israel to gather detailed information and build a target bank over many years in preparation for the awaited day. The other possibility is that the Israeli government itself is unwilling to escalate the confrontation and is content with punitive strikes proportional to the limited damage caused by the Houthis. It is likely waiting for an agreement under which the Houthis would pledge to stop harassing Israel, similar to the arrangement they made with the United States ahead of President Donald Trump's regional visit. Still, in my view, the Houthis are like moths drawn to a flame. They appear advanced because they launch drones and missiles. But in reality, they're no more than primitive cave fighters from the Middle Ages – or reckless mountain rams charging toward the fire.
Al Arabiya
a day ago
- General
- Al Arabiya
Why did Israel succeed in Lebanon but not in Yemen?
Israel's crushing victory in its war against Hezbollah in Lebanon last year is considered one of its military triumphs – ranked alongside the Six-Day War victory in 1967. Meanwhile, its operations against the Houthis in Yemen, so far, have been more theatrical than effective – resembling its 2006 war in Lebanon. This, despite the fact that the armed group has no air defense capabilities or a missile arsenal to strike back. Israel's current goals in Yemen resemble its attacks on Lebanon during what became known as the July War. Most of the attacks destroyed civilian or semi-civilian facilities. This may be because Israel doesn't have a strong target bank in Yemen, which is why it resorted to bombing ports, the airport, and roads to halt the reception and transport of weapons. The difference between the two fronts is significant. Against Hezbollah, Israel showed overwhelming and terrifying superiority last year – its operations seemed like science fiction. It eliminated most of the top leadership, whether they were in their homes, cars, or hiding underground in ten-story bunkers, and destroyed or disabled most of Hezbollah's offensive arsenal. If we recall what happened in 2006 during the 34-day war, Hezbollah wasn't destroyed – but Israel paralyzed the Lebanese state. It bombed the airport, the port, power and water stations, highways, around a hundred bridges and crossings, and vast residential neighborhoods. Within two years, Hezbollah had fully restored its capabilities. In contrast, during last year's battles in Lebanon – which lasted 13 months – civilian life in most of the country remained nearly normal, and infrastructure wasn't targeted. Civilian airplanes were taking off and landing at Rafic Hariri Airport even as Israel bombed Hezbollah positions in the southern suburb of Beirut. The strikes were visible to airline passengers flying in and out of the nearby airport, which remained fully operational. Photographers and journalists would wait for announcements of airstrikes and their targets, sitting across from the buildings awaiting the attack in order to film them up close. Since January, Israel has struck Yemen six times, but not with the same effectiveness as in Lebanon. Few of these attacks actually targeted Houthi forces or leadership. Just last month, Israel bombed Sanaa Airport and destroyed the last civilian aircraft there, which belonged to the internationally recognized Yemeni government – not the Houthis. This Yemeni militia resembles ISIS and al-Qaeda and shows little concern for civilian losses or infrastructure damage. Israeli strikes have not deterred the Iran-backed group from launching drones and missiles. Their arsenal is modest compared to Hezbollah's, which suffered massive destruction of its offensive capabilities. Houthi projectiles are limited and do not pose a major threat to Israel. Most have missed their targets, and those that did enter Israeli airspace briefly disrupted air traffic and forced residents into shelters for a short time. This ideologically driven Yemeni group comes from a small minority – no more than 7 percent of the population – and relies on terrorizing civilians with its militias to maintain control in cities under its grip. In other areas, it holds sway through a network of allied tribal forces. These groups will abandon the Houthis once they sense a decline in the militia's military strength. As for why Israel's performance has been so lackluster, I believe there are two possible reasons: First, a lack of intelligence in Yemen – unlike in Lebanon, where it enjoys a vast network of informants and agents, even within Hezbollah itself. This network enabled Israel to gather detailed information and build a target bank over many years in preparation for the awaited day. The other possibility is that the Israeli government itself is unwilling to escalate the confrontation and is content with punitive strikes proportional to the limited damage caused by the Houthis. It is likely waiting for an agreement under which the Houthis would pledge to stop harassing Israel – similar to the arrangement they made with the United States ahead of President Donald Trump's regional visit. Still, in my view, the Houthis are like moths drawn to a flame. They appear advanced because they launch drones and missiles. But in reality, they're no more than primitive cave fighters from the Middle Ages – or reckless mountain rams charging toward the fire.
Al Manar
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Al Manar
Hezbollah's Sheikh Qassem Salutes Lebanese Southerners on Eve of Local Elections
Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem addressed the Lebanese southerners on the eve of local elections. In a message published by Hezbollah's Media Relations Office, Sheikh Qassem saluted the Lebanese southerners, calling for wide participation in the fourth round of municipal and mayoral elections, which will take place on Sunday, a day ahead of the 25th anniversary of south Lebanon's liberation. 'You have made the greatest sacrifices and set a model of legendary steadfastness in the face of Israeli aggression for decades, most recently in supporting Gaza's Flood, the Battle of the Almighty Warriors, and the subsequent events. You have proven to be people of pride, sovereignty, and the liberation of the land,' Sheikh Qassem wrote in the message, carried by Al-Manar. 'You reconstructed the South after the liberation in 2000, and once again after the 2006 July War. Now, you have preceded the Lebanese State and officials in returning to your land. You have defied the dangers and made sacrifices to reclaim your land and homeland with steadfastness, courage, and trust in Almighty God,' the Hezbollah S.G. added. Sheikh Qassem noted that this year's municipal and mayoral elections 'are a challenge of steadfastness, solid position, adherence to the land, and reconstruction. All those who are betting on the Israeli aggression are awaiting the results.' 'We are not addressing you to achieve victory in the elections. you are the winners by rallying around Amal Movement and Hezbollah, your support for the Development and Loyalty lists, and your support for the resistance,' his eminence said, referring to electoral lists supported by the national duo. 'Indeed, you are the resistance. We are addressing you to intensify your presence and participation in the elections, so that victory will be resounding.' The Hezbollah leader stressed that the resistance party 'won't relinquish a single grain of sand from our generous south, and we will not accept the continued Israeli occupation of any inch of our land and homeland.' His eminence affirmed that the southerners' massive participation in the municipal and mayoral elections 'is part of the reconstruction that we will keep up with the elected municipalities and with the Lebanese State, which must assume its responsibility. ' 'Restoring and rebuilding the land of the South, and rebuilding all that was destroyed in Lebanon, is an integral part of showing loyalty to the blood of the martyrs, foremost among them the master of the nation's martyrs, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and to the wounded and prisoners, whom we will work to recover,' Sheikh Qassem concluded the message. Sheikh Qassem's message comes as the Israeli enemy launched a wave of fresh attacks on southe Lebanon and Bekaa, targeting dozens of towns including a residential area in the southern town of Toul.
Al Binaa
31-01-2025
- Politics
- Al Binaa
Israel is Moving Toward a Battle Between Wars
• Israeli military conduct under the ceasefire agreements in both Lebanon and Gaza blends strategic considerations with tactical imperatives. Yet, at the strategic level, Israel's leadership remains burdened by a reality they persist in denying: the exceptional conditions that enabled them in this war to attempt the eradication of the resistance: ample time, unconditional American support, an enraged climate among settlers and the army following al-Aqsa Flood operation, and unrestrained killing and destruction without accountability – are irreproducible. What was not achieved in this war will not be achieved in any future war, assuming there even is a future war. This stands in stark contrast to the strategic climate that followed the 2006 July War and the successive wars on Gaza, all of which were treated as opportunities to prepare for the next war. That war has now arrived, and what was not accomplished in it will remain beyond reach. • A closer look at the agreements signed by Israel's leaders reveals a stark truth: the illusion of being able to eliminate the resistance has collapsed irreversibly, and with each passing day, that collapse deepens, as evidenced by the images emerging from Gaza and southern Lebanon. There, vast, well-organised Palestinian military formations, both in manpower and armament, have taken shape, while the flags and symbols of the resistance now line the border with occupied Palestine. The bet on maintaining the occupation has also crumbled, as evidenced by Israel's agreement to a complete withdrawal from both Gaza and southern Lebanon. Likewise, the strategy of forced displacement, whether in the effort to create a buffer zone in Lebanese border villages, where residents defied Israeli fire and forced the occupation to retreat from most of them, or in Gaza, where displacement is directly tied to the Jewish identity of the Israeli state, has failed. The demographic imbalance increasingly favours Palestinians, while immigration to Israel declines. An entity that failed to occupy and displace Gaza's population across a mere 360 square kilometers has no legitimacy to speak of a 'Greater Israel'. An entity that failed to impose its will on the resistance in Lebanon and Gaza has no standing to claim itself a 'Great Israel'. And an entity whose leaders now face global pursuit for genocide, war crimes, and the killing of children has forfeited any credibility in speaking of a 'Mighty Israel'. • Parallel to this strategic reality, another fundamental truth emerges: just as this war has rendered the prospect of another war impossible, it has also shifted Western discourse toward securing Israel's existence through Arab recognition – namely, normalisation with Saudi Arabia – accompanied by a political resolution to the Palestinian issue centered on establishing a Palestinian state. However, Israel, both in its religious and secular factions, continues its radicalisation, producing an overwhelming majority that stifles any chance of leadership willing to align with the evolving global and Western climate. This means that the international push for a resolution will remain without an Israeli partner. Any Israeli figure who dares to challenge the extremist dominance will meet the fate of Yitzhak Rabin, assassinated by the very factions that have since given rise to the likes of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. • Amid these two realities – the incapacity to wage another war and the inability to embrace any political resolution, Israel finds itself hesitant in implementing the ceasefire agreements in Lebanon and Gaza, constantly seeking avenues to evade its commitments. The only deterrent against reneging is the certainty that returning to war is no longer an option. At the same time, Israel remains unable to reconcile with the unfolding realities of its defeat, particularly as the images from Gaza continue to project undeniable truths. It is fully aware that the resistance in Lebanon and Gaza possesses not only formidable strength but also the ability to plan, maneuver, endure, and rebuild. Israel cannot afford to merely stand by, nor can it retire from the battlefield, nor can it surrender. • The doctrine of the 'battle between wars' was conceived for precisely such scenarios. Israel has implemented this strategy effectively in Syria for years – avoiding full-scale war while refusing to remain passive. This approach is likely to define its engagement with the Lebanese and Gazan fronts both during and after the implementation of ceasefire agreements. The challenge before the resistance, therefore, is to craft a strategy capable of dismantling this doctrine and reshaping the strategic conclusions that dictate the unfolding reality.
