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Local Sweden
17-05-2025
- Politics
- Local Sweden
Swedish journalist held in Turkey heading home: prime minister
A Swedish journalist arrested at the end of March in Turkey and jailed for "insulting" President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been freed and is heading home, Stockholm said on Friday. Advertisement Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson wrote on X that Joakim Medin was "en route for Sweden from Turkey" and would land "in a few hours". He thanked foreign ministry staff and Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard for having worked "intensively" behind the scenes on the case, as well as European colleagues. Medin, 40, is a reporter for the Swedish newspaper Dagens ETC and was stopped on his arrival in Istanbul on March 27. He had travelled to Turkey to cover protests triggered by the arrest on March 19 of the popular Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, who is seen as Erdogan's main political rival. At the end of April Medin was given an 11-month suspended jail sentence at a court in Ankara for "insulting the president" and appeared by videolink from a cell at a prison in the Istanbul region. Advertisement Despite the suspended sentence, Medin remained behind bars while awaiting a separate trial for "belonging to a terror organisation". Medin denies the charge that he participated in a protest by the banned Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Stockholm in January 2023.
New York Times
12-05-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
What to Know About the P.K.K. and Its Fight Against Turkey
The Kurdistan Workers' Party, known by its Kurdish acronym P.K.K., said on Monday that it would lay down arms and disband, ending a decades-long armed insurgency against the Turkish state. The announcement came several months after the group's imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, urged his followers to disarm and disband. The move could reshape Turkish politics and reverberate in neighboring countries. The P.K.K. began as a secessionist group that sought to create an independent state for Turkey's Kurdish minority. More recently, it said it sought greater rights for Kurds inside Turkey. More than 40,000 people have been killed in four decades of conflict, both in P.K.K. attacks on military and civilian targets, and in Turkish military operations against the militants and the communities that harbor them. Turkey, the United States and other countries consider the group a terrorist organization. Here is what to know about the P.K.K. and its conflict with Turkey. What is the P.K.K.? The group began fighting the Turkish state in the early 1980s, originally seeking independence for the Kurds, who are believed to make up about 15 percent of Turkey's population. Starting from the mountains in eastern and southern Turkey, P.K.K. fighters attacked Turkish military bases and police stations, prompting harsh government responses. Later, the conflict spread to other parts of the country, with devastating P.K.K. bombings in Turkish cities that killed many civilians. During the past decade, the Turkish military has routed P.K.K. forces from major Kurdish cities in southeastern Turkey and used drones to kill its leaders and fighters, hindering the group's ability to organize and carry out attacks. The conflict has been on a low boil for years, although occasional P.K.K. attacks have revived fears of a wider conflict. Last year, a small squad of its militants stormed into the headquarters of a state-run aerospace company armed with rifles and explosives and killed five employees before the security forces regained control. Who is Abdullah Ocalan? Mr. Ocalan is the founder and leader of the P.K.K. He has been in a Turkish prison for a quarter-century. Many of Turkey's Kurds view Mr. Ocalan as a potent symbol of the struggle for Kurdish rights. And despite his imprisonment, he still wields great influence over the P.K.K. and its affiliated militias in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Mr. Ocalan founded the P.K.K. in the late 1970s with a group of other rebels and largely ran the organization from neighboring Syria as it launched attacks in southeastern Turkey and, later, in other major Turkish cities. In 1998, Syria forced him out and he traveled to Greece, Italy and Russia to seek asylum, before Turkish intelligence agents, with help from their U.S. counterparts, captured him on a plane at an airport in Nairobi, Kenya, on Feb. 15, 1999. After his capture in 1999, he was incarcerated on Imrali Island in the Sea of Marmara, south of Istanbul, where he was the only prisoner for many years. That same year, Turkey convicted him and sentenced him to death. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment after Turkey abolished the death penalty as part of its bid to join the European Union. Since his incarceration, Mr. Ocalan has shifted the P.K.K. ideology away from secession and toward Kurdish rights inside Turkey. In a February message from prison, Mr. Ocalan said that the group's armed struggle had outlived its initial purpose and that further progress in the struggle for Kurdish rights could be achieved through politics. On Monday, the group echoed Mr. Ocalan's call to disband, saying in a statement that it had 'carried the Kurdish issue to a level where it can be solved by democratic politics, and the P.K.K. has completed its mission in that sense.' The group said that Mr. Ocalan should lead the process of disarming and called on Turkey's Parliament to take part. How does Turkey see Mr. Ocalan? For most Turks, Mr. Ocalan remains the country's most hated terrorist. Human rights groups criticized his isolation on Imrali Island. In 2009, five other prisoners were sent to the facility, and Mr. Ocalan was allowed to meet them a few times a week, according to Turkish news reports. But in recent years, Mr. Ocalan and the island's other inmates were not allowed any visitors, not even their lawyers, or any phone calls with family members. In October, a powerful political ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, made a surprising public call to Mr. Ocalan, requesting that he tell his fighters to lay down their arms and end the conflict. That led to limited visits from relatives and political allies of Mr. Ocalan to explore the possibility of a new peace process. What happens next? The next steps were not immediately clear. The P.K.K. and pro-Kurdish politicians have called for Mr. Ocalan's release or at least for a loosening of the restrictions on him to allow him to oversee disarmament. It was also not immediately clear how the decision would affect P.K.K. bases hidden in the mountainous areas of Iraq's northern Kurdish region. Turkey has repeatedly bombarded P.K.K. strongholds in northern Iraq, as well as the group's offshoot controlling northeastern regions of Syria, branding them a terrorist threat near its borders. Turkish officials have said publicly that the government offered no concessions to the P.K.K. to persuade it to disarm. But officials from Turkey's main pro-Kurdish party have expressed hope that the government would expand cultural and educational rights for Kurds. The P.K.K.'s declaration could influence other Kurdish militias, particularly in Syria, and shift regional dynamics beyond Turkey's borders. It could also expand support among Kurds for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which many analysts suspect that he covets to change the Constitution and seek a third presidential term. Who are the Kurds? The Kurds are an ethnic group of roughly 40 million people — there are widely varying estimates — concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. They speak multiple dialects of Kurdish, a language not directly related to Turkish or Arabic. Most are Sunni Muslims. The Kurds were promised a nation of their own by world powers after World War I, but that was never granted. There were Kurdish rebellions in various countries over the following generations, and Kurds have faced state suppression of their language and culture. In Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, whose leaders have roots in the P.K.K. and follow Mr. Ocalan's ideology, control the northeastern part of the country. They have been backed for years by the United States and played a crucial role in defeating the Islamic State. But the fall of the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December has left their future status unclear. They are clashing with Turkish-backed Syrian Arab rebels, and they remain outside the control of the new Syrian government in Damascus. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the largely Kurdish northern region of Iraq has been semiautonomous. The P.K.K. leadership is now based in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq. In recent years, Turkey has attacked the group and affiliated militias in Iraq and Syria, and has lobbied the Iraqi government to expel it. How did previous peace efforts fare? Multiple efforts to freeze or end the Turkey-P.K.K. conflict have been made, starting with a cease-fire in 1993. But all of them collapsed, often leading to greater bloodshed. Violence flared on and off until a round of peace talks began in 2011. At that time, Turkish intelligence officers met with Mr. Ocalan in prison to map out a plan for his fighters to disarm, and Kurdish politicians ferried messages between him and his associates in northern Iraq. But the process collapsed in mid-2015, with each side blaming the other for the failure. One of the conflict's most deadly phases followed, with pitched battles in cities in Turkey's southeast that killed more than 7,000 people, according to the International Crisis Group.
Yahoo
12-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Kurdish militant group PKK plans to disband, end conflict with Turkey
The banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has decided to disband and end its armed conflict with Turkey, the PKK-affiliated news agency ANF reported on Monday. At the end of February, the group's imprisoned founder, Abdullah Öcalan, had called on the group to formally disband and disarm. The PKK has been engaged in armed conflict and attacks since the 1980s, advocating for a Kurdish state or an autonomous region in south-eastern Turkey. However, the organization has since moved away from its demand for an independent state. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization in Turkey, the European Union and the United States. According to the think tank International Crisis Group, approximately 40,000 people have been killed during the group's conflict with the Turkish state.
Middle East Eye
10-05-2025
- Politics
- Middle East Eye
PKK disarmament: What does it mean for Baghdad and Erbil?
The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which has created significant challenges for Turkey-Iraq relations, is on the verge of disbanding. As Middle East Eye reported on Friday, the PKK is expected to imminently announce the end of its armed struggle against Turkey, as requested by jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan. All eyes are on how the process will unfold from here. The group's disbanding will cast uncertainty on the future of its members in the Qandil Mountains, an area that has served as the PKK's headquarters in northern Iraq for decades. Ocalan's appeal, which marks a turning point in the decades-long conflict between the PKK and Turkey, will have repercussions for regional actors. The possible closure of this tumultuous file could significantly alter the course of Ankara-Erbil-Baghdad relations. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters This geopolitical shift comes after the launch of Israel's ongoing war on Gaza in October 2023, followed a year later by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. While weakening Iran's allies in the region, these developments also pushed Ankara to recalibrate its stance towards the PKK. Although Turkey has focused more on disarmament than on democratisation of the Kurdish issue, this process remains of critical importance to the Iraqi government. Cross-border operations Baghdad has traditionally avoided defining the PKK, long embroiled in a conflict with Turkey, as its own issue, suggesting that Erbil and Ankara were responsible for confronting the armed group. Ankara has drawn the ire of Baghdad by conducting military operations against the PKK in Iraqi territory, interpreted by the Iraqi government as a violation of its sovereignty. With the strategy of 'eliminating terrorism at its source' adopted in recent years, Turkey has extended air operations to Sulaymaniyah and Sinjar, while setting up dozens of military outposts inside Iraq. Is Turkey on the brink of peace with the Kurds? Read More » Iraqi leader Muqtada al-Sadr and some state-sponsored Iraqi paramilitaries within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) have described the Turkish military presence as an 'occupation'. Ankara's stubborn diplomacy, at the risk of damaging bilateral relations, resulted in Baghdad banning the PKK last year. The group's disarmament will thus neutralise a powder keg along their shared border. Noting that Turkey's military presence in Iraq has been justified as a response to the PKK's activities, Iraq's national security adviser, Qasim al-Araji, has said that once a resolution is in place, 'all armed groups and foreign forces' would be expected to leave Iraq. The PKK's tactical relations with Iran could also end in this new era. Ankara believes that Tehran uses certain armed groups to undermine its own influence in Iraq; the disbanding of the PKK could thus strengthen Turkey's hand in Iraq. Ankara, which has established strong relations with Shia leaders in recent days, should focus on public diplomacy in this process. While Turkey might want to stay in Iraq to fight the Islamic State group, balance Iran, or increase its influence after a possible US withdrawal - despite the PKK problem being resolved - this could reinvigorate the 'occupier' rhetoric. Basis for dialogue Disbanding the PKK and putting an end to its attacks on infrastructure such as oil pipelines would also be good news for the local economy, with trade between Turkey and Iraq now reaching $20bn. In addition, the PKK has been seen as a threat to the Development Road rail and highway project. The group's disbanding will mark a positive turn for Iraq's Kurdish region, where the PKK has been a disruptive actor, occupying hundreds of villages. The group's targeting of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which has collaborated with Ankara, and its clashes with the Peshmerga have harmed the Iraqi Kurdish leadership financially and psychologically. The strengthening of relations between the PKK and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has complicated matters further, reinforcing Ankara's anger towards the Sulaymaniyah-based political party. The PKK laying down its weapons will ultimately facilitate a thaw between both the KDP and PUK, and Ankara and Sulaymaniyah Amid Ankara's operations against the PKK in Sulaymaniyah and the closure of Turkish airspace to planes taking off from the northern city, a high-level politician I recently met there expressed excitement about the forthcoming disarmament process, noting: 'The PKK has harmed us more than Turkey.' Ankara values the role of Iraqi Kurdish leaders in the disarmament initiative, which enjoys broad local support. If the PKK is ultimately eradicated, the KDP, a nationalist party, will be able to escape the reputational damage of acting in concert with Turkey in its battle against the armed group. It is noteworthy that there is no mention of an independent Kurdish state and autonomy in Ocalan's call for disarmament. One of the main reasons why Ankara opposed the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum in Iraq was its fear of triggering separatist sentiments among Turkey's Kurds. The PKK process will create a basis for dialogue among Kurds in Syria and Iraq, while strengthening the KDP's stance on Kurdish nationalism - at least, in the short term. But amid sharp ideological differences between the KDP and PKK, political competition is inevitable in the medium term. The PKK laying down its weapons will ultimately facilitate a thaw between both the KDP and PUK and Ankara and Sulaymaniyah. But historical divisions and spheres of influence will continue to be decisive in regional politics in the months and years ahead. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
Asia Times
31-03-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Turkey holds the key to solving multiple global crises
While Turkey's government is struggling to deal with mass protests at home (after Istanbul's mayor Ekrem Imamoglu was imprisoned), in foreign affairs, it is in an increasingly strong position as a key power broker in deals with Europe, the US and Russia. At the crossroads between Asia and Europe, Turkey is strategically important to just about everyone and is emerging as a clever negotiator. Since the early 2000s, Turkey has relied on a foreign policy approach that emphasized cooperation instead of competition. Economic ties were a priority, which helped Turkey steadily improve its relationships with Russia, Iran and Syria. While remaining a part of Nato and a major trading partner with the European Union, Turkey views its ties with Russia, Ukraine, China and countries in the Middle East as equally important. Turkey has shown that it will work with whatever government benefits its interests, and has taken advantage of regional conflicts to be a convenient ally when needed. At the same time, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has no qualms about confronting both friends and rivals equally, giving it strategic flexibility. Turkey is Russia's second biggest trading partner. Ankara continues to rely on Russian gas and banking networks, doing over US$60 billion in trade annually with Moscow. The Turkish relationship with Russia improved dramatically in 1995 when Russia stopped supporting the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and Turkey stopped supporting Chechen rebels. Since then, Turkey has maintained a functional relationship with Russia, while never being pliant to Moscow. Turkey was critical of Russia setting up military bases in Syria, in Tartus and Khmeimim and as it controls the airspace in northern Syria it also has the ability to restrict Russian access. Ankara has also used its military presence in Idlib, in northern Syria, to check Russian influence in the past. Turkey's drone offensive in Idlib in 2020 helped the Syrian opposition and pushed back the Syrian government and Russian-backed activity in the northwest. The Black Sea is another area of competition where Turkey has emerged with the upper hand during the war in Ukraine. Russia aimed to exercise control over the Black Sea, even seizing several Ukrainian ports which affected global grain supply in 2022. But Turkey negotiated the release of millions of tonnes of grain and has ensured the safety of shipping routes through the Black Sea by enforcing the Montreux Convention. This 1936 agreement granted Turkish control over the shipping route between the Black Sea (through the Bosporus Strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, through which hundreds of millions of tons tonnes of cargo pass each year) and the Mediterranean. Citing the agreement, Turkey also restricted Russian reinforcements into the Black Sea, which has restricted Russian naval power considerably. Map: Shutterstock via The Conversation Though Turkey has not levied sanctions on Russia and has kept its revenue streams open, Turkey also does not accept the Russian annexation of Crimea. With more than 5 million Turks claiming to have Crimean Tatar roots, Crimea has both strategic and historical importance to Turkey. Yet, Turkey maintains communication with Moscow (and Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin are 'dear friends'). Complicating this 'friendship' is the fact that Turkey also supports Ukraine, supplying it with Bayraktar TB2 drones, heavy machine guns, laser-guided missiles, electronic warfare systems, armoured vehicles and protective gear. Ultimately, Turkey wants Ukraine to remain independent in order to check Russian naval power in the Black Sea. As such, Turkey is likely to work with Nato to ensure that Ukraine is not defeated. To that end, Turkey is willing to contribute peacekeepers to a post-ceasefire settlement, under the right conditions. Meanwhile, Turkey has used the Ukraine conflict to diversify its supply routes for energy (relying more on suppliers from the Caucasus region and central Asia), to reduce its dependence on Russia. Turkey is in a strong position, especially with the discovery of gas reserves in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Ankara aims to become an energy hub facilitating the transit of gas from the Caucasus, central Asia and Russia to Europe through the Trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline. Turkey's relationship with its neighbour Syria has also been pragmatic and shrewd. Turkey was able to pursue rapprochement with Syria in 2005, when Bashar al-Assad became the first Syrian president to visit Turkey since Syria gained its independence in 1946. But while Erdoğan maintained a relationship (to prevent Syria from moving even closer to Iran), he ultimately chose to abandon this relationship when it no longer suited him. He hosted anti-Assad figures in Turkey from time to time, and created a safe zone on its border which housed displaced Syrians and armed fighters. He gave rebels the go-ahead to oust Assad in 2024. Just as the war in Syria provided Turkey with opportunities, so too has the conflict in Ukraine. Ankara has strengthened its bargaining position and pushed for greater diplomatic and economic concessions from Western allies. Turkey is taking advantage of the US's retreat from NATO to push for closer cooperation with Europe. Turkey also is taking advantage of Donald Trump's more lenient policies towards Russia to improve its relationship with the US. This is primarily based on wanting to improve defense cooperation. During the Cold War, Turkey relied on the US for arms, funding and equipment but was not able to use these weapons without US authorisation. After 1989, Turkey carved out different markets for its weapons imports and faced US sanctions for buying S-400 surface-to-air missiles from Russia in 2020. Turkey would like to purchase F-35 supersonic fighter jets from the US and is hoping that the US will move away from sanctioning third countries that have engaged with Russia. Turkey has made sure that it is not seen by the US as a junior partner in the Middle East region. For example, when Turkey launched operations in northeast Syria in 2019, where it repeatedly fired close to US forces, the US offered no military response. The US sees Turkey as a key ally in spite of some different strategic goals. In addition to its geopolitical importance, Turkey also hosts US and NATO military forces at several of its bases and US nuclear weapons (20 B61 nuclear bombs) at its Incirlik Air Force Base. Turkey now wants to expand its diplomatic and military footprint. As a member of the G20, with one of the 20 biggest economies in the world and the second largest and second most powerful military force in NATO after the US, it has a lot of power. And in geopolitical juggling, currently Turkey is in the luxurious position of everyone wanting Ankara to be on their side. Natasha Lindstaedt is professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
