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Interview: India's options are limited but military strikes are ‘symbolic', won't deter terror
Military strikes will not deter Pakistan from using terrorism as a tool of foreign policy since Kashmir and the conflict with India are existential to the Pakistani army, said Christine Fair. 'The purpose of this was more illustrative than it was deterrence,' Fair told Scroll in an interview. India's options remain extremely limited, said Fair, an associate professor at Georgetown University who is considered an expert on the Pakistan army and the country's terrorist network. Terror groups, like the Lashkar e Taiba, are domestically crucial to Pakistan while Islamabad's use of nuclear threats in negotiating with the West will ensure its continued survival, said Fair. 'The only thing that really changes Pakistan is a decisive military defeat of the Pakistan army that leaves the Pakistan army in complete disarray,' she said. 'This is not something that India can do right now or for the policy-relevant future. It's not possible at all now [given the nuclear umbrella].' Referring to the military strikes, she said they generated a lot of jingoism in India and were risky but didn't change anything on the ground. 'They're really important symbolic attacks – but they're symbolic attacks. They don't degrade the ability of these organisations to operate.' Fair also pointed out that the off-ramp in this case was manufactured, like it was during the 2019 military strikes in Balakot after the Pulwama terror attack. In both instances, she said, the Indian and the Pakistani publics were left with this 'enormous sense of victory'. The Indian media's 'bakwas', or nonsense, said Fair, also made it difficult to evaluate the implications for foreign policy. Edited excerpts: Play Do you think Pakistan will be deterred by what just happened? No, not at all. The Pakistan army is an insurgent army – it can't defeat India conventionally. And for that matter, India can't defeat Pakistan in a short war because the forces along the IB [international border] and the LOC [Line of Control], are similarly poised. India's advantage can only kick in during a long war and that's increasingly difficult because of nuclear weapons and so forth. So India can't defeat Pakistan, Pakistan can't defeat India. But Pakistan views Kashmir as part of this incomplete process of Partition and that Pakistan itself is not complete without Kashmir. This is a story that all Pakistanis learn. It gives rise to every army chief. There was a lot of hay made about [General Asim] Munir's speech about Kashmir being the jugular vein of Pakistan. The fact is every army chief says this and every prime minister says this. The Pakistan army can't take Kashmir. But what the Pakistan army can do is deny India the victory of saying that Kashmir is calm and a peaceful part of India. I also wanted to dispel any criticism that has been leveraged against the Indian state saying this is an intelligence lapse. I was in Kashmir two years ago [and] the counter insurgency grid is very robust. But the fact is you can't stop every attack. It's just not possible. So, Pakistan has to do this to show that India hasn't compelled or deterred it. What this means is that we're going to see a return to normalcy – just as we did after Pulwama. But mark my words, there's going to be another terrorist attack. It'll likely be in Kashmir. I don't think anything has happened here strategically that is going to deter Pakistan from using terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. But does it increase its cost? In Balakot in 2019 and again this time, we're seeing credible sources that Pakistani air bases have been hit. So does increasing that cost at least impose a further barrier on Pakistan exporting terror to India? The short answer is no and the evidence really shows this, right? Pulwama was pretty costly, but let's look at the lessons that came out of Pulwama. This is important because it involves the duplicity of Indian and Pakistani media. What the Pakistanis, credibly, can say is that they shot down a MiG and they returned its pilot and they were accoladed for doing what a country is supposed to do. What allowed India to back down was this complete fabrication of an F-16 shootdown. There was no F-16 shot down. I say this with 100% confidence. This entire off ramp was manufactured, right? Let's take a look at the off ramp here. It is from the Indian public and from the Pakistani public. The Indian public believes if I listen to [Republic TV anchor] Arnab Goswami, apparently Pakistan took Karachi port. The Indians have these fictive beliefs about these capacious gains that were made vice Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, believes that it shot down five Indian aircraft. Now, there is evidence that it shot down two, but we don't know about the other three. The Indian and the Pakistani publics are both left with this enormous sense of victory. It's going to take a really long time to do satellite imagery analysis. India made very capacious claims about damage that was made to Balakot. It turned out to be absolute nonsense. But it took a couple of weeks for those claims to be interrogated through satellite imagery analysis. By the time that the actual truth comes out, the media has moved on to something else. In any event, neither the Pakistani or Indian media are interested in what actually happened – because that's just not the way they're operating. Both of the publics have been misinformed, which allows them to have very different beliefs about the costs and the benefits that have been. So what can India do now? India really pulled out all its stops in some way. What do you think that India could do now to credibly deter the Pakistan army from misadventure. The only thing that really changes Pakistan is a decisive military defeat of the Pakistan army that leaves the Pakistan army in complete disarray. That happened in 1971. And yet, within a matter of years, we had Zia ul Haq and we know about the terror story under Zia's tenure. That's the best example we have. But there was a period of relative peace between '71 and '77 or so. So the only way to really deter Pakistan is to decisively defeat and dismember and dismantle the Pakistan army and thoroughly vilify it in the eyes of the Pakistanis. This is not something that India can do right now or for the policy-relevant future. It's not possible at all now [given the nuclear umbrella]. At a strategic level, it's very unfortunate for India. The only way forward, is the path that won't be taken, which is the international community has to resolve that the Pakistani state as it is currently constituted is a menace not only to India but to the international order. What what we've seen instead is that Pakistan gets away with this every single time. It was never on the blacklist FATF [Financial Action Task Force] because that would have deprived it of IMF [International Monetary Fund] funds – and no one wants to deprive Pakistan of IMF funds because it's too dangerous to fail. So absent a consolidated and concerted effort by the international community to reorder the way Pakistan does business, this is going to continue. I have a lot of empathy for the paucity of options that India possesses. As this conflict was going on Pakistan received a $1billion loan from the IMF. Even in a post-Afghanistan situation, we are seeing a Pakistan which does have support from the West and is best friends with China. Practically, will the West ever completely turn away from Pakistan and want to dismember it or completely change the way the state is currently? It's never going to happen. And it's never going to happen because Pakistan uses its nuclear weapons to blackmail the West that we're too dangerous to fail. In the old days we had a parking meter: you put a quarter in it, you got 15 minutes. With Pakistan, you put a quarter in it and you got two minutes – but it was a reliable two minutes. People are afraid that if you change the policy with respect to Pakistan, you'll put that quarter in and you'll get negative 15 minutes. People feel confident that they can manage Pakistan – sort of like mowing the lawn. But in this belief that it has somehow managed Pakistan and managed the conflict that it generates, it actually enables the very same conflict that is so dangerous. What has this conflict meant for Munir. The Pakistan Army's popularity has been declining over the last few years. Does this reverse that decline? It's really fascinating because the Pakistan Army hates me and its enthusiasts have hated me. There have been several occasions over the past year… I was at an airport with a former army officer of all people… So I've had a number of people reach out to me and say, '...I used to hate you because of your views about the Pakistan army, but now I love you because you were right.' This was an actual quote from a former army officer at the Dubai airport. And I was absolutely gobsmacked. So I said, 'It's because of Imran Khan, isn't it? You're an Imran Khan supporter.' And he said, 'Yes'. Imran Khan has put a huge wedge between the Pakistan army and the Pakistan people. And Munir has been suffering tremendously. Imran Khan really was the first prime minister – whether you love him or you hate him – to aim his sights at the Pakistan army, which is why he is in jail. You don't do that and get get away with it. We saw remarkable scenes – people overrunning Pakistani cantonments. The Lahore core commander's house. Just things that you don't see. Domestically, not just Munir, but the Pakistan army is really on its heels. The other issue that doesn't come up, of course, is Balochistan terrorism. In the same way that Indians believe there's a Pakistani hand behind every explosion in Kashmir, the Pakistanis believe there's an Indian hand behind every explosion in Balochistan. There was just a very horrific terrorist attack on a train in Balochistan. In terms of the timing, what explains what's going on with Pahalgam is threefold. There had been normalcy, for the most part, in the Valley. Tourism was returning. Kashmiris were making money off of the increased tourism. You have the declining popularity of Munir specifically, but the army more generally, and then you have this pretty severe spike in terrorism in Balochistan. Those three factors account for why Pahalgam and why now. When there's a war, there's a sense of national unity, especially behind the army. Will this end up badly impacting the PTI [Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf]? This is going to give the army a very temporary respite from the criticism. There's always been discussion about corruption within the army. But for the first time you have the 'core' commanders being called the 'crore' commanders. There's a much more systemic rot in the Pakistan army. The Pakistanis themselves are attuned to. This is going to provide some temporary respite, but it's not going to provide a permanent solution to the gap that has emerged between army supporters and PTI supporters. Can you describe for us how this terror network works? Right now is the Lashkar-e-Taiba as strong as it was 10 years back or has there been a decline in how Pakistan looks at and supports these terror groups? I would say just the opposite. Everyone knows about the LET conducting operations on behalf of the army. But what very few Indians are aware of is the domestic utility of the LET within Pakistan itself. The Lashkar-e-Taiba opposes all of the violence that's taking place within Pakistan, not just obviously the Baloch violence, but also the Islamist violence. They take aim at those that engage in takfir [excommunication]. They take aim at those that are trying to destabilise the government. Lashkar-e-Taiba has this really important domestic function as well as an external function. It is a militant opponent of the Islamic state. The LET is much more important in this post 9/11 world than it was before. You called the Pakistan army an insurgent organisation rather than one that behaves like a conventional army. It's very difficult to defeat an insurgent. Take a look at the Taliban. Look at how many hundreds of thousands of forces, during the height of the surge, and we still couldn't defeat the Taliban. But how does an insurgent organisation prove that it hasn't been defeated? It just has to conduct one attack. It's very easy for the Pakistan army to show that it hasn't been defeated by conducting attacks in Kashmir. More structurally, the Indians are at a huge disadvantage. If the Indians want normalcy – or the semblance of normalcy – which is usually measured by terrorist attacks to return to the valley, they have to have an increasingly impressive counter-insurgency regime, which causes a lot of resentment in the Valley, which furthers the goal of of making Kashmiris feel that they're part of the Indian project. The Pakistanis win this game because it's not a game that's hard for the Pakistanis to win. But on the other hand, it's a very difficult game for the Indians to win. What is the end game for Pakistan and its army here? It keeps exporting terror to Kashmir? Pakistan itself becomes poorer and poorer. Where does this go and end? The Pakistan army only thinks of its own corporate interests. Having an aggressive India that the Pakistan army can credibly say menaces Pakistan, burnishes the Pakistan army's credentials – it allows it to have this huge conventional footing. If there were to be peace with India, the Pakistan army, as it exists today, could not exist. There's no rationale for its existence. For the Pakistan army to have the size that it has, to have its outsized role in politics – it has a hegemon that claims the state's resources – it needs a strong India that looks menacing. I think it might be difficult for Indians to understand that all of this just benefits the Pakistan army. It's almost as if conflict is existential to the Pakistan army. People say if there were peace, there would be a better economy – and this is of course true. But the Pakistan army puts its existential needs above material gains. We've seen that happen in '71 where the Pakistan army was ready to have Pakistan divided rather than lose power. Correct. How popular is support for these terror groups domestically in the public in Pakistan? Your average Pakistani doesn't view these groups as terrorist groups for one thing. They view these groups as fighting a good fight in Kashmir, helping to liberate their Kashmiri brethren from an oppressive Indian state. If people are familiar with the group, they don't view them as terrorists. The other thing that Lashkar e Taiba does [is] it has a bunch of front organisations that do things like health and social service outreach. For example, in Sindh, the state has completely neglected to provide water to the residents. It's also an area that has a lot of Hindu residents. The Lashkar e Taiba provides water services and actually through those service provisions, they've also converted several Hindus to their creed, which is really amazing. Through these health and services outreach, coupled with those who know what they do in Kashmir not being viewed as terrorists, the support is reasonably high. I did a survey of Pakistan. It's very, very out of date – I think it was done in 2013. Obviously, support for the Lashkar-e-Taiba is highest amongst the Punjabis [of Pakistan's province] and it is lowest amongst the Baloch – because Lashkar-e-Taiba is also used as a bulwark against Baloch terrorism and against Baloch nationalism. There are 10 districts in Punjab [province] that account for about 90% of LET recruitment. It's very similar to the Pakistan Army actually. There's an overlap. And the reason for that is they need people with similar skill sets. A lot of what India did in this conflict is to target Punjab, which is such a stark diversion from Indian policy earlier. Do you think that will have an impact on Pakistani army morale? I support the attacks. I'm not criticising India for the attacks. I want to be very very clear. But I also want to be very clear that it was very very risky. And the fact is none of those targets are going to strategically degrade the ability of Jaish-e-Mohammed or Lashkar-e-Taiba to operate. That's a fact. So, it was a lot of risk for not a lot of gain. And by the way, that's why it assured that there would be a strong Pakistani response because when the Indians struck, they didn't go into Pakistani airspace. Within Indian airspace, they used standoff missiles to attack Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. That was pretty provocative, right? We saw the escalation at Balakot pretty quickly. So, obviously the Pakistanis were going to respond robustly to an attack upon the Punjab. But what I wish people would reflect upon – how do I put this nicely? This burnished the credentials of the chappan-inch sinawala [the one with the 56-in chest]. It generated a lot of jingoism in India. It had a lot of risk, but it didn't change anything on the ground. The purpose of this was more illustrative than it was deterrence. I think they were much more political in calculation than they were aimed at degrading the organisations. They're really important symbolic attacks – but they're symbolic attacks. They don't degrade the ability of these organisations to operate. Where does the US-Pakistan relationship stand now post the Afghanistan withdrawal? During the Afghan war, we were really dependent upon Pakistan because of the ground lines of communication. All the war material, most of it flew through Pakistan's airspace or was transported on the ground through Pakistan's ground lines of communication. So we needed them and we were much more willing to put up with their nonsense. But after the withdrawal, the essential concerns about Pakistan's failure remain in place. You still have the constituent of people saying that we should be engaging the Pakistanis, we shouldn't be isolating them. This conflict is going to burnish the credentials of those people who are arguing for engagement. Paul Kapoor has been tapped to be the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, and it's very unfortunate that he had not been confirmed prior to this crisis. He will be very welcomed in India. He will not be welcomed in Pakistan. It is going to limit our ability to engage Pakistan. We'll just have to see what happens after we have an assistant secretary of state in place. How do you evaluate India's foreign policy performance during this conflict? It's hard to evaluate because the Indian media was just a sea of bakwas [nonsense, rubbish]. And I have to say, after the whole Balakot affair and the manufactured F-16 shootdown, I no longer take Indian announcements as being credible. India lost a lot of credibility for me in the Balakot affair. Because of the media? Because the media was so bad, but also the Indian government directly participated in this fabrication of an F-16 shootdown. So, it's not just the media, it was the Indian government, and specifically the Modi government. I can't just take Indian pronouncements at face value, but what I can see is that the proof is in the pudding. You had a bunch of people engaging on both sides. We encouraged both sides to engage peacefully to resolve their outstanding issues peacefully. But India sees that as a defeat, right? For India that's a defeat. For Pakistan it's a victory. Because it's an acknowledgement that Pakistan's equities are valid. But for India it's a defeat. I can't evaluate the rigorous efforts that were made, but what I can see is that in the outcome of those efforts, India did not secure unequivocal support from international capitals. [Donald] Trump's tweet is something that in India we're looking at with a lot of disfavour. Let's be really clear, right? Trump and JD Vance are not reliable narrators. I actually don't know the extent to which to trust their pronouncements. The Indians have pretty much rubbished a lot of what Trump has said. I don't know the truth because my media is also unable to get to the bottom of things. But today's tweet is a really good example of what I would say is a failure of Indian foreign policy. Because if India had successfully persuaded the United States of its position, we would not have seen such an obtuse statement coming from the President of the United States.
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First Post
21-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
How Operation Sindoor signals strategic shift, redraws red lines for Pakistan
(File) Operation Sindoor displayed on the screen during a press briefing by the Indian armed forces, in New Delhi, Sunday, May 11, 2025. PTI Every military clash between India and Pakistan has exposed the latter's sinister designs with ignominious outcomes. In October 1947, Pakistan surreptitiously attacked Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and illegally occupied one third of the state. In 1965 it invaded India with the aim to grab J&K, but the attempt failed miserably. In 1971, Pakistani aggression ended in its breakup, debunking the 'Two Nation' theory. Even in 1999, Pakistan's Kargil misadventure was a disaster, which was tantamount to its national humiliation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The recent military standoff in the aftermath of a brutal terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, came as a severe jolt to Pakistani military rulers, who were forced to clamour for a ceasefire. As a retaliation to the Pahalgam massacre, India launched 'Operation Sindoor' on the night of May 6-7, targeting nine terrorist camps through precision aerial strikes. It resulted in killing over 100 terrorists, including prominent ones like Yousf Azhar, Chief of 'Lashkar e Taiba' (LeT), and Abu Jindal, causing a serious setback to Pakistan's military-terror nexus. It was for the first time since 1971 that air strikes were undertaken across the international border (IB), signifying a major shift in India's response to the cross-border terrorism. The magnitude of India's action was evident from an hour-long aerial standoff between the two sides, wherein over 70 fighter jets from the Indian Air Force (IAF) and around 50 from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) were involved, leading to possibly the biggest air combat since World War II. Pakistan retaliated by targeting 26 Indian cities and defence installations with swarm drones and missiles. However, India's robust, multi-layered air defence formed an impenetrable shield and effectively foiled Pakistan's design. Never before have India's indigenous equipment, along with Russian and Western platforms, been pitched against the Chinese systems. In the counterstrike, India targeted major Pakistani airfield bases across the entire length of the border, including Nur Khan, Rahim Yar Khan, Sialkot, Lahore and Karachi, besides critical air bases in Sargodha and Jacobabad, closely linked with nuclear infrastructure, inflicting heavy damage. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD On May 10, Pakistan launched 'Operation Bunyan-un-Maroos' – attempted aerial strikes against 16 Indian airfields but met with little success. The Line of Control (LoC) witnessed intense firing involving the use of heavy artillery and high-calibre weapon systems. Amidst heightened tension, on May 10, a ceasefire came into effect at Pakistan's bidding. The four-day standoff witnessed India raising the escalatory bar and junking Pakistan's assumptions with far-reaching ramifications, as enumerated below: 'Operation Sindoor' marked a tectonic shift in India's strategy in its fight against terrorism, evident from the intensity of reprisal. The politico-militant intent was to deter the Pakistan Army with a clear message – mend the ways or face the consequences. In his address to the nation on May 12, two days after the ceasefire, PM Modi emphatically stated that India will not be blackmailed by the nuclear threats, and any act of terrorism by Pakistan will be treated as an act of war. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Pakistan Army's doctrine of waging low-cost proxy war based on the strategic calculus that the nuclear weapons will shield it against India's major retaliation stood invalidated. It was proved that in the escalatory ladder there are a number of steps below the nuclear threshold. India undoubtedly got the better of Pakistan as it successfully foiled the latter's aerial strikes and drone intrusions while effectively hitting targets deep inside the enemy's heartland. Pakistan's air defence based on the Chinese-Turkey systems could not withstand India's integrated response composed of homegrown missiles, drones, jammers, radars and satellites. It marked India's debut in the high-tech war domain. On May 10, President Trump facilitated the orchestration of a ceasefire to obviate Pakistan's defeat. As India is opposed to external mediation, Delhi did clarify that the ceasefire was between India and Pakistan and not brokered externally. The global scene today is characterised by the proliferation of complex alliances. The international community did extend support to India but not in the way Delhi expected. This is despite the fact that most countries except for Islamabad's handful of allies believe that Pakistan exports terrorism. China-Pakistan ironclad relations stood vindicated, and Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan committing to 'stand by the brotherly people of Pakistan in good and bad times' indicates the emergence of a trilateral alliance. Bangladesh, given its new alignment, could make it a foursome. The US has been playing a double game given its strategic interest vis-à-vis Pakistan. Only Israel supported India openly, while Quad members' responses remained subdued. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD There are a number of takeaways for India from the recent skirmish. Deterrence, being the sum of intent and capability, was amply demonstrated during 'Operation Sindoor'. To make the deterrence more credible, India needs to significantly enhance its military capability, given two-front scenarios are now a foregone reality. It is high time to formulate the national security strategy and war-fighting doctrine. The 'National Comprehensive Power' and warfighting potential are no more an option but an imperative. Given India's strategic interests as an emerging regional power, force projection capability is crucial. In modern warfare, air domination is a prerequisite to shape the battlefield environment. Air power stands out as the sword arm and not a supporting one, as was once propagated by General Rawat, the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Recently, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, Chief of Air Staff, has forthrightly brought out the need to bridge the capability gap vis-à-vis China. Incidentally, the Chinese Air Force has around 200 J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter jets in its inventory. On the other hand, India's 'Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft' (AMCA), a fifth-generation stealth fighter programme, is still in the early stages, with production likely to begin after a decade. There are reports about China fast-tracking production of another stealth fighter J-35, which Pakistan is set to acquire. This will seriously upset the existing strategic balance. A strong navy is vital for power projection where carrier battle groups provide the winning edge. Submarines do not substitute for aircraft carriers, as the two are mutually exclusive. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD India needs to execute limited responses at short notice, as in the current faceoff, Pakistan got adequate time to prepare. This implies restructuring of the higher defence organisational setup. Deep-rooted military reforms are required to accelerate defence modernisation programmes. Besides, defence spending needs to be enhanced to three per cent of the GDP. The vulnerability gaps must be realistically analysed and effectively addressed with a sense of urgency. It is necessary to undertake a reality check of Atma Nirbhar self-reliance programmes so these do not impinge on operational efficiency. Our foreign policy definitely merits recalibrations, and a more proactive approach is needed. Investment in real-time narrative building through diplomatic channels and global media is paramount to counter Pakistan's misinformation campaign as well as China's Grey Zone Warfare (GZW). A recent initiative aimed at global outreach by sending seven delegations composed of eminent political leaders and diplomats to various countries is a step in the right direction. Defence diplomacy has emerged as an important component in the prevailing international ecosystem. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Operation Sindoor stands out as a pivotal moment in India's fight against terrorism with a paradigm shift in its strategy and redefined red lines. Being a nation's call, it implies that every instrument of the state must be optimally employed to take the fight to its logical conclusion. Here on, the rules of the game are set to change, making Pakistan's proxy war a cost-prohibitive proposition. The writer is a war veteran, currently Professor of Strategic and International Relations. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
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First Post
18-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist behind 2006 RSS HQ attack shot dead in Pakistan by unidentified gunmen
LashkareTaiba terrorist Razaullah Nizamani alias Abu Saiullah, who was the brain behind the 2006 attack on the RSS headquarters, was killed by unidentified gunmen in Sindh province of Pakistan, officials here said. read more Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist Razaullah Nizamani alias Abu Saiullah, who was the brain behind the 2006 attack on the RSS headquarters, was killed by unidentified gunmen in Sindh province of Pakistan, officials here said. Nizamani, who had been provided security by the Pakistani government, had left his residence at Matli in Sindh this afternoon and he was gunned down by assailants near a crossing, the officials said. Besides masterminding the attack on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) headquarters at Nagpur, the Lashkar operative was involved in the Indian Institute of Science attack of 2005 in Bengaluru and the terror strike at a CRPF camp at Rampur in 2001. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD With inputs from agencies
Daily Mirror
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Daily Mirror
Why India and Pakistan are on verge of all-out war after terror attack and strikes
Stunningly beautiful Kashmir is the jewel in the crown for both Pakistan and India but it has been blighted by years of violent, bloody turmoil which has led to both countries to war before and could again. When British rule of the Indian subcontinent ended in 1947 hastily drawn borders gave birth to two sovereign nations - majority Hindu India and majority Muslim Pakistan. The poorly-executed transition led to one of history's largest-ever refugee catastrophes and a boiling over of sectarian violence that had simmered for many years. Ethnically diverse Kashmir is a Himalayan region famed for the beauty of its lakes, meadows and snow-capped mountains, which is why India wants tourism there. But after partition, under the Indian Independence Act, Kashmir was free to become either Indian or Pakistani and the local Maharaja or ruler wanted independence. In October 1947 the Maharaja chose to join India, in return for its help against an invasion of tribesmen from Pakistan. War erupted, the UN stepped in and could not solve the issue for the whole of Kashmir and in 1949, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to establish a ceasefire line. This meant the region was divided and has remained so. A second war followed in 1965. Then in 1999, India fought a brief but bitter conflict with Pakistani-backed forces. By that time, India and Pakistan were declared nuclear powers. Today, Delhi and Islamabad both claim Kashmir in full, but control only parts of it. Each controls a section of the territory, separated by one of the world 's most heavily militarised borders. However there is still unrest in the India-controlled part. Within India-controlled Kashmir, some do not want it to be governed by India, preferring either independence or union with Pakistan instead. The population of historic Kashmir is divided into about 10 million people in Indian-administrated Jammu and Kashmir and 4.5 million in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. There are a further 1.8 million people in the Gilgit-Baltistan autonomous territory, which Pakistan created from northern Kashmir and the two small princely states of Hunza and Nagar in 1970. An armed revolt has been waged against Indian rule in the region since 1989, claiming tens of thousands of lives. India accuses Pakistan of backing militants in Kashmir and Pakistan has accused India of encouraging oppression against Muslims. In 2019, Indian-administered Kashmir was stripped of its semi-autonomous status by the government in Delhi amid a huge security crackdown. For several years after, the revocation of the region's special status, militancy waned and tourist visits soared. But as we saw with the terrorist killings of mostly Indian tourists in the region, tension still simmered. As many as 26 civilians were killed by the gunmen in an attack that was claimed by Pakistani Salafi jihadist militant organisation Lashkar e Taiba , whose objective is to merge the whole of Kashmir. The group has since withdrawn their claim of responsibility. India has repeatedly accused Pakistan of being involved in supporting insurgents within Kashmir, which Islamabad has denied. And that is with some evidence of Pakistan in the past having had links to terror groups such as the Taliban and others. And that is why this current spat has blown up, with protests on both sides of the border becoming increasingly angry over the side's aggression.
Time of India
02-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
The Pahalgam terror atack
April 22, 2025 will be another black day in history of Kashmir when 26 tourists, including a foreigner and one native Kashmiri, were killed in a gruesome terror attack by terrorists owing allegiance to The Resistance Front (TRF), a terror outfit with links to other larger terror outfits like Lashkar e Taiba (LeT). The terrorists appeared well trained and had modern weapons with proper military gear which points towards involvement of Pakistan army as well. The site was well chosen as it about 6.5 km away from the nearest motorable road head and is surrounded by forests. The massacre lasted for about 10-15 minutes and carried out selective murder of mostly non-Muslims. Were there any indications in last few days of any impending major terrorist activity in Kashmir? There were obviously no definite intelligence inputs for such an attack. But based on past experience, three different events happening simultaneously in this period should have alerted the authorities to increase vigilance in the valley. First, the incendiary and anti-India speech by Pakistan's Army Chief on April 16, 2025 in Islamabad. It was aimed at raising passions and to revive the credibility of Pakistan's Army which currently is at an all-time low in the country. It could also be seen as a signal for the start of another proxy war against India, through Jihadi terror activities, to divert the nation's attention from the pathetic state of affairs on most fronts within the country. Second, the Vice-President of USA was on a visit to India from April 21, 25. One may recall a similar attack in Kashmir valley during President Bill Clinton's visit to India in 2000 and the 2020 Delhi communal riots during President Donald Trump's visit to India. Third, Prime Minister Modi was on a visit to Saudi Arabia from April 22-23, 2025. All these events, including the latest incident, were aimed at keeping the Kashmir issue alive and to embarrass the Modi government by highlighting communal discord. There are many eye witness accounts that confirm how the terrorist checked the religion of those killed before shooting them. It leaves no doubts that the targets were non-Muslims. A lot of local Kashmiri Muslims have condemned the attack and have even come out on the streets to profess solidarity with the nation and those who have suffered. This is indeed welcome. The livelihood of majority of Kashmiris depends on tourists who flock the valley from April to October every year. This statement from Gulam Nabi, the president of local taxi stand in Pahalgam, as published in a leading English daily, sums it all, 'We are finished along with our families as everyone here lives off tourism. Those killed in the attack could be counted but what about us – we are as good as dead.' A lot is being said and written about the lack of security planning and security personnel in the area. It may be prudent to assume that the security cover planning must be based on a security grid across Kashmir with more sensitive areas receiving greater resources. Baisaran valley, the site of massacre was perhaps on a lower priority in the grid. It is not clear who reported the incident and to whom. One would assume some of the local traders, restaurant owners or others must have called the police or some other authority. The fact that it took over two hand a half hours for security personnel to reach the site does indicate that such contact with authorities was somehow delayed. Ideally, one of the locals from the site should have called the police within minutes of the start of the shooting. While this would not have prevented the killings but it would certainly speeded up the arrival of help. The government of India has already set the ball rolling as far as punitive actions against Pakistan are concerned. As expected, Pakistan has followed suit. But the real test for Indian authorities lies in identifying, capturing or killing the terrorist involved and the kind of military action that it may take, at some point of time, to send a clear message to Pakistan's army. The government was quick to call an all-party meeting in the capital. More importantly, it accepted that there was an intelligence failure. The Prime Minister cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia and returned early, once again an action that sends a correct message to all concerned. However, the absence of the Prime Minister from the meeting did not go well with the opposition as also some right-thinking citizens. In a national emergency like situation, the PM should have chaired the meeting instead of addressing a rally in Bihar. The opposition's conduct in the aftermath of the attack has once again left a lot to be desired. Instead of standing with the government unequivocally, most are trying to score political brownie points. Many among them have not acknowledged the involvement of Pakistan and its army despite the government being very clear on it. Some have doubted the claims that only Hindus and non-Muslims were targeted despite many eye witness accounts confirming such selectivity including an eight-year-old child. This once again shows the insensitivity of many opposition leaders in such situations. Kashmir, which for long was the hotbed of terror, has seen a welcome change in the recent times. Local support for terror has reduced, but is still not completely stopped. Authorities should find ways and means to identify and destroy such remaining support. Meanwhile, it is also important that the government, both state and central, should continue to build credibility and confidence among the locals. In the end, there are no shortcuts in this fight against terror and no quick solutions either.
