06-05-2025
Hard Lines Vs. Soft Power: The transatlantic divide over Iraq's PMF
Shafaq News/ A new legislative proposal in Washington is raising concerns over its potential impact on US-Iraq relations, as nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran remain at a standstill.
Titled the ''Liberate Iraq from Iranian Influence Act,' the bill aims to condition future US military assistance to Iraq on the country's efforts to reduce the role of Iran-backed armed groups. Introduced by US lawmakers in 2024, the legislation would impose a set of binding benchmarks that Iraq must meet to continue receiving security aid.
Under the proposed measure, the US President would be required to regularly certify that Baghdad is taking tangible, verifiable actions to dismantle the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a coalition of mostly Shiite factions, some of which maintain close ties to Tehran.
The certification process would include evaluating Iraq's progress in reducing intelligence cooperation with groups aligned with Iran and in breaking up their military and financial networks. According to the US, the legislation does not target the Iraqi state as a whole but singles out armed factions perceived to operate beyond central government control.
The PMF's Ascent
However, these efforts to limit the influence of Iraq's PMF have faced criticism for neglecting the group's transformation from a wartime alliance to a key pillar of the state.
Established in 2014 to counter the ISIS threat, the PMF has since evolved into one of Iraq's most powerful military entities, with more than 150,000 fighters spread across over 60 factions. Though the PMF was formally integrated into the country's security framework following a parliamentary vote in 2016, it remains structurally complex. The group answers to the Prime Minister, who holds the title of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, yet many of its factions operate with considerable autonomy.
A 2025 report by the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) highlighted the PMF's expanding control over crucial economic sectors, including customs offices, border crossings, and logistics corridors. The revenues generated from these strategic positions have helped strengthen the group's financial base. As one senior Iraqi officer anonymously noted in the FDD report, the PMF is increasingly viewed as 'a state within a state.'
The PMF's presence is further institutionalized through Iraq's federal budget. The 2022 budget allocated approximately $2.1 billion to the PMF Commission, matching the funding of the Ministry of Interior. By the end of 2023, the Finance Ministry revealed that PMF salaries and benefits made up more than 15% of Iraq's total security spending.
This financial leverage has complemented the PMF's rising political influence. Factions such as the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hezbollah have firmly entrenched themselves within Iraq's political landscape. These groups hold significant positions within parliament, oversee ministries, and dominate local security bodies, particularly in provinces such as Basra, Dhi Qar, and Diyala. In these regions, the PMF functions both as a political force and as a provider of security.
Senior PMF figures now occupy prominent positions within Iraq's national landscape. Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri commands a large network of loyal forces and officials across Baghdad and southern Iraq. Qais al-Khazali of Asaib Ahl al-Haq and PMF commander Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi also exert substantial influence within parliament and the broader political scene, effectively combining military might with political leverage.
Hard Power vs. Soft Influence
The United States and the European Union remain broadly aligned in their deterrence for Iraq's PMF, yet their strategies for managing its influence reveal a growing transatlantic divide.
Washington continues to frame the PMF primarily through the lens of its broader strategic confrontation with Iran. Since 2017, the United States has imposed a series of sanctions on factions within the PMF, including Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. The US Treasury Department has blacklisted both groups due to their ties with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), which Washington designated as a foreign terrorist organization in 2019.
Alongside its hardline stance, the US remains one of Iraq's largest bilateral security donors. Between 2014 and 2023, Washington provided over $6.3 billion in security assistance, largely through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF), according to the US Congressional Research Service. In 2023 alone, Iraq received $158 million in military aid under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. This support, however, is not unconditional; US funding has increasingly been tied to benchmarks, particularly regarding the expansion of civilian control over Iraq's security sector, as highlighted by the State Department.
In 2024, lawmakers introduced the ''Liberate Iraq from Iranian Influence Act'', a bill seeking to make future military assistance contingent on the dismantling of Iran-linked PMF groups. The proposed legislation aims to 'strengthen Iraqi sovereignty' by pressuring Baghdad to remove factions affiliated with the IRGC from within its security institutions. However, critics warn that the bill underestimates the extent to which these groups have been woven into Iraq's state structure and political fabric.
A senior US defense official, speaking to Politico in early 2024, observed that 'While we cannot ignore the threat posed by Iran-backed groups, pushing Baghdad too hard may undermine our partnership and strengthen the very groups we are trying to contain.'
Despite the complex dynamics on the ground, the United States maintains a significant military footprint in Iraq. Roughly 2,500 US troops remain stationed in advisory and training roles under the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. However, the presence of Iran-aligned PMF factions has fueled escalating tensions. Since October 2023, US bases in Iraq and Syria have come under attack more than 170 times by rockets and drones, according to US Central Command (CENTCOM).
Nonetheless, the Trump administration has underscored its commitment to the Iraqi state. During his last visit to Baghdad, CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla reaffirmed Washington's intention to preserve a 'long-term security partnership' with Iraq. He cautioned, however, that 'Iranian proxies operating outside state control are a danger to that partnership.'
A Growing Transatlantic Contrast
In contrast to the United States' coercive strategy, the European Union has charted a markedly different course, one grounded in diplomacy, institution-building, and non-military engagement.
Between 2014 and 2023, the EU and its member states contributed over €2.2 billion in humanitarian, development, and stabilization aid to Iraq. Of that total, the European Commission alone provided more than €450 million through the EU Trust Fund and the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund).
Central to the EU's strategy is the reinforcement of Iraqi institutions and the rule of law. Launched in 2017, the European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM) works with Iraqi police and justice sector bodies to promote civilian oversight and enhance internal security.
Its 2023–2025 strategic plan outlines a clear objective: "supporting the integration of Iraq's various security actors under a single national command." While diplomatically phrased, this objective alludes to the need to reform and centralize PMF command structures without directly confronting them, a notable contrast to Washington's more forceful rhetoric.
Brussels has consistently avoided imposing unilateral sanctions on PMF-affiliated factions, instead prioritizing dialogue with both Baghdad and Tehran. In a 2022 address to the European Parliament, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell framed this preference for engagement within the broader vision of Iraqi sovereignty, stating that 'The integration of all armed groups into state structures, in line with constitutional principles, is essential for Iraq's long-term stability. But it must be pursued through Iraqi-led processes, not external impositions.'
This position was reaffirmed during a 2023 EU–Iraq Cooperation Council meeting, where the EU offered expanded assistance in several key areas, including border management, counter-terrorism efforts, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. The EU also reiterated its support for Iraq's unity and sovereignty, while continuing to steer clear of the military and geopolitical rivalry between the US and Iran.
That deliberate distance is part of what one senior EU diplomat in Baghdad, speaking anonymously to Der Spiegel in late 2023, described as 'pragmatic neutrality.' The official elaborated, 'We are not here to pick sides between Iran and the US. We are here to ensure Iraq does not collapse under the weight of its confrontation.'
However, the EU's softer approach has drawn criticism from rights groups and Iraqi civil society. Activists argue that Brussels has been too cautious in addressing abuses committed by PMF factions.
Meanwhile, EU-funded DDR programs have struggled to gain traction. Political obstruction by PMF-affiliated parties within the Iraqi parliament has slowed progress, limiting the EU's ability to transform its technical assistance into meaningful reform on the ground.
Is it Working, Though?
In its most recent paper, FDD claimed that the Iraqi government is working to legitimize Iran-aligned armed groups by formally integrating them into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and advancing legislation to secure their position within the state's security structure.
According to the report, the PMF has expanded by 20,000 personnel in recent months, bringing its total budget to $3.5 billion. This rapid growth, FDD noted, comes as Baghdad faces continued US pressure to disarm Iranian-backed groups and place all weapons under central government control.
Iraqi media reports suggest that the government is presenting this integration as a step toward full disarmament. However, FDD argued the move does not reflect a dismantling of these groups but rather their absorption into official security forces without any meaningful shift in allegiance or conduct.
While the government has not publicly rejected the principle of exclusive state control over weapons, FDD pointed out that actual policy remains far from this goal. Ammar al-Hakim, a senior leader in the Coordination Framework coalition, affirmed, 'All weapons must be exclusively held by the state.' Still, Iraqi officials continue to describe the PMF as a vital part of the country's security apparatus. In January, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani referred to the force as 'an essential force in the defense of Iraq.'
According to FDD, this reclassification does not alter the underlying loyalties of these groups. Instead, it provides them with a legal shield while allowing them to continue operations aligned with Iran's strategic agenda. 'State cover will enable these groups to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of their Iranian patron using government-funded and licensed weapons,' the report warned.
So far this year, two draft laws relating to the PMF have been submitted to parliament. One has been withdrawn, and the second remains stalled. Neither proposal has sought to restructure or reform the force. Instead, both are seen by FDD as attempts to entrench the PMF within Iraq's legal and institutional framework, making it more difficult for future governments to limit or dismantle its role.
In its final assessment, FDD concluded that Baghdad is not seeking to reform Iran-aligned armed networks. Rather, it is reinforcing Tehran's longstanding political and military influence in Iraq, an influence the report links to years of instability.
