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Dr Mahathir hints at final appearance at Nikkei forum after 30 years
Dr Mahathir hints at final appearance at Nikkei forum after 30 years

Sinar Daily

time4 days ago

  • Business
  • Sinar Daily

Dr Mahathir hints at final appearance at Nikkei forum after 30 years

After three decades of involvement, this could mark the end of an era for Dr Mahathir at the prestigious conference, which focused on Asia's economy, technology and future. By DANIAL HAKIM 03 Jun 2025 01:46pm Dr Mahathir also shared his views on global economic issues discussed at the event, including US President Donald Trump's tariff policies. - Photo source: Dr Mahathir Mohamad/FB TOKYO – Former prime minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad hinted that this might be his final participation in the Nikkei International Forum, which is currently holding its 30th edition in Tokyo. After three decades of involvement, this could mark the end of an era for Dr Mahathir at the prestigious conference, which focused on Asia's economy, technology and future. Dr Mahathir also shared his views on global economic issues discussed at the event, including US President Donald Trump's tariff policies. - Photo source: Dr Mahathir Mohamad/FB 'Over the past 30 years, I have only missed the forum three times due to health issues and Covid-19 restrictions. 'This might be my final participation. I truly appreciate the forum as it provides a valuable platform to share ideas and thoughts on Asia's future. I hope the Nikkei Forum continues to thrive," he said in a Facebook post on Saturday. Dr Mahathir also shared his views on global economic issues discussed at the event, including US President Donald Trump's tariff policies. 'Many have asked about the impact of Trump's tariffs. I expect that within three months, Trump will retract them after realising the adverse effects on the domestic market, where imported goods become more expensive. Eventually, he will have to reconsider imposing these tariffs. "In fact, electronic devices are already being exempted. 'Even the United States Supreme Court is challenging the President's authority to impose such tariffs," he added. The forum also revisited the Look East Policy, pioneered by Dr Mahathir, where he praised Japan's dedication to innovation and discipline. 'Japanese industries consistently conduct research on new products, including medical treatments. Their work culture is impressive,' he said. - AWANI

Why Northeast-Kolkata link via Myanmar — not Bangladesh — is significant
Why Northeast-Kolkata link via Myanmar — not Bangladesh — is significant

Indian Express

time17-05-2025

  • Business
  • Indian Express

Why Northeast-Kolkata link via Myanmar — not Bangladesh — is significant

Amid a downturn in India's relationship with Bangladesh, the long-delayed Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) linking Mizoram to Kolkata via Myanmar has grown in importance. The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) has now okayed a 166.8-km four-lane highway from Shillong to Silchar, which will eventually be extended to Zorinpui, Mizoram, and connect the KMMTTP with a high-speed road corridor that runs through the heart of the Northeast, The Indian Express reported. 'With the help of the Kaladan project, cargo will reach from Vizag and Kolkata to the Northeast, without being dependent on Bangladesh,' a senior official from National Highways & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (NHIDCL) told The Indian Express. Ties between New Delhi and Dhaka have taken a nosedive since the ouster of former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, an all-weather ally to India, last August. The MoRTH sanctioned the Shillong-Silchar highway about a month after Muhammad Yunus, the head of Bangladesh's interim government, called Northeast India 'landlocked', and referred to Bangladesh as the 'only guardian of the ocean' during a visit to China. For New Delhi, this was a matter of concern. Currently, rest of India's only access to the seven Northeastern states is through the narrow Siliguri Corridor, which goes by the apt moniker of 'Chicken's Neck'. Straddled between Nepal and Bangladesh, and only 20 km at its narrowest, this corridor has long posed an economic and a strategic challenge to New Delhi — one that has prompted some experts to call it 'an Achilles heel for India'. Over the last decade-and-a-half, an important element of New Delhi's engagement with the Hasina government in Dhaka was to open pathways to the Northeast via Bangladesh — as would have been the case pre-Partition. (Note that Agartala, the capital of Tripura, lies less than 200 km from the port of Chattogram in Bangladesh.) This, experts argue, would boost economic activity across the Northeast as well as in Bangladesh. But with a new, seemingly 'anti-India' dispensation in place in Dhaka, these plans have fallen by the wayside, prompting India to 'Look [further] East'. After feasibility studies were conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the KMMTTP framework was signed by India and Myanmar in 2008. This was set to be a major development in India's strategically vital Look East Policy. (Act East Policy under the Narendra Modi government). The idea behind the project was straightforward. To create a transit corridor from the port of Sittwe in the Rakhine State in Myanmar to Mizoram, and eventually the rest of Northeast India. This would allow goods to be shipped from India's easten ports — primarily Kolkata — to Sittwe and then taken to Mizoram and beyond. Upon completion, the KMMTTP would effectively shave off 1,000 km in distance between Kolkata and Mizoram, and save a journey time of three-to-four days. As former Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary Sripriya Ranganathan had said during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Myanmar in 2014: '[the KMMTTP is a] totally win-win kind of a project in which we get the access that we seek to ensure to our Northeast, while Myanmar gets an asset which it will be able to use and that will benefit the people of a fairly backward and under-developed [Rakhine] state'. As the term 'multi-modal' suggests, the project combines several modes of transport. * Kolkata to Sittwe: This 539 km stretch between the two seaports will be covered by ship via the Bay of Bengal. Although this route has technically been operational for decades, India has invested significant resources to upgrade the Sittwe port to increase its capacity. This part of the project has been completed. * Sittwe to Paletwa: This 158 km stretch on the Kaladan river in Myanmar will be covered by boat. The MEA has invested in dredging the river, and constructing requisite jetty facilities at Paletwa to handle 300-tonne barges. The river is navigable and all work has bee completed on this part of the project. *Paletwa to Zorinpui: This 108 km four-lane road will be the last leg of the corridor in Myanmar. Myanmar has granted all approvals for this part of the project, and the Integrated Customs & Immigration Checkpost at Zochawchhuah-Zorinpui has been operational since 2017. But the last 50-odd-km of this highway (from Kaletwa, Myanmar to Zorinpui) is yet to be completed. *Zorinpui to Aizwal & beyond: While Zorinpui is connected to Aizwal and the rest of the Northeast by road, the NHIDCL plans to eventually extend the high-speed corridor from Shillong all the way to the border town, The Indian Express reported. Behind long delay Although work on the KMMTTP began a decade and a half ago, the political situation in the Rakhine State has precluded the corridor from becoming operational. The project was set to be completed in 2016. Myanmar is among the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, while the Bamar/Burman make up more than 65% of the population, there are well over 100 ethnic minorities spread across the country. Since 1948, when it received independence from British rule, Myanmar's many ethnic minorities have been in armed conflict with the Bamar-dominated state (and often each other). This conflict once again picked up after a military coup in 2021 ousted the nominally civilian government that had been in place in Yangon for a decade. A BBC study published in December 2024 estimated that the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military) controls only 21% of territory, with the rest divided among a dozen or so warring ethnic militias. Much of the Rakhine State — through which the KMMTTP passes — is currently under control of the Arakan Army, now rebranded with the more-inclusive moniker Rakhine Army. To get the corridor operational, New Delhi will thus have to deal with an ethnic militia which Yangon has officially designated as a terrorist outfit. That, along with the fact that Rakhine State has seen some of the worst fighting in the civil war, has been a major stumbling block for the KMMTTP. In 2022, India inked a new contract with IRCON International Limited, a public sector undertaking of the Indian Railways. The terms of the deal require IRCON to sub-contract the construction of the incomplete sections of the highway, and finish the project within 40 months. One clause in the agreement, however, adds that this deadline can be extended for reasons including 'war, riots, [and] civil disorder'. While IRCON has signed up some local contractors, the project is yet to make a headway. Notably, the Arakan Army itself claims to support the construction of the highway. 'We have been providing security for the project along the Kaladan since 2021. There is no security threat for the project,' Khaing Thu Kha, spokesperson of the Arakan Army, told The Diplomat in 2024.

India-New Zealand ties scale new heights with Luxon visit
India-New Zealand ties scale new heights with Luxon visit

Times of Oman

time19-03-2025

  • Business
  • Times of Oman

India-New Zealand ties scale new heights with Luxon visit

New Delhi: Christopher Luxon, the prime minister of New Zealand, is visiting India from March 16-20 at the invitation of his counterpart, Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Timely as it is, the visit marks a pivotal moment in the evolving bilateral relationship between the two Indo-Pacific democracies. Historically underemphasized, Delhi-Wellington engagement is now gaining strategic and diplomatic prominence in economics and trade, diaspora, education, and, more importantly, the strategic front. Luxon's role as the chief guest at this year's Raisina Dialogue on March 17 – a high-profile Indian public forum on geopolitics and geoeconomics – signals New Zealand's intent to enhance its engagement with India on multiple diplomatic channels. A high-level delegation running the gamut from business and academia to media and diaspora figures is accompanying Luxon, signifying the importance he has attached to his India tour. For its part, India's Look East Policy in 1992 under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao has led to a series of enhanced ties with Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region. India became a dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1995, the Pacific Island Forum in 2002, and the East Asia Summit in 2005. New Zealand, likewise, has seen the potential of the vast Indian consumer market and has shown interest in boosting trade ties with India. Wellington also sees India as a safe bet to counter China's assertive rise in the Indo-Pacific region. One of the key focus areas of Luxon's visit is the potential signing of a free trade agreement (FTA), which could significantly transform bilateral trade relations. Currently, India-New Zealand trade is modest at US$2.83 billion, highlighting substantial untapped potential. New Zealand, whose foreign policy is driven by trade and security considerations, views India as a critical partner for diversifying its economic and trade linkages. Luxon's scheduled discussions with business leaders in Mumbai further emphasizes the intent to deepen economic engagement. However, long-standing challenges remain. The FTA negotiations, initiated in 2009, have faced repeated delays due to India's protective economic policies. India maintains high tariffs on agricultural and dairy products to safeguard domestic livelihoods and ensure food security, particularly for its rural population. While this protectionist stance aligns with India's broader developmental strategy, a phased liberalization could facilitate mutually beneficial trade expansion. India's evolving trade posture provides optimism. Recent FTAs with Australia (2023), the UAE (2022), and Mauritius (2021) demonstrate Delhi's willingness to engage in comprehensive economic agreements when strategic interests align. Furthermore, India is working on finalizing FTAs with the United Kingdom, the EU, and the United States. Given these precedents, it is plausible that New Zealand and India will eventually overcome trade negotiation hurdles, fostering a more integrated economic partnership. Beyond trade, the Indo-Pacific construct offers new avenues for collaboration between India and New Zealand. Historically, New Zealand's skepticism toward India – particularly concerning its nuclear policies – posed a diplomatic hurdle. However, India's consistent track record in arms control and disarmament has alleviated these concerns, paving the way for deeper strategic engagement. A key driver of this partnership is China's growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. New Zealand faces a critical foreign policy challenge in interpreting and responding to China's expanding strategic footprints in its immediate neighborhood. One recent example is China's signing of a Comprehensive Security Partnership with the Cook Islands, a territory in free association with New Zealand. The secrecy with which the agreement was signed, coupled with the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) recent unannounced live-fire drills armed with 'extremely capable' weapons near the Tasman Sea, underscored the urgent need for Wellington to recalibrate its regional strategy. Delhi is equally jittery about Beijing's strategic intentions. China's checkbook diplomacy, the secrecy of its Belt and Road Initiative investments (particularly in smaller countries), and its assertive and expanding military presence beyond its immediate areas are a cause of concern – not just in the Pacific but also in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean region. It is time regional stakeholders convened an honest exchange of thoughts on what kind of neighbor China should be and what kind of neighbor it has been. Luxon's visit to India at this juncture is particularly significant. India, as a major Indo-Pacific player and a key Quad member, is increasingly seen as a counterbalance to China's assertiveness. Strengthening ties with India allows New Zealand to diversify its diplomatic and security partnerships while reinforcing a rules-based regional order. Beyond trade negotiations and geopolitics, there are numerous domains where India and New Zealand can bolster bilateral cooperation. Climate change, clean energy, the blue economy, the higher education sector, and research on Pacific Island nations present promising opportunities. New Zealand's academic and scientific institutions could collaborate with Indian universities to advance studies on climate resilience and sustainable development in the Pacific. Such initiatives align with India's Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) and would strengthen its benign regional presence. Additionally, both nations can collaborate on cultural preservation initiatives for Pacific Island communities affected by climate-induced displacement. Luxon's visit represents a strategic recalibration in India-New Zealand relations. While trade discussions remain a key focus, the broader geopolitical and collaborative dimensions of the partnership should not be overlooked. In a rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific landscape, deeper India-New Zealand engagement could yield long-term economic and strategic dividends. By addressing economic barriers and leveraging complementary strengths, the two nations can forge a robust and multidimensional partnership that aligns with their respective national interests.

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