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Abujhmarh op shut Basavaraju chapter of Maoist insurgency. How homegrown DRG gave forces edge
For Chhattisgarh police, all moving parts fell into place to give way to the high-stakes anti-insurgency operation which was unlike any the state had witnessed. But none of it would've been possible without the off-field and on-the-field roles played by District Reserve Guard (DRG), which comprises to some extent Maoists who have returned to the mainstream.
On 21 May, security forces killed 27 Maoists including 12 women following two days of fierce exchange of gunfire. Among those killed was Basavaraju , who took over as general secretary in 2018 and carried a reward of at least Rs 3 crore.
New Delhi: Having spent weeks sifting through intelligence gathered by way of multiple sources and corroborated with the help of a vast network of human and technological assets, Narayanpur Superintendent of Police (SP) Prabhat Kumar and his team had a prized scalp in sight—Nambala Keshava Rao alias Basavaraju, the elusive general secretary of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist). Intelligence placed Basavaraju, 70, deep inside Abujhmarh, the dense forest spanning around 5,000 sq km between Narayanpur, Kanker, Bijapur, and Dantewada in Chhattisgarh's Bastar division.
Among these are former Maoists who brought to the table their knowledge about a special unit within the armed wing of CPI (Maoist) responsible for protecting the top leadership.
Formally created in 2015, DRG played a key role in collecting and verifying inputs on Basavaraju's movements, besides assisting security forces with tactical nuances during the operation. Bastar Range Inspector General of Police (IG) Sundarraj Pattilingam told ThePrint that the DRG has 'turned out to be the primary strike force against the Maoists'.
IG Sundarraj explained that DRG personnel are locally recruitedt and the specialised force gives boys and girls from interiors and remote parts of Bastar an opportunity to 'protect their land and people'. He added that their knowledge about 'the hilly and jungle terrain, tribal languages, local customs, etc., is proving to be a game changer in the anti-Naxal operational front'.
Though DRG was instrumental in neutralising hundreds of Maoist cadres, he said, the operation which resulted in the elimination of Basavaraju is the 'ultimate achievement'. The IPS officer added that more than 2,000 DRG jawans are deployed in Left Wing Extremism-affected districts in Bastar.
Still recovering from a foot fracture, Yogesh Madvi has only one complaint about the latest counter-insurgency operation—that he couldn't be part of it. A former Maoist who surrendered arms more than a decade ago, Madvi hails from Chintalnar village that saw the deadliest attack by Maoists on security forces, in April 2010, in which 74 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans and two Chhattisgarh police personnel were killed.
Madvi, now 49, was with CPI (Maoist) for 14 years until 2012 and was also a part of the banned outfit's organisational wing. He joined DRG in 2014.
On how Maoism came into his life, he told ThePrint, 'I joined the party in 1988 when they were popular in our villages, and they talked about forests, land, and water—the three most important components for tribals like us. But in my experience of more than a decade, they are ridden by sycophancy and factionalism and have no alternative vision for the common people.'
Madvi said he never met top leaders including Basavaraju, 'nor could I meet my ailing parents who died in my absence'. Madvi's father died in 2014, and his mother in 2020 but he could not see either of them for fear of villagers informing on him to the Maoists. 'My mother came to meet me in hiding, but she was threatened and harassed by the party. My brother was threatened not to lodge a police complaint,' he said.
Former Maoists like Madvi account for nearly 15-20 percent of DRG, which primarily comprises individuals locally recruited by the state police three years ago to join another specialised unit, the Bastar Fighters.
'In addition to these categories, troops are handpicked from the district after their induction into the force based on their promises and potential. They are our best men for the job,' said a senior state police officer who did not wish to be named.
Among the top brass of the state police, there is little room for doubt when it comes to the key role surrendered Maoist cadres play in ensuring the success of counter-insurgency operations like the one that resulted in Basavaraju's elimination earlier this month.
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Company No. 7 & how op unfolded
As the banned outfit's general secretary, Basavaraju was entitled to heavy security cover overseen by Company No. 7 of the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), armed wing of the CPI (Maoist).
A senior police officer privy to operational planning revealed that 'surrendered cadres who had previously worked in PLGA Company No. 7 were the crucial difference this time between a successful operation and just another failed attempt' to neutralise Basavaraju.
'They played a key role in the planning and execution stages of the operation since they knew how to operate in the area where PLGA Company No. 7 operates. They knew the tactical nuances of Company No. 7 as well as their escape tactics,' the officer added.
The three-day operation was launched after the go-ahead from the top brass on the afternoon of 18 May. Troops began their journey on foot from three directions—Dantewada, Narayanpur, and Dantewada inside Abujhmarh—that same night. They covered 36 km that night in order to take positions around pre-decided areas in time as planned.
The operational task, though, was not as straightforward.
After exchange of gunfire on 19 and 20 May, there was some apprehension that Basavaraju may have escaped. But security forces relied on real-time information sharing among ground commanders and senior officers to stay put. 'Basavaraju and his security apparatus got scattered from other cadres in the area after frequent exchange of fire on the first two days. At the start of operation, forces focus on spreading their area of dominance to avoid incidents of ambush. This scattering of forces in a large dense forest area allowed them to escape troops on the first two days,' a second senior police officer explained.
But this time troops on the ground were prepared not to give Basavaraju and his aides any opportunity to escape which is why possible escape routes were plugged by DRG teams from Bijapur and Dantewada.
The plan, a third police officer added, was to move the troops west of the primary spot. 'However, troops on the ground relayed that there was a high probability of the Maoists' movement in the eastern direction. Considering their unmatched records of reading operational situations correctly, the senior officers pressed ahead with their inputs.'
Around 7 am on the morning of 21 May, a sentry part of Basavaraju's security spotted a DRG jawan and opened fire. The jawan identified as Khotluram Korram (38), from Bhatbeda village in Narayanpur's Orcha, was the only casualty security forces suffered in exchange of gunfire with Maoists during this operation.
But this turned out to be the precipitating factor that alerted all troops, leading to the final exchange of gunfire in which 27 Maoists, including Basavaraju, were killed.
The critical task of identifying the CPI (Maoist) general secretary too fell on a former Maoist who was with Company No. 7.
'It was the culmination of solid intelligence networks of DRG jawans, years of knowledge of surrendered cadres and their ability to pre-empt tactics of PLGA Company No. 7 that produced this historic result for the state,' a fourth police officer underlined.
Additionally, a fifth police officer emphasised the effect surrendered cadres have on direct and new recruits. 'They bring with them the experience that they are not as strong as they used to be a decade or two ago. These cadres come with the understanding that they're no match for the sophisticated weapons and modern intel gathering apparatus DRG jawans are equipped with. Their understanding of Maoists' limitations rubs off on other jawans in the operations team as a confidence-building measure.'
DRGs 'not prisoners of linear thinking'
For Inspector Mukesh Tati (41), every counter-insurgency operation DRG executes is the culmination of a well-established procedure. Tati, who joined DRG six years after joining the state police force in 2008, has been part of several such operations.
Hailing from Konta in Sukma district, he joined the specialised force despite knowing his decision could expose his parents to the Maoist threat. 'What works for them can also work for us. We are from the same villages they are. We were born and brought up in the same jungles and terrains as them and went on to dominate. The tide is now turning, for good.'
Currently posted in Dantewada, which is no longer a district of concern as far as Left Wing Extremism is concerned, Tati has enrolled all three of his children into a local school.
According to Dantewada SP Gaurav Rai, there is 'no match' for DRG jawans like Tati in terms of 'awareness of the area and superiority in operations'.
'Moreover, they have not come with any baggage of failure or botched operations. Precise operations, which have been very successful, only boosted their morale,' he added.
Bijapur SP Jitendra Kumar Yadav said DRG jawans are the elite among Chhattisgarh police for their familiarity with local languages, terrains as well as their fearless approach.
Another senior police officer outlined that DRG jawans 'are not deployed in law and order duties like other units; this demarcated mandate has kept them ready to go for cumbersome operations, in remote areas of Bastar'.
'By the work they put in during operations, there is a misperception that DRG is only a force that carries out operations. Contrary to that, DRG troops spend more time with laptops, scanning coordinates on Google Maps and other technologies than they operate with guns,' said Narayanpur SP Prabhat Kumar, who, along with Additional SP (Operations) Robinson Guria, forged the initial plan for the massive three-day operation.
He added that DRG jawans have trounced preconceived notions. 'They have proved that Abujhmarh is unsafe even for their topmost leaders, let alone lower-level ones. Instead of coming to Abujhmarh for safety, they are now fleeing Abujhmarh.'
According to him, recent successes in counter-insurgency operations can also be attributed to the move away from the 'linear thinking' strategy that Left Wing Extremism can only be dealt with through incremental improvements in social indicators and results over time. 'The pre-established approach of freeing one area after another starts from the nearer area, moves deeper, starts acting on junior cadres, and then targets higher cadres. The DRGs are not prisoners of this linear thinking,' he told ThePrint.
(Edited by Amrtansh Arora)
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